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This thesis contributes to debates in Evolutionary Economic Geography (EEG) by providing a 
better understanding of how processes of adaptation and diversification unfold to support 
new economic growth paths. To date, EEG research has focused upon conventional 
economic geography research objects and actors, such as firms, industries or networks. Less 
attention has been focused upon the evolving roles of infrastructural asset bases in 
supporting and driving new growth paths. In response, this thesis aims to better understand 
the causal processes through which ports, and their infrastructural assets, have been 
adapted and diversified to capture growth in the burgeoning offshore wind industry.  
 
The research seeks to complement and extend existing studies of port adaptation and 
diversification within the transport geography research, by developing a more evolutionary 
approach, capturing how existing infrastructural assets, the agency of key actors and 
broader political-economic contexts influence processes of port adaptation and 
diversification through key episodes of change. At the same time, the thesis responds to calls 
within EEG for more international comparative analysis by exploring the variations between 
national institutional environments, infrastructural asset bases, port governance models and 
the corporate strategies and investment from offshore wind firms.  
 
The research provides a comparative analysis of adaptation and diversification across the 
cases of the ‘Humber Ports’ (Port of Hull and Port of Grimsby, UK) and the ‘Port of Cuxhaven’ 
(Germany). The thesis reveals the critical role played by national policy contexts in 
establishing a buoyant offshore wind market environment to stimulate investment from port 
authorities, sub-national government agencies and offshore wind firms, and so enable the 
port adaptation process. However, even within these broader enabling environments, 
important variations exist in the vision and agency of port authorities in developing and 
delivering strategies for adaptation. Of critical importance, are the ways in which different 
models of ownership and governance within ports influence and mediate the scale, scope 
and character of strategic investment opportunities. Lastly, the research also reveals the 
important variations in the roles and positions of ports within the broader external 
governance of territorial development. The ability of ports to operate within a broader 
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coalition of actors supporting adaptation and diversification, strongly influences the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 “As by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every sort of industry 
than what land-carriage alone afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, and along the banks of 
navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve 
itself…” (Adam Smith, 1776, pp30). 
 
1.1 Port adaptation and diversification 
 
Ports have existed for thousands of years and are important gateways for the movement of 
goods and people between the marine and land environments, whilst existing as “obvious 
sites for industry” to embed and support the development of associated localities (Alderton, 
2008, pp4; Hall & Jacobs, 2012). Ports have been traditionally viewed by many in industry, 
government and academia as being critical for industrial expansion and a catalyst for the 
socio-economic growth of localities directly adjacent and closely connected to them 
(Alderton, 2008; Bottasso et al, 2014; Hall & Jacobs, 2012).  
 
Ports have the potential to be key assets for driving economic change through adapting and 
diversifying into new and emerging markets (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010). In the post-war period this has occurred through different rounds of 
adaptation and diversification, which has enabled ports to capitalise on opportunities in new 
markets and growth of emerging sectors such as oil and gas, subsea engineering and 
container handling (Notteboom, 2016; Martin & Sunley, 2006; Pike et al, 2010).  
 
To understand how ports adapt and diversify, existing research in port studies and transport 
geography provides insights into how national and sub-national policy arrangements and the 
governance of port authorities influence port adaptation and diversification into new 
markets (see Notteboom, 2016; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; 
Debrie et al, 2013; Verhoeven, 2010). Essentially, this literature illustrates how ports have 
distinctive ownership contexts, governance models and practices, which vary depending 
upon the national political economic context they’re operating in, with fluctuating levels of 
government ownership and intervention (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; 
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World Bank, 2016). As such, these variations of national policy arrangements and port 
governance models, means port authorities and associated sub-national government 
institutions have differing abilities and capacities to shape port adaptation and 
diversification (Verhoeven, 2010; Debrie et al, 2013; Notteboom, 2016). Although the 
research in port studies and transport geography considers port adaptation and 
diversification by investigating national policy and port governance arrangements 
(Notteboom, 2016; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Jacobs & Lagendijk, 2014), it is quite 
narrow in its qualitative and conceptual understanding of what actually causes port 
adaptation and diversification to occur and unfold in an evolutionary manner (Martin, 2010; 
Martin & Sunley, 2006; Pike et al, 2016a). 
 
The first limitation of existing research on port adaptation and diversification is that it is 
overly focused upon empirically analysing the internal context of port authorities to 
understand how ports have diversified into markets such as container-handling (Notteboom, 
2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011), meaning a more qualitative and deeper conceptual 
understanding of how external factors, influences and conditions shape port adaptation and 
diversification is required (Martin, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006). Secondly, existing studies 
need to consider port adaptation and diversification as a more evolutionary process, shaped 
and driven by key episodes or moments of change (Martin, 2010; MacKinnon et al, 2019; 
Dawley et al, 2019). Thirdly, there needs to be greater consideration given to how port 
authorities are situated in particular localities and interact with distinctive sets of regional 
actors including local government institutions and firms, to enable port adaptation and 
diversification (Notteboom, 2016; Dawley et al, 2019). Fourthly, the existing literature 
largely overlooks how ports shape and drive broader regional economic development and 
industrial growth (Notteboom, 2016, Martin, 2010). As a result of these limitations in the 
empirical studies and understandings of port adaptation and diversification, the thesis must 
look beyond the existing set of port literature and explore and utilise concepts in the field of 
EEG.  
 
1.2 Significance of Evolutionary Economic Geography (EEG) to ports 
 
EEG provides an alternative lens for researching ports and its relations to broader regional 
economic development, whilst allowing for a more advanced comprehension of adaptation 
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and diversification processes (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016). 
Several scholars in EEG perceive evolutionary paths as open systems of change and as a 
process, forming a continually interactive system of path dependence, path creation and 
path destruction (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Boschma & Martin, 2007; Martin, 2010). The 
notion of evolutionary paths changing through different stages as a process is important for 
considering how the adaptation of ports influences the evolution of broader regional paths 
(Boschma & Martin, 2007; Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2010).  
 
Adaptation is a key concept in within EEG to explain regional economic evolution and 
change. Adaptation is the renewal of a previously dynamic and successful development path 
(Pike et al, 2010). Moreover, adaptation is the outcome of an episodic process of alteration, 
allowing regions to respond and manage changes in extra-regional contexts, requiring a 
reorientation to extra-regional political-economic contexts (Evenhuis, 2016; Martin, 2012). 
Adaptation is characterised by a process involving interconnected social agents absorbing 
and responding to exogenous shocks, which shapes a new shift towards a regional 
evolutionary path (Pike et al, 2010; Evenhuis, 2016). The concept of adaptation as perceived 
in EEG provides a new way of conceptualising and understanding port adaptation, by 
considering how port authorities and regional actors respond to challenges and changes in 
broader political-economic contexts, and subsequently adapt a port’s existing path of 
development (MacKinnon, 2017; Notteboom, 2016). Given their theoretical overlaps, the 
thesis will utilise and apply adaptation in coordination with the concepts of adaptability and 
adaptive capacity (Pike et al, 2010; Evenhuis, 2016). Adaptability is underlying ability of 
socio-economic agents to be adaptive and focuses upon the competence of agents to 
respond to potentially damaging future events within a region (Pike et al, 2010; Dawley et al, 
2010). Adaptive capacity is the ability of economic entities to be adaptable and facilitate 
economic adaptation (Pike et al, 2010; Dawley et al, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2015b). 
 
Diversification is another key concept in EEG used to better understand how firms increase a 
greater variety of industries within a regional economy, enabling regions to adapt and 
change over time (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Boschma & Frenken, 2006; Boschma & Martin, 
2007). Diversification considers the harnessing and valorising of endogenous territorial 
assets (infrastructural, material, natural, industrial and human) from existing industries, as 
key in catalysing new regional paths (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). By 
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more closely considering the infrastructural and material assets of ports, diversification can 
provide a deeper insight into how ports actually diversify their infrastructural assets to 
capture new markets (Martin, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006). The conceptual relationship 
between diversification and adaptation is critical to highlight given its importance to the 
research and comparative analysis. The thesis recognises that diversification is one of the 
processes of long-term adaptation (see Martin & Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 
2010). The thesis sees port adaptation as an overarching process of long—term change and 
sits at a higher level of abstraction than port diversification throughout the thesis (Evenhuis, 
2016; MacKinnon). Port adaptation is based upon the harnessing and valorising of existing 
assets and influenced by key actors, agency and changing institutional environments 
(Evenhuis, 2016; MacKinnon, 2017; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Martin, 2010). The research 
perceives port diversification as one process of port adaptation and sits at a lower level of 
abstraction than port adaptation in the thesis, which involves the port moving beyond 
existing market activities and capturing new opportunities in a new port market (see Martin 
& Sunley, 2006; Notteboom, 2016).  
 
This thesis will provide a new angle on the processes of port adaptation and diversification 
by making the argument that path creation has the potential to emerge as an outcome of 
port adaptation and diversification (Notteboom, 2016; Hassink et al, 2019; Trippl, 2019; 
MacKinnon et al, 2018; Martin, 2010). In doing the thesis hopes to contribute to work on 
path creation in EEG which refers to the emergence of industries, technologies and 
economic activities which create new regional economic paths (Martin & Sunley, 2006; 
Martin, 2010; Isaksen, 2015).  
 
Whilst the concepts of adaptation, diversification and path creation in EEG provide a new 
opportunity to explore how ports adapt and diversify in a more comprehensive and 
advanced way, the study of ports can also provide new empirical and analytical perspective 
into how processes of adaptation, diversification and path creation are operationalised 
(MacKinnon et al, 2019; Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006). Firstly, ports 
are important and strategic asset bases which have previously been overlooked in driving 
regional economic transformation and in processes of path creation (Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Secondly, ports provide a new and dynamic 
vehicle for applying, extending and deepening concepts in EEG, which have been primarily 
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utilised as important lenses for analysing firms and technologies in the context of particular 
industries, sectors and clusters (Pike et al, 2016a; MacKinnon et al, 2009).  
 
1.3 Ports and Offshore Wind  
 
Port adaptation and diversification occur through different rounds of activity, including oil 
and gas, subsea engineering and container handling (Notteboom, 2016). Offshore wind 
provides the most recent and critical case of port adaptation and diversification into an 
emerging market. Offshore wind has been explored in EEG as an empirical case and its role 
in shaping regional path creation and development (Dawley, 2014; MacKinnon et al, 2018; 
Dawley et al, 2019; Fornahl et al, 2012). However, existing studies in EEG which investigate 
the case of offshore wind have tended to overlook the ways in which port assets can be 
harnessed and diversified to capture opportunities in this emerging sector (Notteboom, 
2017; Dawley, 2014). “The offshore wind industry, in particular, is inextricably linked to 
ports, as the construction, installation and maintenance of offshore wind farms requires 
dedicated portside infrastructure and expertise” (IPPR North 2016, pp22).  
 
Informed by concepts of adaptation, diversification and path creation in EEG, offshore wind 
has emerged as a new and dynamic case for exploring port adaptation and diversification in 
a new context (Martin, 2010; Dawley et al, 2019; Notteboom, 2016). Ports serve as an 
important infrastructural base for operationalising the offshore wind industry and are 
valuable economic entities in stimulating new regional economic development through 
supporting the offshore wind industry, which is emerging as an dynamic industry by 
continually fostering new employment, supply chain and inward investment opportunities 
(IPPR North, 2016; Renewable UK, 2017a; Wind Europe. 2017a; Dawley, 2014). Therefore, 
ports are being increasingly perceived by national and sub-national government actors as 
being vital economic entities to be considered with greater importance in regard to being 
harnessed and revalorised to support offshore wind activities, as there is existing evidence 
and examples of ports catalysing and supporting regional economic growth around offshore 
wind (IPPR North, 2016; DfT, 2019; Wind Europe. 2017a; Dawley et al, 2019). 
 
Port authorities, therefore, are becoming increasingly important actors in shaping how 
critical port infrastructures can potentially  adapt and support the emergence of offshore 
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wind (IPPR North, 2016; DfT, 2019). To explore this element of port adaptation and 
diversification in greater depth, the thesis will utilise EEG to explore a range of factors and 
drivers influencing the decision-making of port authorities, including the role of intra and 
extra regional actors, the existing port asset base and broader institutional environments 
(Martin, 2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Notteboom, 2016). 
 
Sub-national government agencies across various countries are becoming involved in 
harnessing and valorising port infrastructure to catalyse port adaptation and diversification 
into offshore wind, alleviate economic decline and create new regional paths (IPPR North, 
2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Dawley, 2014; Martin, 2010). However, the extent to which 
decision-making and spending powers, legitimate political authority are decentralised, 
strongly mediates the capacity of sub-national government agencies to support port 
adaptation and diversification around offshore wind (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003; Ćetković 
et al, 2016; Martin, 2010). The strong inter-relation to sub-national economic policy and 
strategies means that it is critical to study port adaptation and diversification in the context 
of regional economic development (IPPR North, 2016; Humber LEP, 2016; DfT, 2019). 
Therefore, the research undertaken in this thesis will look to offer insights that may  to 
inform the decision-making and future strategies of port authorities and local and regional 
government agencies, with regard to supporting port diversification into offshore wind and 
enable new regional economic development. This is particularly pertinent to the Humber 
Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) as the project’s collaborative partner, who supported this 
three-year research project funded by the ESRC (Economic Social Research Council).  
 
1.4 The Thesis 
 
The research will aim to make key empirical, theoretical and methodological contributions to 
EEG and existing research on port diversification and governance. The overall aim of the 
thesis is to better understand and assess processes of port adaptation and diversification. 
This aim will be explored answering the following research questions:  
 
1. What forms of port diversification have been developed by port authorities and 
associated local institutions?  
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2. In what ways do port ownership and governance models shape a port’s capacity to 
adapt? 
3. How do multiscalar institutional environments enable and/or constrain port 
adaptation? 
 
The thesis investigates and conducts an international comparative analysis of two port case 
studies, the Humber Ports case (consisting of the Port of Hull and Port of Grimsby in the UK), 
and the Port of Cuxhaven case in Germany. As such, the research aims to answer calls in 
economic geography and EEG to conduct more rigorous international comparative work 
across different geographical settings, whilst examining causal mechanisms, agents, 
structured relations and multiscalar networks (Pike et al, 2016a; Evenhuis, 2016). In terms of 
research methods, the research will obtain primary data by conducting a range of semi-
structured interviews in the UK and Germany, which will be subsequently coded and 
analysed to identify key themes relating to the research questions. The collection and 
analysis of the primary data and international comparative analysis will be supplemented by 
a range of primary and secondary data sources, in the form of academic publications, 
government reports, industrial strategies, corporate documents, policy documents, planning 
reports and news articles.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
 
Chapter 2 reviews EEG as a theoretical framework and explains the relevance of several 
related concepts and ideas in EEG, including adaptation, diversification and path creation, 
with the aim of better understanding the process of port adaptation and diversification. The 
chapter subsequently explores the role of institutions and port ownership and governance, 
explaining their importance for investigating port adaptation and diversification. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by arguing the most important concepts drawn from EEG and institutional 
economic geography for understanding port adaptation and diversification, and then 
provides an analytical framework for clarifying and investigating the process of port 
adaptation and diversification. The central contribution of the chapter is the provision of a 
better understanding of how key arguments in EEG and institutional economic geography 




Chapter 3 outlines and justifies the methodology for undertaking a comparative analysis of 
the two case studies, the Humber Ports case (Port of Hull and Port of Grimsby) and the Port 
of Cuxhaven case. Essentially, the chapter argues for a robust, international comparative 
analysis of evolutionary port cases on multiple scales, in order to operationalise and develop 
key research ideas and methods within EEG (Pike et al, 2016a). The chapter begins by 
outlining the thesis’ ontological and epistemological positioning, and subsequently discusses 
the multiple case approach, case selection criteria, empirical focus of the cases and outlines 
the port cases themselves. Chapter 3 also includes discussions on the selected research 
methods to obtain relevant primary and secondary data, and the subsequent data analysis 
process. 
 
Chapter 4 provides an overarching understanding of how ports and the offshore wind 
industry have evolved and how they are becoming increasingly interdependent, thus 
establishing a strong contextual foundation for more clearly understanding the adaptation of 
the port cases over time. Chapter 4 begins by explaining the evolution of ports across global 
and European context and then drills down to discuss the national contexts of the port case 
studies. The chapter focuses upon the explaining the evolution of UK and German ports 
sector. As this thesis also focuses heavily upon the offshore wind sector, Chapter 4 outlines 
the evolution of offshore wind globally and in a European context. Chapter 4 explains how 
the UK offshore wind market was created and then outlines how the UK offshore wind 
industry has emerged and its subsequent evolution. The chapter does the same for the 
German context, explaining how the German offshore wind was created and then outlining 
the German offshore wind industry has developed and evolved. Subsequently, the chapter 
summaries and contextualise the project case studies, the Humber Ports case and the Port 
of Cuxhaven case. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 then move onto the empirical analysis of the case studies and deliver an 
important contribution to the thesis by underlining and drawing out the most important 
findings within the overall evolution and adaptation of the port cases, thus providing a rich 
empirical platform for more deeply analysing the main conceptual themes in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 5 will provide an empirical analysis of the Port of Cuxhaven’s diversification into 
offshore wind. Chapter 5 is structured by four key episodes of adaptation which shaped and 
influenced the Port of Cuxhaven’s diversification into offshore wind. These episodes are 
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‘Preformation and planning: 2003-2005’, ‘Emergence and growth: 2006-2012’, ‘Uncertainty 
and disinvestment: 2011-2014’ and ‘Revival and expansion: 2014 onwards’. The chapter will 
then provide a conclusion for Chapter 5, discussing the most important findings in relation to 
the project’s research questions. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses the Humber Ports’ diversification into offshore wind. Chapter 6 is 
structured by three key episodes of adaptation which shaped and influenced the Humber 
Ports’ diversification offshore into wind. The episodes are ‘Path origins and growth: 2006-
2011’, ‘Disruptions and divergent sub-regional paths: 2011-2013’ and ‘Path realisation: 2013 
onwards’. In similarly to Chapter 5, Chapter 6 will conclude with the most significant findings 
in relation to the project’s research questions. 
 
Chapter 7 delivers a comparative perspective, critically analysing how the port case studies 
have been shaped by the processes of adaptation, diversification and path creation in 
distinctive ways, drawing upon the most important findings and themes from Chapters 5 and 
6. Essentially, Chapter 7 directly contributes to the thesis and wider literature base by 
uncovering a deeper understanding of port adaptation and diversification by comparatively 
analysing rich empirical data, whilst interweaving the key theoretical ideas from the fields of 
EEG, institutional economic geography and port studies emerging from Chapter 2. More 
specifically, Chapter 7 uses analytical lenses connected to the analytical framework included 
in Chapter 2 to compare the empirical analysis, including the national institutional and 
market environments, port visions and strategies, infrastructural and material asset bases, 
port governance models and investment approaches, corporate strategies of offshore wind 
firms and inward investment, and regional path outcomes.  
 
Chapter 8 provides a range of conclusions to the thesis and overall research process, 
underlining which port case better adapted and diversified to support the offshore wind 
industry and wider regional path, whilst drawing together the main empirically informed 
conceptual contributions of the thesis.  The chapter will begin by outlining contributions as a 
result of conducting an international comparative analysis of port adaptation and 
diversification into offshore wind. The contributions of Chapter 8 include the unpacking and 
defining of how port adaptation is operationalised, identifying the ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’ and 
‘why’ factors underpinning port adaptation, the recognition and analysis of key causal 
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episodes underpinning port adaptation, and the roles of strategic port visions, agency, port 
governance models and the institutional environment in shaping port adaptation. Drawing 
upon the contributions and main empirical findings, the chapter will provide some 
recommendations to port authorities and government organisations for enabling port 
diversification and new regional growth paths. Then the chapter will consider the potential 



























Chapter 2 Literature Review: providing a new analytical lens for 
understanding port adaptation 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The chapter will inform three interconnected research questions, aiming to analyse the 
adaptation of two port sites. To provide a strong theoretical platform for an improved 
understanding of the port adaptation and diversification process, the first two-thirds of the 
chapter introduces Evolutionary Economic Geography (EEG) as the overarching theoretical 
framework and explores the position of institutions in EEG. This part of the chapter focuses 
upon important theoretical debates around regional path creation, adaptation and 
diversification, whilst interweaving the relevance of EEG concepts and institutions in 
examining port adaptation, as the key focus of study. The final third of the chapter 
concentrates more directly on how the consideration of EEG, institutions and governance, 
can enable an enhanced understanding of the port adaptation and diversification process 
around a new regional sector, which is highlighted by the analytical framework. The chapter 
is structured by area of literature to provide the reader with a deep understanding of the 
broader discussions and interrelation between path creation, adaptation, diversification and 
institutions, before moving onto directly explaining how they can support a greater 
comprehension of how port adaptation and diversification unfolds. 
 
EEG provides a theoretical framework for analysing and discussing adaptation, change and 
regional economic evolution (Pike et al, 2017; Grabher, 2009). The thesis will draw upon the 
EEG framework to examine how port authorities and associated local institutions harness 
infrastructural and material assets to catalyse the adaptation of ports, and ultimately 
influence a new regional path (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999). Secondly, literature examining the role of institutions and governance in adaptation 
and regional industrial change is important for investigating how institutions on multiple 
scales, alongside market and industrial policy environments, shape how the process of port 
adaptation and diversification occurs (Martin, 2010; 2000; Gertler, 2010). In close 
connection to discussions of institutions in EEG, it is important to consider how the 
governance and ownership of ports shapes the capacity of port authorities and associated 
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institutions to actively influence the port adaptation and diversification process (Verhoeven, 
2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016).  
 
2.2 Evolutionary Economic Geography (EEG) 
 
EEG has gained prominence over the last decade through the formulation of concepts such 
as path creation, diversification, branching, adaptation, adaptability and adaptive capacity 
(Martin & Sunley, 2006; Pike et al, 2010; Martin, 2010). The discussion will draw upon 
adaptation, diversification and path creation currently applied to the local and regional scale 
and begin to extend the analytical lens to ports as key sites of adaptation and diversification, 
and in connection to port authorities as important actors in shaping regional path creation 
and development. 
 
Path as a process 
 
Certain principles make up EEG to explain how regions and localities (referred to as regions 
hereafter) unfold and change over time. These include the existence of variety in regions 
shaping industrial change, the historical continuance or change of regional settings, 
characteristics and assets, and the uneven capacity of regions or entities to select pathways 
to adapt, survive and prosper (Boschma & Martin, 2007; Martin & Sunley, 2006; Dawley, 
2014). The EEG theoretical framework has continuously advocated that ‘history matters’ 
when analysing economic change of places, institutions and actors (Martin & Sunley, 2006; 
MacKinnon, 2008). The concept of path dependence conveys this message through its main 
principles. Path dependence argues that past events, processes and paths in regional 
economies shape their future trajectories (Pike et al, 2017; Martin & Sunley, 2006). 
However, path dependence has been argued to be theoretically limited, emphasising 
regional evolutionary paths to be irreversible and pre-determined by history, alongside 
overlooking entrepreneurial novelty and socio-institutional agency of various regional actors 
(Garud & Karnoe, 2001; Martin & Sunley, 2006; Dawley, 2014). More recently, scholars have 
argued that regional evolutionary paths should be viewed as ‘open’ systems and evolve as a 
process, forming a constantly interactive system comprising of path dependence, path 
creation and eventual path destruction (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Boschma & Martin, 2007; 
Martin, 2010). The ‘path as a process’ perspective in EEG provides a potentially more 
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advanced and comprehensive way of understanding how ports adapt and diversify over time 
(Martin & Sunley, 2006; Boschma & Martin, 2007; Martin, 2010). 
 
The historical evolution and ‘lock-in’ of regional assets, institutions, firms, infrastructure, 
industries, technologies and relations forms a unique regional environment, which in-turn 
can enable or constrain the capacity of economic actors located within a region to create 
future paths of growth (Essletzbichler, 2012; Martin, 2010). The initial period of historical 
economic evolution typically generates a growing industrial pathway, formed by positive 
externalities and increasing returns, known as ‘positive lock-in’ (Martin & Sunley, 2006). 
Eventually, a region’s economy becomes dependent upon and locked-in to a particular 
sector, leading to increasing industrial rigidity because of inflexible industrial specialisation, 
thus undermining the region’s adaptability, competitiveness and performance leading to 
decreasing returns and negative externalities known as ‘negative lock-in’ (Martin & Sunley, 
2006; Arthur, 1989).  The path dependent process of regional ‘lock-in’ was illustrated by 
Grabher (1993) through his discussion of the once prosperous coal, iron and steel complex in 
the industrial Ruhr region in West Germany. The Ruhr region fell victim to rigid industrial 
specialisation causing negative lock-in, which was framed through three specific dimensions 
of lock-in: ‘functional’ (industrial economic relations), ‘cognitive’ (specific ‘world view’) and 
‘political’ (industry and state vested interests) (Grabher, 1993; Pike et al, 2017). These 
dimensions of lock-in severely constrained adaptation as a mechanism for ‘escaping’ 
negative lock-in (Martin, 2010). Therefore, adaptation will be analysed in greater depth to 
better understand how adaptation, as a key concept in EEG, can be utilised to investigate 
how may ports evolve and escape negative lock-in (Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2010). 
 
Isaksen (2015) presents four evolutionary processes in EEG which are forms of adaptation, 
indicating how regions can adapt and evolve: path extension, path exhaustion, path renewal 
and path creation itself. Firstly, path extension is the gradual reproduction of existing 
economic trajectories within regions, acting as a mechanism for path creation and 
development. Regional actors carry out incremental technological innovations causing 
regional industries to continuously prevail and reinforce regional resilience (Hassink, 2010). 
If constant innovation and continuous resilience fails to materialise, a region may face the 
prospect of path exhaustion caused by technological stagnation and industrial decline 
(Hassink, 2010). Path exhaustion hypothetically mirrors regional lock-in and processes of 
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path dependence (Martin & Sunley, 2006). By contrast, path renewal is closely connected to 
diversification and the notion of change, thus contrasting path extension’s focus upon 
regional path continuation. The process of path renewal is primarily industry driven through 
existing firms opting to diversify into new but related industries, alongside the establishment 
of new firms in a region, thus creating broader regional “industrial specialisation and 
competence” (Isaksen, 2015, pp588). Moreover, a successful process of path renewal 
involves intra-regional actors such as firms and government agencies, (re)coupling existing 
technology and knowledge, alongside infrastructural, industrial, material and natural assets, 
to extra-regional networks and flows of capital (MacKinnon, 2012a; Coe & Yeung, 2015; 
Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Micro-level and meso-level processes of regional change 
depend upon the natural industrial structures, state-led strategies, institutional settings and 
distinctive social agency within regions (Steen, 2016; Boschma & Frenken, 2006). Path 
renewal involves the widening of industrial specialisation in a region through a process of 
industrial diversification and branching, renewing an existing path (Isaksen, 2015; Boschma 
& Frenken, 2011). By contrast, path creation is the establishment of new industries and new 
firms within a region “that have different variants of products”, in order to create a new 
path of growth (Isaksen, 2015, pp588). However, the mechanisms underpinning both path 
renewal and path creation are not separate as highlighted by Isaksen (2015), who argues 
that both path renewal and path creation are driven by firms seeking to diversify into new 
sectors, establish new industries and widen their industrial specialisation. The thesis can 
draw upon the conceptualisation of path creation by Isaksen (2015), as it is closely related to 
the notions of diversification and related variety (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010). 
Considering path creation, as defined by Isaksen (2015), will provide a deeper understanding 
of how port authorities, occasionally acting as firms, diversify into new market sectors to 
create a new infrastructural base for establishing new regional industries and paths of 
growth (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Notteboom, 2016).  
 
2.2.1 Adaptation, adaptability and adaptive capacity  
 
Notions of adaptation and adaptability can shape and influence processes of path 
dependency and associated regional lock-in, path creation and (un)related variety (Martin, 
2010; Pike et al, 2017). Fundamentally, notions of adaptation and adaptability deepens our 
understandings of the ways regions recover and respond to disruptive economic change and 
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produce diverse adaptive paths (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010; Martin 2012). Firstly, 
adaptation contrasts with more limited neo-classical approaches, which fail to “adequately 
explain responses” to disruptive economic change (Pike et al, 2017, pp107). Neo-classical 
approaches assume that rational decisions will be made by economic actors based on 
market signals, leading to a state of equilibrium and recovery following disruptive economic 
change (Pike et al, 2017). However, this adjustment process fails to occur due to imperfect 
competition, labour immobility, information and externalities, alongside technological 
differences and geographically uneven access to capital across space (Pike et al, 2017; 
McCann, 2013; Pike et al, 2010). For instance, old industrial regions are often 
underperforming in national economies and frequently face multiple adaptability and 
restructuring challenges following disruptive economic change (Hassink, 2010).  
 
Firstly, adaptation has been defined as the renewal of a formerly dynamic and successful 
development path (Pike et al, 2010). However, a deeper, more sophisticated definition of 
adaptation by Evenhuis (2016, pp13) views adaptation as an episodic “process of 
alterations”, which allows regions to “cope with changes in the broader [extra-regional] 
contexts”, formed through internal reorganisation of a region, or through a region 
undertaking a reorientation to extra-regional political-economic contexts (Martin, 2012; 
MacKinnon, 2017). Adaptation is characterised by a process involving “strong and tightly” 
interconnected social agents operating in a place-specific economic system, which can 
absorb and respond to exogenous shocks, then subsequently shapes the movement towards 
a pre-conceived evolutionary path in a region (Pike et al, 2010, pp62). On the other hand, 
adaptability is the underlying ability of “loosely and weakly” interconnected social agents to 
be adaptive, which differentiate across various places, to formulate several economic paths 
(Pike et al, 2010, pp62). Moreover, adaptability focuses upon the competence of social 
agents to manage and respond to unforeseen future events which ultimately have negative 
or even damaging economic implications for a regional system or entity (Dawley et al, 2010). 
Adaptation and adaptability relate the idea of resilience, referring to the capability of 
economic systems or entities to recover to their earlier growth position following a shock or 
disturbance such as financial crises or technological leaps, or following slow-burn events 
such as de-industrialisation (Pike et al, 2017; Pike et al, 2010). However, resilience has been 
criticised as having limited consensus on its actual definition and theoretical origin (Martin, 
2012), despite its increasing emergence and attention in academic and policy circles 
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(Christopherson et al, 2012; Bristow & Healy, 2014; OECD, 2011). Furthermore, Martin 
(2012) highlights that a regional system or actor can either be anticipatory or reactionary to 
disruptive economic shock or slow-burn change (Pike et al, 2010; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 
2016). Fundamentally, governance actors, often individuals, can seek to influence paths to 
take actions in advance (anticipatory) or following (reactionary) external shocks such as 
market disruptions or technological changes, or slow-burn transitions such as the decline of 
heavy industries (Pike et al, 2010). Anticipatory or reactive processes will be discussed in 
greater depth later in this chapter in relation to institutions and governance. 
 
By drawing upon definitions of adaptation by Evenhuis (2016) and MacKinnon (2017), the 
thesis utilises adaptation in a generic sense and views it as the long-term and continual 
process of change on the basis of existing assets and characteristics, in response to shifting 
conditions and new challenges in the external institutional environments (Martin, 2010). The 
thesis will be drawing upon notions of adaptation and adaptive capacity because they 
conceptualise how ports change over time and respond to changing market and policy 
conditions (Evenhuis, 2016; MacKinnon, 2017; Pike et al, 2010; Martin, 2010). However, 
adaptive capacity is the geographically differentiated quality and inherent ability of various 
actors, individuals and institutions to be adaptable and facilitate economic adaptation (Pike 
et al, 2010, pp62; Dawley et al, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2015b). The concept of adaptive 
capacity directly influences the process of port adaptation, as some port authorities and sub-
national government organisations have greater adaptative capacity than others to be 
adaptable and respond to changes in external institutional environments (Pike et al, 2010; 
Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). Adaptive capacity is the ability of intra-regional actors 
(firms, individuals, research institutions and government organisations) to modify, renew 
and adapt a region’s industrial structure, labour market, institutional settings and asset base 
in the face of adversely changing market conditions and policy environments (Simmie & 
Martin, 2010). In connection to arguments around diversification and path branching, 
regions which are more diversified have a strong underlying adaptive capacity (Pike et al, 
2010). This allows for an increased capacity to absorb adverse shocks or slow-burning 
disruptions in an open system, displaying greater related variety of industries, firms, 
resources, knowledge bases, institutional connections and physical territorial assets (Pike et 
al, 2010; Simmie & Martin, 2010). Conversely, a region comprising overspecialised industries, 
an unrelated economic structure with public institutions unwilling to reconfigure policy and 
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strategies to new ends, have a weak adaptive capacity, which disables innovation and 
entrepreneurship capabilities and creates regional lock-in (Pike et al, 2010; Martin, 2016). 
Adaptive capacity highlights that institutions could play a more prominent role in discussions 
of adaptation, as institutions are clearly vital in facilitating resilience, adaptation and 
diversification in the face of regional shocks or disruptions (Gertler, 2010; MacKinnon et al, 
2009).  
 
More broadly, the thesis sees adaptation as a key overarching concept for unpacking the 
long-term change and the creation of new development paths in places. The thesis will be 
using adaptation in a generic sense and in terms of the long-term change of port assets to 
support new port-related activities, in response to changes and challenges in multiscalar 
institutional environments (Evenhuis, 2016; MacKinnon, 2017; Martin, 2010). The research 
also recognises that analysing the adaptive capacity of intra-regional actors is fundamentally 
important in understanding how port authorities and sub-national government agencies 
adapt and respond to external changes and challenges in the multiscalar institutional 
environment (Pike et al, 2010; Evenhuis, 2016; Martin, 2010). However, the thesis is not 
contrasting the overarching concept of adaptation with the notions of adaptability or 
adaptive capacity.  The thesis views the overarching process of port adaptation as being 
influenced by a process of port diversification which sits at a lower level of abstraction, 
whilst path creation emerges as an outcome of the port adaptation and diversification 
process (Pike et al, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010).  
 
The concepts of adaptation, adaptability and adaptive capacity are key in explaining some of 
the ways economic actors change and influence regional paths, which are dependent upon 
certain industries (Pike et al, 2010; Martin, 2010). Although path dependence offers valuable 
insights in how regions are locked-into specific development trajectories, path dependence 
theory offers little insight into the mechanisms launching path creation from the path 
preformation phase (Martin, 2010). This has prompted economic geographers to engage 
with how regional paths are launched and what are the drivers in the path creation process 
(Martin & Sunley, 2006; Dawley, 2014). Escaping a locked-in path or a path which is 
dependent upon a declining industry and into path creation and subsequent path 
development, has been defined as path ‘de-locking’ by Martin and Sunley (2006) 
(MacKinnon et al, 2019; Martin, 2010). Path de-locking mechanisms have been theoretically 
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framed as tools to understand the ways in which regions gain economic momentum and 
become self-reinforcing through new industries or technologies. Path de-locking 
mechanisms, especially those defined by Martin and Sunley (2006), are often overlapping, 
related and contingent, and have also been labelled as mechanisms for path creation 
following the process of path de-locking (Dawley, 2014; Simmie, 2008). However, a key area 
of exploration is to identify the actual operation of various path creation mechanisms, whilst 
exploring wider sets of political economic contexts shaping path creation mechanisms 
(Dawley, 2014; Simmie, 2012). The latter includes multiscalar institutional contexts and 
policy environments, as well as the socio-institutional agency of state and non-state actors 
operating in external networks (MacKinnon et al, 2009; Coe, 2011; Morgan, 2013).  
 
Martin and Sunley (2006) provided five scenarios (indigenous creation, heterogeneity and 
diversity, transplantation, diversification, upgrading) for regions to avoid becoming locked-in 
to a declining evolutionary path, which have been subsequently labelled as candidate 
mechanisms in the creation of new paths of development and growth (Dawley, 2014; 
MacKinnon et al, 2019). The thesis will be utilising diversification and transplantation as the 
underlying mechanisms of adaptation, whilst recognising that broader regional path creation 
emerging as an outcome of adaptation, diversification and transplantation (Martin & Sunley, 
2006; Martin, 2010).  
 
2.2.2 Diversification, branching and transplantation 
 
Diversification, akin to ‘path branching’ in EEG literature (Boschma & Frenken, 2006; 
Boschma & Martin, 2007), centres upon firms as key drivers of diversification through a 
process of increasing a greater variety of industries within a regional economy (Martin & 
Sunley, 2006). This process of regional diversification is drawn from the notion of corporate 
diversification of products (Montgomery, 1994), enabling regions to establish a diversified 
‘portfolio’ of industrial specialisation to become increasingly resistant to external economic 
shocks (Frenken et al, 2007). The supposed diversified portfolio must consist of 
technologically related industries, otherwise known as related variety, which enables 
heightened opportunities for localised knowledge spillovers and learning (Frenken et al, 
2007; Frenken et al, 2005; Neffke et al, 2011). Conversely, unrelated variety denotes that 
regions with unrelated industries and a lack of knowledge spillovers and learning ‘protects’ 
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regions against sector-specific external shocks through a heightened capacity of unrelated 
industries, allowing for increased path branching opportunities, thus resisting regional path 
dependency and negative lock-in (Frenken et al, 2007; Martin & Sunley, 2006). Related 
variety, unrelated variety and path branching (diversification) are connected to EEG through 
emphasis upon the evolutionary industrial history of regions (Pike et al, 2017). Thus, the 
relatedness of technology between industries shapes the future of a region’s industrial 
variety, economic transformation and evolution (Neffke et al, 2011; Dawley, 2014). 
Interestingly, Neffke et al (2014, pp261) argue that although it is difficult for regions to 
attract new industries if they’re technologically unrelated to existing industrial activities, 
new regional growth paths “are strongly rooted in the historical economic structure of a 
region.” Therefore, historically influenced industries, firms, government organisations, 
infrastructure and labour market, shape and influence regional path branching processes 
(Neffke et al, 2011). The concept of regional diversification and path branching can be used 
to better understand how ports adapt and support new industries emerging within regions 
over time (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Pike et al, 2017; Notteboom, 2016). 
 
Path branching and (un)related variety are directly concerned with technological 
relatedness, learning, knowledge spillovers and expansion within a region, overlooking the 
relatedness of territorial assets between pre-existing industries within a region (Boschma, 
2009; Frenken et al, 2007; Metacalfe et al, 2006). This theoretical issue of path branching 
will be enriched in this investigation through the incorporation of territorial assets 
(infrastructural, material, natural, industrial and human) into understandings of 
diversification (path branching) as a mechanism of adaptation and path creation (MacKinnon 
et al, 2015; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). Thus, the thesis will 
utilise the concept of diversification and branching in EEG to explore how port authorities 
and sub-national government agencies re-orientate infrastructural and material assets to 
capture new markets (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010 Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). The 
research will therefore provide a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of how 
port adaptation unfolds, thus adding to existing literature on port diversification in port 
studies and transport geography (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Jacobs & 




On a different note, the transplantation mechanism acknowledges the potential of locked-in 
regions dependent upon declining traditional industries, to ‘transplant’ new industries, 
technologies and associated firms from exogenous sources, which influences a broader 
process of path creation (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Dawley, 2014). Additionally, the 
transplantation mechanism conceptually relates to the current sub-field of GPNs, in 
connection to the established notion of strategic coupling (Coe & Yeung, 2015; MacKinnon, 
2012a). The GPN framework seeks to develop understandings of the interactions between 
regional economies and extra-regional actors such as firms, placing emphasis upon 
processes of territorial development (Henderson et al, 2002; Coe et al, 2004; Yeung & Coe, 
2015). The GPN approach discusses how territorial assets can be harnessed by regional 
institutions to serve the needs of TNCs or focal firms, this is known as ‘strategic coupling’ 
(Coe et al, 2004; Dawley et al, 2019). Moreover, the linking of territorial assets to the needs 
of extra-regional TNCs or focal firms through the strategic coupling process, can effectively 
launch new regional growth paths (MacKinnon, 2012a; Dawley et al, 2019). Interestingly, 
certain parallels can be drawn between strategic coupling and the path creation mechanisms 
of diversification and transplantation.  
 
Diversification highlights that endogenous territorial assets which are inherited from 
declining industries, can be identified, harnessed and (re)valorised to form new regional 
paths (Martin & Sunley, 2006). In the same way as transplantation, the diversification of 
regions may require resources (inward investment, labour and physical assets) from TNCs or 
focal firms operating in extra-regional networks (Coe & Yeung, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012a). 
Furthermore, FDI can be a mechanism of path creation, as firms look from the ‘inside - out’ 
to international flows of capital and new export markets, relating to the diversification 
mechanism, whilst regions can also attract FDI into related sectors from the ‘outside - in’, 
linking to the notion of transplantation (Coe & Yeung, 2015; Martin & Sunley, 2006). 
Diversification and transplantation are the most pertinent of the discussed path de-locking 
mechanisms because identifying and subsequently entering new markets, using endogenous 
and exogenous resources, is essential for the survival and growth of regions (Martin & 
Sunley, 2006; MacKinnon, 2012a). Moreover, the GPN approach offers a useful framework 
for considering the role of extra-regional linkages in catalysing adaptation, diversification 




2.2.3 Path Creation  
 
Path creation refers to the emergence of industries, technologies and economic activities 
forming new regional paths. The creation or ‘birth’ of new industries can be conceptualised 
as ‘mindful deviation’ (Garud & Karnoe, 2001). This involves entrepreneurs or firms acting as 
innovative micro-economic actors, breaking away from existing industries and technologies 
that comprise a regional economy and forming new industries and technologies 
endogenously (Garud & Karnoe, 2001). Firms and entrepreneurs seek to mobilise existing 
assets, resources and competencies to create new path options, thus deviating from past 
mistakes and locked-in trajectories (Garud et al, 2010). Simmie (2012) adopts ‘mindful 
deviation’ within a hybrid socio-economic model concerning ‘knowledgeable agents’ and 
‘niche markets’, to explain successful path creation and establishment of the Danish wind 
industry. This path creation and path establishment process was enabled through the role of 
government institutions and policies supporting a niche market, which accumulated a critical 
mass of firms emerging or diversifying into the wind turbine market (Simmie, 2012; Morgan, 
2013). Here Simmie (2012) demonstrates how the role of institutions was vital in 
establishing an enabling institutional environment to catalyse the path creation process 
(Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010). The dynamic role institutions play in shaping processes of 
adaptation, diversification and path creation will be explored further in this chapter.  
 
Martin (2010) offers a useful insight into clearly conceptualising path creation, which has 
been through defining stages within an alternative path dependent model explaining 
regional industrial evolution (Figure 2.1). The path ‘preformation phase’ consisting of 
existing technologies, knowledge, competencies and place-specific economic structures 
forms the basis of path creation (Martin, 2010). The ‘path creation phase’ follows, closely 
aligned to arguments of Garud and Karnoe (2001) regarding purposeful socio-institutional 
agency and action, comprising of entrepreneurial activity, experimentation and localised 
competition creating a new emerging pathway (Martin, 2010). Next the ‘path development 
phase’ succeeds, based upon the development of local increasing returns and a network of 
externalities to support an emerging path (Martin, 2010). Following this phase, the path can 
move in two contrasting directions, either towards a ‘stable state’ formed through 
increasing rigidification of networks and actors leading to stasis, or towards a ‘dynamic 
process’ forming industrial and technological renewal leading to adaptation (Martin, 2010). 
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However, a more comprehensive model is required for greater exploration of processes and 
mechanisms which shape and trigger the initial stages of industrial and path evolution 
(Martin, 2010). Interestingly, Martin (2010) argues that ‘enabling’ or ‘constraining’ 
environments shape the creation and emergence of new industries and technologies. The 
former establishing a dynamic regional path through adaptive processes and the latter 
counteracting local industrial and technological evolution (Martin, 2010; Dawley et al, 2015). 
This theoretical argument will be explored in greater depth later in this chapter through 












Figure 2.1: Toward an alternative path dependence model of local industrial evolution 
Source: Martin, 2010, pp21 
 
Notions of path creation typically focus upon the role of endogenous factors and agents in 
creating new industries and technologies, centring upon the local and regional scales in 
analysing industrial evolution (Neffke et al, 2011). Although endogenous factors and actors 
(high-level knowledge base, capital investment, research institutions, universities, firms and 
entrepreneurs) are crucial for path creation, they’re occasionally lagging or completely 
absent in specific regions (Isaksen, 2015; Isaksen & Trippl, 2016). Therefore, peripheral 
regions in advanced countries are dependent upon starting path creation with a path 
‘preformation phase’ which is deficient in formation, alongside constraining initial conditions 
(Isaksen & Trippl, 2016; Martin, 2010; Simmie, 2012). Consequently, peripheral regions often 
require exogenous resources such as the inward movement of trans-national corporations 
(TNCs) and inward investment, alongside policy instruments (incentives and subsidies) 
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initiated by regional, national and supranational government organisations to catalyse path 
creation through certain sectors (Isaksen, 2015; Morgan, 2013; Dawley et al, 2015). The 
multiscalar approach has been relatively unexplored throughout the theoretical formulation 
of path creation (Martin, 2010), although multiscalar processes fundamentally shape the 
institutional and policy environment for adaptation, diversification and path creation 
(Martin, 2010; Essletzbichler, 2012b; Martin, 2000). Therefore, introducing discussions of 
multiscalar actors and institutions will strengthen and enhance the concept of path creation.  
 
As previously discussed, endogenous or territorial assets are crucial foundations for founding 
industrial evolution in the initial path preformation phase of the path creation process 
(Neffke et al, 2011; Martin, 2010). The thesis will draw upon the notions of assets to better 
understand how port authorities and sub-national government agencies harness and 
valorise infrastructural and material assets of ports, in order to stimulate the port adaptation 
process (Martin, 2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Notteboom, 2016).  The infrastructural 
and material assets of ports are crucial in supporting new industries requiring port and 
quayside access, and for driving the regional path creation process (Martin, 2010; 
MacKinnon et al, 2019). Examples of territorial assets are clearly evident in the path 
preformation phase, including technology, knowledge base and competences (Figure 2.1) 
(Martin, 2010). Territorial assets have been neatly categorised aligning to capabilities and 
attributes: natural assets (physical resources and built environment); infrastructural and 
material assets; industrial assets (technology and firm capabilities); human assets 
(knowledge base, labour competences and costs); and institutional assets (rules, routines 
and norms) (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). However, territorial assets must be identified, 
harnessed and valorised to capture new growth paths through assertive and strategic action 
by individual actors or organisations (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Moreover, territorial 
assets comprised within the path preformation phase or initial conditions of a locality, 
strongly influence the capabilities of actors and government agencies to launch new growth 
paths and characterise previous path trajectories of economic development (Martin, 2010; 
Simmie, 2012). Actors and government agencies in regions may lack endogenous resources 
or financial capacity to harness territorial assets (Isaksen, 2015; Morgan, 2013). If so, actors 
and associated government agencies must establish interactions with lead firms or TNCs 
operating in global production networks (GPNs) and pursue extra-regional flows of capital, 
including Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Coe et al, 2004; Coe et al, 2008). Thus, regional 
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evolution is shaped by complex interactions between local and regional actors and global 
networks (Coe & Yeung, 2015; Coe et al, 2004). Moreover, there is an emerging need in the 
GPN framework to more deeply consider specific strategies of lead firms and specialised 
suppliers in shaping processes of adaptation, diversification and path creation (Yeung and 
Coe, 2015; MacKinnon et al, 2018). Therefore, the thesis will analyse the strategies of lead 
firms and specialised suppliers in the UK and German offshore wind industry, to better 
understand how they influence processes of port adaptation, diversification and path 
creation (MacKinnon et al, 2018). As such, path creation needs to look beyond but also 
consider endogenous assets (knowledge base, skilled labour market, technology base, 
physical), in launching new growth paths (Binz et al, 2016). 
 
Drawing upon work of Martin & Sunley (2006), Martin (2010) and MacKinnon et al (2019), 
the project defines path creation as a process which unfolds to enable the growth of a new 
industry in a region, as an outcome of underlying processes of adaptation and 
diversification, which is shaped by the pre-existing nature of regional assets, actors, 
institutions and competencies (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Pike et al, 2010). The thesis’ 
definition and use of path creation is inspired by the notion of the “opportunity space” 
Grillitsch and Sotarauta (2018, pp8), who argue that “some regional growth paths are more 
likely than others”, as they’re highly influenced by a relationship between inherited assets, 
actors, institutions and competencies, and agency, whereby the recognition of future paths 
matters too (Martin, 2010). This definition and use of path creation differs from the 
perspective of Grillitsch and Trippl (2016, pp10) who see path creation as a form of path 
development, occurring as the “emergence and growth of entirely new industries based on 
new technologies and scientific discoveries”. Grillitsch and Trippl (2016, pp10) distinguish 
path creation as a form of path development with “path branching”, defined as the 
“development of a new industry based on competencies and knowledge of existing related 
industries” and “path importation”, defined as the “setting up of an established industry that 
is new to the region (e.g. through foreign firms)”. By contrast, the thesis sees ‘path 
branching’ and ‘path importation’ conceptually overlapping with diversification and 
transplantation as defined by Martin and Sunley (2006), which can act as mechanisms of 




Diversification emerges as the most important mechanism influencing path creation (Martin 
& Sunley, 2006). In connection to ports, the thesis sees diversification as the re-orientation 
of a port’s business portfolio and asset base to serve new markets and activities, which 
drives incremental port adaptation and can lead to path creation as an outcome (Martin & 
Sunley, 2006; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Transplantation is the other important 
mechanism, but the project is specifically concerned with transplantation in the context of 
diversification, thus demonstrating that path de-locking mechanisms are highly interrelated 
and are occasionally symbiotic (Martin & Sunley, 2006). The chapter sees diversification and 
transplantation as the most applicable regional path de-locking mechanisms, serving as 
potential mechanisms for enabling processes of port adaptation and broader regional path 
creation, through catalysing the “breeding [of] new industries” at port sites (Isaksen & Trippl, 
2016, pp3; Martin & Sunley, 2006). 
 
2.3 Institutions and governance  
 
This section of the chapter discusses the role of institutions and governance in discussions of 
path creation, diversification and adaptation. There is a growing discussion and analysis of 
the role institutions play in the adaptation of localities and regions, which was previously 
overlooked in the EEG theoretical framework (MacKinnon et al, 2009; Martin, 2010; Gertler, 
2010). Institutions are critical in influencing industrial policy contexts, market conditions and 
the governance of ports, which shapes the adaptation and diversification of ports into new 
sectors (Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016). 
 
It is important to attempt to define the ‘institution’, despite divergent perspectives within 
economic geography (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; Gertler, 2010). A consistent agreement upon 
defining the institution is that institutions are ‘systems of rules’ (Hodgson, 2009; Hodgson, 
2006). Moreover, as a part of what is termed the ‘institutional turn’ multiple scholars have 
argued how the “economy is an instituted process” (Amin, 2001, pp1238; Martin, 2000; 
Philo & Parr, 2000). The fortunes of local and regional economies are shaped by both 
indigenous institutions operating within regions and exogenous institutions operating ‘at a 
distance’, including national policy organisations, international market regulators and in 
some regions, practices of powerful business elites managing TNCs (Amin, 2001). However, a 
broader and more definitive definition of institutions is given by Meric Gertler (2010; 2004). 
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Gertler argues that institutions are actively formed socially and politically, and characterised 
by “formal regulations, legislation, and economic systems” alongside “informal societal 
norms that regulate the behaviour of economic actors”, which essentially form the 
“attitudes, values, and expectations of individual economic actors” (Gertler, 2010, pp7-8). 
These institutional characteristics, norms and positions subsequently influence the economic 
decisions made by individual economic actors (Gertler, 2010).  
 
2.3.1 Institutions in Evolutionary Economic Geography 
 
On a different note, institutions shape norms, conventions and routines to increase the 
adaptive efficiency of territories and shape the adaptive capacity of economic actors to 
react, change and evolve within multiscalar economies (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; Pike et al, 
2010; Martin, 2010). There has been an emerging trend in institutional economic geography 
to reconstitute discussions around institutions with greater alliance to EEG, in order to 
deepen understandings of how institutions interact, adapt and evolve (Gertler, 2010; 
Boschma & Frenken, 2009; Jessop, 2001). Institutions are becoming a growing influence 
upon shaping EEG in relation to adaptation, diversification and path creation (MacKinnon et 
al, 2009; Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010). Academics have acknowledged this theoretical issue, 
emphasising that institutions must play a more pivotal role in EEG’s conceptual development 
(MacKinnon et al, 2009; Essletzbichler, 2009; Cumbers & MacKinnon, 2011). Understandings 
of evolutionary paths are largely focused upon firms and technologies, therefore the 
incorporation of diverse institutions and actors can broaden, develop and enhance firm-
centric accounts (MacKinnon et al, 2009; Morgan 2013; Smith, 2015). A recent empirical 
account by Dawley (2014) discusses the ways multiscalar non-firm actors, including regional 
development organisations, national policy organisations, research institutions and 
entrepreneurs have enabled path creation and subsequent adaptation in the North East of 
England through the offshore wind industry. Another dynamic account by Simmie (2012) 
explores how the creation of the Danish wind power industry was mechanised by various 
non-firm institutions and individuals, including engineers and scientists at universities, 
government organisations, farmers, volunteers and enthusiasts. These two empirical 
examples demonstrate how the dynamic social agency of various non-firm actors, alongside 
the institutional contexts of regions and nations, are important in shaping path creation and 
adaptation (Pike et al, 2009; Essletzbichler, 2009). Moreover, these examples highlight how 
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various institutions and individuals strive towards a common form of adaptation in regions, 
emphasising the necessity “public-private strategic leadership” in path creation and 
adaptation (Bailey et al, 2010, pp462). However, path creation and adaptation processes are 
also influenced by institutions, actors and policy environments on multiple spatial scales 
(Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010). Therefore, the multiscalar institutional environment and 
associated institutional arrangements will be discussed next. 
 
Interestingly, Martin (2000) distinguishes between ‘institutional arrangements’ and the 
‘institutional environment’ which shape the spatial economy, drawing upon work originating 
in mainstream economics (North, 1990).  The institutional environment refers to both an 
informal system consisting of norms, customs, routines, cultures, practices and corporate 
behaviour, and a formal system consisting of rules, regulations and laws “which constrain 
and control socioeconomic behaviour” (Martin, 2000, pp80). Institutional arrangements 
refer to specific organisations which are governed and influenced (evolution, functionality, 
overall existence) by the institutional environment they inhabit (Martin, 2000; 2010). 
However, the institutional environment and institutional arrangements are constantly 
interacting and modifying each other, thus producing varying local economic outcomes 
across space, generating place-specific ‘institutional regimes’ (Martin, 2000). Furthermore 
(Martin, 2010) distinguishes between a ‘constraining’ institutional environment and an 
‘enabling’ institutional environment based upon inherited assets, skills, competences and 
experiences, which shape path creation, development and adaptation processes. The 
notions of constraining and enabling institutional environments will be adopted within the 
project, as they are important concepts for investigating the influence of external actors and 
institutions upon path creation, diversification and adaptation (Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 
2010). These conceptual ideas drawn from EEG look beyond the rather limited notions of 
‘historical accidents’ or ‘chance’ as mechanisms for shaping path creation and path 
dependence processes (Arthur, 1989; David, 1994). A local industrial path formed through a 
constraining institutional environment produces a “self-reproducing form” creating an 
economic reality of continuity and stasis which is vulnerable to market shifts and 
competition, consequently leading to possible decline (Martin, 2010, pp21). Secondly, a local 
industrial path formed through an enabling institutional environment generates a more 
open process to allow change, dynamic evolution, industrial and technological renewal and 
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incremental adaptation (Martin, 2010). Nevertheless, Martin (2010) also argues that the 
pace of adaptation varies from one local industry to another and evolves over time.  
 
Although Martin (2010) bases his arguments upon the local and regional scales, he also 
notes that shifting market and regulatory environments evident on multiple spatial scales 
also influence regional path creation, diversification, adaptation and evolution. This 
contrasts with the view of Boschma and Frenken (2009) who argue that if institutions play a 
key role in path creation and adaptation, it will be in an endogenous manner through a 
process of collective action (Maskell & Malmberg, 2007). However, as Martin (2010) 
suggests, the influence of actors, institutions, strategies and policies formulated at the 
national or supra-national scales are also vital in path creation and adaptation processes 
(Dawley et al, 2015). As Dawley et al (2015) support, regional industrial change and path 
creation processes are influenced by vertical (selective) policies, based upon industrial 
sectors, and horizontal (functional) policies, whereby states actively shape markets, 
infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, which both enable and constrain path creation, 
path development and adaptation (Chang et al 2013; Martin, 2010). The evolutionary 
political economy approach to EEG developed by Dawley et al (2015) demonstrates how 
local and regional path creation is enabled or constrained by strategies formulated by 
national state organisations (Morgan, 2013; Martin, 2010). Moreover, development agencies 
and state organisations on the regional scale, alongside the policies, strategies and initiatives 
they design and implement, are also significant actors and tools shaping the institutional 
environment and the subsequent evolution of institutional arrangements (Morgan, 2013; 
Dawley et al, 2015; Martin, 2000). In support of these arguments, Gertler (2010, pp6) 
highlights that the reproduction of institutions, actors and industries at one geographical 
scale is undoubtedly constrained and shaped by “institutional architectures that are erected 
at other geographical scales.” Importantly, the thesis will discuss the institutional 
environment and institutional arrangements through a multiscalar approach to theoretically 
analyse institutional change, path creation, diversification and adaptation. 
 
In some instances, national, regional and local organisations can work jointly and 
collaboratively to support a common economic development mission and form important 
institutional arrangements around a particular city, project or case (Martin, 2000; Wood, 
1999; Cox, 1998). This kind of collective action reflects the building of a ‘growth coalition’ 
29 
 
like those historically formed in US cities such as Houston, Milwaukee, San Diego and San 
Francisco, which emulate actions of an ‘entrepreneurial state’ aiming to heighten the 
capacity of localities to (re)develop and grow (Gotham, 2000; Fineberg, 2016; Mazzucato, 
2013; Wood, 1999; Cox, 1998). These growth coalitions and collective local political action 
around economic development in the US was in response to processes of urban decline, 
deindustrialisation and economic restructuring in the 1980s, as local actors were attempting 
to shape the futures of their respective localities (Gotham, 2000; Cox & Muir, 1988; Cox, 
1998). In the context of US growth coalitions and urban redevelopment, private developers 
and interests aimed to attract investors for short-term returns on real estate development, 
which was enabled by local and city government agencies prioritising urban redevelopment 
policies and empowering developers through tax-concessions, grants, low-interest loans and 
liberalising land-use regulation (Gotham, 2000; Wood, 1999; Mazzucato, 2013). Job creation 
and industrial growth within and around ports can be shaped by joint growth coalitions, with 
these positive outcomes featuring in their core missions. Originally, the discussions of 
growth coalitions did not perceive them as being multiscalar (Gotham, 2000; Cox & Muir, 
1988; Cox, 1998). However, the thesis recognises the importance of exploring how actors 
within joint growth coalitions work together across multiple scales and shape processes of 
adaptation and diversification, which can lead to job creation and industrial growth as 
positive path outcomes (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2010).  
 
To drive new regional paths and organise coalitions, actors should have the necessary 
agency to “act or intervene” (MacKinnon et al, 2019, pp122; Martin, 2010). Grillitsch and 
Sotarauta (2018) outlined three types of agency demonstrated by actors. The first is 
‘innovative entrepreneurship’, whereby firms and entrepreneurs seek to break with existing 
paths and create new paths, based upon the concept of ‘mindful deviation’ (Garud and 
Karnøe, 2001; MacKinnon et al, 2019). The second is ‘institutional entrepreneurship’, 
wherein an institution’s existing rules, norms and practices are incrementally changed for an 
alternative set of rules, norms and practices, which can drive a new path creation agenda 
(Grillitsch and Sotarauta, 2018; MacKinnon et al, 2019). ‘Place leadership’ is another form of 
agency, occurring when actors demonstrate the necessary leadership capacity to advocate 
new paths across “institutional and organisational divides”, in order to attract other actors 
and interests (Grillitsch and Sotarauta, 2018, pp14; MacKinnon et al, 2019). The project will 
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draw upon these concepts to better understand the actors and the agency they exercise, 
which shape the processes of path creation, adaptation and diversification. 
 
2.3.2 Institutional adaptation and change 
 
First and foremost, Martin (2000, pp80) highlights that institutions enable the continual 
reproduction and continuity of economic activity across time and space because institutions 
are “characterised by inertia and duality”, thus emphasising the long-term adaptation of 
institutions. In connection to this perspective, David (1994) emphasises that institutions and 
places are mutually reinforcing and shaping each other over time (Martin, 2000; North, 
1990). Moreover, David (1994) suggests that institutions are ‘carriers of history’, whereby 
institutions respond to the changing environments in which they inhabit and continually 
reproduce themselves through actions of individuals, whilst being constantly influenced by 
previous practices, norms and routines. Institutions are never static in arrangement and 
structure, as they constantly react and respond to the spatial settings or contexts, 
institutional environments and occasional shocks to their structures (Hollingsworth & Boyer, 
1997; Martin, 2000). 
 
However, in contrast to these arguments, the evolution and change of an institution can be 
explained through “historical ruptures or openings”, referring to convulsive exogenous 
shocks to the institutional system prompting change, and “gradual and incremental change” 
through internal developments (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp18). This perspective emphasises 
that adaptive change within institutions is influenced by both endogenous and exogenous 
influences, in tandem with dynamic social agency and strategic action (Streeck & Thelen, 
2005; Bailey et al, 2010). Mechanisms of institutional change has strong linkages to the 
notion of adaptation, as institutions are realigning themselves through the alteration of 
endowed assets and resources to adapt to changing contexts, settings and environments. 
This is the theoretical perspective adopted for this project, due to the dynamic interplay 
between multiscalar endogenous and exogenous factors and processes which occur through 
key historical moments. To expand upon this argument, the discussion will move onto 





In the academic fields of historical sociology and political science, there have been 
developments to move away from notions of path dependence and stable institutional 
forms, to focus upon how institutions change over time on the microeconomic scale through 
certain mechanisms of change (Martin, 2010; Boas, 2007, Streeck & Thelen, 2005). The 
institutional change mechanisms outlined below fundamentally relate to notions of path 
creation, diversification, transplantation and adaptation as they essentially create new 
economic realities and paths through enabling incremental change (Martin, 2010; Boschma 
& Frenken, 2011; Martin & Sunley, 2006). The first of these mechanisms is known as a 
‘layering’ process, whereby an institution add new rules or ‘layers’ incrementally, thus 
gradually changing the nature of the institution over time (Martin, 2010; Boas, 2007). If this 
process of change occurs it can set in motion dynamics which can alter an evolutionary path, 
creating differential growth (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). These dynamics of institutional change 
involve new layers of arrangements being implemented on top of existing institutional 
structures and arrangements (Thelen, 2003; Shickler, 2001).  
 
The second mechanism is known as a ‘conversion’ process, defined as when an institution’s 
existing arrangements, structures, rules and procedures are reoriented, realigned and 
modified to serve new functions and purposes (Martin, 2010; Boas, 2007). The process of 
conversion is set in motion when individuals within institutions are faced with a new set of 
problems and the institutional arrangements or form needs to be realigned to serve new 
goals and new ends (Thelen, 2003). The overall redirection of an institution through the 
conversion process may be in response to changing interests of external institutions (state 
policies and strategies, market conditions), or fluctuating internal power relations (Streek & 
Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2003; Dawley, 2014). Moreover, conversion has clear links to the 
process of path creation, the diversification mechanism and adaptation, as the process of 
conversion occurs in response to shifts in the external institutional and policy environment 
(Boas, 2007; Martin, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006). Additionally, Boas (2007) and Thelen 
(2003; 2004) emphasise that these two mechanisms of incremental institutional change 
often interact and coexist. The process of conversion is reflective of the realignment of 
infrastructural and material port assets, enabling the diversification of ports into new 
markets (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Martin & Sunley, 2006; Notteboom, 2016). In this 
sense, the conversion of port assets can be argued to be a form of adaptation and 




Another mechanism of institutional change is known as ‘recombination’ (Martin, 2010). This 
process involves the recombination and redefining of existing institutional resources with 
new resources to produce a completely new institutional arrangement and structure 
(Martin, 2010; Dawley, 2014). For example, an institution’s resources may have been 
depleted or are incompatible with new market conditions or multiscalar policy environment, 
therefore individuals can exercise human agency and strategic action to recombine existing 
assets or resources to create a new path for the institution (Dawley, 2014). As previously 
discussed, multiscalar institutions shape and constrain economic activity and action, whilst 
evolving over time (Gertler, 2010; Martin, 2010).  
 
2.3.3 Multiscalar governance and policy 
 
The role of the state has morphed from providing into providing a complex multiscalar 
governance system, with an overarching and prominent national scale of governance (Labao 
et al, 2009; Brenner, 2004; Jones, 2001). Throughout the literature on institutions and 
governance, a key argument stands out which highlights a ‘qualitative shift’ from 
government to governance on multiple spatial scales (MacKinnon, 2012b; Jessop, 1997; Cox, 
2009). Jessop (1997) outlined three key processes of state reorganisation within a highly 
influential account (MacKinnon, 2012b). Firstly ‘denationalisation’ has occurred through a 
‘upwards’ rescaling (transfer of functions, responsibilities and powers) from the national 
level to the supra-national level and through a ‘downwards’ rescaling from the national level 
to sub-national organisations and agencies (Jessop, 1997; MacKinnon, 2012b; Cox, 2009). 
The second state process of ‘destatisation’ has occurred through states relocating functions 
‘outwards’ to quasi-state agencies operating at arms-length to the national government, 
private institutions or interests and voluntary organisations (Jessop, 1997; MacKinnon, 
2012b). The third state reorganisation process is the internationalisation of policy regimes, 
based upon the increasing interconnections between individuals, local, regional and national 
state institutions in different countries. This highly complex form of governance enables 
policy transfer processes to take place between countries and subsequent policy adaptation 
to occur, according national political-economic environments (Jessop, 1997; MacKinnon, 
2012b; Hall & Soskice, 2001). These state rescaling and reorganising activities represent a 
qualitative shift in the role of the state through a ‘transformational’ process, demonstrating 
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a complex reorganisation and adaptive process facilitated by national state governments 
(MacKinnon, 2012b; Peck, 2001; O’Neill, 1997). However, throughout institutional economic 
geography, questions regarding the influence of political and multiscalar governance upon 
regional development and growth have been largely unheeded (Hanssen et al, 2011; 
Tomaney, 2014; Hassink et al, 2019).   
 
Governance on sub-national and sub-regional spatial scales allows for effective 
implementation of development strategies in a place-sensitive manner and efficient 
deployment of local and regional institutional resources (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; Pike & 
Tomaney, 2009). For governance to occur on sub-national spatial scales a process of 
devolution is required, which has been marked a global trend of devolution and 
decentralisation of power (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003; Armstrong & Taylor, 2000). 
Devolution involves the decentralisation (transfer) of power from central government to 
sub-national government organisations, thus allowing the latter to gain financial and human 
“resources”, political “authority and responsibility”, and “strong subnational legitimacy” 
(Rodríguez-Pose & Gill 2003, pp335). Political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation from 
national scales to local and regional scales is an ongoing, continuously changing and global 
phenomenon, whereby nation states seek to improve socio-economic development 
outcomes at lower spatial scales (Tomaney, 2014). The complex process of devolution 
demonstrates the ongoing power of state governments to shape and transform institutional 
environments and arrangements in regions (MacKinnon et al, 2009; Martin, 2010). This has 
been viewed as incrementally ‘unfolding’ in the UK context through rounds of state 
restructuring and rescaling processes (MacKinnon, 2015; Shaw & MacKinnon; 2011; Pike et 
al, 2012). Newly transformed institutional arrangements following devolution of power and 
resource can heighten a region’s institutional capacity to catalyse path creation and 
adaptation (MacKinnon et al, 2009; Martin, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006). This catalytic 
process would be operationalised through local and regional state (and non-state) 
institutions connecting territorial assets to wider production networks and flows of capital 
investment, thus enabling strategic coupling (Coe & Hess, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012a; Coe & 
Yeung, 2015). Therefore, by incorporating extra-regional networks, local state (and non-
state) institutions increase the possibility of generating path creation and adaptation 




Additionally, the devolution of power and resources often enables the ability of sub-national 
and sub-regional state organisations and development agencies to strategically mobilise 
non-state actors such as firms, universities and research institutions in order to successfully 
govern economic “manifestations of uneven development” (Labao et al, 2009, pp8; Pike & 
Tomaney, 2009). As previously demonstrated throughout discussions of empirical examples, 
the collective mobilisation of regional and sub-regional state (and non-state) actors is crucial 
for catalysing path creation, diversification, transplantation and adaptation (Simmie, 2012; 
Neffke et al, 2011; Fornahl et al, 2012; Dawley, 2014). The thesis will seek to add to these 
empirical examples by exploring the ways devolved local and regional governance 
institutions are important for catalysing port adaptation within a multiscalar governance 
approach (Hanssen et al, 2011; Martin & Sunley, 2006). To gain a greater understanding of 
the roles regional institutions and governance play in shaping adaptation, diversification and 
path creation, the chapter must explore the role of multiscalar policy environments (Martin, 
2010; Dawley et al, 2015). 
 
Institutions “make behaviour, rather than simply reflecting it” (Peck & Theodore, 2007, 
pp745; Hall & Soskice, 2001). The policies macro and meso level institutions implement 
differ between nation states, due to the nature of capitalism being diverse across space (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001). Therefore, the corporate strategies devised by firms and similar private or 
private-public institutions, run parallel to the predominant institutional structures of the 
political economy, which vary between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs) (Hall & Soskice, 2001). In LMEs firms organise their economic 
activities and corporate strategies in alignment with competitive markets. By contrast, in 
CMEs, firms operate with an agenda of constructing strategic partnerships and 
collaborations, whilst relying heavily upon non-market actors, such as the state, to build core 
economic competencies. Moreover, Hall & Soskice (2001, ppp6-7) focus upon five spheres, 
namely industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-
firm relations and employees, in which firms must develop relationships to settle 
“coordination problems central to their core competencies” (Peck & Theodore, 2007).  
However, the ways in which firms carry out this process are fundamentally shaped by 
coordinating state and non-state institutions, whose institutional character is irrepressible 
and differs between LMEs and CMEs (Hall & Soskice, 2001).This theoretical perspective is 
very important for analysing the governance, adaptation and diversification of particular 
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institutions operating in varying political-economic settings, together with differing 
multiscalar institutional environments and policy contexts (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Martin, 
2010; 2000).  
 
The original discussions of the varieties of capitalism by Hall & Soskice (2001), have been 
critiqued by Peck and Theodore (2007), who argue that Hall & Soskice (2001) were too 
focused upon defining varieties in the national scale of governance. Furthermore, Ćetković 
et al (2016, pp4) add to this critique and argue that CMEs and LMEs can be ‘simple’, when 
the “state structure is centralized and governing is concentrated in a single authority”, or 
‘compound’, when states “feature multiple authorities.” On a related note, path creation 
and adaptation processes within regions are often stimulated, shaped and controlled by 
centralised state organisations constructing vertical (national industrial strategies) and 
horizontal (legal, regulatory, infrastructure, R&D, market) policy environments (Dawley et al, 
2015; Chang et al, 2013; Hall & Soskice, 2001). In addition, local and regional state 
organisations also implement policies, strategies and initiatives on the regional scale to 
support various non-state economic actors, which subsequently shapes path creation and 
adaptation in regions (Dawley et al, 2015; Morgan, 2013). Therefore, multiscalar governance 
systems often construct policy environments which can enable or constrain path creation, 
industrial diversification and adaptation within regions (Martin, 2010; Boschma & Frenken, 
2011; Dawley et al, 2015).  
 
2.4 Port governance 
 
The core focus of the thesis is to gain a deeper and more advanced understanding of how 
the process of port adaptation unfolds, whilst simultaneously exploring how port authorities 
as key actors influence local and regional path creation as an outcome of port adaptation. 
Path creation, diversification and adaptation have all been applied to exploring the ‘region’ 
as a socio-economic entity in EEG. However, they can also be applied to ports as overlooked 
institutions and economic actors in processes of local and regional path creation because 
ports are actively involved in shaping processes of path creation, diversification and 
adaptation by harnessing and valorising port assets for new industries emerging within 
regions (Notteboom, 2016; MacKinnon et al, 2009; Morgan, 2013; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999). Port adaptation, diversification and evolution is dependent upon “past decisions, 
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processes and institutional contexts”, whilst future decisions and “proactive strategies by 
various stakeholders” may enable a port to branch towards new development paths (Monios 
& Wilmsmeier, 2016, pp247; Notteboom, 2016). Consequently, certain actions taken by 
strategically affiliated governance actors shape the adaptation or conversion of port-related 
assets and a port authority’s overall adaptive capacity (Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Pike et al, 
2010). For ports to fully capitalise upon extra-regional market opportunities and inward 
investment, governance actors in ports and associated local institutions should define clear 
trajectories of adaptation through dynamic leadership and decision-making activities (Bailey 
et al, 2010; Notteboom, 2016).  
 
It is important to consider ports as key actors within discussions of local and regional path 
creation because as institutions, ports are fundamentally different to firms. Therefore, ports 
provide a new conceptual and empirical vehicle to view and analyse how ports as important 
actors contribute to occurrences of local and regional path creation. Firstly, ports have a 
different physical and human asset base to firms, referring to the infrastructural, industrial 
material assets located within the port, alongside the specialised labour operating within the 
port (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Alderton, 2008). Secondly, the ways in which ports are 
governed through distinctive governance models, with evidence of state intervention in 
some instances, clearly differs to the ways firms are governed, operating as privatised 
entities operating for profit through directly trading goods or services (Verhoeven, 2010; 
Alderton, 2008). Thirdly, ports are deeply rooted in various localities and regions in terms of 
their physical geography, economic purpose as gateways for trade and commerce, alongside 
the numerous sunk costs in port infrastructure and associated assets (Alderton, 2008; Musso 
et al, 2006). This distinctive embeddedness contrasts the key characteristic of firms and TNCs 
operating in a multiscalar economy, as these private institutions can freely move and 
relocate to seek higher profits, cheaper labour and improved state incentives (Coe & Yeung, 
2015; Smith, 2015).  
 
2.4.1 Port policy and state governance 
 
Interestingly, Debrie et al (2013) emphasise that ports operate in multiscalar institutional 
environments (regulatory, legal, industrial, market), which are controlled and shaped by 
governance decisions made most commonly at the national level by government institutions 
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(Martin, 2010). In many countries with market-orientated political-economic systems, 
transport ministries exercise various executive responsibilities to control ports including 
policy-making, legislation, international relations, economic affairs and auditing procedures 
(World Bank, 2016). Consequently, transport ministries or departments operating in central 
governments often design and control the multiscalar policy environment, whilst shaping 
broader political-economic contexts in which ports operate (World Bank, 2016; MacKinnon 
et al, 2009). However, small to medium sized ports in states which have avoided national 
port privatisation policies are often governed by lower tiers of government or operate as 
independent bodies, following the decentralisation of power from centralised government 
departments (Debrie et al, 2007). Multiple legislative, legal, industrial and market-based 
factors shape the unique ways port authorities govern themselves (Debrie et al, 2013; 
Notteboom et al, 2013; Martin, 2010). By drawing upon existing understandings of 
institutions in EEG, the thesis aims to provide a more advanced understanding of how 
multiscalar institutional environments shape governance models and diversification 
strategies of port governance actors (port authorities and sub-national government 
agencies), which allows us to better understand how port adaptation unfolds (Martin, 2000; 
2010; Gertler, 2010; Pike et al, 2010; Notteboom, 2016; Figure 2.4). 
 
The thesis is particularly concerned with the institutional arrangements of port authorities 
and associated local and regional institutions as key actors in undertaking the conversion of 
physical assets, then subsequently shaping the port as a key site of adaptation and 
diversification (Boas, 2007; Martin & Sunley, 2006). The conversion of port-related 
(infrastructural, industrial, material) assets can enable the diversification of ports towards 
new or emerging markets (Boas, 2007; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Martin & Sunley, 2006). 
By applying conversion in this manner, the project empirically develops conversion and 
moves beyond abstract theoretical uses of conversion (Boas, 2007; Thelen, 2003; 2004). 
Strategically affiliated governance actors with local and regional institutions can adapt and 
realign territorial assets to serve new markets, in order to fit the interests of focal firms and 
TNCs operating in extra-regional networks (Boas; 2007; Streek & Thelen, 2005; Coe & Yeung, 
2015). Consequently, local and regional government institutions and development agencies 
work in association and strategic alignment with ports for adaptation to occur (Rodriquez- 
Pose, 2013; Todtling, 2011; Pike et al, 2010). A governance process involving the coordinated 
planning, design and implementation of bottom-up strategies and initiatives to catalyse new 
38 
 
port developments is increasingly important (Moglia & Sanguineri, 2003; Todtling, 2011). 
Territorially specific port governance models and processes within port authorities or 
operators, shape how ports adapt, diversify and succeed (Debrie et al, 2013; Meersman & 
Voorde, 2010). Therefore, the chapter needs to analyse and discuss how different 
governance models, functions, strategies and decision-making processes shape the 
adaptation of ports (Debrie et al, 2013; Verhoeven, 2010; Martin, 2010). 
 
2.4.2 Port governance models  
 
Ports are governed by port authority models established by national or regional state 
institutions depending upon each national political-economic framework (World Bank, 
2016). There have been several scholars in recent years attempting to theorise how ports 
are governed and subsequently interact with external public institutions in order to 
understand how port governance changes over time and subsequently shapes port 
performance, development and adaptation. Firstly, Baltazar and Brooks (2007) provide an 
interesting ‘Matching Framework’ account of port governance in their analysis of Canadian 
ports. The ‘Matching Framework’ is made up of three interacting features consisting of an 
operating environment fluctuating in political and economic certainty, an established 
strategy for ports competing in certain markets and a structure, defining the degree to which 
decisions are made centrally or autonomously by individual ports (Figure 2.2) (Baltazar & 








Figure 2.2: The ‘Matching Framework’ port governance model 
Source: Baltazar & Brooks, 2007, pp384 
 
This rather simplistic model was critiqued and developed by an account by Brooks and Pallis 
(2008), which argued that the formulation, change and reform of port governance models is 
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because of ‘external environments’. Pre-reform and post-reform external environments 
consist of highly influential national port policies and regulations from national government 
institutions, alongside business development strategies implemented by private port 
operators, shifting markets and external focal firms or TNCs (Brooks & Pallis, 2008). 
Therefore, external environments consisting of exogenous port markets and policy 
frameworks set by national governments, as defined by Brooks and Pallis (2008), intrinsically 
influence the microlevel governance decisions made within an individual port to alter port 
governance models, long-term development strategies and subsequently enable or constrain 
a port’s industrial path (Martin, 2010). 
 
The notion of ‘external environments’ made by Brooks and Pallis (2008) is linked to Martin’s 
(2010) account, of how (external) multiscalar policy environments and institutional 
arrangements shape local path creation, institutional governance, diversification and 
adaptation. The thesis will theoretically combine these accounts which present a gap for 
empirical investigation (Brooks & Pallis, 2008; Martin, 2010). The account by Brooks and 
Pallis (2008) argues that historical formulation, change and reform of port governance 
models is shaped by multiscalar institutions, national political-economic contexts and policy 
(legal, legislative, industrial, market) environments (Brooks & Pallis, 2008; Martin, 2010; Ng 
& Pallis, 2010). Subsequently, this complex governance process shapes the port as a key site 
of diversification, and the incremental building of adaptation capacity of a port authority 
(Martin & Sunley, 2006; Notteboom, 2016).    
 
On a global scale, there have been two trends of devolution and privatisation, in order to 
transfer power from national state institutions to local or regional state institutions or 
remove state ownership and management of ports, the latter being particular evident in the 
UK (Debrie et al, 2007; Petitt, 2008). Throughout the 1990s there was widespread 
privatisation in the global ports industry catalysing the emergence of private port operators, 
essentially acting as TNCs to operate ports across regions, nations and even continents 
(Oliver & Slack, 2006). The majority of national governments across the globe have followed 
the devolution trend with the exception of some developing and undeveloped states, thus 
creating unique port governance models which differ from state to state (Debrie et al, 2007; 




To better understand these trends, Brooks and Cullinane (2007b) formulated a range of  port 
ownership, management and control combinations following devolution of power to lower 
tiers of government or privatisation of ports (Table 2.1). ‘Ownership’ is simply the legal 
possession of port land, infrastructure and superstructure, alongside the responsibility of 
providing capital investment (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Table 2.1). ‘Management’ refers to 
central management activities including development planning, financing, maintenance of 
infrastructure, real estate management and general port operations (Brooks & Cullinane, 
2007b; World Bank, 2016; Table 2.1). ‘Control’ relates the allocation of governing control to 
a port authority following the decentralisation of power and resources, or the allocation of 
governing control to a private body (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b). This control encompasses 
decision making on investment approvals, conceiving and implementing a range of policies 
(financial, tariff, labour), strategic usage of assets and resources, licencing users, employees 
or agents, power to obtain and analyse port information, and responsibility for full recovery 
of port-related costs (World Bank, 2016; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b). Finally, port authorities 
have varying levels of accountability in terms of their responsibility for enabling broader 
local and regional development. This may take place through investment into port 
(infrastructural, industrial, material, natural) assets, which influences the wider development 
and growth of connected port-related industries in the adjacent locality or region (Langen, 
2007).  
 
 Port Governance Dimensions 
Governance 
Characteristics  
Public:  Central - 
Local 







(federal, regional or 
municipal). 
 
Trust (local): Independent 
statutory body (established 








Private body: via 
concession, lease 
agreement or public-private 
arrangement. 
 











Government body (federal, 
regional or municipal) or 
private body (corporatised 
entity, state owned). 
 
Trust (local): Independent 
statutory body (influenced 
by local stakeholders). 
Private 
body  
Table 2.1: Allocation of port governance practices following decentralisation of control 
Source: Adapted from Brooks & Cullinane (2007b) 
 
International examples of the port governance model classifications in Table 2.1 would 
include the Port of Colombo as Public (Central), the Port of Shanghai as Public (Central - 
Local), the Port of Sunderland as Public (Local), the Port of Rotterdam as Mixed (Public - 
Private), the Port of Liverpool as Private and the Port of Tyne as a Trust port. However, the 
fact remains throughout the literature on ports that categorising and comparing port 
governance remains challenging as all ports operate in varying political, economic, social and 
fiscal environments (Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Brooks & Pallis, 2008). Despite this 
ongoing challenge, Suykens & Van de Voorde (1998), provide an insightful account which 
acknowledges the differing political, economic, social and fiscal environments between 
nation states and regions, especially in Europe, which is discussed below (Hall & Soskice, 
2001). Complementing this account, Verhoeven (2010, pp251) recognises the need for 
geographically sensitive definitions of governance models. He argues that ports are not 
single units and are shaped by complex interactions with multiple private and public actors 
on multiple scales, thus creating a very complex array of both internal and external 
“economic, societal and public policy stakeholders.” In addition, Alderton (2008) points out 
that ownership categories, such as state ownership, autonomous bodies, municipal 
ownership or private ownership, may be a combination of two or three of these categories. 
The discussion will now move onto to discuss port governance models in Europe based upon 
Suykens & Van de Voorde (1998) and several other associated accounts.  
 
The ‘Anglo-Saxon’ port governance model, as termed by Suykens & Van de Voorde (1998), is 
aligned to port authorities being ‘independent’ private organisations responsible for port 
ownership, management and control, outlined ‘Private’ in Table 2.1 (Brooks & Cullinane, 
2007b). Additionally, trust ports align to the Anglo-Saxon port governance model, as they’re 
essentially ‘independent’ statutory bodies created through a legislative Act of Parliament 
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(Baird & Valentine, 2007; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998). Trust ports consist of no 
shareholder ownership, receive no UK government funding and operates on a commercial 
basis for multiple stakeholders (Baird & Valentine, 2007). However, unlike private ports, 
trust ports are characterised by mix of public-private ownership, management and control 
practices, unique to the UK port governance context (Table 2.1) (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; 
Baird & Valentine, 2007). In the UK, the Anglo-Saxon model is clearly evident as there is no 
centralised port regulator controlled by the state, therefore responsibilities have been 
decentralised to private and independent interests (World Bank, 2016; Petitt, 2008). 
Moreover, especially in the current UK political-economic climate, there has been a lack of 
public financing for port infrastructure provision following rapid privatisation of the ports 
industry in the 1980s and 1990s causing some opposition to total private ownership, 
management and control over investment decisions (Baird, 2004). The governance 
processes, investment strategies and practices within a private port are profit-based, flexible 
and market-orientated, thus public involvement in producing plans and development 
strategies for private ports is often minimal or totally absent (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; 
World Bank, 2016). The Anglo-Saxon port governance model heavily relies upon high levels 
of revenue and finance (Verhoeven, 2010). Although this model certainly brings some 
economic benefits such as readily available capital for (re)investment into port-related 
assets, it can also lead to decreasing levels of investment due to risk averse investment 
strategies (Verhoeven, 2010; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). Decreasing investment into 
assets can occur if the port is underperforming because of an economic shock, such as 
disinvestment from a partnered firm(s) or is undergoing radical internal change through 
governance reform (Verhoeven, 2010; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b). Additionally, privately 
owned, managed and controlled ports often make investments based on past, current or 
certain future market developments, thus operating like a firm in the traditional sense rather 
than a port (Verhoeven, 2010).  
 
A differing port governance model termed by Suykens and Van de Voorde (1998) is the 
‘Hanseatic model’, aligned to a tradition of local, mainly municipal, public governance found 
in Northern Europe and Scandinavia. Although the operation and management of some 
Hanseatic ports has been privatised in recent years, Hanseatic ports still tend to be 
municipally owned, whilst others continue to be operated by the public port authority. This 
governance trend demonstrates a reality found in Northern Europe and Scandinavia, 
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whereby ports maintain characteristics of public institutions as well as private enterprises 
(Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998). Therefore, as seen in Table 2.1, the 
complex governance models found in Hanseatic ports can range from public or mixed 
governance models (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998). The 
Hanseatic port governance model also has greater access to public financing and support, 
therefore a port operating through this governance model will have a different adaptive 
capacity than a port adopting an Anglo-Saxon or Free Port governance model (Suykens & 
Van de Voorde, 1998; Notteboom, 2016). Moreover, Hanseatic ports are more likely to work 
in cooperation with other regional ports, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon ports which tend to 
become embedded within national level port monopiles (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Brooks, 
2004). For example, state ministers, port managers and other key actors from Bremen, 
Lower Saxony and Hamburg meet annually to hold a port development dialogue to discuss 
current port planning strategies from each regional port, alongside other important port and 
industry related topics (Notteboom, 2016). This example is also supported by Notteboom et 
al (2013), wherein they argue that there’s strong political control over the Hanseatic port 
governance model (strategic planning and development) by local, regional and federal state 
authorities in Northern Europe, using the examples of Hamburg and Antwerp to establish 
their arguments.  
 
An alternative model to private, trust or municipally owned ports is the ‘free port’ 
governance model. A free port or zone is designated by a state government and remains 
under full sovereignty of the state, however imported and exported goods are not subject to 
customs laws and limits (Alderton, 2011). The main European examples of free port 
governance models is at the Port of Rotterdam and the Port of Hamburg (Alderton, 2011). 
Despite free port governance models being completely absent in the UK port policy 
framework, a report by the Sunak (2016) has suggested that reforming some of the 
governance models of some ports in Northern England may present lucrative political, 
economic and manufacturing opportunities for ports willing to undergo port governance 
reform. Due to the absence of custom laws on port authorities and companies located 
within a free port or zone, the free port model presents a compelling economic case for 
firms to relocate within free port boundaries to undertake manufacturing activities (Sunak, 
2016). This has been billed as a radical response to the numerous trade deals formulated as 




The existing literature on port governance models provides an insight into how port 
adaptation and diversification can be shaped by how ports are owned and governed by port 
authorities and broader sub-national and national government bodies (Verhoeven, 2010; 
Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998). However, the thesis will turn to literature on the role of 
multiscalar institutions and varieties of capitalism to obtain a more advanced understanding 
of how the ownership and governance of ports are influenced by distinctive forms of 
capitalism and institutional arrangements (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2007; 
Martin, 2010). For example, the Anglo-Saxon port governance model reflects the market 
orientated and profit driven variety of capitalism in the UK as an LME (Liberal Market 
Economy), meaning the majority of ports are privately owned and organise their corporate 
strategies in alignment with competitive port markets (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de 
Voorde, 1998; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2007). By contrast, the Hanseatic port 
governance model reflects the agenda of constructing strategic partnerships and 
collaborations between public institutions and industry in a CME (Co-ordinated Market 
Economy), meaning port authorities in CMEs typically rely on non-market actors, such as the 
state, for ownership and financial resources (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 
1998; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2007). 
 
2.4.3 Port adaptation and diversification 
 
Existing literature in port studies and transport geography, considers port adaptation and 
diversification to be exclusively shaped by port governance models and internal governance 
activities of port authorities, which will be explored in this section (see Notteboom, 2016; 
Debrie et al, 2013; Notteboom & Jacobs, 2011; Jacobs & Lagendijk, 2014). However, to 
provide a more comprehensive grasp of how processes of port adaptation and diversification 
unfold, the thesis will utilise the concepts of adaptation, diversification and path creation 
from EEG and the role of multiscalar institutional environments and governance in shaping 
port adaptation and diversification. 
 
Certain port governance models and in particular the key governance actors (senior 
individuals and boards) within ports will operate differently in relation to one another, in 
terms of directing institutional change and designing diversification strategies, thus altering 
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each port’s capacity to adapt and create new growth paths (Debrie et al, 2013; Notteboom, 
2016). Port governance actors can either instigate proactive or reactive responses to 
external policy or market changes, subsequently shaping the conversion of infrastructural, 
industrial, material and natural assets (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Pike et al, 2010; Brooks 
& Pallis, 2008; Boas, 2007). Notteboom (2016) discusses how building the adaptive capacity 
of a port is an incremental process, driven by an overall port authority mission, ambitions for 
future port development, current territorial assets and resources, and existing capacities 
(Figure 2.3). This incremental process is fundamentally controlled by unique port governance 
models, which can either enable or constrain the port adaptation process (Notteboom, 
2016; Debrie et al, 2013). However, the model proposed by Notteboom (2016) has some 
limitations and overlooks some factors relating to the thesis’ perspective on port adaptation 
and diversification, inspired by concepts and ideas from EEG and the role of institutions. In 
particular, Figure 2.3 lacks focus regarding the specific governance actors who are initiating 
the diversification of infrastructural, industrial, material and natural assets on port sites, to 















Figure 2.3: The process of adaptive capacity building by a port authority 




In relation to the Notteboom (2016) framework, the building of adaptive capacity and the 
activity of adaptation itself can be reconstituted as a process of change which takes places 
through key ‘critical junctures’ over time (Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011). Critical junctures are 
formed based on tactical decisions made by key governance actors, relating to the 
conversion of territorial (infrastructural, industrial, material) assets to align with new market 
opportunities through a process of strategic coupling, as previously discussed (Jacobs & 
Notteboom, 2011; Buitelaar et al, 2007; MacKinnon, 2012a). The thesis will draw upon 
Notteboom’s (2016) notions of a strategic ‘port authority mission’, ambitions or strategies 
for future port development, alongside the existing resources which drive existing adaptive 
capacity of a port. Moreover, the research will principally adopt the idea of a strategic 
mission or ‘vision’, which is strongly influenced by the “governance model under which [a 
port] operates and the legislative [and] economic…environment in which [a port] operates” 
(Brooks, 2004, pp174). These lines of analysis will be harnessed in partnership with the 
dynamic concept of critical junctures formulated Jacobs & Notteboom (2011). 
 
In tandem with this adaptive capacity building process, the strategic decisions made by TNCs 
and focal firms to provide inward investment into a port’s infrastructural, industrial, material 
and natural assets cannot be overlooked as important factors in shaping critical junctures of  
port adaptation (Coe & Yeung, 2015; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011). Furthermore, the strategic 
efforts made by key governance actors within ports in terms of attracting exogenous inward 
investment or FDI, alongside fiscal resources from government bodies, is also an important 
governance process catalysing port adaptation, diversification and eventual critical junctures 
(Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Coe & Yeung, 2015; Smith, 2015). However, diversification is 
the key mechanism in forming a critical juncture in a port’s adaptation process, creating a 
new growth path (Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Martin & Sunley, 2006). Drawing upon the 
role of institutions play in shaping evolutionary processes, the thesis understands port 
diversification as essentially key governance actors endeavouring to diversify the port in an 
intentional direction, based upon new or emerging market opportunities and shaped by 
multiscalar institutional environment (Brooks & Pallis, 2008; Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010).  
 
A port’s overall infrastructure, alongside its adjacent industrial assets and facilities, are key 
components in the supply, assembly, installation, operation and maintenance networks 
embedded within Europe’s offshore wind industry (ESPO, 2016). This means that ports are 
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crucial institutional ‘nodes’ and spaces of economic activity within Europe’s offshore wind 
industry (Hess, 2004; Coe & Yeung, 2015; Dawley et al, 2015). The offshore wind industry 
currently presents a burgeoning market environment for port authorities in the UK and 
Europe to diversify into, through the conversion of infrastructural, industrial, material and 
natural assets, enabled by strategic planning and decisions made by key governance actors 
(Guardian, 2016; Boas, 2007; Brooks & Pallis, 2008). Therefore, offshore wind is a major 
market for ports to diversify into, align existing resources and assets towards and base 
adaptation strategies upon, to ultimately create a new growth path (Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin & Sunley, 2006). However, in relation to the previous discussion of port governance 
models, ports operating under the Anglo-Saxon model tend to be more focused on profit 
maximisation, reflecting their dependence on private revenue and finance, compared to 
higher levels of public support and finance in the Hanseatic ports (Verhoeven 2010; Suykens 
& Van de Voorde, 1998). This has emerged as a significant barrier to diversification into the 
offshore market in the UK context given the high levels of investment required to enhance 
port infrastructures to industrial standards (Dawley et al, 2015).  
 
Chapter 2 has considered a range of literature from the areas of EEG (Evolutionary Economic 
Geography), institutions and governance, and current literature on port governance and 
diversification. A central aim of the research is to identify and apply concepts and ideas 
found in EEG and in discussions on institutions and governance, to help inform existing 
understandings of port adaptation and diversification in port studies and transport 
geography. However, the research will only draw upon certain concepts and ideas from the 
areas of EEG, institutions and governance, in order to provide a more comprehensive and 
deeper understanding of how port adaptation and diversification processes unfold, which 
will inform an analytical framework for grasping processes of port adaptation and 
diversification. 
 
The research will apply adaptation as a concept from the sub-field of EEG, recognising it as 
an overarching process by which ports evolve over a long-term period, in response to 
external changes and challenges in policy and market environments (Pike et al, 2010; Martin, 
2010). The research will draw upon diversification as a concept from EEG, applying it as an 
underlying process by which ports harness and valorise assets to capture new market 
opportunities, which drives the broader process of port adaptation and change (Martin & 
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Sunley, 2006; Pike et al, 2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). The thesis will also utilise the 
concept of transplantation as a concept for explaining how external firms from new markets 
invest and move into port sites, thus influencing the port adaptation and diversification 
process (Martin & Sunley, 2006). However, the research is concerned with transplantation in 
the context of diversification occurring, meaning it will be excluded from the analytical 
framework (Martin & Sunley, 2006; MacKinnon, 2012a). The thesis will also use the concept 
of path creation, to help identify the broader regional outcomes of the port adaptation and 
diversification process (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010; MacKinnon et al, 2019). 
Furthermore, the research will draw upon the notion of territorial (infrastructural and 
material, industrial, natural, institutional, human) assets, which is emerging as an important 
idea in EEG and can support the explanation of how port assets influence processes of port 
adaptation and diversification (see Dawley et al, 2018; MacKinnon et al, 2019). To better 
understand how port adaptation and diversification are catalysed, the research will draw 
upon the notion of ‘conversion’ found in literature discussing institutional change (Boas, 
2007; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2003; Martin, 2010). However, the thesis uses 
conversion in a different way in comparison to its traditional understanding and application 
in exploring institutional change, by recognising it as a distinctive mode of investment which 
re-orientates existing assets to support new activities and thus catalyses the diversification 
of ports into new markets (Boas, 2007; Martin, 2010). The research aims to add to existing 
understandings of how port adaptation and diversification are stimulated, by identifying 
‘expansion’ as a mode of investment which enables the construction of new port assets and 
the diversification of ports into new market activities (Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016).  
 
To provide further theoretical clarification to these concepts utilised within the thesis, their 
contrasting levels of abstraction require a deeper explanation. The concepts of path 
creation, adaptation and adaptive capacity (supporting adaptation), are at the highest level 
of abstraction (Pike et al, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006; Martin, 2010). It is important to note 
that path creation emerges as an outcome of port adaptation and is therefore not the main 
conceptual focus of the thesis, which is to better comprehend the underpinnings of port 
adaptation and diversification (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). The process of 
diversification sits at a lower level of abstraction than adaptation, due to its more tangible 
focus upon diversifying assets for new market purposes (Martin, 2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999). The process of transplantation sits at the same level of abstraction as diversification 
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due to its focus upon firms (Martin & Sunley, 2006). However, as transplantation is purely a 
process of firm implantation occurring in tandem with diversification means it is not the 
primary focus of the thesis, which is primarily concerned with obtaining a more granular 
understanding of the underpinnings, drivers and causality of port adaptation and 
diversification (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Coe & Yeung, 2015).  Conversion and 
expansion sit at the lowest level of abstraction given their nature as distinctive modes of 
investment for changing assets on greenfield or brownfield land, which influence the 
processes of diversification, adaptation and adaptative capacity sitting at higher levels of 
abstraction (Boas, 2007; Martin, 2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999).  
 
2.5 An analytical framework for port adaptation and diversification 
 
The thesis is seeking to develop an analytical framework to investigate the processes of port 
adaptation and diversification. Broader regional path creation emerges as an outcome of 
port adaptation and diversification. The analytical framework provides a foundation for 
investigating the actors who are “actually (doing the) evolving in the economic landscape”, 
together with the important processes and mechanisms facilitating adaptation and path 
creation, whilst interconnecting multiscalar “research objects, subjects and levels” (Pike et 
al, 2016a, pp129; Martin, 2010). Ports exist as key sites of adaptation and diversification, 
whilst port authorities and (sub)-regional government agencies simultaneously operate as 
important intra-regional actors in shaping port adaptation and diversification. Figure 2.4 
demonstrates the analytical framework for analysing port adaptation and diversification. 
Figure 2.4 proposes an analytical framework to explore the adaptation and diversification of 
port sites by port authorities and associated government organisations, who subsequently 
catalyse, initiate and implement the adaptation and diversification of port assets. The overall 
adaptation and diversification process is strongly influenced by ports and (sub)-regional 
government agencies operating as key intra-regional actors. In a broader sense the port 
exists as a key site which is the focus of adaptation and often neglected throughout EEG 






Figure 2.4: An analytical framework for analysing port adaptation and diversification 
Source: Author 
 
In Figure 2.4, the ‘assets’ are a port’s pre-existing port asset base, formed of infrastructural 
and material, industrial, natural, institutional and human assets (see Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999; MacKinnon et al, 2018). However, this thesis will focus upon the diversification of the 
infrastructural, material and industrial assets of the port (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
MacKinnon et al, 2018). The key ‘actors’ are the port authority, (sub)-regional government 
agencies and private firms from a new market, who strategically determine and shape which 
assets are diversified to serve new market-orientated purposes. The existing nature of the 
assets influence which ‘modes of investment’ are selected by the key actors. The modes of 
investment comprise of conversion (investment provision for the changing of existing 
infrastructural, material and industrial assets for new uses on brownfield land) and 
expansion (investment provision for the growth of new infrastructural, material and 
industrial assets for new uses on greenfield land). The mode of investment made by the port 
authority is fundamentally shaped by the port governance model, as this influences the port 
authority’s overall vision, investment approach, powers, responsibilities and resources. As 
actors, port authorities, (sub)-regional government agencies and private firms are all 
influenced by and sit within multiscalar institutional environments. The multiscalar 
institutional environments, consisting of market, institutional, policy, legislative and legal 
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arrangements, essentially enable and/or constrain the capacity of actors to instigate the key 
‘modes of investment’. Ultimately, broader regional path creation emerges as an outcome of 
the interaction between the elements within the analytical framework and a port’s overall 
adaptation and diversification. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
Chapter 2 has recognised the key roles of actors and agency in EEG and therefore the 
research will unpack the interactions between port authorities, national and sub-national 
government agencies and offshore wind firms, to provide a more advanced understanding of 
the causality of port adaptation and diversification (Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010; Steen & 
Hansen, 2018; Grillitsch & Sotarauta, 2018). Chapter 2 has also highlighted the importance 
of drawing upon and informing existing literature on port governance models, by 
considering how varying forms of capitalism and governance shape how port authorities are 
owned and governed across different national contexts, which influences how port 
adaptation and diversification occurs (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2007; 
Verhoeven, 2010). Finally, Chapter 2 has emphasised the importance of drawing upon 
discussions on the varieties of capitalism, as distinctive national institutional arrangements 
and environments enable and constrain how port authorities, sub-national government 
agencies and firms interact and drive port adaptation and diversification (Hall & Soskice, 


















This chapter describes, explains and justifies the research design, case study approach, 
comparative case studies and qualitative methods selected to explore and answer the 
following research questions:  
 
1. What forms of port diversification have been developed by port authorities and   
associated regional institutions?  
2. In what ways do port ownership and governance models shape a port’s capacity to 
adapt? 
3. How do multiscalar institutional environments enable and/or constrain port 
adaptation? 
 
The analytical framework’s principal aim is to clarify and emphasise the ‘who’, ‘what’, 
‘where’ and ‘why’ questions in connection to ‘doing’ evolution in the economic landscape 
(Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2016a). The purpose of the analytical framework is to identify and 
explore key sites, research objects, actors and mechanisms ‘doing’ the evolving of the 
research objects, and articulate an overall outcome (Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2016a). This 
approach clarifies the analytical focus and attempts to connect research objects, subjects 
and levels together (Pike et al, 2016a).  
 
The overall aim of the thesis is to better understand and assess processes of port adaptation 
and diversification, based upon the role of local institutions harnessing and valorising 
inherited and geographically specific port-related assets. By exploring two comparative port 
case studies, the research seeks to address key challenges of comparative work within EEG 
research (Pike et al, 2016a; Coe, 2011; Grabher, 2009). The principal challenges include 
ensuring rigour and robustness of theoretical frameworks and concepts through broadening 
the type and scope of comparative case studies in EEG research, moving beyond examining 
and comparing ‘typical’ research objects in EEG (firms, industries and networks), as well as 
conducting EEG research in different spatial contexts beyond the regional or city-region 




The chapter is structured by the following sections around ontological and epistemological 
positioning, research design (including the case study approach, the empirical focus and case 
study selection), methods of data collection including ethics, data analysis and ending with a 
short conclusion.  
 
3.2 Ontological and Epistemological positioning 
 
In connection to the research questions, the thesis needs to obtain specific knowledge and 
evidence to better understand how unique forms of port conversion and diversification have 
been established, how the governance of ports shapes their capacity to diversify into new 
markets, and how external environmental factors shape port diversification and adaptation.  
 
Pike et al (2016) discuss the need for EEG research to investigate comparative cases from 
different geographical settings, examining causal mechanisms, agents, structured relations 
and multiscalar networks. This approach involves a “deep contextualisation” of objects, 
mechanisms, actors, human agency and networks in relation to the economic development 
case(s) under investigation, which may be endogenous or exogenous to the case(s) itself 
(Pike et al, 2016a, pp132; Martin & Sunley, 2015a). Essentially, the qualitative 
methodological approach developed by Pike et al (2016) applies EEG concepts, mechanisms 
and notions to empirical cases to better understand the underlying causality of evolution in 
the economic landscape (Peet, 1998; Martin, 2010). This EEG methodological approach 
developed by Pike et al (2016) is central to the project’s approach and largely reflects a 
critical realist position (Peet, 1998). Therefore, the critical realist position supports the 
approach the research is taking, as it similarly suggests that exploring causality, human 
agency, structured relations and networks in the socio-economic landscape is crucial for fully 
understanding empirical cases (Peet, 1998; Graham, 2005).  
 
A critical realist position fundamentally sees that real, concrete social entities or objects 
“have causal powers, which can be evoked under certain circumstances” and are 
“interrelated through causal mechanisms”, arguing that social science research must be 
undertaken through actual, concrete research (Peet, 1998, pp166; Bhaskar, 1978; 1979; 
Sayer, 1984). Originally devised by Bhaskar (1978) and further developed by Sayer (1984; 
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1992), critical realism sees concrete (social) objects, which vary in scale from multinational 
corporations to a household, as being embedded and as a part of wider structures and 
relations (Peet, 1998; Sayer, 1991). In particular, critical realism is concerned with the 
internal, causal powers of objects or knowledgeable agents and “their ways of acting”, 
otherwise defined as mechanisms (Peet, 1998, pp170; Sayer, 1984). The effects of causal 
powers and mechanisms are shaped by and dependent upon external and contextual, 
contingent conditions constituted within wider structures and relations (Peet, 1998; Sayer, 
1984; Yeung, 1997). Critical realism was devised to counter the problem of applying “theory 
at the concrete level without due regard for contingent mediations” (Sayer, 1985, pp270; 
Barnes et al, 2007). To do this, critical realism recognises and captures a reality of multiple 
layers comprised of structured relations, mechanisms and outcomes embedded within an 
open system, forming an exclusive discourse and language (Peet, 1998; Barnes et al, 2007). 
Moreover, critical realism attempts to reconcile the important relationship and bridge the 
gap between theoretical and empirical research within critical realism and human geography 
(Yeung, 1997; Pratt, 1995). Fundamentally, critical realism must act as a philosophical 
guideline in the process of selecting appropriate (multiple) methods, in order to conduct 
empirical research in human and economic geography (Yeung, 1997; Pratt, 1995).  
 
Interestingly, critical realism can be situated in contrast with various philosophical 
standpoints. Originally, the formation of critical realist thought drew inspiration from 
Marxism, as it is similarly concerned with exploring the relations between and human 
agency of individuals, which underpin and shape socio-economic phenomena (Bhaskar, 
1978; 1979; Peet, 1998). Also, critical realism partly aligns to positivist thought, as both 
positions perceive social objects and human action to be as a result of real causes (Peet, 
1998; Eridisngha, 2012; Graham, 2005). However, positivism is concerned with exploring a 
singular empirical reality, whereas critical realism argues that there’s a “layered reality” of 
relations, mechanisms and outcomes (Barnes et al, 2007, pp7). Furthermore, linkages 
between empiricism and critical realism are evident as both philosophical standpoints 
underline the need for observing and collecting empirical evidence to formulate causal 
explanations of reality (Graham, 2005). However, critical realism contrasts interpretivist 
thought, as interpretivism views concrete entities or objects as socially constructed and aims 
to find meanings in human behaviour, rather than alluding to causal power and mechanisms 
as factors in forming social objects and events (Peet, 1998; Eridisngha, 2012). Therefore, the 
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project seeks to utilise and integrate a critical realist position through an approach suggested 
by Pike et al (2016), by exploring causal mechanisms, human agency, actors, relations and 
structures which are underpinning and influencing socio-economic ‘research’ objects, 
processes and events (Peet, 1998). 
 
On an important note, the thesis is conducting an empirical investigation of comparative 
cases through collecting rich primary data which is theoretically informed by multiple 
concepts, notions and mechanisms situated in EEG (Pike et al, 2016a). This will involve trying 
to uncover the complexities of unique mechanisms and human agency, which shape the 
structured relations between social objects and actors (Pike et al, 2016a; Peet, 1998; Taylor, 
2016). Consequently, the thesis will take a critical realist ontological and epistemological 
position, as the project is seeking to better understand the causal mechanisms, human 
agency and relations, actors and networks which underpin and shape real socio-economic 
objects, events and phenomena (Peet, 1998). Additionally, this position also interconnects 
with a growing epistemological and methodological issue in EEG, whereby scholars are 
seeking to “bridge theory with empiricism” through comparative studies, in order to 
separate “place-bound (evolutionary) properties from universal ones” (Kogler, 2015, pp709). 
By taking a critical realist philosophical position, the project will gain deeper insights into 
how causal mechanisms, human agency, and the structured relations between actors 
operating within multiscalar networks, underpin and shape port adaptation, diversification 
and regional path creation (Peet, 1998; Pike et al, 2016a). Moreover, Pike et al (2016) argue 
it is important to take a comparative case study approach through an EEG perspective over a 
period of time, thus taking a longitudinal approach as opposed to a snapshot comparison, to 
better understand the influence of multiscalar actors, settings and national contexts across 
different cases. As such, the project takes a comparative case study approach to investigate 
the similarities and differences between multiscalar factors (causal mechanisms, human 
agency, actors, structured relations and networks) and national contexts shaping port 







3.3 Research design 
 
3.3.1 Case study approach 
 
Case studies have been recognised as a research approach to investigate social phenomena 
within its actual everyday context and to explore ‘how’ and ‘why’ social phenomena works 
(Yin, 2014). Case studies are often used in tandem with different qualitative research 
methods, whilst being sensitive to geographical contexts on different spatial scales 
(Siggelkow, 2007; Baxter, 2010).  Essentially, case study investigations enable the rigorous 
investigation of a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’ or ‘cases’) within real-world 
settings (Yin, 2014). Moreover, case studies attempt to identify the “in-depth nuances” of 
the case(s) and the “contextual (social, economic and political) influences” upon the case(s) 
(Baxter, 2010, pp81; Yin, 2014). In relation to the aims of the research project and 
methodology, the guiding principle of the case study approach concerns the requirement to 
‘get inside’ the case(s), to better understand the port adaptation process through ‘close 
dialogue’ with key actors, economic agents and organisations (Clark, 1998). In particular, 
close dialogue is about the researcher gaining a deeper understanding of a respondent’s 
circumstances and opinions “against (preconceived) informed expectations”, which is guided 
by defined questions and points of references in the theoretical literature (Clark, 2007, 
pp191).  
 
A general and common misunderstanding within social science research is that one cannot 
generalise based on case study analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Flyvbjerg (2006) strongly argues 
case study research can contribute to theoretical and (social) scientific development through 
providing in-depth and context dependent knowledge (Yin, 2009; Silverman, 2013). Flyvbjerg 
(2006, pp228) goes onto argue that the “force of example is underestimated” in the social 
sciences. Meaning that case study analysis can contribute to the enhancement and 
progression of social science through in-depth explorations of case(s), to identify hidden 
realities by accessing knowledge existing “behind closed doors” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp228). 
Furthermore, the case study approach typically involves an “intensive” research technique, 
asking ‘how’ processes work in cases, ‘why’ these processes occur, ‘what’ actors ‘do’ within 
cases and ‘what’ mechanisms and processes catalyse changes in the object(s), actors and 
contexts comprising a case study (Bradshaw & Stratford, 2010, pp71; Platt, 1988). Intensive 
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research seeks to ‘challenge’ theory by engaging with diverse empirical cases, which is 
marked by a process of moving between “theoretical explanations and cases, revising 
explanations along the way” (Barnes et al, 2007, pp5; Sayer & Morgan, 1985). Thus, the 
intensive research technique embedded within the case study approach seeks to uncover 
causal mechanisms and processes shaping certain objects, actors and events (Barnes et al, 
2007; Pike et al, 2016a). This is principally what the intensive research technique and case 
study approach adopted within the project endeavours to ascertain.  
 
Case studies are concrete, specific and are bounded within time and space, despite being 
highly complex in certain instances (Taylor, 2013; Stake, 2005). Through this lens, case 
studies are also viewed as a ‘space’ of interrelationships and networks made up of multiple 
actors and multiple institutions (Taylor, 2013). Moreover, the case study as a ‘space’ is also 
viewed as a product of geographically differentiated historical and social relations which 
produce place-specific outcomes (Massey, 2005; Taylor, 2013). This conceptual perspective 
in the literature directly relates to the project’s philosophical and methodological position of 
critical realism. This is because the project is aiming to better understand the causal 
mechanisms underpinning and shaping port adaptation, diversification and regional path 
creation, which transpire within place-specific structures and networks of related agents and 
institutions (Peet, 1998; Massey, 2005; Taylor, 2013). Moreover, the project’s case study 
approach aligns with contemporary approaches within EEG when investigating local and 
regional cases, by exploring research objects, subjects and multiscalar levels, whilst 
“capturing agency and context” through a “deep contextualization” of “sociospatial 
relations, mechanisms and processes” (Pike et al, 2016a, pp139; Barnes et al, 2007).  
 
As EEG is a relatively youthful sub-field within economic geography, it is still developing a 
substantial body of empirical work focused upon comparing cases of various economic 
activities situated in different (international) geographical contexts (Pike et al, 2016a; 
Grabher, 2009). This connects to a broader methodological condition within economic 
geography and EEG, which is to make empirical studies “more comparable, transparent, and 
cumulative” (Boschma & Frenken, 2009, pp156). In EEG, comparative case studies have been 
underutilised, are increasingly demanded throughout the literature and used in a relatively 
narrow manner through certain research objects including firms, industries, cities and 
networks (Pike et al, 2016a; Coe, 2011). A comparative case study approach through an EEG 
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perspective should account for the influence of multiscalar actors, settings and national 
contexts across different cases (Pike et al, 2016a). Therefore, the project utilises a 
comparative case study approach to broaden the existing type and scope of comparative 
cases in EEG, through comparing two port cases with differing multiscalar actors and 
national contexts. Additionally, the project utilises a comparative case study approach to 
conduct EEG research across diverse spatial contexts by providing an alternative research 
object, the port as a site of adaptation.  
 
Existing comparative studies of port adaptation and evolution between (and within) nations 
and regions tend to examine the internal arrangements of port authorities and analyse 
trends in quantitative data. (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Lagendijk, 2014; Wang & Ducruet, 
2013; Ducruet & Itoh, 2016). Less attention has been paid to investigating and comparing 
the underlying contexts, influences, key governance actors and mechanisms underpinning 
port adaptation, diversification and regional path creation across two cases (Yin, 2014; Pike 
et al, 2016a).  
 
To tackle the theoretical and methodological issues in EEG and port studies, the thesis will 
articulate contrasting but comparable findings between cases within different international 
settings (Pike et al, 2016a). This will be enabled by an embedded local and regional 
comparative case study approach (Barnes et al, 2007; Pike et al, 2016a). A distended case 
approach explores the “situational (local) depth” of policy networks to understand processes 
shaping local objects, subjects and settings, without sacrificing the “‘low-flying’ network-
centric” approach, which seeks to understand the transnational mutuality of policy contexts 
across multiple sites (Peck & Theodore, 2012, pp25). Similarly, the thesis’ local and regional 
comparative case study approach will be open to broader linkages between case study sites 
and multiscalar (extra-regional and intra-regional) actors, operating within global production 
networks (GPNs) (Barnes et al, 2007; Pike et al, 2016a; Coe et al, 2015). The thesis’ case 
study approach contrasts with the traditional, tightly bound local and regional case study 
approach which overlooks the role of linkages and relationships between the case study and 
external institutions, actors and networks (Barnes et al, 2007). The research needs to be 
open to elements of a distended case study approach as it compares different policy 
networks, institutional environments and settings between the comparative cases (Martin, 
2010; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2012). Ultimately, research will gain a 
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deepened understanding of the cases in question and to theorise a broader framework to 
investigate port adaptation, diversification and regional path creation on local and regional 
scales across different localities (Berg, 2012; Pike et al, 2016a; Peck & Theodore, 2012).  
 
Fundamentally, the thesis’ multiple-case method compares different sites, objects, actors, 
mechanisms and outcomes between distinctive (international) geographical settings on local 
and regional spatial scales, through an intensive research approach (Yin, 2014; Pike et al, 
2016a; Barnes et al, 2007). Moreover, the thesis’ multiple-case approach also explores port 
cases as ‘spaces’ of interrelated networks and agents through an intensive style, to uncover 
place-specific contexts, settings, mechanisms and processes shaping port adaptation, 
diversification and regional path creation (Taylor, 2013; Massey, 2005; Baxter, 2010). 
Ultimately, by investigating the comparative cases through a deep contextualisation of 
structured relations, networks, mechanisms and processes, it enables the researcher to get 
“behind closed doors”, through close dialogue with key individuals and actors (Pike et al, 
2016a; Flyvberg, 2006, pp228; Clark, 2007). However, this chapter also needs to clarify the 
empirical focus of the multiple-case research design within an embedded, local and regional 
case study (Yin, 2014; Pike et al, 2016a; Barnes et al, 2007).  
 
3.3.2 Case study selection 
 
Defining what the actual case is within each case is, is very important for the methodology as 
a whole (Berg, 2012). Importantly, Pike et al (2016) discuss the notion of a ‘site’ and spatial 
context of adaptation as being a city or city-region. However, the role of infrastructure and 
physical assets within a site of adaptation is overlooked within the EEG literature and plays 
an important role within this thesis, which is investigating the infrastructural and material 
nature of the port as site of adaptation. The empirical focus and the unit of analysis within 
the project’s comparative case approach is upon the port as a site of adaptation. The port 
complex is a site where processes of port adaptation and diversification take place and are 
revealed, within a boundary comprised of certain assets, encompassing the pre-existing port 
(infrastructural, industrial, material and natural) asset base (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). 
These include brownfield and/or greenfield quayside land, quays, river berths, 
manufacturing facilities, office buildings, transfer systems and cranage. However, the port 
complex is also a site which is where key actors operationalise the process of port 
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adaptation. This means that project’s focus is also upon the site within (or outside) the port 
complex, where internal governance processes occur including strategic planning and key 
decision-making activities, which ultimately enables the process of port adaptation occur. 
This process is carried out through a dialogue between various actors, typically formed by 
the port authority and associated government organisations. Moreover, the port complex is 
the focus of the research which is under empirical investigation, as opposed to a city, region, 
industry, firm or network (see Pike et al, 2016a). Secondly, the empirical focus also includes 
the actors ‘doing’ the adaptation, conversion and diversification of port-related 
infrastructural assets on the physical port site, through certain underlying mechanisms. The 
actors are port authorities and associated government organisations (local authorities and 
development agencies). Therefore, this focus upon actors allows the thesis to uncover the 
role, operation and key forms of agency, which shapes and influences comparative processes 
of port adaptation and diversification (Grillitsch & Sotarauta, 2018; Notteboom, 2016). In 
this sense, outlining the empirical focus here clarifies ‘what’ (site and assets) and ‘who’ 
(actors) is being studied within the comparative case study approach, which are shaped by 
place-specific contemporary policy networks and the varying histories of localities (Pike et al, 
2016a; Peck & Theodore, 2012; McMichael, 1990). Therefore, the research selects cases 
which have corresponding units of analysis (site, assets and actors), to enable a clear and 
efficient process of comparison (Yin, 2014; Barnes et al, 2007).  
 
To fully understand the critical phenomena underpinning each case study, the cases 
themselves must be relevantly and accurately selected (Stake, 2005; Yin, 2014). 
Interestingly, Flyvberg (2006) offers a range of strategies for selecting case studies. However, 
the project adopts Flyvbjerg’s (2006) information-orientated selection approach to selecting 
case studies because the project requires particular cases to provide relevant and 
appropriate information, in order to draw clear and accurate comparisons. The project’s 
case study selection requirement directly aligns to the definition of ‘information-orientated 
selection’ approach by Flyvbjerg (2006, pp230), which involves selecting “cases…on the basis 
of expectations about their information content”. The project's comparative case selection 
partly relates to what Flyvbjerg (2006) defines as ‘critical cases’, which essentially are 
exemplary comparative cases enabling the project to gain a better understanding of the port 




The comparative cases were selected based upon certain criteria which were supported by 
indicators across the comparative cases (Table 3.1). The criteria for case study selection was 
the process of port diversification into offshore wind activity, the role of the port in the 
offshore wind industry (and in associated offshore wind production networks), the broad 
typology of port governance models and the national institutional arrangements and 
conditions in the UK and Germany (Table 3.1). Case comparability is an important 
methodological concept used to identify elements of commonality between cases, to enable 
a balanced, accurate and successful case study comparison (Yin, 2014). Therefore, clear 
rationale concerning comparability which underpins case study selection, alongside the 
purpose case study serves, will now be fully described, explained and justified (Yin, 2014; 
Stake, 2005). 
 
The first selection criterion relates to diversification, wherein the timing and longevity of 
diversification into offshore wind and the infrastructural assets and facilities related to 
offshore wind industry, determined the case study selection (Table 3.1). The first reason for 
selecting the Humber Ports case is that it diversified into the offshore wind industry in 2007 
when O&M first was established at the Port of Grimsby (PoG) by Centrica’s commitment, 
who further expanded in 2010 (BBC News, 2007; Wind Power Offshore, 2014). Moreover,  
Siemens established a new blade manufacturing facility at the Port of Hull (PoH) and Ørsted 
opened its new O&M base at the PoG (Siemens, 2016a; Humber Business, 2016). Similarly, 
the PoC case was selected because the Port of Cuxhaven (PoC) diversified into offshore wind 
in 2006 and has further constructed its infrastructural asset base for offshore wind, thus 
enabling interesting comparisons (Table 3.1) (Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 2017a). The PoC 
originally diversified into offshore wind in 2006 through the establishment of the Offshore 
Base Cuxhaven (OBC) and the Cuxhaven Steel Construction (CSC) in 2007, the latter 
manufactured foundation structures and components for offshore wind turbine generators 
(Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c). This initial episode of diversification was 
followed by AMBAU establishing itself at the PoC in 2008, manufacturing towers, monopiles, 
components, and jacket-piles for offshore wind turbines (Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 2017a). 
The diversification process has been extended by Siemens’ nacelle manufacturing facility, 




The second selection criterion is the role of the port in the offshore wind industry and more 
specifically, the role of the port in offshore wind production networks (Table 3.1). There are 
three key roles ports play in the offshore wind industry. Ports can serve as sites to support 
the manufacturing of turbine components, to facilitate the pre-assembly and offshore 
installation of turbines and to provide an onshore base for the operation and maintenance 
(O&M) of offshore wind projects (The Crown Estate, 2010a). This criterion allows the 
research to draw interesting comparisons between each case’s port diversification and 
adaptation into offshore wind activities (Notteboom, 2016). 
 
The Humber Ports case was selected due to its prominent manufacturing role in the offshore 
wind industry and connection to Siemens’ offshore wind production network. The Siemens 
blade manufacturing facility at the Port of Hull is intrinsically linked to the nacelle 
manufacturing facility at the PoC, both important parts of Siemens’ offshore production 
network (Siemens, 2016a; 2016b; Coe & Yeung, 2015). Similarly, the PoC also has an 
important role in supporting manufacturing activities and in Siemens’ offshore wind 
production network following the construction of a nacelle manufacturing facility, opened in 
mid-2017 (Siemens, 2016b; Coe & Yeung, 2015). This is an important criterion for enabling a 
port diversification and adaptation comparison as the project can draw upon similarities and 
linkages to the Humber Ports case, as it comprises the Siemens blade manufacturing facility 
at the PoH (Siemens, 2016a; 2016b; Notteboom, 2016). 
 
The Humber Ports case was also selected because of the evidence of pre-assembly and 
installation activities at the Port of Hull and O&M activities at the Port of Grimsby (The 
Crown Estate, 2010; ABP, 2017a; 2017b). The research can draw similar comparisons 
between the Humber Ports case and PoC, as the PoC also demonstrates a similar form of 
port diversification as there is evidence of installation and O&M occurring at the PoC since 
the formation of the OBC in 2006 (Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 2017a; 2017b). 
 
Thirdly, the port cases were selected upon their distinctive port governance practices 
(ownership, management and control) and differing governance models as the third criteria, 
relating to ‘Anglo-Saxon’ (private) and ‘Hanseatic’ (mixed) port governance (see Table 2.1) 
(Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998). The research will investigate 
four key factors of port governance across the two cases: relationships with central 
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government, legal and statutory frameworks, financial capability and management culture 
(Verhoeven 2010).  The Humber Ports have a distinctive governance model, operating 
through an Anglo-Saxon (private) governance model (Table 2.1) (Suykens & Van de Voorde 
1998; Petitt, 2008). As a result, clear comparisons can be made between the Humber Ports 
case and the PoC, which operates in a different way, through a Hanseatic (public) 
governance model (Table 2.1) (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998). 
As such, this provides scope to compare and contrast the Humber Port’s Anglo-Saxon 
(private) port governance model and practices with the PoC’s Hanseatic (public) port 
governance model and practices, in relation to enabling and/or constraining port adaptation 
(Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Suykens & Van de Voorde 1998; Notteboom, 2016). By 
investigating distinctive governance practices embedded within this unique private 
governance model, the project can capture the underlying mechanisms, influences and 
forces within the port authority, shaping the conversion and diversification of the Humber 
Port’s port-related infrastructural assets. As a result of this, key policy and planning insights 
can be identified relating to enabling and/or constraining contexts underpinning the Humber 
Port’s diversification into the offshore wind industry (Peck & Theodore, 2012; Haughton & 
Allmendinger, 2015; Martin, 2010). 
 
The final selection criterion is the national institutional arrangements of the country in which 
the port case was situated and diversifying into offshore wind (Table 3.1). There are 
distinctive national institutional arrangements and environments which influence and shape 
how ports adapt and diversify into offshore wind (Martin, 2010; Martin, 2000; Notteboom, 
2016). The Humber Ports case was selected because it is situated and operates in the UK 
which has a Liberal Market Economy (LME), meaning ports are typically privately owned and 
organise their corporate strategies based upon market signals and national offshore wind 
policy focuses upon creating an enabling market environment to attract investment from 
project developers and foreign manufacturers (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 
1998; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2007). In contrast, the PoC was selected 
because it is located and operates in Germany, which has a Coordinated Market Economy 
(CME), meaning the majority of ports are publically owned and national offshore wind policy 
is centred upon enabling the manufacture and export of turbine components to overseas 
markets such as the UK, whilst creating an attracting market for offshore wind projects 
(Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 
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2007). Moreover, this selection criterion allows the comparison of centralised institutional 
arrangements and governance in the UK to the decentralised federal system of governance 
in Germany, which have contrasting characteristics and capacities to influence and shape the 
adaptation and diversification of the port cases (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 
2007). 
 
To ensure strong and balanced case comparability and to enable the comparative research 
approach to function, two case study criteria were allowed to vary and two were allowed to 
remain constant (Yin, 2014).  The first selection criteria remained constant to allow similar 
processes of diversification to be compared which have similar episodic timings and 
evolution. The second selection criteria remained constant across the two cases to allow the 
research to compare similar roles of ports within the offshore wind industry across different 
national and regional contexts. The third selection criteria varied across the two cases 
because the research required a deeper understanding of how different port governance 
and ownership arrangements shaped port adaptation and diversification (Suykens & Van de 
Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010). The final selection criteria varied across the two cases to 
allow the research to more deeply understand how contrasting national institutional 
arrangements in the UK and Germany influenced the port adaptation and diversification 
process (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2007).  
 




Humber Ports case 
 
Diversified into offshore wind in 2007, at an early phase of the 
offshore wind industry in the UK. 
 
O&M facilities constructed by Centrica (announced and began in 
2007, completed in 2010). Additional O&M operators 
constructed and completed facilities since 2007. O&M hub 
constructed by Ørsted (announced in 2015, completed in 2019). 
 
Siemens blade manufacturing and turbine assembly facility 
constructed (began 2014, completed in 2016). 




Diversified into offshore wind in 2006, at an early phase of the 
offshore wind industry in Germany. 
 
Construction of port infrastructure since 2006 to support 
manufacturing, installation and O&M activities (heavy duty 
platform). Evidence of O&M activities (Offshore Marine 
Management, 2011).  
 
Manufacturing activities from a series of firms (Cuxhaven Steel 
Construction, AMBAU, Siemens). Siemens nacelle manufacturing 
facility began construction in 2016 (completed in 2017).  
Role of port in 
offshore wind 




Humber Ports case 
 
Strategic manufacturing hub for Siemens as leading blade 
producer, installation port base and flagship O&M hub. 
 
Siemens and Ørsted offshore wind production networks. 
Port of Cuxhaven 
 
Internationally leading manufacturing hub for a wide range of 
offshore wind components and strategic base for installation 
and O&M activities. 
 
Siemens’ offshore wind production networks. 
Port governance 
model 
Humber Ports case 
 
Privately owned and operated by ABP. 
Port of Cuxhaven 
 




Humber Ports case 
 
UK is a liberal market economy (LME) featuring private port 
ownership and light-touch policy for port development. 
 
UK offshore wind sector heavily influenced by the market 
activity of project developers and manufacturers  
 
Centralised governance arrangements 
 
Port of Cuxhaven case 
 
Germany is a co-ordinated market economy (CME) featuring 




German offshore wind sector strongly shaped by the 
manufacture and export of turbine components 
 
Decentralised governance arrangements 
Table 3.1: Case study selection criteria 
Source: Author; Hall & Soskice (2001) 
 
Whilst influenced by the PhD’s collaborative partner (Humber Local Enterprise Partnership 
(LEP), the selection of the Humber Ports case study was based upon an array of detailed 
evidence and collaborative discussions with the Humber LEP, which emphasised the Humber 
Ports case as the UK case study choice. The evidence was identified through exploring 
secondary data (port industry reports, strategic economic plans, government policy 
documents), preliminary fieldwork consisting of industry and policy workshops with 
important actors in attendance and through discussions with key individuals at the Humber 
LEP. As a result of evidence-based research, short listing process and the strong collaborative 
partnership with the Humber LEP, certain ports within the Humber Ports case were selected. 
Consequently, the UK case study in question is the ‘Humber Ports’, comprising the Port of 
Hull (PoH) and the Port of Grimsby (PoG). The Humber Ports case will be compared to an 
international comparative case study, the Port of Cuxhaven (PoC) located in Lower Saxony, 
Germany. As such, the project can explore varying forces, mechanisms, actors and offshore 
wind production networks shaping port adaptation across two port cases: the Humber Ports 
and the PoC (Notteboom, 2016; Coe & Yeung, 2015). A range of international candidate 
cases in the North Sea basin were considered and short listed in partnership with the 
Humber LEP and through exploring secondary data. These included the Port of Bremerhaven 
(Germany), the Port of Esbjerg (Denmark) and the Port of Oostende (Belgium) because of 
their varying levels of investment into assets and facilities, current offshore wind activity, 
scope of port-related infrastructural assets and planned site development for offshore wind. 
The Port of Bremerhaven was rejected due to the emerging examples of offshore wind firms 
disinvesting and the research required a case supporting port diversification into offshore 
wind and successful path creation. The Port of Esbjerg was rejected as it was already an  
established offshore wind port and the research required a case study undergoing a similar 
process of diversification to enable clear comparisons (Table 3.1). The port of Oostende was 
rejected as it was highly concentrated on supporting O&M and installation activities and had 
no evidence of existing or future manufacturing activities (Table 3.1). The Port of Cuxhaven 
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(PoC) was selected because it allowed the project to make relevant and accurate case 
comparisons with the Humber Ports case, corresponding to the case study selection criteria 
(Table 3.1). Furthermore, a counter-factual case exploring how a port failed to diversify into 
offshore wind and support new path creation was not considered as the project’s 
collaborative partner, the Humber LEP, was interested in better understanding how a North 
Sea port can successfully support offshore wind as a new regional industry. Moreover, at the 
time of selection and given the emerging stage of the global offshore wind industry, there 
were no comparative examples to provide long-term evolutionary insights into how ports 
have unsuccessfully diversified (Notteboom, 2016). 
 
The PoH and the PoG were selected following a process of exploring secondary data and 
discussing short listed ports with the Humber LEP, determining that these two ports are 
most relevant comparative cases within the Humber Ports case for a number of different 
reasons. This process revealed the port-related infrastructural assets (available port land, 
quays and facilities) and market factors (amount of current or planned investment and 
planned site development) at each candidate port site, would enable diversification into 
offshore wind in the near future (BVG Associates, 2016). The collated evidence 
demonstrates that the Humber Ports make an interesting and compelling comparative case, 
corresponding to the case study selection criteria (Table 3.1). A series of underlying parallels 
with the Humber Ports case led to the selection of the PoC, which were identified following 
an evidence-based research process and short listing a series international comparator ports 
in discussions and meetings with the Humber LEP (Table 3.1).  
 
3.3.3 The comparative cases 
 
The research undertakes an international comparative analysis of the Humber Ports case 
(featuring the Port of Hull and the Port of Grimsby on the Humber Estuary) and the Port of 
Cuxhaven, which sits at the mouth of the River Elbe in Lower Saxony, Germany. 
 
There are four major ports managed and operated by Associated British Ports (ABP) 
including the Port of Hull (PoH), Port of Grimsby (PoG), Port of Immingham and Port of 
Goole. ABP are the dominant port owner and operator on the Humber Estuary (ABP, 2016). 
Currently, the Port of Immingham and the Port of Goole have not diversified into offshore 
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wind activities, therefore these ports are not of interest within this project (ABP, 2017c; 
2017d). The four ABP Humber Ports operate alongside one planned port project (Able 
Marine Energy Park), which are all located on the Humber Estuary. The Able Marine Energy 
Park (AMEP) is a fully consented project and if its greenfield site were to be developed with 
an array of infrastructural assets, it could emerge as an important port site on the Humber 
Estuary, acting as a base for various offshore wind activities (Able UK, 2017). Importantly, 
Triton Knoll Offshore Wind Farm Ltd have displayed interest in catalysing the input of public 
and private investment to fully develop the AMEP site, to ultimately support manufacturing, 
installation and O&M activities relating to various North Sea offshore wind projects 
(including Triton Knoll) (Humber Business, 2017a; Able UK, 2017). 
 
These ports and potential port sites on the Humber Estuary vary in origins, scale of the port 
complex, scope of offshore wind activity, infrastructural and material assets and levels of 
investment, although collectively they all adopt private governance models (Table 2.1) 
(Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; World Bank, 2016; Pettit, 2008). The chapter has justified the 
selection of the Humber Ports case study within this research methodology and overall 
project, emphasising that the project takes particular interest in the PoH and the PoG, which 
wholly form the Humber Ports case. However individually the PoH and the PoG have unique 
characteristics and settings including specific infrastructural assets and facilities, scale and 
size, location on the Humber Estuary (opposing banks), port governance structures, 
management contexts and offshore wind activities. 
 
The research is focused upon two ports located on the Humber Estuary, namely PoH and the 
PoG, which merge to form a single comparative case study - the ‘Humber Ports case’. The 
PoH is currently owned and operated by ABP, the dominant private port company on the 
Humber Estuary (ABP, 2016). Consequently, the PoH adopts an Anglo-Saxon (private) port 
governance model, which is unique to the UK when situated in Europe’s port governance 
and policy contexts (Table 2.1) (Suykens & Van de Voorde 1998; Petitt, 2008). The PoH’s 
historical path trajectory has been shaped a variety of key governance actors, beginning as a 
fishing and whaling port (Robinson & Hart, 2014; BVG Associates, 2017). Currently, the PoH 
has an emerging role in the offshore industry, operating as an installation port (providing 
facilities for the staging, pre-assembly and loading of turbine components) and 
manufacturing port (Siemens, 2016a). The PoH plays an intrinsic role in UK and Northern 
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European offshore wind production networks through the Green Port Hull (GPH) site 
(Siemens, 2016a; Notteboom, 2016; Coe & Yeung, 2015). The GPH site currently comprises 
important infrastructural, industrial and material assets serving the offshore wind industry 
(Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Green Port Hull, 2017a). Specifically, the GPH site at the PoH’s 
‘Alexandra Dock’ is comprised of the Siemens blade manufacturing facility and a load-out 
area for pre-assembling offshore wind components for offshore installation (Siemens, 
2016a). Importantly, the project is investigating the conversion and diversification of GPH set 
within the Humber Ports case. GPH has been branded as a collaborative project between 
Hull City Council, East Riding of Yorkshire Council, Associated British Ports (ABP) and Siemens 
Wind Power, aiming to position the PoH as the key port complex on the Humber for 
renewable energy, principally offshore wind (Green Port Hull, 2017a).  
 
As with the PoH, the PoG is currently owned and operated by ABP, functioning as a private 
port operator (ABP, 2016). Consequently, the PoG adopts an Anglo-Saxon (private) port 
governance model, which is unique to the UK when situated in Europe’s port governance 
and policy contexts (Table 2.1) (Suykens & Van de Voorde 1998; Petitt, 2008). Additionally, 
Grimsby Fish Dock Enterprises Ltd lease the PoG’s east dock known as the ‘Fish Dock’ from 
ABP for fishing activities and small-scale offshore wind activities (O&M and logistics) thus 
signifying a key site of diversification and highlighting the PoG’s distinctive governance 
model and settings (Port of Grimsby east, 2017; Grimsby Fish Market, 2017). 
 
The PoG developed as an important fishing port in the UK from the mid-19th century 
onwards and the fishing industry has played an important part in shaping the PoG’s historical 
trajectory and current industrial context (Grimsby Telegraph, 2012; 4AllPorts, 2017; BVG 
Associates, 2017). Currently, the PoG is emerging as a distinctive port within Ørsted’s 
offshore wind production networks, establishing itself as a burgeoning O&M base on the 
Humber Estuary (ABP, 2017b; Humber Business, 2016; Coe & Yeung, 2015). Importantly, 
Ørsted are further developing its O&M facilities at the PoG in the ‘Royal Dock’, to enable the 
PoG to transform into a large O&M hub on the UK’s east coast (Ørsted, 2016; Humber 
Business, 2017b). This episode of the PoG’s adaptation and diversification is part of Ørsted’s 
£6bn commitment to the Humber region by 2019 (Humber Business, 2016; Notteboom, 
2016). This section will now consider the Port of Cuxhaven (PoC) case, which provide an 




Firstly, in terms of port governance, the PoC adopts a Hanseatic (public) port governance 
model (Table 2.1) (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998). This is 
because the PoC is owned and controlled by the Lander (Lower State of Saxony) and the port 
and associated land is owned, operated and managed by Niedersachsen Ports GmbH & Co. 
KG as a special purpose company, which is fully owned by the Lower State of Saxony 
(European Commission, 2016; Niedersachsen Ports, 2009; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; World 
Bank, 2016).  
 
The PoC historical path trajectory began with the fishing and cruise industries and evolved 
into supporting general cargo and container handling activities, thus making the PoC an 
important port in Northwest Germany (4AllPorts, 2017; BVG Associates, 2017). However, the 
PoC’s contemporary path trajectory has been underpinned by a series of investments into 
infrastructural, industrial and material assets forming the Offshore Base Cuxhaven (OBC) 
(Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 2017a; 2017b; Siemens, 2016b; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). The 
OBC is comprised of two terminals with quay areas specialised for supporting offshore 
components and heavy lifting, jack-up installation vessels, a mobile and crawler crane, a 
heavy-lift crane, a gantry crane, pontoons and other related commercial, logistics and 
industrial areas (Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 2017b; 2017c). However, the Port of Cuxhaven still 
supports a range of other sectors and handles a range of products including Ro-Ro (roll-on, 
roll-off) cargoes, containers, automobiles, heavy loads, project cargoes, break bulk 
(especially forest and steel products) (Cuxport 2017a; 2017b). 
The PoC has adapted and diversified into functioning as a prominent manufacturing, 
installation and O&M port in the offshore wind industry (Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 2017a; 
2017b; Siemens, 2016b; Notteboom, 2016). To achieve these important roles, the PoC has 
adapted and diversified its infrastructural, material and industrial assets (offshore terminals, 
jack-up installation vessels, cranage, heavy-load quays, commercial, industrial and logistics 
areas) at the OBC since the mid-2000s, to support and stimulate offshore wind activity 
(Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 2017b; Siemens, 2016b; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). The research 
is directly comparing the adaptation and diversification of the OBC at the PoC, to the 




Evidence of the PoC’s diversification includes the construction of the OBC from 2006 
onwards, which forms an integral part of the PoC case, the establishment of the Cuxhaven 
Steel Construction GmbH (CSC) at the PoC in 2007 and the establishment of AMBAU at the 
PoC in 2008 (Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 2017a; 2017b). In 2016, AMBAU took over CSC’s 
construction site (AMBAU, 2016). Moreover, OMM (Offshore Marine Management) based its 
O&M facility at the PoC in 2011 (Wind Power Monthly, 2011). Additionally, STRABAG 
committed to building a facility to produce foundations at the PoC 2009, although it 
disinvested from the German offshore wind market in 2013, therefore the facility was never 
built (STRABAG, 2009; 2013). Most importantly, Siemens constructed a nacelle 
manufacturing facility which opened in mid-2017, and produced its first nacelle in January 
2018 (Siemens, 2016b). This will further establish the PoC as an important port site within 
offshore wind production networks in Northwest Europe (Siemens, 2016b; Coe & Yeung, 
2015). Furthermore, there’s evidence of an emerging supply chain firms (STUTE Logistics) 
and offshore wind manufacturing firms (Nordmark and Muehlhan) in Cuxhaven and 
supporting the PoC, thus further supporting the argument that the PoC is an established port 
base for the offshore wind industry (HWG, 2017; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). 
 
3.4 Methods of Data Collection 
 
The research adopted a multi-method approach to data collection to ensure rigour and to 
access the most pertinent secondary and primary data. A multi-method approach draws 
upon two or more methods and sources of information throughout the course of data 
collection to ensure analytical rigour, robustness and validity, and to maximise 
understandings of the research questions (Valentine, 2005; Punch, 2014). The project’s 
research questions required the investigation of actors and institutions shaping and 
influencing port adaptation, diversification and regional path creation. Therefore, rich 
qualitative data and complimentary quantitative data was obtained through a corroborative 
mixed-method approach, which provided insights into the human agency (decision-making, 
negotiations and relationships) of the actors and institutions involved in these processes 
(Yeung, 2003; Hughes, 1999).  This method of data collection contributes to a growing body 
of literature calling for the enhancement and development of the methods of data collection 




3.4.1 Secondary Data 
 
This thesis provided a deep-seated and robust contextual backdrop of secondary materials 
for each case study, constructed from multiple information sources (Bradshaw & Stratford, 
2010; Tyrrell, 2016). The exploration of the substantial body of secondary was of high 
importance, as it provided important contemporary knowledge in preparation for 
conducting interviews with elite individuals across different localities (Punch, 2014; 
Odendahl & Shaw, 2001). Secondary data provided the thesis with geographical, historical, 
socio-economic, market, industrial and policy contexts to support the eventual analysis and 
comparison of the two port case studies (Clark, 2005).  
 
My comparative case selection was informed by literature on port adaptation, diversification 
and governance, the current realities and contexts of the ports and associated organisations 
in question and the analytical framework from the previous chapter, which are all aligned to 
the thesis’ aims and research questions. The exploration and research of secondary data and 
discussions with the project’s Collaborative Partner along with other key actors, facilitated 
the selection of the Humber Ports case and the ‘mapping’ of the relations and connections 
between relevant actors (principally firms), associated institutions and regions, through an 
unfolding research process (Markusen, 1994). This process was important in understanding 
and building an ‘organisational ecology’ of the respective case study regions (Dicken, 2011; 
Coe & Yeung, 2015). The organisational ecology of the respective case study regions is 
formed and shaped by various institutional conditions, contexts and settings (Dicken, 2011; 
Coe & Yeung, 2015). Underpinning a region’s organisational ecology are the impacts of 
multiple global production networks (GPNs) upon regions, revealing the intrinsic 
intersections between (intra-regional and extra-regional) firms and regions (Dicken, 2011; 
Coe & Yeung, 2015). Interestingly, Coe & Yeung (2015) expand upon this, arguing that a wide 
range of corporate actors (lead firms, local firms, generic suppliers, subsidiaries of externally 
owned firms, logistics firms) are found within a region’s organisational ecology (Dicken, 
2011). Through an unfolding research process, the size and ownership of different firms and 
associated organisations present within a region can be mapped, reflecting “different modes 
of incorporation into global production networks” (Markusen, 1994; Coe & Yeung, 2015, 
pp180; Dicken, 2011). This incremental, unfolding process ultimately determined the 
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selection of the relevant firms and associated organisations for empirical investigation within 
each case study.  
 
The ever-changing ports and offshore renewables sector (principally offshore wind) in the UK 
and Northwest Germany, possesses a rich body of secondary material in the form of 
government reports, industrial strategies, corporate documents, policy documents and 
planning reports. This secondary material was obtained from a range of private and public 
sources on multiple spatial scales including BVG Associates, Local Enterprise Partnerships, 
Chambers of Commerce, Renewable UK, the Crown Estate, corporate websites, and various 
government departments in the UK and Germany. Moreover, historical and socio-economic 
secondary data provided an important contextual backdrop to the case study localities was 
sourced from news websites and public archives. In addition, secondary data was obtained 
from local, regional and national news agencies and industry focused websites, delivering 
contemporary updates on the port case studies, inward investment reports and project 
developments in the offshore wind industry. These sources are port authority, port operator 
and offshore wind industry websites, alongside the Financial Times, BBC News, Offshore 
Wind.biz, 4AllPorts, 4C Offshore, Humber Business, the Hull Daily Mail and the Grimsby 
Telegraph. Furthermore, valuable secondary data in the form of industrial strategies, local 
and regional government plans and port reports was sourced from various industry and 
policy workshops and meetings in the Humber region. Overall, the secondary data provides 
balanced and valuable information regarding the state of industry, market, government, 
academic and policy arenas connected to the port case studies, the offshore wind industry 
and national renewable energy arrangements. Table 3.3 provides the most relevant 
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Table 3.2: Indicative examples of secondary data sources 
Source: Author 
 
3.4.2 Primary data: Interviewing Elites 
 
The secondary data documents snapshots and outlines of events, issues and challenges 
connected to (firm and non-firm) actors and institutions (Tyrell, 2016). However, the 
interview as a research method attempts to uncover the in-depth and underlying contextual 
information, which shape events, issues and challenges associated with (firm and non-firm) 
actors and institutions (Valentine, 2005). The method of interviewing in the research forms a 
crucial part of the process of data collection which provides primary data. The primary data 
is important in the data collection process as it adds to and works in tandem with the 
secondary data (Bryman, 2012; Tyrrell, 2016). The interview as an investigative method is 
the most prominent in qualitative research, seeking to access participant’s perceptions, 
opinions, agency and involvement in connection to certain subjects, events and situations 
(Punch, 2014; Hughes, 1999). Fundamentally, the interview allows the research to identify 
the underlying story and series of events to better understand how socio-economic 
phenomena came to be, or occur (Dunn, 2010; Hughes, 1999). The thesis can move beyond 
gaining simple closed answers to research questions through forming open-ended response 
options, to gain a deeper understanding of what is relevant to the participant and why 
(Dunn, 2010). The interview method is framed as a mechanism to collect relevant qualitative 
data within the case study approach, in order to analytically compliment and ‘get inside’ the 
port cases (Clark, 1998; Baxter, 2010). As such, the interview process in this thesis involved a 
‘close dialogue’ with participants connected to or operating within the selected port cases 
(Clark, 1998; 2007). This enabled the thesis to access a deeper understanding of the forces, 
influences and processes underpinning investment decisions, planning and strategies 
shaping infrastructural asset adaptation and diversification (Schoenburger, 1991; Pike et al, 
2016a). 
 
In order to do this, the thesis accessed and engaged with participants who hold senior 
management and executive positions operating in both firm and non-firm contexts, thus 
exploring research sites, assets and actors from the perspective of ‘elite’ interviewees (Neal 
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& Mclaughlin, 2009). The research investigated elite actors aligned to Desmond’s definition 
(2004, pp264), who stated that elites are individuals with an influential status within social, 
economic and political spaces, upholding control over “human, capital, decision-making and 
knowledge resources.” Fundamentally, the process of interviewing elites provides a dynamic 
mechanism to identify strategic relationships between key (firm and non-firm) actors and 
institutions, alongside the underlying influences shaping strategic decision-making processes 
within key (firm and non-firm) actors and institutions (Schoenburger, 1991; Hughes, 1999; 
Pike et al, 2016a). However, interviewing elites poses fundamental methodological 
challenges within this thesis and in (Evolutionary) Economic Geography, in connection to 
accessing participants and the uneven power dynamics occasionally present between the 
interviewer and elite interviewee (Harvey, 2010; 2011; Schoenburger, 1991).  
 
When interviewing an elite participant, the methodological approach must accommodate 
fluctuating discourses and quickly adapt to the every-changing power dynamics between the 
researcher and the elite participant (Ward & Jones, 1999; Woods, 1998). Therefore, a semi-
structured interview approach was adopted, which allowed for continuous flexibility and 
greater freedom to fine-tune control and power dynamics throughout the interviews 
(Warren, 2001; Baxter, 2010). The semi-structured approach to interviewing is structured by 
a pre-formulated list of topics enabling a series of open-ended questions to be formed 
within each interview (Bryman, 2012; Warren, 2001). The pre-formulated list of topics 
associated with the series of open-ended questions were continuously adapted before each 
interview, in respect to the specialist knowledge, information and views aiming to be 
obtained from each individual interviewee (Warren, 2001). Moreover, asking open-ended 
questions and following up with close-ended questions (if required), enabled a 
conversational interview style, which is what the research set out to achieve (Harvey, 2010). 
Essentially, a semi-structured interview approach embracing open-ended questions is crucial 
for interviewing elites, as it is important to encourage the interviewee to accurately 
contribute specialised knowledge of utmost relevance to the topics and themes in question 
(Kezar, 2003; Odendahl & Shaw, 2001; Bryman, 2012).  
 
The research adopted a ‘purposive sampling’ technique to ensure the selection of elite 
individuals and organisations which were directly relevant to answering the research 
questions (Bryman, 2012). As such, the research questions provided guidelines for selecting 
77 
 
specific organisations and individuals to sample (Bryman, 2012). Moreover, the selection of 
the elite interviewees was underpinned by their historical or current experiences regarding 
specific research topics, themes or question(s) (Mikecz, 2012; Longhurst, 2016). 
Furthermore, once a base of participants was secured and the interview process was 
underway, the ‘on-site’ technique of ‘snowballing’ accessed additional interviewees within 
public and private sectors (Longhurst, 2016). This technique involved using one contact to 
recruit another contact into the research process (Valentine, 2005).  
 
The key participants principally included port authority management, directors, 
representatives of leading firms and industry associations, and officials from local authorities 
and relevant organisations, in addition to local politicians and experts (academics, 
consultants). The research undertook 40 interviews with a total of 44 participants in the UK 
and Germany. In each case study locality, the research targeted organisations responsible for 
national port management and development, alongside creating and implementing national 
port policy, strategy and legislation. These included the Department for Transport (DfT) in 
the UK, and the Federal Ministry for Transport and Digital Infrastructure in Germany. On the 
sub-national scale in the UK, the project targeted Local Enterprise Partnerships and Local 
Councils responsible for port issues in specific localities in the Humber. On the sub-state 
(sub-Lander) scale in Germany, the project targeted the Economic Development Agency of 
Cuxhaven and the Ministry for the Economy, Labour and Transport of Lower Saxony which 
are responsible for port issues in particular localities in Northwest Germany. In addition, the 
research targeted certain industry and trade groups including Team Humber Marine Alliance 
representing organisations predominately located on the Humber Estuary and WAB (Wind 
Energy Agency) representing organisations across Northwest Germany. Both organisations 
aim to bring various actors including port authorities, research institutions and offshore 
engineering companies together, enabling them to collaborate on port-related projects, 
developments and activities. Influenced by the historically informed nature of EEG research, 
the research casted back its interview focus to address the longitudinal role of organisations 
and institutions, which have over time shaped the current actors connected to the 
comparative case studies (Pike et al, 2016a).  
 
Access to elite interviewees in the UK was assisted through collaborative industry 
organisations connected to the project’s collaborative partner, the Humber Local Enterprise 
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Partnership (LEP). The research methodology required participation of overseas 
interviewees in order to make important case study comparisons and gain an in-depth 
understanding of the international case study (Yin, 2014). Fortunately, the process of 
identifying and accessing ‘foreign’ elites as an ‘outsider’ in relation to industry and policy 
networks was less complex as originally envisaged, as foreign elites in Northwest Germany 
operate in clearly identifiable institutions, organisations and firms (Herod, 1999). The range 
of interviewees across the case study sites, including their corresponding organisations, 
location of the organisations, the positions held by the interviewees and the interview dates, 
can be found in the Appendix. Sources for quotes included within Chapters 5 and 6 are 
labelled as the interviewees’ current or former role, followed by their current or former 
organisation, which correspond directly to the interviewee tables included in the Appendix. I 
have labelled the interviewees’ current or former roles and organisations to reflect their 
relevance to the empirical analysis of the comparative cases. 
 
3.4.3 Ethics  
 
To abide by strong ethical guidelines, confirmation of informed consent was obtained 
allowing the interviewees to know exactly what they’re agreeing to participate in, whilst 
giving each interviewee the chance to opt out of participation (Dowling, 2010). Also, a 
guarantee of confidentiality was offered to the participants and participants were provided 
with information outlining my academic background, the thesis’ research aims and the 
topics covered within the interview (Dowling, 2010). Maintaining confidentiality is vital as 
elite individuals can be easily identifiable in industry and policy networks, and may have 
discussed sensitive business information or controversial political views in the interview 
(Odendahl & Shaw, 2001; Smith, 2006). Therefore, it was important not to accentuate 
personal accounts through direct quotations, or past and current organisational positions or 
affiliations, unless informed consent was required to conduct research (Odendahl & Shaw, 
2001; Smith, 2006). Furthermore, the research abided by accuracy ethics, ensuring that the 
qualitative data obtained is not fabricated in any way (Christians, 2000). The research project 





The positionality of myself as the researcher in connection to conducting interviews with 
elite participants was important in order to establish trust, build rapport and most 
importantly, abide by strong ethical principles underpinned by confidentiality, anonymity 
and transparency (Mikecz, 2012; Smith, 2006). My interviews were with elite interviewees 
operating in positions of influence in the public and private sectors, consequently I upheld 
the anonymity of participants, necessitating that no information included in the thesis could 
jeopardise individual or organisations’ identities or standpoints (Odendahl & Shaw, 2001; 
Dowling, 2010). Furthermore, as Yeung (2003, pp457) rightly questions, “how does an 
economic geographer combine his/her multiple roles as a trusted enrolee of the actor 
network [when researching], an independent critical scholar” and as a public citizen, 
producing findings to support relevant policy outcomes, whilst maintaining a certain level of 
“civil consciousness”? The personal actions taken throughout my research aimed to address 




In terms of managing and storing vast quantities of qualitative data from key documents and 
interviews, I stored documents and transcripts in systematic folders in the data processing 
stage of the project, to avoid “drowning in data” (Berg, 2012, pp53). Essentially, by utilising 
this data management and storage technique throughout the stages of data processing 
(management and storage) and data analysis addressed multiple core concerns and 
objectives. These included ensuring high-quality accessibility to vast amounts of qualitative 
data, facilitating the systematic coding of interview transcripts using a common format and 
script in Microsoft Word, alongside retaining and protecting qualitative data and any data 
analysis undertaken throughout and after the PhD project (Berg, 2012). Importantly, the 
data from interview recordings and transcripts were stored in a single and secure location to 
avoid unwanted access to sensitive information. 
 
After conducting a range of qualitative interviews across the case study localities, a common 
format and script allowed overlapping coding processes to occur, which supported the 
analysis and identification of patterns among and between respondents and groups 
(Bradshaw & Stratford, 2010; Cope & Kurtz, 2016). The production of analytical codes 
directly reflected thematic topics and categories corresponding to the research questions, 
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forming a clear organisational structure for the analysis chapters (Cope & Kurtz, 2016; 
Bryman, 2012). Firstly, an open coding process involved identifying codes emerging from the 
data by “getting as close to the material as possible”, whilst ensuring codes are not directly 
influenced by theory and concepts at this stage (Crang, 2005, pp222; Strauss & Corbin, 
2008). Subsequently, analytical connections between codes based upon recurring themes 
and topics were produced which established succinct categories, known as axial coding 
(Strauss & Corbin, 2008). Fundamentally, axial coding involved putting the qualitative data 
back together again, by “linking [categories] to contexts, consequences, patterns of 
interaction [among actors] and causes”, following the splitting of qualitative data into codes 
through the ‘close’ open coding process (Bryman, 2012, pp569; Crang, 2005; Cope & Kurtz, 
2016). As a result of the coding processes, the categories were linked to and uncovered 
contexts, consequences, patterns of interaction [among actors] and causes (Bradshaw & 
Stratford, 2010; Bryman, 2012). Interconnections were identified between multiple 
respondents and organisations, enabling the detection of the contexts, influences, forces 
and causal mechanisms underpinning port adaptation across the case study sites (Barnes et 
al, 2007; Pike et al, 2016a; Bradshaw & Stratford, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the empirical analysis of the comparative case studies was structured around 
key causal episodes of port adaptation and diversification into offshore wind. These key 
causal episodes were identified and created by analysing and grouping a series of smaller 
events which occurred closely in time and were related in terms of their overall 
characteristics and purpose. The key causal episodes strongly shaped the adaptation and 
diversification of the port cases, and the formation of distinctive regional paths. The smaller 
events or sub-episodes within the episodes were identified by the overall coding process, 
which highlighted these smaller events as critical in shaping the evolution, adaptation and 
diversification of the case studies. The start and end times of episodes and smaller events 
were identified in the primary and secondary data and characterised by when a period of 
pre-formation and planning, investment(s), disinvestment(s) or stable activity began and 
ended in time. Finally, the changes between episodes and smaller events were explained in 
an evolutionary manner through short introduction and conclusion sections included within 
each episode, as well as brief introductory or concluding sentences within smaller events, 




3.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has sought to identify and justify the research project’s methodological 
approaches and comparative case studies, whilst providing relative alternatives and relevant 
critiques. Based upon the research design I considered in section 3.3 for an international 
comparison of two case studies (directly discussed in section 3.4) and using the methods of 
data collection outlined in section 3.5, I will utilise the analytical framework (Figure 2.4) to  
investigate, analyse and compare the diversification of the Humber Ports and the Port of 
Cuxhaven into offshore wind. The analytical chapters of the thesis are structured by 
distinctive levels of critical analysis. Firstly, the empirical analysis unfolds in Chapter 5 (Port 
of Cuxhaven case) and Chapter 6 (Humber Ports case) and is structured around key episodes 
of port adaptation and diversification into offshore wind evident in the comparative cases. 
Subsequently, Chapter 7 deepens the level of analysis and compares the most important 
factors emerging from Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 in relation to answering the project’s 
research questions, and the most significant in influencing and driving the evolutionary 





















Chapter 4 Context chapter: the evolution of ports and emergence of the 




The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of the overall context 
and adaptation process of UK and German ports diversifying into offshore wind. This chapter 
will also position the exploration of the adaptation of the two comparative port cases, thus 
supporting the further explanation and justification of the case studies within the 
Methodology chapter. The chapter illustrates the importance of the historical, political, 
market, policy and governance contexts underpinning the comparative port cases. This 
comparative historical information informs and supports the EEG (Evolutionary Economic 
Geography) perspective which the research is adopting, in order to investigate the process 
of port adaptation (Pike et al, 2017; Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011). This 
chapter will discuss the evolution and current arrangement of ports and the offshore wind 
industry through addressing their governance, market, industry and policy arrangements, 
positioned within the European context. Exploring the European context of ports and the 
offshore wind industry reveals the UK and Germany as the most significant national cases of 
port diversification into offshore wind. Finally, the chapter explains the important market 
opportunity offshore wind creates for UK and German ports, before focusing in more directly 
on the two port case studies. 
 
4.2 Evolution of ports and port governance 
 
Several supra-national governing bodies shape the governance and market activity of ports. 
These mainly include the World Bank, UN, EU, OECD, ESPO (European Sea Ports 
Organisation), IAPH (International Association of Ports and Harbours) and AIVP (Association 
Internationale Villes et Ports) (Port Economics, 2017; World Bank, 2016; United Nations, 
2015). The main supra-national organisation governing European ports is the EU, whereby 
the European Commission and Parliament sets out policy, legislation and strategies shaping 
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multiple aspects of EU ports, including state aid, port infrastructure, port labour, investment 
rules, operations and connectivity between European ports (European Commission, 2017a).  
 
However, as Brooks et al (2017) and others argue, the most important actors in global port 
governance are national government departments or bodies (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007a). 
Moreover, different levels of port governance reforms across Europe have been 
implemented by national governments that has shaped the capacity of ports to adapt and 
develop (Brooks et al, 2017; World Bank, 2016; Brooks, 2004). The global trend of port 
governance in the 21st century context is that most national governments form policies, 
strategies and instruments to “govern ports in a way that makes them more profitable and 
efficient, and, increasingly, [in] a way that makes them more sustainable” (Brooks et al, 
2017, pp8). To support the decision-making process and strategies of governments shaping 
the future adaptation, diversification and development of ports across Europe, organisations 
like the OECD and ESPO often provide policy recommendations (OECD, 2014; 2016; ESPO, 
2016). The main EU policy shaping the future development and adaptation of European 
ports is the ‘TEN-T’ (Trans-European Transport Network) infrastructure policy, implemented 
in January 2014 with a budget of €24.05 billion up to 2020 (European Commission, 2017b). 
The TEN-T policy aims to continue financing key port-related infrastructure projects across 
Europe through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) funding instrument (European 
Commission, 2017c). This policy framework influenced contemporary examples of European 
ports strategically adapting infrastructure to increase capacity and competitiveness include 
the Port of Rotterdam’s new offshore centre (offshore wind, decommissioning and oil & 
gas), the Port of Antwerp (liquid bulk and container-handling), and the Port of Amsterdam 
(general cargo and cruise) (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Port of 
Rotterdam, 2017; Port of Antwerp, 2017; Port of Amsterdam, 2017). The chapter will later 
discuss the national context of UK and German port governance in greater detail. 
 
Ports handle 74% of goods and services entering and leaving Europe by sea, with the other 
26% of goods and services entering and leaving by air and land transport (European 
Commission, 2017a; Mangan et al, 2008). In 2015 ports within the EU handled 3.8bn tonnes 
of seaborne goods, which is a large increase of 10.8% compared with 2009, marking a low 
point in global trade (Eurostat, 2017). However, ports within EU countries vary within their 
national contexts in terms of seaborne good handled between 2005-2015, highlighting the 
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changing nature of EU ports and global trade (Eurostat, 2017). National seaborne trade (EU 
countries) has been affected by the slowdown of international trade following the global 
financial crisis in different ways, with only some countries regaining capacity in terms of 
gross weight of seaborne trade (Eurostat, 2017). 
 
The European ports system has a distinctive hierarchy in terms of tonnage handled and thus 
financial revenue (World Bank, 2016). In 2018, the largest five European ports in terms gross 
weight of tonnage handled are Rotterdam (441 million tonnes), Antwerp (212 million 
tonnes), Hamburg (117 million tonnes), Amsterdam (99 million tonnes) and Algeciras (88 
million tonnes) (Eurostat, 2020). The Humber Ports case, including the Port of Hull and Port 
of Grimsby, are small to mid-tier ports, with the Port of Hull handling approximately 9.7 
million tonnes per year and the Port of Grimsby handling approximately 1.1 million tonnes 
per year (ABP, 2017a; 2017b; Eurostat, 2019). On a similar scale, the Port of Cuxhaven 
handles approximately 2.7 million tonnes per year (Port of Hamburg, 2014; Eurostat, 2019). 
This statistic which is lower than the Port of Hull due to its main market focus upon the 
offshore wind industry, as opposed to container handling and general bulk cargo (Port of 
Hamburg, 2014; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c; ABP, 2017a). The Humber Ports and the Port 
of Cuxhaven are included amongst a number of small to medium sized ports handling 






Figure 4.1 Main European ports by gross weight of freight handled 2017 
Source: Eurostat, 2019 
 
4.2.1 Evolution of UK Ports 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, the unique governance arrangements of ports are important in 
shaping how ports adapt and diversify their infrastructural assets, in order to seize new 
market opportunities (Debrie et al, 2013; Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). 
However, the ways in which ports are owned and governed differs between countries in 
Northwest Europe, with some port authorities and associated government organisations 
adopting an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ governance model (private ownership and operation) or a 
‘Hanseatic’ governance model (public ownership and operation) (Table 2.1) (Suykens & Van 
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de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010). By adopting certain port governance models, port 
authorities shape the adaptation and diversification in distinctive ways (Table 2.1) (Suykens 
& Van de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010). Additionally, the national policy environment 
consisting of port policies, industrial strategies and regulatory frameworks unique to each 
state, essentially enable and/or constrain the capacity of governance actors to instigate 
mechanisms of port adaptation and diversification to seize new market opportunities 
(Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). These varying national policy frameworks and strategies 
influence and shape the activities of UK and German ports, which are contextualised in 
sections 4.3.1 and 4.4.1. 
 
UK Port Market 
 
The wide-ranging scope of the UK port market in 2015 is contextualised by Figure 4.2, 
summarising the vast array of UK port traffic (imports and exports). The UK port market is 
broadly focused and specialised in a variety of different fields, depending upon the type of 
cargo each port’s infrastructure can handle (DfT, 2015b; Asteris & Collins, 2007). In 2015, the 
largest UK ports in terms of traffic (imports and exports) are the Port of Immingham (55 
million tonnes), London Thames Gateway (45.4 million tonnes), the Port of Milford Haven 
(37.7 million tonnes) the Port of Southampton (37.6 million tonnes) and the Port of 
Felixstowe (28 million tonnes) (ABP, 2017c; DfT, 2015b). As a result of the success and 
capacity of some of these ports, the port authorities owning and operating them have 
decided against adapting and diversifying their infrastructural asset base to seize new 
market opportunities beyond customary port-related activities, such as conventional cargo 
handling (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011). However, certain ports in Figure 
4.2, such as the Port of Grimsby and the Port of Hull, have decided to adapt and diversify 


























Figure 4.2: UK major port traffic by cargo type 2015 
Source: DfT, 2015 
 
In reference to Figure 4.2, an emerging market trend surpasses the ‘traditional’ port market 
of handling bulk cargo (liquid and dry), Ro/Ro cargo, Lo/Lo containers and accommodating 
passenger vessels (DfT, 2015b). This emerging trend within the UK port market has been 
established by some ports handling specialist components and goods connected to the 
renewable energy industry, specifically for wind, biomass, wave and tidal activities 
(Renewable UK, 2017b; Financial Times, 2016). In particular, the offshore wind market 
highlights a viable option for certain UK ports to capitalise upon through adapting and 
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diversifying their infrastructural, industrial and material assets (IPPR North, 2016; Wind 
Europe, 2017a; Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999).  
 
The UK’s offshore wind market has grown dramatically in the past few years, especially since 
2010 onwards in terms of offshore wind capacity installed, currently standing at 5GW (BVG 
Associates, 2017; 2016). Ports around the UK have identified new development 
opportunities relating to the growth of the offshore wind industry. For example, the Port of 
Belfast has adapted and diversified its infrastructural assets and facilities through installing a 
purpose-built terminal for offshore wind staging (installation and pre-assembly) activities 
(Belfast Harbour, 2013; Notteboom, 2016). However, the critical mass of new development 
opportunities is focused upon the UK’s east coast ports (BVG Associates, 2017). The UK’s 
east coast ports are set to benefit extensively from the planned and expected growth of the 
UK’s offshore wind market, with the UK government aiming to support another 10GW of 
installed capacity throughout the 2020s (BVG Associates, 2017; DBEIS, 2016). UK ports 
involved in the offshore wind industry have differing functions and are involved in diverse 
markets: acting as sites for manufacturing activities, bases for assembling and installing wind 
turbines, and bases for operation and maintenance (O&M) activities (BVG Associates, 2016; 
2017; IPPR North, 2016). An array of ports on the UK’s east coast have been identified and 
are emerging as key port sites for manufacturing activities serving the offshore wind industry 
(Figure 4.3) (BVG Associates, 2016; IPPR North, 2016; Wind Europe, 2017a). On an important 
note, Figure 4.3 was created as a market projection of potential port capacity to 
accommodate offshore wind manufacturing and staging (pre-assembly and installation) 
activities, and does not reflect the current market reality of port sites in the offshore wind 
market (BVG Associates, 2016). In reference to Figure 4.3, ‘staging’ activities simply mean 
ports supporting the offshore installation of wind turbines equivalent to “one large offshore 
wind farm per year (approximately 100 complete 8MW turbines per year)” (BVG Associates, 
2016, pp12). Within Figure 4.3, only the Nigg Yard, the Port of Blyth, the Port of Hull 
(Alexandra Dock) and the Port of Great Yarmouth are involved in offshore wind 




Figure 4.3: Potential UK east coast port sites for offshore wind manufacturing and staging 
activities 
Source: BVG Associates, 2016 
 
In addition to UK east coast ports operating as sites for offshore wind manufacturing and 
staging (pre-assembly and installation) activities, some UK east coast ports also operate as 
important bases for O&M (operations and maintenance) activities associated with offshore 
wind projects, which are either fully commissioned or currently under construction, as of 
September 2017 (Table 4.1). However, the involvement of UK ports in the offshore wind 
industry is sometimes episodic in nature following the completed construction of offshore 
wind projects, as further O&M activities can be carried out from a different port with greater 
capacity and capability. By contrast, other UK ports appear to be establishing a move to a 
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permanent position in the offshore wind industry, supporting continuous manufacturing, 
staging and O&M activities for offshore wind projects. 
 
Port Offshore wind projects served (O&M) 
Port of Buckie Beatrice (Demonstrator Project) 
Port of 
Peterhead 
Hywind Scotland Pilot Park 
Port of Methil Levenmouth (Demonstrator Project) 





Port of Grimsby Humber Gateway 
Lynn 




Hornsea Project One 




Port of Lowestoft Greater Gabbard 
East Anglia ONE 
Port of Harwich Galloper 





Gunfleet Sands 3 (Demonstrator Project) 




Kentish Flats Extension 
Wells Harbour Sheringham Shoal 
Table 4.1: UK east coast port sites serving Operations and Maintenance (O&M) activities 







UK Port Governance 
 
The governance of ports is important to consider as various government policies, 
frameworks and strategies, alongside port governance models, have the potential to enable 
and/or constrain a port authority’s capacity and decision-making process with regard to 
adapting and diversifying into new market activities (Notteboom, 2016; Monios, 2017; 
Brooks & Cullinance, 2007b).  
 
National port policy designed and implemented by the UK government has remained 
reasonably unchanged since 1945, enabling relative stability in the UK ports sector (Monios, 
2017; Brooks et al, 2017; Pettit, 2008). However, there have been demands from industry 
and government to establish a port regulator to “ensure appropriate levels of capacity 
provision and service quality” within the UK ports (Brooks et al, pp4; Monios, 2017). To fully 
understand the current context of national port governance in the UK, the changing nature 
of national port policy must be contextualised (Pettit, 2008; Goss, 1998). 
 
Before the Second World War there was no coherent approach to port development or a 
national port planning agenda, meaning there was no clear connection between port 
authorities and the UK government (Pettit, 2008; Owen, 1948). As such, there were four 
principal forms of port ownership and governance prior to the Second World War: statutory 
trusts, municipal undertakings, railway companies and privately-owned ports (Pettit, 2008). 
These port ownership and governance contexts currently exist in the UK (statutory trusts, 
municipal ownership and privately-owned ports), thus reflecting an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ port 
governance context wherein port responsibilities are decentralised to private and 
independent interests, as there is no centralised port regulator controlled by the state (Table 
2.1) (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Pettit, 2008; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998).  
 
However, following the Second World War, a series of UK government Acts were 
implemented shaping the ownership, management and control of ports nationally (Goss, 
1998; Pettit, 2008; Monios, 2017). According to Goss (1998), there has been no uniform port 
policy in the UK since 1945, arguing there has simply been a shift from central port planning 
to privatisation from the early 1980s (Baird & Valentine, 2007). Firstly, the Transport Act 
(1947) nationalised railway companies and the ownership of UK ports was transferred to the 
92 
 
British Transport Commission (BTC). Next the Transport Act (1962) dismantled the BTC and 
the ownership of ports and commercial docks was transferred to the British Transport Docks 
Board (BTDB). A major event in UK ports policy was the Harbours Act (1964) which 
established a National Ports Council (NPC) aiming to create a centrally planned ports 
industry. However the NPC failed to gain acceptance and full recognition from the UK 
government or ports themselves (Baird & Valentine, 2007; Goss, 1998). Notably, the NPC 
launched Harbour Revision Orders (HROs), which still exist as an important policy tool for 
enabling the change of legislation governing the management of a port (DfT, 2016). 
Essentially, HROs are secondary legislation used to change the use of port assets 
(infrastructure and facilities), through the state authorising applications made by port 
authorities to strategically diversify port assets (DfT, 2016). HROs are therefore important 
tools used by actors (port authorities and associated government agencies) to enable port 
developments and expansions, and must be confirmed by the Secretary of State for 
Transport or the MMO (Marine Management Organisation) “to whom order-making powers 
have been delegated” (DfT, 2016, pp30; Baird & Valentine, 2007; Monios, 2017). Moreover, 
the Department for Transport (2016, pp30) state that the HRO is only made if the individual 
(Secretary of State for Transport or individual at MMO) is satisfied that the HRO will: 
 
• “secure the improvement, maintenance or management of the harbour in an 
efficient and economical manner; or 
• facilitate the efficient and economic transport of goods by sea; or 
• be in the interests of the use of sea-going ships for leisure purposes”. 
 
Therefore, HROs are crucial elements within the UK’s port policy environment which 
ultimately enables port adaptation, by allowing port authorities to change the use of a port’s 
infrastructural assets and facilities (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Debrie et 
al, 2013).  
 
Moreover, certain port authorities in the UK have various statutory duties established under 
numerous legislative Acts implemented by the UK government, thus shaping their 
contemporary administrative and operational functions (Table 4.2) (DfT, 2016; Alderton, 
2008). Importantly, these duties only apply to port authorities which are acting as the 




Open Port Duty • Harbour, dock or berth must be open to anyone for the 
shipping and unshipping of goods and the embarking and 
landing of passengers. This is subject to payment of the rates 




• Locating and marking best navigable channels  
• Placing and maintaining navigational marks. 
• Keeping ‘vigilant watch’ for any changes in the sea or riverbed, 
moving or renewing navigation marks as appropriate. 
• Channel(s) must be regularly dredged, or information must be 
provided if advertised channel depth has not been 
maintained. 
• Keeping proper hydrographic and hydrological records. 
• Ensuring that hydrographic information is published in a 
timely manner. 
• Providing regular returns and other information about the 
authority’s local aids to navigation as the relevant General 
Lighthouse Authority may require. 
 
Environmental Duty • Harbour authorities have a general duty to exercise their 




• Civil protection in the event of an emergency that threatens 
serious damage to human welfare, the environment or 
security. 
Table 4.2: UK Statutory Harbour Authority Duties 
Source: DfT, 2016, pp28-30; Alderton, 2008 
 
Another major event in UK ports policy was the Transport Act (1981), which abolished the 
NPC and transferred powers to the Department of Transport (DfT) and British Ports 
Association (BPA). In 1982, the second part of the Transport Act (1981) transferred port 
facilities formerly administered by the BTDB to a statutory company called Associated British 
Ports (ABP). Shortly after, ABP was privatised in 1983 through a process of selling 51.8% of 
shares to the public and the remaining 48.2% of shares to the private sector in 1984. In the 
years following this privatisation event, ABP’s value increased from £60M in 1983 to £490M 
in 1990. Since its privatisation, ABP has grown into the UK’s leading port authority and 




Conversely, ‘trust ports’ are independent statutory bodies formed by individual acts of 
Parliament. Trust ports are governed by a board of Trustees, aiming to enhance the state of 
the port to meet the requirements of users and local stakeholders (Baird & Valentine, 2007). 
However, the Ports Act (1991) acknowledged that trust ports were neither public nor 
private, and compelled UK trust ports to privatise on a national scale in the early 1990s. The 
Act essentially gave the government power to induce privatisation through transferring 
municipally owned ports and trust ports to a company formed under the Companies Act 
(Pettit, 2008). This Act lead to the privatisation of several ports including Teesport, Medway, 
Tilbury, Forth, Clyde, Ipswich and Dundee (Baird & Valentine, 2007). However, some UK 
ports are still owned and governed as trust ports which have decided not to privatise despite 
demands from the UK government and remain independent statutory bodies, thus 
highlighting a distinctive port governance practice undertaken by existing trust ports of 
opposing privatisation (Monios, 2017). Examples include the Port of Tyne, the Port of Dover, 
the Port of London Authority, Belfast Harbour, the Port of Aberdeen, the Port of Milford 
haven and others (Monios, 2017). In similarity to privately owned ports, trust ports also 
adopt an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ port governance model, operating as ‘independent’ statutory bodies 
created through a legislative Act of Parliament, which is unique to the UK’s port governance 
context (Table 2.1) (Baird & Valentine, 2007; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 
2010). 
 
The Labour government of 1997 – 2010 adopted a light-touch approach to forming UK port 
policy, which was an extension of the legislative environment established under the 
Conservative government of 1979-1997 (Monios, 2017; Headicar, 2009). Effectively, the 
Labour government enabled the “pre-existing policy of a market-based ports industry” 
following the publication of a series of documents (Pettit, 2008, pp723; Monios, 2017). The 
Modern Ports: A UK Policy (DETR, 2000) confirms this approach taken by the Labour 
government of the time. Its successor is the National Policy Statement for Ports (Dft, 2012) 
and was originally designed by the Labour government in 2009/10 and published under the 
Coalition government (Monios, 2017). According to Monios (2017, pp84), this document 
confirmed the UK government’s long-term perspective stretching back to the early 1980s, 
that it’s not the responsibility of “government to plan and build ports, but simply to approve 




As Monios (2017) summarises, the governance of UK ports including decisions for 
investment into port infrastructure for expansion, is the responsibility of trust, private or 
municipal port authorities (Goss, 1998; Pettit, 2008; DfT, 2012). Moreover, the light-touch 
approach from the UK government in regard to implementing ports policy and the laissez-
faire state intervention in port ownership and operation, reflects the liberalised political 
economy of the UK (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Furthermore, this approach taken by the UK 
government undoubtedly shapes the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ port governance model evident within 
the UK, as a result of the UK having no centralised port regulator and laissez-faire approach, 
therefore responsibilities have been decentralised to private and independent interests 
(Table 2.1) (Baird & Valentine, 2007; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Pettit, 2008). 
 
However, considering the market-based ports industry that the UK government had 
established, the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) published an insightful 
report in 2009 titled UK ports for the offshore wind industry: Time to Act. This report 
catalysed placing greater industrial emphasis upon increasing an insufficient port capacity 
for offshore wind activity, to enable emerging UK and European offshore wind 
manufacturers, developers and operators to be based within UK ports (DECC, 2009). In 
essence, this report demonstrates the indirect involvement the UK government has in 
deciding the future of ports (Monios, 2017; Goss, 1998). Interestingly, since this report was 
published, an array of offshore engineering companies, research consultancies and think-
tanks have stated the growing importance of ports to the UK economy, and their importance 
for stimulating and supporting new industrial activities like offshore wind (IPPR North, 2016; 
BVG Associates, 2016; Renewable UK, 2017b; Wind Europe, 2017a).  
 
4.2.2. Evolution of German Ports 
 
The geography of Germany’s port sector contrasts with that of the UK, with a greater 
number of inland ports (currently at 250) and a port system split between two distinctive 
coastlines in Northern Germany, the majority of ports being located on the North Sea coast 





Figure 4.4: Germany’s Major Ports 
Source: BMVI, 2015 
 
The process of the German government and numerous private actors investing into port 
infrastructure remains vitally important for increasing Germany’s seaport’s size, scale and 
handling capacity (BMVI, 2016; 2017). This principle has been fully supported by the Ministry 
of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI), which also stated that the infrastructural 
capacity of Germany’s seaport’s may have to increase to handle a growth of “269 million 
tonnes [of cargo] in 2010 to 468 million tonnes [of cargo] in 2030” (BMVI, 2016, pp17).  
 
The ports of Hamburg and Bremen/Bremerhaven are the largest, multifunctional ports 
acting as important transport and logistics hubs, both located in Northwest Germany (Port of 
Hamburg, 2014; Alderton, 2008). Both the Port of Hamburg and the ports of Bremen and 
Bremerhaven handle all types of cargo including Ro/Ro cargo (including automobiles), 
containers, general and bulk cargo, dangerous goods and project cargo, whilst providing 
services for offshore energy activities (Bremenports, 2017a; 2017b). Furthermore, a port 
emerging as an important transport hub is the purpose-built Port of Wilhelmshaven, the only 
deep-water port in Germany, loading and discharging the world’s largest container vessels 
(City of Wilhelmshaven, 2012; Port of Hamburg, 2014; Alderton, 2008).  
 
Figure 4.5 summarises the diverse German port market, defining the maritime flows and 
industrial sectors each German port is connected to (Port of Hamburg, 2014). The German 
port names highlighted in red are located on the North Sea coast, the Port of Rendsburg 
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(highlighted in red and blue) serves markets and vessels linked to both German coasts, and 
port names highlighted in blue are located on the Baltic Sea coast (Figure 4.4; Figure 4.5).  
 
Figure 4.5: Market activities of German ports 
Source: Port of Hamburg, 2014 
 
Over the past 15 years, German ports have been developed as key sites for the pioneering 
development of offshore wind, highlighting a burgeoning market beyond ‘traditional’ port- 
related activities and the changing role of ports in Northern Germany (GTAi, 2017; Port of 
Hamburg, 2014; Alderton, 2008; Wind Europe, 2017a). Since the early 2000s, the German 
port market has experienced a shift towards and growth of conducting onshore and offshore 
port-related activities which supported and accommodated European offshore wind 
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activities and operations, highlighting a strong drive by industrial leaders involved in port 
and offshore wind activities (Figure 4.5) (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011; GTAi, 2017; BMWi, 2015).  
 
The pioneering role of the German offshore wind industry enabled the establishment of 
German port activities in particular sections of the offshore wind industry, primarily within 
high-value manufacturing activities (BWMi, 2015). German ports pioneered the 
development of appropriate infrastructure and facilities for firms to install, operate and 
maintain pilot projects such as ‘Alpha Ventus’ and ‘Baltic 1’, clearly reflecting an industrial 
drive into offshore wind (BMWi, 2015; Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011; Markard & Petersen, 2009l; 
Alpha Ventus, 2015). Specifically, some German ports are adapting and diversifying into 
offshore wind as a result of the restructuring of the offshore wind industry in Germany and 
more broadly in Northwest Europe (BMWi, 2017; Martin, 2010). German ports are becoming 
more important for manufacturing, installation and O&M (operations and maintenance) 
activities as a result of their physical setting in Northwest Europe, highly developed 
infrastructural asset bases and connections to offshore wind production networks (BMWi, 
2017; BMWi, 2015). Moreover, spare facilities have become available over time resulting 
from broader processes of deindustrialisation in Germany, which have been strategically 
converted and diversified to support offshore wind activities (Notteboom, 2016; BMWi, 
2017; BMWi, 2015).  
 
The geography of Germany’s offshore wind industry is centred upon the North Sea basin, 
allowing ports located on Germany’s North Sea coast to capitalise upon various market 
opportunities by utilising their physical setting and natural assets, whilst accordingly 
adapting their (infrastructural, industrial and material) asset base (see Figures 8, 9 and 10) 
(BMWi, 2015; GTAi, 2017; Wind Europe, 2017a; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Although the 
geography of Germany’s North Sea coast has motivated port authorities to adapt and 
diversify their asset bases to support the offshore wind industry, it plainly contrasts with the 
UK’s longer coastal length and larger area of seabed for installing and constructing offshore 
wind projects, which is an important natural asset in enabling the UK to generate a strong 
market draw (BMWi, 2016; DBIS, 2014). Furthermore, German ports have adapted and 
diversified their infrastructural assets to enable the export of turbine components to major 
overseas markets, in particular the UK, as a result of its rapid market expansion and strong 




O&M is another activity which some German ports are involved in. This activity is recognised 
as a diverse set of port-related activities common across all European offshore wind 
markets, which is comprised of onshore logistics, offshore logistics, turbine maintenance, 
export cable and grid connection, array cable maintenance, foundation maintenance, and 
back office administration and operations (GL Garrad Hassan, 2013; Niedersachsen Ports, 
2014; Wind Europe, 2017a).  
 
The manufacturing of turbine components within German ports is situated alongside other 
related offshore wind activities, due to demands from the industry which emphasise 
logistical efficiency (BMWi, 2015). Therefore, some German ports operate as multifunctional 
offshore wind bases, conducting a range of offshore wind related activities, including O&M, 
pre-assembly and installation activities, and the manufacturing of offshore wind turbine 
components (BMWi, 2015; BVG Associates, 2017). Examples of German ports heavily 
involved in a range of offshore wind activities (manufacturing, installation and O&M) include 
the ports of Cuxhaven, Bremerhaven, Stade and Nordenham, whilst Wilhelmshaven is 
growing into a multifunctional complex (Figure 4.6) (GTAi, 2017; Niedersachsen Ports, 2014). 
The Port of Wilhelmshaven is a key example of an important O&M base, conducting 
activities such as retrofitting and equipping of jack-up vessels, cable ships and supply unit 
services, whilst functioning as a strategic base for offshore wind energy companies and port 





Figure 4.6: German Ports involved in offshore wind activity 
Source: GTAi, 2017 
 
German Port Governance 
 
Germany’s port governance and policy environment shapes processes of port adaptation 
and diversification into new market activities, through policies supporting state ownership of 
ports and significant state investment into port infrastructure, whilst emphasising the critical 
role of ports in the offshore wind industry (BMVI, 2016; Notteboom, 2016; Debrie et al, 
2013; Brooks & Pallis, 2008). Currently the Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure 
(BMVI) is responsible for creating and implementing national port strategies, policies and 
legislation (BMVI, 2016; Debrie, 2010). The most recent National Strategy for German port 
governance and development was published in 2016, replacing the previous National 
Strategy published in 2009 (BMVI, 2016; 2017). The German government have stated the 
latest National Strategy is the national port policy framework for the next decade, aiming to 
support all relevant stakeholders involved (BMWi, 2017; BMVI, 2016). There are various 
policy criteria outlined by the German government for updating the National Strategy for 
German ports (BMVI, 2016; 2017). The policy criteria outlined below reflects the changing 
nature of Germany’s port activity and market settings, together with the growth of the 
offshore wind industry, and the broader political, economic and social conditions within 




• “maintenance and upgrading of transport and port infrastructures, and 
superstructures 
• fiercer international and European competition between ports 
• new EU initiatives in the ports sector 
• offshore wind energy 
• technological developments (automation of cargo handling, IT) 
• environmental protection and climate change mitigation 
• alternative fuels 
• security (especially cybersecurity) 
• demographic change.” 
 
Importantly, each National Strategy is developed and implemented in a co-operative way, 
through intense integration and coordination between several actors including the federal 
government, the states, ports, firms, trade unions and trade associations (BMVI, 2016; 
2017). However, the federal government has ultimate control over how the policy measures 
and mechanisms it creates are implanted, expecting “the states and local (municipal) 
authorities, the ports sector and trade unions to similarly implement the measures 
addressed to them” (BMVI, 2016, pp41). The federal government is also responsible for 
road, rail and water transport connections to German ports, nautical management and port 
planning external to port land, therefore the federal government provides funding for 
maintaining and improving port channels, alongside road and rail access routes (Ubbels, 
2005; BMVI, 2016). The approach taken by the federal government of establishing ports 
policy and taking strategic intervention in the ports industry (state ownership, management 
and investment), reflects Germany’s characteristic co-ordinated market economy, through 
the government working alongside port authorities to design and implement policy (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). Furthermore, the public ownership and operation of German ports mirrors 
the ‘Hanseatic’ port governance model, whereby ports receive considerable financial and 
political support from the federal government and German states (or Lander) (Suykens & 




Below the scale of the federal government, the Lander develop and implement policies for 
ports and port development in collaboration with municipalities, port authorities and port 
operators, with municipalities and port authorities having greater power in deciding specific 
changes to port infrastructure and land development (Debrie, 2010; BMVI, 2017). 
Furthermore, municipal governments within the Lander play a secondary role within 
Germany’s overall port governance system (Debrie, 2010; Ubbels, 2005). The Free Hanseatic 
City of Hamburg, the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen (including Bremerhaven), Lower Saxony 
(Niedersachsen), Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, are the main Germen 
states with policies and strategic plans for seaport governance, management, development 
and expansion. 
 
The State of Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen) has 39 seaports, 15 of them are fully owned by 
the state government, 21 are fully owned by municipalities and Nordenham is the only 
privately-owned seaport, belonging to ‘Rhenus-Midgard’ (Niedersachsen, 2017). In terms of 
implementing the National Strategy for ports, the State of Lower Saxony has “expressly 
committed to close and trustful cooperation with the federal government” to implement 
national policy framework, in order to strengthen Lower Saxony’s seaports (Niedersachsen, 
2016, pp11; Ubbells, 2005). In the latest port development strategy for Lower Saxony’s 
ports, named The Ports of Lower Saxony 2020: A Perspective Paper, the state government 
stated that Lower Saxony’s ports will aim to capitalise upon certain growth markets including 
the energy sector, automotive sector, container handling and agricultural products 
(Niedersachsen, 2016). Furthermore, the State of Lower Saxony and its municipalities are 
port owners and strategically invest into port infrastructure, in order to capitalise on 
emerging market opportunities (Niedersachsen, 2016; BMVI, 2016; Ubbells, 2005). A key 
example of this is the State of Lower Saxony investing over 250 million euros into the ports 
of Cuxhaven and Emden since the mid-2000s, thus capitalising upon the growth of offshore 
energy industries (including offshore wind) (Niedersachsen, 2016).  
 
So far the chapter has discussed the overall context and the changing role of Global, 
European, UK and German ports. The evolution of German ports is pinned around ports 
adapting and diversifying their industrial functionality and infrastructural assets, as a result 
of port governance actors shifting the focus, scale and significance of port market portfolios 
towards accommodating and supporting the bourgeoning offshore wind industry 
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(Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Wind Europe, 2017b). However, in relation 
to overall German port activity, offshore wind only represents a limited amount of value in 
relation to the overall traffic and markets that German ports are connected to. The 
emergence of the offshore wind has provided a new marketplace for ports to capitalise upon  
(Wind Europe, 2017a; 2017b). Therefore, the chapter will now move onto discuss the 
manner in which the offshore wind industry has emerged and developed to create new 
market opportunities for ports.  
 
4.3 Offshore Wind: A New Opportunity for Ports 
 
The ways in which particular ports have adapted and captured market share within offshore 
wind reflects the broader growth of the European offshore wind industry, which created a 
range of industrial and market opportunities for certain ports and catalysed port 
diversification into offshore wind (Wind Europe, 2017a; 2017b; Notteboom, 2016). Section 
4.3 will provide a profile of the evolution and change of offshore wind across the European, 
UK and German contexts, which create differentiated opportunities for ports to adapt and 
diversify. 
 
The emergence and growth of the UK and German offshore wind industries have been 
shaped by broader climate change, renewable energy transition and industrial 
decarbonisation policies and strategies. In the UK, the Climate Change Act (2008) provided 
an important step in providing a framework for UK climate change policy, statutory targets 
for decarbonisation and established the Committee on Climate Change as an independent 
body to advise the Government on climate change and renewable energy (House of 
Commons Library, 2020). The Act has been subsequently supported by the Low Carbon 
Transition Plan (2009) to tackle climate change, introduce new low carbon technologies and 
transform the lives of individuals (HM Government, 2009). More recently, the UK has 
introduced the Clean Growth strategy which set out specific financial mechanisms and 
initiatives for enabling the UK’s renewable energy transition and decarbonisation (DBEIS, 
2017a). In Germany, the Energiwende or ‘energy revolution’ is an ongoing climate change 
and decarbonisation strategy adopted by the German government (Stefes, 2016). In 2010, 
the German government set out its ‘Energy Concept’, a strategy which outlined how 
Germany could secure a clean and renewable energy supply, setting out a roadmap up until 
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2015 (GTAi, 2020). Building upon this important strategy and the German government’s new 
commitment to phase out nuclear energy following the 2011 Fukushima disaster, the 
German government published the Climate Action Plan 2050, which outlines the process for 
achieving its climate targets in response to the Paris Agreement, across the strategic areas of 
energy supply, construction and transport, industry and business, agriculture and forestry 
(BMU, 2016). As such, these wider policies and strategies to address key issues of climate 
change and decarbonisation, has set the political and legislative platform for the growth of 
offshore wind in the UK and Germany (GWEC, 2016; IRENA, 2012; Stefes, 2016; Dawley, 
2014). 
 
The European offshore wind industry operates as the leading global market, creating a range 
of industrial and market opportunities for North Sea ports to adapt and diversify into, 
including manufacturing, installation and O&M (operations and maintenance) activities 
(Wind Europe, 2017a; Notteboom, 2016). Consequently, a number of North Sea ports 
responded to these industrial and market opportunities and diversified to attempt to 
capture inward investment and offshore wind activities (BVG Associates, 2016; Wind Europe, 
2017a; 2017b). From 2014 to 2015, offshore wind doubled its market share to 24% of all 
wind power installations (offshore and onshore) in Europe, capitalising upon 34% 
(13.2billion) of renewable energy investment in Europe (EWEA, 2016). The offshore wind 
industry is geographically centred upon the European market with nearly 88% of all offshore 
wind installations located off the coast of ten European countries at the end of 2016 (GWEC, 
2016; Wind Europe, 2017b). Within Europe, the North Sea basin currently has 72% of 
installed capacity, followed by the Irish Sea (16.4%), the Baltic Sea (11.5%) and the Atlantic 
Ocean (0.04%) (Wind Europe, 2017b). The remaining 12% of all offshore wind installations 
are located largely off the coast of China, Japan, South Korea and the United States, 
highlighting a range of emerging international markets (GWEC, 2016).  
 
The European Commission has established a governance framework for the offshore wind 
industry through Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy, 
establishing a range of market-based schemes for EU nations to meet 2020 energy and 
climate change targets (GWEC, 2016; European Commission, 2014). However, there are 
growing concerns from port authorities invested in Europe’s offshore wind industry, 
demanding a market support regime from the EU and national governments to ensure a 
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stable pipeline of offshore wind projects and increased market certainty (Wind Europe, 
2017a). As such, regulatory governance frameworks implemented by the EU and national 
governments enable and/or constrain the process of ports adapting and diversifying into 
offshore wind activities (Notteboom, 2016; Debrie et al, 2013; Martin, 2010).  
 
Within Europe’s offshore wind industry Denmark is a pioneer, becoming the first country in 
the world to install wind turbines offshore at the ‘Vindeby’ offshore wind farm in 1991 
(Danish Energy Agency, 2015). Denmark, as the industry’s early leader and technological 
pioneer, currently has 1,271.3MW installed capacity making Denmark the third largest in 
Europe (GWEC, 2016). However, Denmark has since been overtaken by the UK (5066.5MW) 
and Germany (3294.6MW) in the past decade (GWEC, 2016; Garud & Karnoe, 2003; Simmie, 
2012). Germany is also a early pioneer of wind energy with offshore demonstration projects 
installed throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, underlining how there was an industry drive 
for offshore wind in Germany from an early stage of technological development (IRENA, 
2012; GWEC, 2016). This early industry drive has since catalysed the incremental adaptation 
and diversification of German ports into a range of port-related activities supporting the 
offshore wind industry (Notteboom, 2016; BMWi, 2015). Conversely, the UK’s offshore wind 
industry emerged from 2001 onwards before experiencing rapid growth from the mid to late 
2000s, and has since become a market draw for exporters based in Germany and other 
countries (IRENA, 2012; GWEC, 2016; Dawley et al 2015). The industrial leaders are 
Denmark, Germany and the UK in terms of installed capacity, with Belgium and the 
Netherlands succeeding them (Table 4.3): 
 
 
Country BE DE DK ES FI IE NL NO PT SE UK Total 
No. of 
farms 
5 18 12 1 2 1 6 1 1 5 27 80 
No. of 
turbines 




712 3294.6 1,271.3 5 26.3 25.2 426.8 2.3 2 201.7 5,066.5 11,034  
Table 4.3: European countries by offshore wind farms, turbines and capacity installed MW 




The majority of offshore wind turbine manufacturing firms in Europe are based in Germany 
(Wind Europe, 2017b; GWEC, 2016; BMWI, 2015). The leading and most important offshore 
wind turbine manufacturer at the end of 2016 in terms of market share is Siemens based in 
Germany (67.8%), followed by MHI Vestas Offshore Wind based in Denmark (16.4%), 
Senvion based in Germany (6.2%) and Adwen based in Germany (5.2%) (Wind Europe, 
2017b). Conversely the manufacturers of wind turbines foundations are based in a range of 
European countries (Wind Europe, 2017b). In terms of leading foundation manufacturers in 
Europe at the end of 2016 (installed foundations), these include Sif based in the Netherlands 
(22.3%), Bladt based in Denmark (19.7%), EEW based in Germany (18.8%) and Smulders 
based in Belgium (12.7%) (Wind Europe, 2017b). The chapter will now explore the context of 
UK offshore wind as an important national case in the context of European offshore wind. 
 
4.3.1 UK Offshore Wind Industry 
 
Offshore wind in the UK began in the early 1990s, growing into the world’s largest market 
with over 5GW of operational capacity by 2016 (GWEC 2016; IRENA, 2012). However, 
despite the UK having the largest offshore wind market, it has an absence of industry 
leaders, highlighting a strong market draw for European and Scandinavian firms (GWEC, 
2016; Wind Europe, 2017b). The chapter will now explore how and why this has occurred 
through discussing the creation of the UK offshore wind market and the context of the UK 
offshore wind industry, since the initial emergence of offshore wind in the UK in the early 
1990s.  
 
The initial development and growth of the UK offshore wind industry began through small 
but important pilot projects, originating in the North East of England (Dawley, 2014). This 
initial industrial footing was catalysed by the implementation of the NFFO (Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation) in England and Wales in 1990, stimulating a small amount of developer interest 
through two bidding rounds in 1990 and 1998 (Markard & Petersen, 2009). Further state-led 
support from the Labour government in 1997 enabled offshore wind to become quickly 
recognised by the UK government and industry as an important renewable energy option 
throughout the 2000s (Dawley, 2014; DBIS, 2014). This recognition was underpinned by the 
UK’s underlying assets listed below, enabling it to ultimately grow into the leading nation in 




• UK possesses a competitive advantage in its natural resource asset base (shallow 
continental shelf, extensive coastline and high wind speeds). 
• UK’s port-related infrastructural, industrial and material asset base can support 
offshore wind development, including manufacturing, installation, operation and 
maintenance (O&M) activities. 
• UK’s industrial, infrastructural and labour market competences relating to offshore 
oil and gas fabrication, and other port-related engineering activities. 
 
Building upon the UK’s overall infrastructural, industrial, material and natural asset base, a 
selection of UK ports strategically adapted and diversified their territorial assets to capture 
new market opportunities, and play unique roles in Europe’s offshore wind industry (Wind 
Europe, 2017a; Notteboom, 2016; Notteboom et al, 2013; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999).  
 
The offshore wind market has been governed in parallel with energy market regulation 
implemented by the UK government since the early 1990s and the introduction of the NFFO. 
As such, the NFFO paved the way for the introduction and implementation of the 
Renewables Obligation (RO) in 2002, a support mechanism which required suppliers (power 
generators) to “increase their uptake of renewable energy” by meeting targets of renewable 
energy power generation set by the RO (Bradshaw, 2010, pp205; IRENA, 2012). Renewable 
Obligation Certificates (ROCs) are issued to suppliers for the eligible renewable electricity 
they generate, and suppliers subsequently gain a subsidy for each ROC produced, currently 
at £45.58 (per ROC) for 2017/18 (IRENA, 2012; Ofgem, 2017). Despite slow market 
development initially, the implementation of ‘banding’ from 2009, wherein the UK 
government provided greater financial support for costlier renewable energy technologies, 
such as offshore wind, through permitting suppliers to receive 2 ROCs from 1MWh 
generated instead of 1 ROC (IRENA, 2012). Fundamentally, this shift in the policy mechanism 
for renewable power generation catalysed the rapid expansion of the offshore wind sector 
from 2009 onwards.  
 
The current scale, scope and geographical development of the UK’s offshore wind market 
has been catalysed and structured through rounds of development governed by the Crown 
Estate (and Crown Estate Scotland). The Crown Estate operates as an autonomous business 
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established by an Act of Parliament and is responsible for the management of the UK’s 
seabed, licensing ‘rounds’ for offshore wind farm projects and granting exclusive rights to 
develop particular projects (The Crown Estate, 2017a; Crown Estate Scotland, 2017). In 2000, 
the UK government announced Round 1 would consist of 18 projects of up to 30 turbines 
around the UK coast and ultimately licensed 13 projects, currently generating 1.2GW (IRENA, 
2012; The Crown Estate 2017b). Round 2 followed in 2003, with the Crown Estate licencing 
16 projects with a total generating capacity of just under 6 GW (IRENA, 2012; The Crown 
Estate, 2017b). However, following the UK Offshore Energy Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA) in 2009, Round 3 projects were identified and thus catalysed an 
acceleration in the UK’s offshore wind market through large scale deployment (Dawley, 
2014; Crown Estate, 2017b). This identification comprised of an array of offshore wind 
across 9 zones in UK Territorial Waters which were ultimately licensed in January 2010 
(IRENA, 2012; The Crown Estate, 2017b; The Crown Estate, 2010b). The rapid growth of the 
offshore wind market, despite various consenting delays and uncertainty throughout Round 
3, has enabled the UK to deploy 27 wind farm projects and a cumulative capacity of over 
5.1GW by the end of 2016 (GWEC, 2016; Wind Europe, 2017b; Table 4.3).  
 
Following the election of the Coalition Government in 2010, the UK government launched 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR) aiming to increase the capacity and volume of renewable 
energy to meet climate targets, increase inward investment into low carbon technology such 
as offshore wind, whilst aiming to decrease costs for consumers (DECC, 2012). As part of the 
EMR, the Coalition Government introduced the Levy Control Framework (LCF) to control the 
costs of supporting electricity generated from low carbon technology by establishing a 
restricted budget available for renewable energy. The latest announcement made by the UK 
government states that funding for the low-carbon energy schemes will be capped at £7.6 
billion in 2020/21 (2012 prices) (NAO, 2016). The UK government announced in 2016 that 
they will support offshore wind projects and other less established renewable energy 
technologies up to 2025/26 with a LCF (Levy Control Framework) budget of £730 million 
established under the CfD framework (NAO, 2016). 
  
Primarily underpinning the EMR was the introduction of the Contracts for Difference (CfD) 
framework which succeeded the RO mechanism. Essentially, CfD operates based upon a pre-
agreed ‘strike price’ as an administrative guide, with suppliers (power generators) receiving 
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the difference between this ‘strike price’ and the wholesale price on the electricity market 
(DECC, 2012). Under the first FIDeR round (Final Investment Decision Enabling for 
Renewables) enabling round in 2014 (in 2012 prices), strike prices for offshore wind were set 
at £155 per MWh for 2014/5, decreasing to £140 per MWh by 2018/19 (DECC, 2014a). 
Following this, the ‘awarded’ prices for suppliers was lower, standing at £119.89 for Scottish 
Power Renewables (UK) Limited and £114.39 for Neart na Gaoithe Offshore Wind Limited 
(DECC, 2015). Under the second CfD allocation round announced  in April 2017 (in 2012 
prices) strike prices for offshore wind were originally set at £105 per MWh for 2020/21 and 
£100 per MWh for 2021/22 (DBEIS, 2017c). However, between April and September 2017, 
the UK government introduced lower ‘awarded’ prices as the offshore wind market 
continued to grow and costs for suppliers continued to reduce (Financial Times, 2017). 
Consequently, strike prices in the second CfD allocation round for offshore wind were 
awarded in September 2017 at £74.75 per MWh for 2021/22 to Triton Knoll Offshore Wind 
Farm and £57.50 per MWh for 2022/23 to Hornsea Project 2 and Moray Offshore Wind Farm 
(East) (DBEIS, 2017c). More recently, the third CfD allocation round in 2019 strike prices for 
offshore wind were awarded in September 2019 at £39.65 per MWh for 2023/23 to 
Doggerbank Creyke Beck A P1, Forthwind and Sofia Offshore Wind Farm Phase 1, and at 
£41.61 per MWh for 2023/24 to Doggerbank Creyke Beck B P1, Doggerbank Teeside A P1 
and Seagreen Phase 1 (DBEIS, 2019b). 
 
In 2018 the UK government and the OWIC (Offshore Wind Industry Council) announced an 
ambitious estimate of installing 30GW of turbine capacity by 2030, which was confirmed 
through a ‘Offshore Wind Sector Deal’ in March 2019 (Renewable UK, 2018; Humber 
Business, 2019; DBEIS, 2019a). Within the Offshore Wind Sector Deal, the UK government 
committed to providing  up to £557m for CfDs, whilst confirming a third CfD allocation round 
in May 2019, future allocation rounds will occur every 2 years thereafter and that the Crown 
Estate and the Crown Estate Scotland will provide a new seabed leasing round in 2019 
(DBEIS, 2019a).  
 
However, the EMR process, encompassing the CfD framework, has been seen by some 
actors within the UK offshore wind industry to be lengthy and catalysed market uncertainty 
throughout the 2010s, demonstrated by certain offshore wind projects being cancelled or 
delayed (BVG Associates, 2017). Despite some market uncertainty, five of eight offshore 
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wind projects were granted contracts in the Final Investment Decision Enabling Round 
(FIDeR) in 2013/14, two contracts to offshore wind projects in the first CfD round granted in 
2014/15, three contracts to offshore wind projects in the second CfD round granted in 2017 
and six contracts to offshore wind projects in the third CfD round granted in 2019 (DECC, 
2014b; DECC, 2015; DBEIS, 2017b; 2017c; BEIS, 2019b). These projects have been awarded 
under a regime which promotes competition for financial support reflecting the UK’s highly 
liberalised political economy, especially since the election of the Coalition Government in 
2010 and the Conservative Government in 2015 (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
 
The UK government is continually aiming to create an appropriate policy framework to 
enable the offshore wind market to develop and expand, through employing the CfD 
(Contracts for Difference) mechanism as an outcome of the EMR (Electricity Market Reform) 
(DECC, 2012; DECC, 2015; DBEIS, 2017b; 2017c). Moreover, the Crown Estate Licencing 
Rounds underpin the organisation and expansion of the UK offshore wind. However, the LCF 
(Levy Control Framework) essentially constricts the UK’s offshore wind market development, 
as it sets a limited annual budget for all renewable energy levy-funded schemes. The chapter 
will now explore the UK offshore wind industry and the main policies that shape it, thus 
highlighting its potential to stimulate port adaptation and shape new regional industrial 
paths. 
 
Influencing Industrial Paths 
 
The rapid growth and expansion of the UK offshore wind market prompted the UK 
government to place emphasis upon growing the UK’s industrial competence, capacity and 
scope in offshore wind through policy actions focused upon market support, to build a 
competitive and innovative UK supply chain (HM Government, 2013). Underpinning this 
strategy was that the vast majority of content within the UK’s offshore wind supply chain for 
turbine installations originate in Germany (Siemens, Senvion, Adwen) and Denmark (MHI 
Vestas), as a result of a strong industry drive by leading firms such as Siemens (OWIC, 2014; 
Wind Europe 2017a). The main policy publication for setting a strong industrial target to 
move towards generating 50% of value from UK content was the Offshore Wind Industrial 
Strategy (OWIS) (HM Government, 2013). To achieve this target, the OWIS recommended 
some key policy actions. Firstly, that the ‘Offshore Wind Investment Organisation’ should 
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market the UK offshore wind industry to attract greater volumes of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), due to the absence of turbine manufacturing and other related activities in 
the domestic supply chain. Secondly, to increase capacity of existing (domestic) firms in the 
offshore wind supply chain and to enable the diversification of new firms with clear capacity 
to enter the offshore wind supply chain, ‘GROW: Offshore Wind’ must provide financial 
grants and market support packages tailored to individual companies. GROW: Offshore Wind 
was a three-year government-backed programme founded in 2013 with £20M RGF (Regional 
Growth Fund) funding, aiming to enable the ability of firms in England to exploit various 
opportunities offered by the UK offshore wind market (HM Government, 2013). Thirdly, 
OWIS recommended a key action to be taken by the ‘Technology Strategy Board’ to provide 
£46 million of funding between 2013-2018 to establish the Offshore Renewable Energy 
(ORE) Catapult, simulating and directing national R&D, component testing and cost 
reduction activities (HM Government, 2013). ORE Catapult is based in Glasgow and includes 
high-end demonstrating and testing facilities in the North East of England, which have largely 
been developed and modelled to emulate the Fraunhofer model of Technology and 
Innovation Centres (TICs) in Germany (BVG Associates, 2014; Hauser, 2014). The interaction 
of various institutions, industry bodies and strategies arranged by the OWIS, aimed to 
establish an institutional environment consisting of certain policies and organisations 
(GROW: Offshore Wind, RGF, ORE), to enhance the industrial development of the domestic 
supply chain for offshore wind (BVG Associates, OWIC, 2014; Martin, 2010).  
 
Currently the functioning of the UK offshore wind industry is dominated by one key activity 
which is operations and maintenance (O&M) (GL Garrad Hassan, 2013). Essentially, O&M 
covers a range of different interconnected onshore and offshore activities including offshore 
and onshore logistics, back office administration and operations, establishing export cable 
grid connections, turbine maintenance, array cable maintenance and foundation 
maintenance (GL Garrad Hassan, 2013). The owner of each offshore wind project procures 
the O&M provider and some owners often provide the O&M services themselves (GL Garrad 
Hassan, 2013). The foremost actor conducting O&M activities is Ørsted, who is an industry 
pioneer in terms of O&M resulting from developing high-level in-house capabilities as one of 
the first movers into the offshore wind industry (GL Garrad Hassan, 2013; HM Government, 
2013). Other key actors conducting O&M activities in the UK include Siemens, E.ON, 




The process of pre-assembling wind turbines and installing an offshore wind project is 
another key function within the UK offshore wind industry (Crown Estate, 2010a). This 
process is comprised of several interacting activities including export-cable laying, 
foundation installation, array-cable laying, offshore substation installation, onshore pre-
assembly of turbine components and turbine installation (Crown Estate, 2010a). Due to the 
complexity of this process, a vast array of large energy and engineering companies and SMEs 
are involved in conducting the range of interacting activities. However, the main actors 
involved in the pre-assembling of turbine components and installation process for the UK 
offshore wind industry are Siemens, Ørsted, A2SEA and E.ON. 
 
The manufacturing of turbine components is an important industrial function within the 
offshore wind industry (The Crown Estate, 2010). However, the UK is less established in 
manufacturing turbine components in comparison to its O&M, pre-assembly and installation 
capacity (BVG Associates, 2016). This current industry context emphasises how the UK is 
providing a large market draw for European turbine manufactures such as Siemens and MHI 
Vestas to export turbine components (Wind Europe, 2017b). This industrial context is further 
supported by the future market outlook of offshore wind as the UK is expected to add 




Figure 4.7: European offshore wind market outlook 




Thus far, the chapter has outlined the important UK context for offshore wind in terms of 
market creation and industry context, emphasising its capacity to shape new industrial 
paths. However, the German context for offshore wind offers some important and 
interesting comparisons in terms its market creation and industrial context, in relation to 
German ports adapting and diversifying into the offshore wind industry and influencing new 
regional industrial paths in Germany. 
 
4.3.2 German Offshore Wind Industry 
 
Offshore wind in Germany began much later than the UK, emerging in 2010, and has become 
the world’s second largest offshore wind market with 4.1GW installed by 2016 (GWEC, 2016; 
Markard & Petersen, 2009). In addition, Germany comprises key industrial leaders such as 
Siemens (turbine component manufacturer), EEW (manufacturer of turbine foundations) 
and Innogy (offshore wind project developer), thus highlighting an industrial drive of 
offshore wind  since its emergence in Germany (GWEC, 2016; Wind Europe, 2017b). The 
chapter will explore how and why offshore wind emerged in Germany through outlining the 
creation of the German offshore wind market and Germany’s offshore wind industry 
context. 
 
Germany has been the European pioneer for onshore wind technology since the 1970s and 
currently the onshore wind market dominates the offshore wind market in terms of capacity 
installed, inward investment and levels of employment (GWEC, 2016; O’Sullivan, 2014). 
However, in addition to industrial competencies in onshore wind activities, Germany has 
grown into the second largest market for offshore wind power with 4.1GW installed by the 
end of 2016, despite only having two pilot projects installed by the end of 2007 (GWEC, 
2016; Markard & Petersen, 2009). This rapid market growth of offshore wind was catalysed 
by the recognition that offshore wind technology could provide a scalable solution to reach 
Germany’s renewable energy targets and low-carbon transition, a policy regime named 
‘Energiewende’ (Buchan, 2012). The initial development and growth of Germany’s offshore 
wind market was shaped by the ‘Federal Offshore Wind Strategy’ (Strategie der 
Bundesregierung zur Windenergienutzung auf See) in 2002 (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011). This 
strategy aimed for 500MW to be installed by 2006, 3,000MW to be installed by 2010 and up 
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to 25,000MW installed by 2025/30 (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011). These ambitious state-led 
targets catalysed a strong drive from industry leaders and prompted firms into action from 
the mid-2000s, as they recognised that the federal government was willing to provide long-
term market support (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011).  
 
Following growing political scepticism of nuclear energy and increasing demand for 
decarbonisation in the late 1980s, the first Electricity Feed-in-Act (StrEG) (1991) was the first 
industrial policy mechanism which ensured a fixed rate for renewable energy projects to 
feed into Germany’s national grid (IRENA, 2012; Lema et al, 2014; Stefes, 2016). Essentially, 
StrEG enabled the first, important (although limited) growth of Germany’s wind energy 
market, through setting a feed-in-tariff at 90% of the average retail electricity price for wind 
producers (Stefes, 2016). Moreover, the German government also supported the wind 
energy market through various loan programmes to subsidise developers purchasing 
turbines and are “mostly operated by the [state-owned] KfW Development Bank” (Lema et 
al, pp36). A notable example of this type of funding programme is the Offshore Wind Energy 
Loan Programme (2011), financed by the KfW Development Bank, which has funded the 
Global Tech I and Butendiek offshore wind projects. 
 
The fundamental policy framework for the industrial development of wind energy was laid 
down by Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) or ‘RESA’ 
in 2000, acting as a lever for a range of infant technologies through providing targeted 
incentives (BWMi, 2015; Stefes, 2016). As such, the RESA sets a fixed price for producers to 
alleviate the impact of decreasing energy prices within Germany’s energy market, 
underpinned by market incentives (feed-in-tariffs) for renewable energy sources 
(Wüstenhagen & Bilharz, 2006; Stefes, 2016). The RESA policy has been revised in 2004, 
2009, 2011, 2014 and 2017 reflecting Germany’s changing energy market, shifting costs of 
renewable energy technologies for consumers and the need for greater industry support for 
costlier renewable energy technologies, such as offshore wind. Importantly, the 2009 
revision of the RESA policy focused upon providing higher feed-in-tariffs for offshore wind 
(an increase from 9.1 to 15.4-euro cent per kWh), reflecting the industrial and financial 
challenges experienced by developers underpinned by installing turbines in deeper waters 
and at more distance offshore sites (Markard & Petersen, 2009). The increased feed-in-
tariffs implemented through the RESA (2009) also enabled firms to overcome these barriers 
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and ultimately enable the development of Alpha Ventus, which was connected to the grid in 
2009 (Markard & Petersen, 2009; TenneT, 2018).  Moreover, the revision of the RESA in 
2014 adjusted the offshore wind expansion targets to align with industrial development 
whilst regulating the expansion of offshore wind energy until 2030 (BMWi, 2015). The 
revised RESA (2014) set binding targets, stating that cumulative installed capacity of offshore 
wind will amount to 6.5GW by 2020 and rising to 15GW by 2030, thus allowing the 
government to predict costs to the German consumer whilst providing a secure pipeline of 
projects for manufacturers, developers, operators and ports within the offshore wind 
market (BMWi, 2014; 2015). This form of policy realisation and market security within the 
offshore wind industry is what industrial actors (manufacturers, developers, operators and 
ports) within the UK offshore wind market are demanding (GWEC, 2016; Wind Europe, 
2017a). In addition, the revised RESA (2014) introduced the ‘acceleration model’ aimed at 
offshore wind developers, providing initial financial support of 19.4 euro-cent per kWh for 
eight years instead of twelve depending upon distance from the coast and water depth 
(BMWi, 2014; 2015). Following this the ‘basic rate’ is paid for at least the first 12 years of 
operation (15.4-euro cent per kWh). The acceleration model applies to offshore wind 
projects (or ‘plants’) due to commence operation until the end of 2019 (BMWi, 2014; 2015).  
 
The revised RESA (2017) stated new targets of adding 500MW of installed offshore wind 
capacity between 2021/22, 700MW per year between 2023 and 2025, and 840MW added 
per year from 2026 onwards (BMWi, 2016). The main factor underpinning the revised RESA 
(2017) is an auction process for offshore sites based upon releasing them for tender, thus 
pursuing a centralised framework similar to those implemented by the UK, Denmark and the 
Netherlands (BMWi, 2016). This auction process is underpinned by the market being able to 
deliver 15GW of installed capacity by 2030. The German government will examine various 
offshore sites to be auctioned for projects, enabling a process of ‘dovetailing’ with electricity 
grid connections (BMWi, 2016). The site auctions will take place on a ‘transitional’ basis 
amongst the offshore wind projects already in the planning stage until 2026 (BWMi, 2016). 
Furthermore, the new centralised framework in Germany allows the Federal Maritime and 
Hydrographic Agency (BSH) to undertake site surveying and grid connection activities, as 
opposed to offshore wind developers taking on substantial costs associated with these 




Importantly, the revisions made to the RESA policy framework by the German government 
aimed to provide an appropriate policy environment for various industrial actors 
(manufacturers, developers, operators and ports) to further support, enhance and expand 
the German offshore wind industry (BMWi, 2017; Martin, 2010). The German government 
established this through financially and politically supporting the development of costlier 
renewable energy technologies such as offshore wind, in order to develop a prominent, 
domestic offshore wind market within Europe (BMWi, 2015). Additionally, the renewable 
energy policies and funding mechanisms implemented by the German government has 
aimed to create new industrial paths for various German localities based upon the offshore 
wind industry (BMWi, 2017; 2015; 2014; Simmie et al, 2014). Germany’s Energiwende policy 
regime and the historical revisions made to the RESA, reflects the co-ordinated market 
economy of Germany, whereby the role of the German government has been important in 
shaping the initial growth and development of the offshore wind market (Hall & Soskice, 
2001; Stefes, 2016). However, the latest revision of the RESA in 2017 reflects an interesting 
regime change through implementing the new tendering and auction process, highlighting 
the liberalisation of the framework typically found in liberal market economies such as the 
UK (BMWi, 2016; Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
 
Influencing Industrial Paths 
 
Resulting from widespread critique of nuclear energy and oil crisis in the late 1970s, the 
German government and small-scale entrepreneurs focused efforts upon generating power 
from alternative (renewable) energy sources, mainly wind power (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011; 
IRENA, 2012). Following unsuccessful projects to fully launch wind energy technology on a 
national scale, the German government initially decided against pursuing onshore wind 
energy technology, despite some early small-scale success from entrepreneurs, innovators 
and enthusiasts (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011; IRENA, 2012). Government policy for the industrial 
and technological development of wind energy in Germany preceded the market support 
mechanisms implemented from the early 1990s onwards, as previously discussed (IRENA, 
2012; BMWi, 2015). The earliest, although unsuccessful, state-led R&D programme named 
GROWIAN (Groß-Wind-Anlage, Large Scale Wind Turbine) was launched in 1976 aiming to 
establish world leading onshore wind technology and ended in the late 1980s due to 
unstable operation and considerable budgetary problems (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011). 
117 
 
However, the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) launched the Alpha Ventus 
research programme in 2001 in tandem with the launch of the RESO in 2000 to support the 
renewable energy market, which provided an offshore demonstrator site. Importantly, the 
Federal Offshore Wind Strategy (2002) forged a new policy phase for industrial development 
of Germany’s offshore wind market, setting market objectives and strategies for future 
offshore wind development (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011; IRENA, 2012). The Federal Offshore 
Wind Strategy (2002) highlighted the importance and research output of the Alpha Ventus 
programme, which catalysed the establishment of the ‘German Offshore Wind Energy 
Foundation’ in 2005, a public-private body to oversee the Alpha Ventus programme and 
manage long-term R&D support (IRENA, 2012). The opening of the Alpha Ventus offshore 
test site in April 2010 underpinned a research initiative called ‘Research at Alpha Ventus’ 
(RAVE), which is based at the ‘Fraunhofer Institute for Wind Energy and Energy Systems 
Technology’ (IWES), aiming to connect R&D outputs to the broader development of 
Germany’s offshore wind industry (IRENA, 2012; Hauser, 2014). 
 
Alongside the federal government supporting the offshore wind industry, the Lander and 
municipalities also have different financial support instruments and resources (Schonberger 
& Reiche, 2016). For instance, the ‘Land’ (German state) can deliver valuable support for the 
offshore wind activities through providing specialised port infrastructure, which is typically 
publically owned by the state or municipality (Debrie et al, 2013; Verhoeven, 2010; Wind 
Europe, 2017a). Moreover, the Land can finance particular investments required by actors 
within the offshore wind industry, which can be used alongside funding from the EU and 
German development banks (Schonberger & Reiche, 2016). Finally, in regard to Germany’s 
long-lasting R&D capacity in wind technology, research organisations such as ‘ForWind’ in 
Oldenburg, IWES in Bremerhaven and ‘Deutsches Windenergie-Institut’ in Wilhelmshaven 
have been (or are currently) dependent on funding provided by the Lander. 
 
However, the initial limited growth of Germany’s offshore wind market throughout the 
2000s was underpinned by a range of complex industrial and technical challenges related to 
Germany’s problematic coastal and physical settings (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011). Firstly, 
Germany’s comparatively short North Sea and Baltic Sea coasts constrains the potential 
scale and scope for constructing offshore wind farms. Secondly, Germany confined its 
offshore wind projects to its ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’ (EEZ) meaning that developers and 
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vessels had to negotiate rougher and deeper waters 12 nautical miles off its coast, in order 
to successfully install turbines and establish connection to Germany’s national electricity 
grid. Underpinning this was the ‘National Park’ status of large areas of coastal land and 
waters, especially on the North Sea coast (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011). Consequently, a series of 
market, spatial planning and licensing policies were implemented throughout the 2000s and 
2010s, including the RESA (2009) policy to increase the feed-in tariffs, to tackle these major 
technical problems, overcome financial barriers and enable the successful construction of 
offshore wind projects in German waters (Bruns & Ohlhorst, 2011; Markard & Petersen, 
2009). Furthermore, the future outlook of Germany’s offshore wind is positive in terms of 
installed capacity, with 23 projects shortlisted to compete for 3.1GW to be awarded in 
2017/18 and ultimately delivered by 2025 (see Figure 4.7) (Wind Europe, 2017b). 
 
Germany’s current offshore wind industrial context contrasts to that of the UK, whereby 
there has been an industrial drive of offshore wind in Germany since the early 2000s, leading 
to a superior capacity for turbine manufacturing activities (Lema et al, 2014; BMWi, 2015). 
At present Germany is home to Europe’s leading manufacturers and suppliers of offshore 
wind turbines, whereby approximately one third are manufacturing firms and two thirds 
provide installation, deployment and O&M services (Lema et al, 2014). Siemens is the 
world’s largest manufacturer of offshore wind turbines, alongside Senvion, Adwen and MHI 
Vestas (Lema et al, 2014; BMWi, 2015; Wind Europe, 2017b). Turbine manufacturers based 
in Germany, in particular Siemens with a 67.8% market share across Europe, dominate the 
UK offshore wind market because of the absence of UK turbine manufacturers and 
component suppliers, which creates a market draw for German exporters of turbine 
components (OWIC, 2014; BWMI, 2015; Wind Europe, 2017b). 
 
Pre-assembly and installation activities are carried out by transnational utility and 
engineering companies such as Siemens, Ørsted, Vattenfall and E.ON, alongside a range of 
SMEs carrying out a various interrelated installation and O&M activities (BMWi, 2015; The 
Crown Estate, 2010a). In resemblance to the UK offshore wind industry, transnational energy 
and engineering companies (in particular Ørsted and Siemens) are the dominant actors 
carrying out O&M activities for German offshore wind projects. In parallel with the 
functionality of O&M activities in the UK offshore wind industry, transnational utility and 
engineering companies conduct O&M activities alongside various project owners, (often 
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subsidiaries of transnational companies), which also provide O&M services for individual 
projects (Lema et al, 2014; The Crown Estate, 2010).  
 
As a result of the industrial context of Germany’s offshore wind industry, the current 
geography of Germany’s operational, consented and planned offshore wind farms are 





Figure 4.8: Germany’s North Sea Offshore Wind Farms (November 2014) 




Figure 4.9: Germany’s Baltic Sea Offshore Wind Farms (November 2014) 




4.4 Project case studies 
 
The chapter has revealed the UK and Germany to be important national cases in relation to 
investigating processes of port adaptation and diversification into Europe’s bourgeoning 
offshore wind, which are clearly evident in both national cases (Notteboom, 2016; BVG 
Associates, 2016; BMWi, 2015). Within these two national cases, the thesis is exploring two 
comparative port cases on the sub-national scale, the ‘Humber Ports’ case and the ‘Port of 
Cuxhaven’ case. The research is focusing upon these two comparative port cases based upon 
important criteria which is outlined and justified in greater depth and detail within Chapter 
3. To fully support the explanation and justification of the comparative port cases set out in 
Chapter 3, a more detailed context of the comparative port cases adapting and diversifying 
into offshore wind will now be outlined, in relation to the significance of the UK and 
Germany as prominent national cases within Europe. 
 
4.4.1 Humber Ports Case  
 
In relation to the context of ports and offshore wind in the UK, the Humber Ports case 
represents the most important example of UK ports adapting and diversifying into the UK 
offshore wind industry, especially through the examples of growing component 
manufacturing capacity at the Siemens blade manufacturing facility in the Port of Hull (PoH) 
and Ørsted’s strengthening O&M base at the Port of Grimsby (PoG) (see Figure 4.3). 
 
The Humber Ports case is comprised of the PoH and the PoG, which are currently owned and 
operated by Associated British Ports (ABP), operating as the UK’s largest port operator (ABP, 
2016). The Humber Ports case will now be referred to as the ‘Humber Ports’ for ease of this 
discussion. The Humber Ports are located on the River Humber on England’s east coast, with 
the PoH on the north bank and the PoG on the south bank, the latter is located nearer to the 
mouth of the River Humber where it enters the North Sea. The Humber Ports (PoH and PoG) 
were previously publically owned and operated by the British Transport Docks Board until its 
privatisation in 1981, wherein their ownership and operation was fully transferred to ABP 
(Pettit, 2008). The port authority within the Humber Ports case, namely ABP, adopts a 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ port governance model consisting of private ownership and operation, which 
distinctively contrasts with the port governance model at the Port of Cuxhaven (PoC), a 
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Hanseatic port governance model comprising public ownership and operation (Table 2.1) 
(Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010; ABP, 2016).  
 
Importantly, the adaptation and diversification of the Humber Ports has enabled an 
heightened role and increased scale of O&M (Ørsted, Centrica, E.ON, Siemens, RES), 
installation and manufacturing activities (Siemens) to emerge at the Humber Ports (Figure 
4.3; Table 3.1) (ABP, 2016b; Siemens, 2016a). Thus, the Humber Ports are involved in 
important offshore wind production networks principally through the activities of Siemens 
and Ørsted, which has enabled the Humber Ports to play an important port role in the 
offshore wind industry (Siemens, 2016a; Humber Business, 2016; Coe & Yeung, 2015). The 
Humber Ports first diversified into the offshore wind industry in 2007 when Centrica began 
constructing facilities to conduct O&M activities from the PoG, with O&M activities 
beginning in 2010 (BBC News, 2007; Wind Power Monthly, 2014; Table 3.1). The Humber 
Port’s diversification into the offshore wind industry has been extended by the episodes of 
Siemens constructing its manufacturing facility at the PoH and subsequently producing 
turbine blades since late 2016, alongside Ørsted constructing its new O&M base at the PoG’s 
‘Royal Dock’ since 2016 (Siemens, 2016a; Humber Business, 2016).  
 
4.4.2 Port of Cuxhaven Case 
 
The PoC is located on Germany’s North Sea coast at the mouth of the Elbe River. Operating 
as one of Germany’s most important ports, the PoC is owned by the state of Lower Saxony 
and operated by Niedersachsen Ports GmbH & Co. KG, a publically owned port operator for 
all ports within Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen Ports, 2009; European Commission, 2016; 
BMVI; 2015). The PoC has been owned and operated by the State of Lower Saxony since the 
Second World War, and still operates as a port which is public owned and operated, thus 
adopting a ‘Hanseatic’ port governance model (Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 
2010; European Commission, 2016). As previously mentioned, this port governance model 
and arrangement contrasts with that of the Humber Ports, which adopts an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
port governance model comprised of private ownership and operation (Table 2.1) (Suykens 




In connection to the context of Germany’s ports and offshore industry, the PoC is a leading 
port involved within the offshore wind industry with its dedicated infrastructural, individual 
and material asset base at the Offshore Base Cuxhaven (OBC) (GTAi, 2017; AfW Cuxhaven, 
2018a; 2018f; 2018g). However, in comparison to the Humber Ports case, the PoC is one of 
many German ports providing reputable bases to accommodate and support Germany’s 
offshore wind industry through a range of port-related activities (Figure 4.6) (GTAi, 2017; 
BMVI, 2016; BMWi, 2015). The PoC has adapted and diversified its infrastructural asset base 
over time to create a significant role and scale of offshore wind in port’s business portfolio 
(AfW Cuxhaven, 2018a; 2018f; 2018g). The scale of offshore wind within the PoC’s business 
portfolio is relatively similar to the Humber Ports case, with O&M firms (Offshore Marine 
Management), alongside installation and manufacturing firms (Siemens, AMBAU) all evident 
at the Port of Cuxhaven. However, the PoC’s has slightly greater turbine manufacturing 
capacity than the Humber Ports case with the turbine foundation and monopile 
manufacturing capabilities of AMBAU (GTAi, 2017). Essentially, these firms and the offshore 
wind activities they conduct has enabled the PoC to play important roles in the offshore 
wind industry, thus paralleling the roles of the Humber Ports case in the offshore wind 
industry. Furthermore, the PoC is plugged into similar offshore wind production network as 
the Humber Ports case (Coe & Yeung, 2015). This is made evident by the Siemens nacelle 
manufacturing facility at the PoC producing and assembling turbine components which are 
then transported to the Siemens blade manufacturing facility at the PoH for additional 
assembly activities (Siemens, 2016a; 2016b). In contrast to the Humber Ports case, the PoC 
first diversified into offshore wind when it began constructing heavy duty platform in 2006 
(completed 2008) for offshore wind installation and O&M activities, which was then 
supported by a dedicated offshore terminal for manufacturing, installation and O&M 
activities (Offshore Terminal I) from 2007 (completed 2009) (Offshore Base Cuxhaven, 
2017b; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018a). Additionally, and in contrast to the Humber Ports case, the 
PoC has adapted and added a greater amount of infrastructural assets and facilities including 
the ‘Offshore Terminal II’ in 2009 (completed 2012), dedicated commercial and industrial 
areas for offshore wind activities in 2014, and the Siemens nacelle manufacturing facility in 







In conclusion, German ports adapted and diversified to increase their capacity to support the 
industrial drive of offshore wind in Germany since the early 2000s, as German energy and 
engineering firms required port facilities to support the export of turbine components to 
overseas markets such as the UK, who created a market draw (BMWi, 2015; BMVI, 2017; 
Wind Europe, 2017a). Moreover, German ports may not have developed the appropriate 
industrial functions, capacity, infrastructural assets and facilities if the offshore wind industry 
was not driven as strongly and effectively as it was (BMWi, 2015). Therefore, the industrial 
and market requirements of ports can vary between countries depending upon the demands 
placed upon them by the offshore wind industry (Wind Europe, 2017a; 2017b). Essentially, 
both UK and German ports were responding to the demand of the offshore wind industry 
and the creation of a new market (Wind Europe, 2017a; 2017b). In parallel with the UK port 
governance context, German port authorities are important in shaping and instigating port 
diversification, in order to seize new and emerging market opportunities (Debrie et al, 2013; 
Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011).  
 
This chapter has outlined and explained the interrelated and multiscalar historical, political, 
market, policy and governance arrangements underpinning each comparative port case 
study and the broader institutional environments in the UK and Germany, which enables and 
constrains the port adaptation process (Martin, 2000; 2010). Firstly, the chapter discussed 
the evolution of ports, concentrating upon the governance and market contexts connected 
to the adaptation of UK and German ports operating within the broader European port 
environment. Secondly, the chapter examined the evolution of the offshore wind industry 
which fundamentally drove the adaptation and diversification of ports into offshore wind 
within the European context, by creating a range of industrial and market opportunities. 
Interrelated to the ports discussion, the chapter explored the market creation and industry 
contexts influencing the evolution and current arrangement of the UK and German offshore 
wind industry. Importantly, the chapter uncovered the UK and Germany as prominent 
national cases for investigating port adaptation and diversification into offshore wind 
activities (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Wind Europe, 2017b). Lastly, the 
chapter considered and outlined the context of the project’s two comparative cases, which 
was informed by uncovering the national port and offshore wind settings of UK and 
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Germany. The Humber Ports case (the Port of Hull and the Port of Grimsby) in the UK and 
the Port of Cuxhaven case in Germany will be described, explained and their selection 



































This chapter explores the evolution and adaptation of the PoC (Port of Cuxhaven) into 
offshore wind and is framed by the analytical framework (see Figure 2.4). The PoC’s 
adaptation and diversification was undertaken to achieve a distinctive goal and serve a new 
purpose as a port, which was to support and create a new regional path around the offshore 
wind industry. This chapter is structured by key causal episodes, which enables a clear and 
more advanced understanding of the PoC’s temporal evolution, adaptation and 
diversification into offshore wind (Figure 5.1). Each episode is made up of a number of 
elements, highlighting distinctive phases of port adaptation which stimulate and support the 
regional path creation process (Figure 5.1). These elements are organised around port 
diversification and modes of investment, which enable and stimulate processes of port 
adaptation and subsequent regional path creation around the offshore wind industry. These 
modes of investment include conversion and expansion, which drive and shape the physical 
construction of port assets upon ‘brownfield’ port land and ‘greenfield’ port land (see Figure 
2.4). The chapter analyses how key firm and non-firm actors shaped and drove distinctive 
modes of investment to enable the valorisation of infrastructural and material assets, 
alongside how these modes of investment and activities were shaped and influenced by 
particular port governance and ownership arrangements and multiscalar institutional 
environments (see Figure 2.4). 
 
The chapter begins with the preformation and planning stage of the PoC’s adaptation and 
diversification between 2003 - 2005, which originally catalysed a new growth path into 
offshore wind. This first episode encompasses the Offshore Master Plan’s design and launch 
underpinned by a long-term strategic vision which was key in attracting and enabling the 
demonstration effect of a test turbine field. It reveals how the PoC’s change of governance 
arrangements, served to heighten the importance of offshore wind within PoC’s business 
portfolio and prioritised state-led investment for the expansion of port infrastructure to 
attract new firms to realise the Offshore Master Plan’s long-term vision. The chapter then 
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discusses the early growth and expansion of the PoC between 2006 - 2012. This second 
episode is centred around the physical construction of a new infrastructure base on 
brownfield and greenfield land for attracting new manufacturing and pre-assembly offshore 
wind activities, supporting a new regional path around the offshore wind industry. This was 
driven by a number of phased construction projects, which were underpinned by a series of 
proactive and reactive investments for the expansion of infrastructure. The third episode 
then moves to 2011, as the PoC endured an episode of disinvestment and uncertainty 
between 2011 - 2014, marking a stark contrast to the previous episodes of diversification 
and expansion. This third episode discusses the reduction of O&M and manufacturing 
activities at the PoC through the disinvestments of three different firms, namely OMM 
(Offshore Marine Management), STRABAG and CSC (Cuxhaven Steel Construction). The final 
and fourth episode explores how the PoC experienced an episode of revival and renewed 
expansion from 2014 onwards, caused and driven by previous episodes, and shifting from a 
phase of disinvestment and uncertainty. This includes the transplantation of Siemens and its 
suppliers into the PoC, AMBAU’s acquisition of CSC’s former assets and the further 





Figure 5.1: Port of Cuxhaven four causal episodes 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
5.2 Preformation and planning: 2003-2005 
 
This preformation and planning episode draws attention to key actors identifying the novelty 
of offshore wind and emphasising the future of offshore wind in Germany which was yet to 
form. This was primarily enabled a long-term port strategy designed to capitalise upon the 
embryonic Germany offshore wind industry. Few North Sea ports had identified and 
subsequently changed governance settings to take full advantage of job creation and 






















































New vision: 2003 
Demonstration effect: 2004 - 2005 
O&M disinvestment:  2011- 2013 
Initial infrastructure investment : 2006 - 2007 
Establishing new infrastructure:  2006 - 2012 
Governance change: 2005  
Manufacturing disinvestment: 2013 
New round of investment:  2014 onwards 
Port Infrastructure investment:  2016 - 2018 
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AfW and later Niedersachsen Ports (NPorts) strategically identifying how the port’s business 
portfolio and the pre-existing asset base could be diversified to support the offshore wind 
industry, through entrepreneurial state-led investments for the expansion of port 
infrastructure to support offshore wind activities (Notteboom, 2016; Figure 2.4). This 
process was catalysed by the PoC’s shift in governance and ownership arrangements, 
allowing NPorts as the new port authority to utilise greater decision-making powers, 
responsibilities, resources and new individuals to heighten the importance of offshore wind 
within its business portfolio and make future infrastructure investments in a more 
entrepreneurial manner (Verhoeven, 2010; Notteboom, 2016). This episode is made up of 
three elements, namely the PoC’s forming new port vision for offshore wind, the 
construction of test turbines demonstrating the market potential of offshore wind and the 
PoC’s strategic governance change. 
 
5.2.1 New vision for port diversification into offshore wind: 2003 
 
The first element within the episode of the PoC’s adaptation and diversification into offshore 
wind ultimately enabled the transplantation of new firms and investment from non-firm 
actors, which drove the new valorisation of infrastructural, material and industrial assets 
upon brownfield and greenfield land (Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999).  
 
The AfW (Economic Development Agency of Cuxhaven), the City of Cuxhaven, Niedersachsen 
Bank (as the organiser of government grants and loans), and the State of Niedersachsen 
(from now referred to as ‘Niedersachsen’ and/or the ‘Niedersachsen government’) through 
the ‘Ports and Shipping Administration of the State of Lower Saxony’ (PSALS), were a 
coalition of actors aiming to provide the PoC with a new purpose through diversifying the 
port’s business portfolio and asset base into offshore wind (Wood, 1999; Cox, 1998; Martin 
& Sunley, 2006; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). The coalition of actors had a common strategic and 
material interest in the PoC, aiming to create economic opportunities, jobs and industrial 
growth (Wood, 1999; Cox, 1998; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). The coalition formed in the early 
2000s around the formation of an ‘Offshore Master Plan’ (OMP) in 2003 (AfW Cuxhaven, 
2017; 2018a). The coalition of actors only comprises state-owned public bodies with a 
common long-term vision relating to creating new jobs and economic opportunities, whilst 
operating and directing the PoC like a landlord through the devolution of decision-making 
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power, responsibilities and resources to the port authority of the PoC (Mazzucato, 2013; 
Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Baltazar & Brooks, 2007; Wood, 1999; Cox, 1998). This coalition 
of actors worked jointly and grew closer over time as they worked around phased 
infrastructure construction projects and investments (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018a). 
However, the formation of this coalition of actors and the OMP was influenced by previous 
decisions and strategic actions taken by other Lander and Niedersachsen regarding the Port 
of Wilhelmshaven’s future development (JadeWeserPort, 2018). 
 
In the early 2000s, the Lander of Hamburg, Bremen and Lower Saxony, alongside the 
Wilhelmshaven Port Management Association who conducted market analysis and feasibility 
studies of the container market in 1998 and 2000, realised that container vessels were 
growing in scale and container traffic to the Port of Hamburg would be limited due to the 
River Elbe’s physical size (JadeWeserPort, 2018; Senior Executive interview, Cuxport). Port 
officials and politicians from the State of Hamburg informed Niedersachsen and the State of 
Bremen about the new demand for a deepwater terminal to handle larger container vessels 
and future traffic (JadeWeserPort, 2018; Senior Executive interview, Cuxport). Cuxhaven and 
Wilhelmshaven were considered, and the “States of Lower Saxony and Bremen had to make 
up their mind, and the decision was in favour of Wilhelmshaven for a number of reasons” 
(Senior Executive, Cuxport). Consequently, Niedersachsen realised they had “to convince a 
new market that it was serious…to develop the PoC”, which was further driven by pressure 
from the AfW to create a new economic future for the PoC (Senior Executive, Cuxport; 
Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 2009a; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). Therefore, a vision for the PoC’s 
diversification into the offshore wind market emerged in response to Niedersachsen’s 
decision to award the Port of Wilhelmshaven with investment for a new deepwater 
container terminal, in the form of an Offshore Master Plan (OMP) (JadeWeserPort, 2018; 
Notteboom, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Niedersachsen, 2003): 
 
“The Offshore Master Plan was based upon the decision that the state promised us 
to develop a base for offshore wind at Cuxhaven. This was the key reason the OMP 




The OMP was important in establishing a new long-term port vision for the PoC and for 
creating a new industrial path for Cuxhaven, which catalysed future port adaptation and 
diversification into offshore wind (Notteboom, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017):  
 
“In the early 2000s the offshore wind came about and the state government, the city 
government and the port decided that Cuxhaven should be developed as an offshore 
base…because Cuxhaven was a very poor region economically and needed new 
economic life” Senior Executive, Cuxport. 
 
Subject Aims 
New port concept • Port of Cuxhaven development for production of components, and 
the assembly and the shipment of offshore wind turbines. 
Heavy-load 
platform 
• Platform for handling extremely heavy components up to 500 tons 
will be set up at the eastern end of the existing Cuxport terminal. 
• A heavy crawler crane and heavy load road required for 
transporting individual heavy components.  
Expansion of 
further berth (now 
known as Offshore 
Terminal 1) 
• The heavy-duty platform may be supplemented by a second berth. 




• In the first phase of construction 20ha will be developed. (50ha 
would ultimately be constructed).  
• New construction of infrastructure to support companies seeking 
to manufacture and assemble turbine components. 
Location for test 
turbines 
• Designation of five development location for the erection of 
prototype test turbines, which should be marketed to turbine 
manufacturers. 
Financing of port 
development 
• State of Lower Saxony will make the necessary financial 
preparations and investments. 
Implementation 
(2003) 
• The expansion plans for the five prototype locations are available 
and expansion can begin at the same time as the firm allocation. 
• In a second step, the heavy-duty platform and road and should be 
realised according to future market demand.  
• The expansion of the terminal via a heavy-duty road to a second 
heavy-duty platform (now known as Offshore Terminal 1). 
Future vision 
 
• Cuxhaven offers an excellent base for the future market of 
offshore wind energy.  
• The consistent expansion of the offshore base will provide new 
economic impetus and will bring sustainable growth and more 
employment to Cuxhaven. 
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Future steps • Further assembly and storage areas will be built behind the second 
heavy-duty platform and around the ‘Baumronne tributary’. 
• The remaining areas (25 ha) of the industrial park B110 will be 
developed. 
Table 5.1: Content summary of the Offshore Master Plan 
Source: Niedersachsen, 2003 
 
A key factor which enabled the decision to diversify into offshore wind was the pressure of 
inter-port competition in Northern Germany and has been acknowledged as a key issue for 
Germany’s ports sector by the Federal government (Senior Academic Advisor, BMVI; BMVI, 
2016). The PoC operated as a short-sea multipurpose port serving a range of port markets 
including fishing, automobile handling, containers, bulk cargo, Ro/Ro (Roll-on/Roll-off) and 
heavy-load cargo (steel and forest products) (Cuxport, 2017b). Consequently, it was in direct 
competition with other ports internationally and neighbouring ports in Northern Germany. 
Following the decision to grant investment for a new container terminal at the Port of 
Wilhelmshaven, lobbying and political pressure by key individuals in Cuxhaven, 
Niedersachsen realised that it needed to provide state-led investment for the expansion of 
port infrastructure at PoC (Manager interview, NPorts). Therefore, Niedersachsen put the 
PoC at the forefront of their ports portfolio to foster its diversification into offshore wind 
and to compete on a larger scale in these port markets in the future (Senior Director 
interview, Cuxport; Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 2009a, AfW Cuxhaven 2017; Notteboom, 
2016). Subsequently, the ‘OMP’ was developed through the coalition of actors (AfW, City of 
Cuxhaven, Niedersachsen and NPorts) with the common strategic goal of utilising the PoC as 
a key infrastructural asset base for offshore wind (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999). This was realised by these actors undertaking market research internally 
and utilising important strategic ideas from a dynamic individual within the AfW, who was 
previously working at the State of Bremen (Senior Director interview, Cuxport; AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017). 
 
The Niedersachsen government had overall ownership and control of the PoC in 2003, 
including operations, management, investment, development and planning (Brooks & 
Cullinane, 2007; World Bank, 2016). Hence, Niedersachsen had the necessary oversight over 
the PoC’s functionality, development and management to instigate the strategic change of 
direction through diversifying the port’s business portfolio and asset base (Martin & Sunley, 
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2006; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Notteboom, 2016). However, Cuxhaven lacked available 
land and infrastructure to stimulate new economic activities and regional path creation in 
offshore wind (Senior Financial Officer interview, Niedersachsen Bank; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999; Martin, 2010). As a result, the AfW and the City of Cuxhaven regularly met with 
Niedersachsen and exerted pressure upon the high-level officials at Niedersachsen to take 
continuous action on behalf of Cuxhaven.  
 
Actions of the coalition also evolved as a strategic response to the new national-level 
Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) or ‘RESA’ which was passed in 
2000 (BMWi, 2015; Stefes, 2016). This RESA was an instrumental national-level framework 
which created an enabling market climate for local non-firm actors to take risks and attract 
turbine manufacturers, by setting clear installed capacity targets and feed-in-tariffs for 
developers (Martin, 2010; BMWi, 2015; Stefes, 2016). The RESA set a fixed price for offshore 
wind developers to alleviate the impact of decreasing energy prices within Germany’s energy 
market, underpinned by market incentives (feed-in-tariffs and installed capacity targets) for 
offshore wind developers and manufacturers (Wüstenhagen & Bilharz, 2006; Stefes, 2016). 
Ultimately, Niedersachsen realised that Germany’s offshore wind industry would eventually 
form and grow due to increased project development and orders from developers, leading 
to the escalating activity of manufacturers, thus driving the long-term vision underpinning 
the ‘OMP’ (Martin, 2010; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Wüstenhagen & Bilharz, 2006; Stefes, 2016): 
 
“Yes, we definitely reacted to it [RESA] and we decided to develop Cuxhaven as a 
base for the offshore wind industry” Senior Officer, Niedersachsen. 
 
However, following the launch of this new vision and strategy for the PoC, its realisation still 
required decisive inward investment from pioneering firms within the early German offshore 
wind industry (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017).  
 
5.2.2 Demonstration effect of test turbines: 2004-2005 
 
The PoC catalysed an important demonstration effect by exhibiting a new renewable 
technology, the Offshore Master Plan’s (OMP) long-term vision and the port’s assets and 
capacity to the German offshore wind market (Niedersachsen, 2003; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017) 
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The erection of test turbines demonstrated that an offshore wind related project could be 
managed and implemented at the PoC (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). The erection of the offshore 
test turbines marketed the PoC as a key port site and physical location for offshore wind 
firms in the German offshore wind industry. The PSALS (Ports and Shipping Administration of 
the State of Lower Saxony), Niedersachsen Bank, AfW and the City of Cuxhaven marketed a 
large greenfield area adjacent to Cuxport as a potential site for offshore wind turbine testing 
and development (Niedersachsen, 2003). These state and local actors were willing to work 
with firms to decide what physical form an offshore wind development or activity on the 
port site would take (Niedersachsen, 2003; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017).  
 
The PoC’s public land ownership situation highlights the governance and ownership 
complexities of a port adopting the Hanseatic port governance model, as Niedersachsen was 
the majority landowner and the City of Cuxhaven also owned land within the port limits in 
2004 (Table 2.1; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010; AfW Cuxhaven 2017). 
The public ownership of port land by state and local non-firm actors provides a common 
basis and rationale for adapting infrastructure through a long-term investment strategy, 
evident in the OMP (Niedersachsen, 2003; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). Essentially, the City of 
Cuxhaven was strongly involved in the diversification of the PoC from the outset due to 
owning areas of land within the PoC, whilst working alongside the PSALS and AfW to 
configure and launch the ‘OMP’ (Verhoeven, 2010; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). Consequently, the 
City of Cuxhaven created the opportunity for turbine manufacturers (Enercon, 
REpower/Senvion, DeWind/DSME) to erect and test 5 turbines who were actively seeking 
port sites (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017): 
 
“…the idea behind the turbines was that we [offshore wind industry] did not have 
proven technology. So we needed test turbines. But you need space to build them. 
Then the City of Cuxhaven gave the opportunity for turbines developers to erect 
them here [PoC]” Manager, NPorts. 
 
The German offshore wind industry was in its early stages in 2004/5 and a range of onshore 
turbine manufacturers were looking at how they could capitalise upon a future offshore 
wind market, which was being created by the RESA as a critical national-level framework 
(Martin, 2010; Wüstenhagen & Bilharz, 2006; Stefes, 2016). Enercon, REpower/Senvion and 
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DeWind/DSME accepted the City of Cuxhaven’s invitation to test their prototype offshore 
turbine technology for reliability and performance, in order to convince potential offshore 
wind developers to place orders for their components (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). However, 
there was uncertainty from the manufacturing firms and the state and local government 
organisations regarding their physical longevity, as manufacturers were given a timescale of 
15 years “but 15 years could have been too long for the manufacturers, nobody knew” 
Senior Financial Officer, Niedersachsen Bank. Nevertheless, the demonstration effect helped 
the PoC’s market profile and elevated its presence as a key site and location within the 
German offshore wind industry: 
 
“They [City of Cuxhaven] gave land to some big companies to build up test turbines. 
It was not only good marketing, but it was also a good approach, it showed the 
offshore wind market anything was possible at the port” Senior Director, Cuxport. 
 
Before the PoC could fully harness the demonstration effect, changes to the PoC’s 
governance served to alter its evolution and adaptation from 2005 onwards by further 
establishing and expanding its business portfolio in offshore wind, reflecting the PoC’s 
growing interest in Germany’s offshore wind market (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Niedersachsen 
Ports, 2017).  
 
5.2.3 Change of governance and consolidation of port vision: 2005  
 
In 2005, the PoC underwent a fundamental change of governance and management and 
began to operate more like an arms-length public body, thus creating more operational 
autonomy for the new port authority (Debrie et al, 2013; Verhoeven, 2010). This change of 
governance was driven by Niedersachsen (State of Lower Saxony) as the key actor aiming to 
create a new port authority to operate as a vehicle for spending public money and accessing 
EU funding. Niedersachsen understood that the European Commission had grant 
programmes such as the ERDF which could be better accessed if they formally established a 
publically-owned, arms-length public body, as the European Commission preferred to 
transfer funds directly to these types of companies (Manager, NPorts). Furthermore, 
Niedersachsen also realised through internal research that the European Commission was 
looking deeper into port competition rules and spending public money on new port 
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developments, therefore if Niedersachsen “formed a ‘private’ port company, at least in 
practice… it could at least partly spend state money with no notification to the European 
Commission” Senior Policy Officer, BMVI. The change of governance formed a public port 
governance structure operating state-wide, with the main headquarters in Oldenburg and 
devolved branch offices across six ports which are also responsible for managing island 
supply ports, typical of a Hanseatic port governance model (Manager interview, NPorts; 
Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Table 2.1).  
 
On January 1st, 2005 Niedersachsen Ports (NPorts) was founded as a public port 
infrastructure company responsible for the 15 ports of Niedersachsen (Niedersachsen Ports, 
2017). Many of the core activities previously carried out by the Ports and Shipping 
Administration of the State of Lower Saxony (PSALS) were transferred to NPorts’ 
headquarters in Oldenburg and to a separate NPorts office in Cuxhaven (Niedersachsen 
Ports, 2017; Niedersachsen, 2016). These included the development, construction and 
maintenance of port infrastructure, the strategic planning and designing of the PoC’s future 
development and marketing of the port’s physical asset base (Niedersachsen Ports, 2017; 
Niedersachsen, 2016). Therefore, despite having a large degree of autonomy, NPorts 
Cuxhaven was now part of a wider corporate group of NPorts (Niedersachsen Ports, 2017; 
Niedersachsen, 2016). Niedersachsen is responsible for making strategic decisions regarding 
the governance, future market direction and capacity of their ports in Lower Saxony, 
reflecting activities of a port owner within the Hanseatic Port governance model (Suykens & 
Van de Voorde, 1998, Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Table 2.1).  
 
However, there was a range of rationale and effects of Niedersachsen’s policy to alter their 
ports and to form a new arms-length public port authority for the PoC within a wider 
corporate group of NPorts. Niedersachsen wanted its ports to lessen their ‘dependence 
upon state money’ for infrastructure investments, whilst enabling their ports to have a 
greater ability to access EU funding and borrow from private banks to invest into new port 
infrastructure, thus becoming more financially efficient (Senior Officer interview, 
Niedersachsen, ). Niedersachsen realised that a new arms-length port authority would have 
a greater ability to receive and spend grant funding from the European Union (ERDF) as it 
was essentially a publically-owned private company, thus avoiding strict State Aid 
restrictions and consequently heightening the PoC’s ability to adapt and diversify (Senior 
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Policy Officer interview, BMVI; Niedersachsen Ports; European Commission, 2014; Pike et al, 
2010).  
 
This important decision made by Niedersachsen proved to be successful as NPorts was since 
awarded substantial amounts of EU funding from 2005, enabling NPorts in Cuxhaven to 
make key investments for converting and building new infrastructure (AfW Cuxhaven, 
2018c). On a broader scale, other German State governments such as Bremen and Hamburg 
were changing their ports into arms-length public ports, realising the EU was “going to look 
deeper into port competition questions” (Senior Policy Officer interview, BMVI). Therefore, 
Niedersachsen wanted to follow this trend and remain competitive by altering the 
governance of their ports (Niedersachsen, 2009). The PoC was now organised to receive and 
utilise state and EU (ERDF) grants, alongside private finance, to invest into port 
infrastructure more effectively and with less spending restrictions from the EU (Senior Policy 
Officer interview, BMVI). Therefore, this shift and change of the PoC’s governance structure 
and arrangement served to underpin and facilitate the diversification into offshore wind but 
remained intrinsically shaped by the national and supra-national government organisations 
(Martin, 2010; Debrie et al, 2013; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Notteboom, 2016).  
 
NPorts wanted to employ new industry specialists from the private sector “with greater 
experience” and knowledge of the ports sector and other related sectors, such as offshore 
wind, to catalyse the PoC’s diversification (Manager interview, NPorts). This drove NPorts in 
Cuxhaven to be a more commercially-led and flexible port authority by shifting the port’s 
mission, market portfolio and infrastructural asset base towards supporting offshore wind, 
rather than simply operating as a bureaucratic administrative body of Niedersachsen which 
was content with upholding traditional port activities (Debrie et al, 2013; Brooks & Pallis, 
2017; Notteboom, 2016). Thus, the change to a devolved structure of NPorts enabled a new 
shift in responsibility, power and resources (human and financial) from the state to the local 
level, which altered the overall entrepreneurial management, mission and vision of the PoC 
(Debrie et al, 2013; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011).  
 
“…they [NPorts] actually have the self-understanding of ‘we need to do something to 
boost the local or regional economy through developing the port and so forth’. It 
really depends on the mission given to whatever port authority is given the 
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responsibility [from Niedersachsen] and their own individual drive” Senior Director, 
ZDS. 
 
This transfer of power, responsibility and financial resources to an arms-length public port 
authority with a dedicated local office, meant that NPorts could work jointly and more 
closely with AfW and the City of Cuxhaven, as it had new individuals with expertise in port 
development for offshore energy and greater power and resources to do so (Debrie et al, 
2013; Baltazar & Brooks, 2007). At key moment of the PoC’s adaptation, the AfW and the 
City of Cuxhaven have put necessary pressure upon NPorts and Niedersachsen to make 
important decisions to provide investment, diversify and build new infrastructural assets 
(Maskell & Malmberg, 1999).  
 
Although power, responsibility and financial resources were devolved from the state level to 
various port offices, the Niedersachsen government was still the owner of NPorts 
(Niedersachsen Ports, 2009). In relation to this devolution of power, responsibility and 
financial resources, Niedersachsen had ultimate control over the overall direction of its ports 
and final say on important decisions regarding investment provision and infrastructure 
adaptation, typical of a Hanseatic port governance model (Debrie et al, 2013; World Bank, 
2016; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Table 2.1). Therefore, Niedersachsen began to work 
with NPorts to strategically consolidate and reinforce its broader mission and vision to 
diversify into offshore wind:  
 
“They were very involved in the development, the state really wanted offshore wind 
to happen at the port… the politicians said, ‘we want this development to happen’. 
The state said to NPorts ‘we want you to invest your money to support offshore 
wind’” Former Senior Director, former AfW.  
 
This was a crucial element of the episode in shaping the PoC’s adaptation and diversification 
into offshore wind and stimulating regional path creation process (Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). Moreover, this element of the episode catalysed the 
diversification of the PoC into offshore wind as it enabled the consolidation and 
reinforcement of the Offshore Master Plan (OMP) through a change of governance structure 
and arrangement (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Debrie et al, 2013; Notteboom, 2016). The OMP 
indicated that offshore wind was the key industry to diversify into and prompted the PoC to 
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concentrate upon diversifying its business portfolio and asset base to support offshore wind 
activities (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). However, to 
enable the overall adaption and diversification of the PoC into offshore wind, state-led 
investments for the expansion of new large-scale infrastructure on greenfield land and the 
transplantation of offshore wind firms, were critical.  
 
5.3 Emergence and growth: 2006-2012 
 
The erection of the test turbines produced a fundamental demonstration effect upon the 
German offshore wind market, seizing the interest of key firms and shaping this episode of 
adaptation and diversification. This demonstration effect highlighted the novelty and market 
potential of offshore wind and consequently drove the new construction of port 
infrastructure (docks, quays and adjacent quayside areas, berths and Ro/Ro ramps forming 
the port’s physical platform) and superstructure (buildings, facilities, warehouses and 
cranage built above and fixed onto the infrastructure), by firm transplantation and state-led 
investments for the expansion of infrastructure on greenfield land (Jacobs & Lagendijk, 2014; 
Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Martin & Sunley, 2006). 
 
This episode highlights the importance of investments for infrastructure expansion, largely 
provided by the Niedersachsen government as the long-term owner of NPorts, and the 
power, responsibilities and financial resources of NPorts to take proactive entrepreneurial 
risks, in order to attract new offshore wind firms. This episode is around the PoC establishing 
an infrastructural base to attract future investment to help stimulate the creation of the 
regional offshore wind path. Ultimately, new manufacturing and pre-assembly activities at 
the heavy-load platform, industrial and commercial areas, the Offshore Terminal 1 (OT1) and 
Offshore Terminal 2 (OT2) underpinned the PoC’s adaptation and diversification, thus 
stimulating a regional path creation process around the offshore wind industry (Martin, 
2010; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Notteboom, 2016). The new regional path creation 
process is clearly visible in new and increased employment within the offshore wind industry 
at the PoC through the transplantation of new manufacturing firms and the steady growth of 
local and regional offshore wind supply networks connected to new firms within the PoC 
(Martin, 2010; Dawley, 2014). This episode was made up of two elements of phased 
infrastructure projects to support offshore wind activities, namely the construction of the 
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heavy-load platform and the valorisation of new quayside infrastructure through a series of 
phased projects (Offshore Terminal 1, Offshore Terminal 2, Industrial and Commercial 
Areas), in order to support offshore wind activities. 
 
5.3.1 A market statement: converting the heavy-load platform (2006-2007) 
 
The first element within this episode is around the construction of pre-existing 
infrastructural and material assets on brownfield land (Boas, 2007; Martin, 2010; Maskell & 
Malmberg 1999). The City of Cuxhaven, AfW and NPorts aimed to make a large statement to 
the German offshore wind market to attract new offshore wind firms and inward 
investment. The City of Cuxhaven provided a ‘proactive’ €7.5M investment for converting 
infrastructure and superstructure, through a proactive strategy expressed within the 
Offshore Master Plan (OMP) (Niedersachsen, 2003; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; 2017; Monios & 
Wilmsmeier, 2016). Furthermore, the construction of the heavy-load platform was also 
enabled by Niedersachsen and the EU jointly providing a €6.8M grant to support the 
construction activities (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c).   
 
The heavy-load platform and heavy-lift cranage located at the Cuxport multipurpose 
terminal has been used for the onshore assembly turbines, following its completion in 2007 
(AfW Cuxhaven 2018b). In order to obtain these key infrastructural and material assets, pre-
existing infrastructure needed to be converted for new usage (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
Martin, 2010; Boas, 2007). Previously there was a quayside area, a quay wall and cranage 
only equipped for handling and storing general cargo and containers (Cuxport, 2007). 
Therefore, these assets required state-led investment to be converted into a heavy-load 
platform with cranage, which formed attractive port assets for the offshore wind market at 
this time (Senior Executive interview, Cuxport; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Martin, 2010; 
Boas, 2007). 
 
There was a “gold fever” emanating from offshore wind developers in the mid-2000s (Senior 
Researcher interview, University of Bremen). This influenced a ‘proactive’ investment by the 
City of Cuxhaven for infrastructure expansion, supported by EU and Niedersachsen 
government grants (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). The growing 
interest, or “gold fever”, coming from developers and non-firm actors was catalysed by the 
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‘Infrastructure Planning Acceleration Act’ (Gesetz zur Beschleunigung von Planungsverfahren 
für Infrastrukturvorhaben) implemented in 2006 (Former Senior Director interview, former 
AfW). This designated TenneT as the transmission system operator responsible for the 
German North Sea and establishing grid connections, thus taking the responsibility and cost 
away from developers, whilst accelerating planning and licencing proceedings (Kuhne, 2012; 
Wong, 2010; Federal Law Gazette, 2006). 
 
The heavy-load platform was a very important marketing tool which subsequently convinced 
a range of offshore wind manufacturers and developers that the PoC could support offshore 
wind activities (Former Senior Director interview, former AfW). Ultimately, this new market 
presence with the heavy-load platform catalysed future state-led investments for the 
expansion of new port infrastructure on greenfield land for new firms (Notteboom, 2016; 
Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018a). 
 
5.3.2 Establishing new infrastructure to attract future investment (2006 – 2012) 
 
This element of the episode is around the new construction of an infrastructural base by 
NPorts, Niedersachsen, Cuxhaven and the Cuxhaven Port Development Company (CPDC), 
which was fundamental to the PoC’s adaptation and diversification to support a new 
regional offshore wind path (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; 
Notteboom, 2016). The series of state-led investments into the new infrastructural base 
reflects the ability and financial capacity of NPorts and the CPDC to take entrepreneurial 
risks using public finance, private bank loans and grants. Importantly, NPorts and the 
Niedersachsen and Cuxhaven governments deemed constructing new port infrastructure as 
essential for attracting new firms and future investment. 
 
The construction of new industrial and commercial areas provided a new industrial platform 
to encourage new offshore wind firms to provide investment for superstructure and 
catalysed their transplantation (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Martin & Sunley, 2006). In 
tandem with the construction of the 50ha of industrial and commercial areas, heavy-load 
roads were constructed to enable the transportation of heavy-loads to the heavy-load 
platform and the future Offshore Terminal 1 (OT1) and Offshore Terminal 2 (OT2) (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017). The new construction of the 50ha of industrial and commercial areas was a 
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‘reactive’ decision by the City of Cuxhaven to provide a €2.9M investment. This decision was 
underpinned by interest shown by Cuxhaven Steel Construction (CSC) and BARD, as the 
parent company of CSC, to establish a new foundation manufacturing facility to supply and 
support the installation of BARD Offshore I (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c). This state-led 
investment was catalysed by combined grants consisting of €2.6M from EU (ERDF) funds and 
Niedersachsen (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016). Furthermore, the 
City of Cuxhaven owned the 50ha of industrial and commercial areas of greenfield land and 
therefore had the power to make this strategic investment for infrastructure expansion.  
 
CSC approached the Niedersachsen government, City of Cuxhaven and AfW and enabled 
these actors to take the ‘first step’ of land development within the Offshore Master Plan 
(OMP) (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Former Senior Director interview, former AfW):  
 
“After talking with Niedersachsen and the guys in Cuxhaven [City of Cuxhaven and 
AfW] it made us [CSC] think about…how there was lots of available port space in 
Cuxhaven and if you [CSC] want to make such a factory for foundations and want to 
build it we need to think seriously about [the Port of] Cuxhaven” Manager, NPorts, 
former CSC.  
 
Subsequently, CSC decided to transplant their foundation manufacturing operations into the 
PoC through a €45M investment, supporting their existing component manufacturing 
operations at the Port of Emden (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 
2007; Martin & Sunley, 2006). CSC’s investment was for a 650T heavy-lift gantry crane, 
alongside a foundation manufacturing facility and storage facilities to supply components for 
their ‘BARD Offshore 1’ offshore wind project (Wüstenhagen & Bilharz, 2006; Stefes, 2016; 
AfW Cuxhaven, 2018d). CSC’s decision to transplant was strongly influenced by its parent 
BARD, who “totally believed in the offshore wind market and the Federal government 
subsidies, therefore he [BARD owner] fully funded CSC’s development” (Senior Financial 
Officer, Niedersachsen Bank interview; Wüstenhagen & Bilharz, 2006; Stefes, 2016).  
 
However, additional quayside infrastructure was required to support CSC’s manufacturing, 
pre-assembly and installation activities and enable the PoC to operate as an infrastructure 
base for the offshore wind industry, supporting a regional offshore wind path creation 
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process. The construction of the (Offshore Terminal 1) OT1 was triggered by large state-led 
investments and motivated new offshore wind manufacturing firms to transplant 
manufacturing and pre-assembly activities into the PoC and build new superstructure to 
complete these activities (Martin & Sunley, 2006). Completed in 2009, the OT1’s 
infrastructure included a new quay wall, storage area and three berths for handling heavy-
load components, alongside larger jack-up and O&M vessels (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018d).  
 
After CSC transplanted into the PoC to manufacture foundations, the Niedersachsen 
government and the EU made a €31.9M state-led investment for the OT1, driving a total 
investment of €60M completed by NPorts, utilising its own capital and private loans 
(Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 2007; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018). The state-led investment was part of 
Niedersachsen’s and NPorts’ long-term vision and entrepreneurial nature, believing that 
offshore wind was the future direction of the PoC in-keeping with the ‘OMP’, which was 
directing the PoC’s diversification (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Senior Officer interview, 
Niedersachsen):  
 
“The OTI was driven by Niedersachsen… the founder of BARD (CSC) approached 
Niedersachsen for investment and said he wanted to build components at the PoC 
and he will bring lots of jobs and new development to the City of Cuxhaven” 
Manager, NPorts, former CSC.  
 
On a different note, the OT1’s construction was crucial in stimulating the interest and 
eventual transplantation of AMBAU, as a manufacturer of turbine foundations and towers, 
who also influenced NPorts’ and Niedersachsen’s decision to invest into port infrastructure, 
as AMBAU were a promising new port user (Former Senior Director interview, former AfW). 
The AfW actively pursued AMBAU to catalyse AMBAU’s transplantation of manufacturing 
and pre-assembly activities (AMBAU, 2018):  
 
“We [AfW] went to see the owner of AMBAU, we said you have much better 
conditions and infrastructure [50ha and OT1] in Cuxhaven, you have much more 
land, so he decided to switch from investing in Bremerhaven” (Former Senior 




AMBAU provided a €48.75M inward investment to build a new production facility on the 
50ha industrial and commercial area in 2008 for manufacturing towers, monopiles and 
transition pieces (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; AMBAU, 2018). This was supported by NPorts’ and 
the Niedersachsen government’s state-led investment for the OT1, alongside efforts made 
by AfW, availability of the 50ha industrial and commercial area and 650T gantry crane, and 
CSC as a co-located firm (Former Senior Director interview, former AfW). Furthermore, 
Niedersachsen Bank supported AMBAU’s transplantation with a €6.63M “individual business 
investment aid” from the ‘Joint Scheme for the Improvement of Regional Economic 
Structures’ (GRW), which utilises Federal and EU funds to support structurally weak regions 
in Germany (Senior Advisor interview, AfW Cuxhaven; Eurofound, 2018).  
 
In addition to the new construction of the 50ha industrial and commercial area and the OT1 
on greenfield port land, an additional construction of a further 100ha of industrial and 
commercial area took place between 2009 and 2010 (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018a). The 
construction of a further 100ha industrial and commercial area and heavy-load roads 
ultimately motivated new offshore wind manufacturing firms (STRABAG, Siemens and 
Siemens’ suppliers) to transplant into the PoC at a later date (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
Martin, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006). Having the infrastructure constructed for when future 
firms show interest highlights the proactive investment approach of NPorts, which was 
fundamental in enabling firm transplantation and catalysing the PoC’s adaptation and 
diversification into offshore wind (Senior Advisor interview, AfW; Notteboom, 2016; AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016).  
 
The state-led investment for the expansion of the 100ha industrial and commercial area on 
greenfield land and heavy-load roads was carried out by the Cuxhaven Port Development 
Company (CPDC) in conjunction with NPorts, set up by the City of Cuxhaven (as direct 
owner) and Niedersachsen Bank, to develop port land and administer EU (ERDF), Federal and 
State government funding (CPDC, 2009). NPorts also made a state-led investment for the 
100ha industrial and commercial area by providing €13.3M to relocate the ‘Baumrönne’ 
tributary and tidal gate structure with a grant of €10M, reflecting its proactive and 
entrepreneurial strategy (AfW, 2018c). Moreover, the CPDC ‘proactively’ developed the 
100ha industrial and commercial area and heavy-load roads through a state-led investment 
of €35.6M (using EU, Federal and State grants of around €28.6M), without a 100% 
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investment commitment from any firms reflecting its willingness to take risks through public 
finance and grants (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c).  
 
However, underpinning the joint decision made by the City of Cuxhaven, CPDC, AfW and 
NPorts to construct the new 100ha industrial and commercial area, was the reality that both 
STRABAG and Siemens were actively searching for North Sea ports to establish future 
manufacturing and installation operations from 2009 onwards (Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 
2009b; Senior Financial Officer interview, Niedersachsen Bank): 
 
“The building of this area (100ha industrial and commercial area) was vital. The City 
of Cuxhaven really drove this move, to be prepared for firms and to talk to the 
potential investors (STRABAG and Siemens) and to try to convince them to come to 
Cuxhaven” (Senior Executive, Cuxport).  
 
Interest shown by STRABAG and Siemens in the emerging German offshore wind market was 
stimulated by the Federal government’s attractive feed-in-tariffs and future installed 
capacity targets set out in the RESA 2009 (Wüstenhagen & Bilharz, 2006; Stefes, 2016; 
Markard & Petersen, 2009; BMWi, 2015). Moreover, CSC and AMBAU had already 
established operations in the PoC (Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 2007; AMBAU, 2018). 
Therefore, interest shown by STRABAG and Siemens, the existence of CSC and AMBAU and 
previously valorised port assets, influenced the collective decision made by City of Cuxhaven, 
CPDC and NPorts to construct the new 100ha industrial and commercial area and “the 
quayside area was practical for offshore wind and they knew which areas needed to be 
changed” (Senior Financial Officer interview, Niedersachsen Bank; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999).  
 
However, further quayside infrastructure was required to attract future offshore wind 
activities onto the 100ha industrial and commercial area and enable the PoC’s adaptation 
and diversification into offshore wind (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Notteboom, 2016). 
Consequently, the ‘Offshore Terminal 2’ (OT2) was new built between 2010 and 2012. The 
construction of the OT2 catalysed decisions made by STRABAG and later Siemens and 
Siemens’ suppliers to provide investment for constructing new facilities for testing, 
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manufacturing and pre-assembly activities in the PoC, as they could utilise existing and 
industry-leading port infrastructure (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017).  
 
The initial state-led investment by NPorts for the construction of sub-berths 9.3 and 9.4 at 
the OT2, based upon STRABAG’s loading and installation requirements, prompted STRABAG 
to begin constructing their new facilities for testing gravity base foundations on a section of 
the 100ha industrial and commercial area (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018a; STRABAG, 2009). This was 
also catalysed by the Federal government, who provided a €8.5M grant for STRABAG’s test 
facility construction between 2010-2011, thus highlighting an ‘enabling’ institutional and 
market environment for STRABAG (Martin, 2010; STRABAG, 2015). Following this, STRABAG 
announced an overall €500M planned investment for potentially constructing their overall 
superstructure for testing, assembling and manufacturing turbines, and purchasing 
specialised installation vessels and cranage (The Engineer, 2012).  
 
However, the Niedersachsen government, NPorts and AfW had a grander vision laid out in 
the Offshore Master Plan (OMP), which went beyond STRABAG’s infrastructure 
requirements (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011). NPorts 
made a state-led €65M investment for the OT2, with €35.75M in public grants largely from 
Niedersachsen (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; 2018e). This enabled the construction of 4 berths, a 
new quay wall, increased draft and heavy-load quays at the OT2 (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; 
2018e):  
 
“It made total sense for them [PoC] to have some sort of port infrastructure [OT2] 
ready before the offshore wind market started to build…but it was always a bet on 
the future” (Former Manager, former Offshore Wind Industry Alliance).  
 
NPorts and the Niedersachsen government took a high-risk investment approach and 
expressed a shared willingness to make a more proactive and entrepreneurial investment 
based upon the future activity of developers and manufacturing firms in the German 
offshore wind market, in order to support a regional offshore wind path by enabling the 
PoC’s adaptation and diversification (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Figure 2.4). This state-led investment decision was 
ultimately influenced and controlled by the Niedersachsen government as NPorts’ owner 
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(Senior Director interview, Federation of German Seaports [ZDS]; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 
2016; Debrie et al, 2013). 
 
This episode of the PoC’s adaptation and diversification involved the valorisation of an 
infrastructural base for offshore wind activities, driven by proactive and entrepreneurial 
state-led investments for the expansion and conversion of infrastructure on greenfield and 
brownfield land, and firm transplantation (Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). The construction of various infrastructural, material and industrial 
assets was triggered by CSC, AMBAU and STRABAG reacting to increased demand from BARD 
and offshore wind developers (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 2007; 
AMBAU, 2018). This process was underpinned by attractive Federal government feed-in-
tariffs and installed capacity targets creating an appropriate market environment for 
Niedersachsen government, the Cuxhaven Port Development Company (CPDC) and NPorts 
to prioritise and implement state-led investments for offshore wind activities, alongside 
substantial efforts made by the AfW to attract CSC and AMBAU to the PoC.  
 
5.4 Uncertainty and disinvestment: 2011-2014 
 
This next episode underlines the significant role of the Federal government in constraining 
the PoC’s adaptation and diversification into offshore wind, shaping the future regional path 
around offshore wind. This role involved changing feed-in-tariffs, decreasing the installed 
capacity targets and planning offshore wind projects in certain areas of the German EEZ 
(Exclusive Economic Zone). Essentially, this created a constraining institutional environment 
for the offshore wind industry and inhibited the diversification of the PoC into offshore wind 
(Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016).  Until 2011 the PoC’s adaptation and diversification was 
underpinned by investment into expanding infrastructural, material and industrial assets on 
greenfield port land (Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Figure 2.4). Conversely, 
this episode highlights a period of uncertainty and disinvestment at the PoC between 2011 
and the important decision taken by Siemens for its transplantation from 2014 onwards, 
moving from the previous episodes of diversification, investment and expansion (Martin, 
2010; Siemens, 2016b). This episode is made up of two components around the reduction of 
O&M activities and the reduction of manufacturing and pre-assembly activities at the PoC. 
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5.4.1 Operations and Maintenance reduction: 2011-2013 
 
This element of the episode is around the reduction of O&M activities in the PoC, 
underpinned by the disinvestment of OMM (Offshore Marine Management). This 
disinvestment process was primarily driven by the Federal government changing feed-in-
tariffs and installed capacity targets for offshore wind, alongside offshore wind projects 
being designated at extensive distances from the PoC by the BSH (Federal Maritime and 
Hydrographic Agency), making it unattractive, impractical and expensive for O&M activities 
(BMWi, 2014; BSH, 2014). OMM decided to transplant into the PoC in 2011 to provide grid 
cable installation and maintenance, substation platform operations and support services, 
becoming the primary O&M firm in the PoC (Rhenus Logistics, 2011). At the time of its 
transplantation, the German offshore wind market was burgeoning following the installation 
and launch of Alpha Ventus in 2010, supported by an enabling market environment driven 
by feed-in-tariffs and installed capacity targets for prospective developers and 
manufacturers (BMWi, 2015; Stefes, 2016; Martin, 2010).  
 
Following OMM’s approach to Cuxport, Cuxport offered OMM to rent existing quayside 
space, ro/ro ramps, berths and convert existing buildings on the ‘Steubenhöft Terminal’ at a 
lower price than the Port of Bremerhaven (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018h). This was underpinned by 
the offshore wind industry being “more mature” at the Port of Bremerhaven, meaning there 
were a greater number of firms and less quayside space which stimulated higher rental 
prices, thus influencing OMM’s decision to provide investments of “over 500,000 Euros” 
(Senior Director interview, OMM):  
 
“Rent was two or three times as much than Cuxhaven. We didn’t want to go there… 
and the infrastructure and the existing buildings were there at Cuxhaven” Senior 
Director, OMM. 
 
NPorts charged low rents and dues as a result of the long-term vision of the ‘OMP’, aiming to 
support new offshore wind activities, job creation and “not to see a return or profit” via rent 
or dues, which reflects NPorts’ proactive nature to support new firms and its Hanseatic port 
governance model (Former Senior Director, former AfW; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Verhoeven, 




However, OMM disinvested in 2013. Firstly, this was based upon an important policy 
decision made by the Federal government in 2013 to reduce offshore wind installation 
capacity targets from 10GW by 2020 to 6.5GW by 2020, set out in the revised RESA 
(Renewable Energy Sources Act) in 2014 (BMWi, 2014; 2015; reNEWS, 2013a). This policy 
change forced developers to “put their investment plans on hold” (Senior Director interview, 
OMM). Consequently, smaller O&M providers like OMM forecasted that O&M contracts 
would reduce in demand and they would be forced out of the German offshore wind market 
(BMWi, 2014; 2015; reNEWS, 2013a; Wind Europe, 2017b):  
 
“I admit we were a little bit early for the [German] market.  We were paying to rent 
the [port] land and we were waiting for the market to hurry up and form…this caused 
us problems” Senior Director, OMM.  
 
Furthermore, this change of policy was primarily based upon low grid connections from 
offshore wind projects to areas of high electricity consumption and the capacity of the grid 
network operator (TenneT) to install grid connections by 2020 (Senior Director interview, 
Germany Trade and Invest;  BWMi, 2015; 2016; Lema et al, 2014). 
 
Secondly, OMM entered the O&M market at the wrong geographical location at the PoC, as 
other port locations had “shorter distances to the offshore wind parks” (Senior Director 
interview, Cuxport; GTAi, 2017). This is crucial for developers as they’re primarily concerned 
with reducing the sailing distance to reduce O&M time and costs (Group Manager interview, 
Fraunhofer IWES; Wind Europe, 2017a). However, the majority of the designated offshore 
wind projects in the German EEZ were more accessible from the ports of Bremerhaven, 
Emden, Nordenham, Norden, Heligoland and Eemshaven (Former Manager interview, 
former Offshore Wind Industry Alliance; BSH, 2014). Thus, PoC was disproportionality 
affected due to its poor geographical proximity (BSH, 2014). This demonstrates how the 
BSH’s planning policies for designating offshore wind projects shaped the activity of O&M 





5.4.2 Reduction of manufacturing activities: 2013 
 
The offshore wind policy changes and broader industrial activities occurring on a national 
scale directly constrained the adaptation and diversification of the PoC into offshore wind, 
by influencing the disinvestment decision made by OMM and contracting the PoC’s O&M 
activities within the offshore wind industry (Notteboom, 2016; BMWi, 2014; BSH, 2014; 
Figure 2.4). However, firms conducting manufacturing and pre-assembly activities were also 
constrained by offshore wind policy changes and regulatory decisions, alongside the 
technological and supply chain evolution of offshore wind, thus directly constraining the 
PoC’s diversification and shaping the future regional offshore wind path. This element of the 
episode will discuss the reduction of the PoC’s offshore wind manufacturing and pre-
assembly activities, exemplified by the cases of STRABAG and CSC. 
 
STRABAG’s initial investment into test facilities was catalysed by the state-led investment 
commitments from the Cuxhaven Port Development Company (CPDC) and NPorts for newly 
constructing the 100ha industrial and commercial area and sub-berths 9.3 and 9.4 at the 
OT2 (STRABAG, 2009; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c; 2018e). Moreover, STRABAG committed 
to building a test facility after they identified a potential market for gravity-base 
foundations, which was “based upon the EEG at the time and promises of future capacity” 
following higher feed-in-tariffs and installed capacity targets released in the RESA (2009) 
(Manager interview, NPorts; BMWi, 2015; Stefes, 2016; Markard & Petersen, 2009).  
 
Unfortunately for STRABAG the offshore wind industry was changing rapidly in the early 
2010s as developers and manufacturers were avoiding purchasing expensive gravity-base 
foundations with an unproven installation method (Senior Consultant interview, 8.2 
Consulting AG; Renewables Consulting Group, 2017). Therefore, STRABAG deemed their 
planned €500M investment into a new manufacturing facility, including a €200M-€250M 
investment into a specialised catamaran for offshore installation, as financially unfeasible 
(Notteboom, 2016; STRABAG, 2013; The Engineer, 2012): 
 
“The vessel was in the range of the hundreds of millions. 200 to 250 million Euro. We 
[STRABAG] thought about it, to invest in such a vessel is difficult if you don’t have a 




On a different note, the BSH refused to grant permission for full-scale offshore installation of 
their gravity-base as they “did not see a business case for STRABAG”, despite BSH granting 
STRABAG permission to test their gravity-base foundations at an offshore test site named 
‘Albatross I’ (Group Manager interview, IWES; The Engineer, 2012). This legal and regulatory 
setting for installing gravity-base foundations offshore “didn’t support STRABAG…[and] it 
was always considered as a problem”, thus contributing to STRABAG disinvesting from the 
PoC and leaving their test facility in place at the PoC (Group Manager, IWES; STRABAG, 2013; 
Martin, 2010).  
 
NPorts were newly constructing the sub-berth 9.3 featuring a ro/ro ramp and the adjacent 
sub-berth 9.4 for STRABAG’s installation and logistics solution for their proposed gravity 
base foundations and turbines, forming the first infrastructural assets of the OT2 (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018e). However, because of STRABAG disinvesting from the PoC, the 
construction of sub-berths 9.3 and 9.4 was halted due to NPorts and Niedersachsen losing 
confidence in the potential of the offshore wind market providing future port users for the 
OT2 (STRABAG, 2013):  
 
“The STRABAG group decided to stop their project at the time the infrastructure was 
nearly completed and because of this… Niedersachsen Ports in cooperation with the 
state decided to close the quay [sub-berths 9.3 and 9.4]… we stopped construction” 
Senior Officer, Niedersachsen.  
 
Although STRABAG had disinvested from the PoC, NPorts still possessed industry-leading 
infrastructural and material assets at the OT2 which could be fully completed to support 
future offshore wind firms (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018f; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
Notteboom, 2016). Thus, STRABAG’s disinvestment and disuse of port infrastructure 
catalysed new opportunities for offshore wind firms and the PoC, as STRABAG vacated 
important quayside areas at the OT2 and 100ha industrial and commercial area which were 
later capitalised upon (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018a). However, STRABAG were not the only 
manufacturing firm to disinvest from the PoC in this period, highlighted by the story of CSC. 
 
Conversely, there are various factors and broader external processes underpinning CSC’s 
rationale to disinvest and consequently constrain the PoC’s adaptation and diversification 
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into offshore wind (Martin, 2010; reNEWS, 2013b; Notteboom, 2016). In 2012 BARD began 
to experience financial difficulty and began planning to disinvest in 2013 (reNEWS, 2013b). 
This was caused by BARD attempting to produce every turbine component, using untested 
installation methods and unproven technology for manufacturing components, thus driving 
up costs of BARD Offshore 1 and CSC’s operations (Senior Executive interview, Cuxport): 
 
“BARD misunderstood how complex everything is in the industry. They went too 
quickly as a whole, as a turbine manufacturer and as a project developer” Senior 
Consultant, 8.2 Consulting AG.  
 
BARD’s financial difficulty was also caused by heightening competition between 
manufacturers to supply developers in the offshore wind industry, the component design 
evolution, and developers ordering cheaper and high-quality components from specialised 
manufacturers (Senior Consultant interview, 8.2 Consulting AG; Lema et al, 2014). As such, 
BARD could not compete within this market, resulting in BARD disinvesting from the PoC and 
its bankruptcy, after BARD went over budget for BARD Offshore 1 by €1.1BN (Senior 
Executive interview, Cuxport; 4C Offshore, 2018; reNEWS, 2013b; Martin, 2010; Gertler, 
2010). 
 
“It became more difficult for them [BARD] to plan ahead and invest. The bigger 
problem for the industry is uncertainty. ‘We [Germany] needs more capacity, we 
need less capacity, it’s too expensive, oh it’s not too expensive now let’s build’ and 
for developers it’s hard to make plans” Senior Consultant, 8.2 Consulting AG.  
 
The reduction of offshore wind activities was strongly influenced by shifting policy and 
market settings, namely the Federal government’s decision to alter installed capacity targets 
in 2013, the technological change and supply chain evolution in offshore wind which created 
an alternative market demand of certain turbine components, and the geographic proximity 
of the PoC to offshore wind projects in the German EEZ (BMWi, 2014; BSH, 2014). As such, 
OMM, STRABAG and CSC (BARD) reacted individually to these changes of settings, thus 
constraining the PoC’s adaptation and diversification, and shaping a regional offshore wind 
path (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). However, this episode has emphasised how the 
coalition of actors directing the PoC decided to continually support ‘OMP’ despite the 
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reduction of offshore wind activities, allowing vacant port assets to be ultimately capitalised 
upon (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Fineberg, 2016; Wood, 1999). 
 
5.5 Revival and expansion: 2014 onwards 
 
The revival and expansion of offshore wind activities at the PoC from 2014 onwards 
supported a regional path forming around the offshore wind industry, as firm-led 
investments capitalised upon an infrastructural asset base created by various state-led 
investments to expand infrastructure on greenfield land over time, which were catalysed by 
NPorts responding to an enabling institutional environment established by the Federal 
government, positive market signals for offshore wind and NPorts’ new decision-making 
powers, resources, responsibilities and public grants (Martin, 2010; BMWi, 2015; 
Niedersachsen Ports, 2009). The key theme emerging from this episode is how a strong 
coalition of actors, namely Niedersachsen, NPorts, AfW and the Cuxhaven Port Development 
Company (CPDC), worked together to ultimately realise the long-term vision of the ‘Offshore 
Master Plan’ of establishing the PoC as an infrastructural base for supporting offshore wind 
activities. This episode of the PoC’s adaptation and diversification is driven and shaped by 
the transplantation of a firm onto greenfield port land which expands the existing 
infrastructural base, ending the previous episode of uncertainty and disinvestment, thus 
enabling the diversification and expansion of the PoC into offshore wind set out in the 
‘Offshore Master Plan’ (Niedersachsen, 2003; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018a; 2018f; Figure 
2.4). The transplantation of Siemens acted as an anchor investment, as a lead turbine 
manufacturer, which directed and catalysed the diversification and conversion of port assets 
to support offshore wind activities from 2014 onwards (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Notteboom, 
2016; Figure 2.4). This episode is made up of two distinctive elements around firm-led 
investments by Siemens, Siemens’ suppliers and AMBAU into establishing new 
manufacturing activities at the PoC, and subsequent state-led investments to further expand 
the infrastructure base on greenfield land for offshore wind activities. 
 
5.5.1 New firm-led investments into manufacturing activities: 2014 onwards 
 
This element of the episode is around the transplantation of Siemens who provided a €200M 
investment in 2015 for the new construction of manufacturing facilities (Martin & Sunley, 
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2006; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Siemens, 2016b; 2017). However, in addition to Siemens’ 
transplantation into the PoC, Siemens’ supply chain was established within the PoC through 
further firm transplantation and AMBAU strategically decided to acquire CSC’s former assets 
and expand within the PoC (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018e). These firm-led investment 
activities essentially enabled the PoC’s adaptation and diversification into offshore wind, 
thus stimulating and shaping the future regional path around the offshore wind industry by 
creating employment at new offshore wind firms within the PoC and connecting the PoC to 
growing offshore wind supply networks embedding locally and regionally. 
 
In the early 2010s Siemens decided to concentrate their production of components and 
installation of turbines at certain North Sea ports, namely the Port of Hull and the PoC, to 
drive down costs and offshore wind project timescales (Siemens, 2015; 2017). This was 
enabled by Siemens providing new and improved transport and logistics operations using 
purpose-built vessels and Ro/Ro ramps, avoiding the cost-intensive heavy-lifting and 
shipping of components (Siemens, 2015; 2017). Therefore, Siemens required a port location 
with heavy-load quays, a Ro/Ro berth, large areas for construction of manufacturing facilities 
and locating suppliers, good access for large transportation vessels and was close to all 
European offshore wind markets (Siemens, 2015; Siemens Gamesa, 2017). Importantly for 
the PoC, its OT2 and 100ha industrial and commercial area fitted Siemens’ new demands 
(Researcher interview, Technical University of Hamburg; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017):  
 
“This was one of the big factors we could show Siemens, the infrastructure was ready 
for them, not everything but most of the infrastructure…they could be ready to 
produce and ship out turbines quickly” Manager, NPorts.  
 
Despite previous efforts from STRABAG, the City of Cuxhaven as land owner and NPorts as 
the port authority to convince the turbine owners (Enercon, REpower/Senvion, 
DeWind/DSME) to relocate their test turbines erected between 2004 – 2005 in the PoC, as a 
result of STRABAG’s interest for constructing a new manufacturing plant, their removal was 
eventually enabled by the discussion “heating up” between Siemens and the coalition of 
actors in 2014 (Former Senior Director, former AfW; Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 2013, Wood, 
1999). These discussions resulted in the Niedersachsen government proactively providing a 
state-led €37M investment to relocate the test turbines from an area adjacent to the OT2 for 
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Siemens’ transplantation, a process managed by the City of Cuxhaven (Former Senior 
Director, former AfW; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2017; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c).  
 
The removal and relocation of test turbines, which were erected between 2004- 2005, 
aligned to Siemens’ main investment rationale, which was the punctual deliverability of port 
infrastructure to enable Siemens’ prompt construction of superstructure (HWG, 2018; 
Siemens Gamesa, 2017). Additionally, STRABAG had disinvested and vacated the semi-
complete OT2 and the 100ha ICA, therefore part of the infrastructure was already 
constructed and delivered (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018e, 2018f):  
 
“[Sub-] berth 9.3 was probably 50% ready for them [Siemens] …what we had to build 
before Siemens came was only the heavy-load ramp at [sub-] berth 9.3 which was 
about 50% completed” Manager, NPorts.  
 
In addition, substantial efforts made by the coalition of actors, in particular the AfW, 
influenced Siemens’ attraction to the PoC, as opposed to the Port of Bremerhaven as a rival 
port competitor (Notteboom, 2016; Fineberg, 2016; Cox, 1998). Siemens visited the PoC 
several times between 2008 and 2015 (Manager interview NPorts):  
 
“We [AfW Cuxhaven] coordinated the Siemens investment from the beginning…every 
agency was on the table and Siemens said ‘this is my plan’… then every agency told 
Siemens information. We had 25 people and we met every 4 weeks” Former Senior 
Director, AfW Cuxhaven. 
 
Moreover, Siemens’ transplantation and new construction of superstructure was not 
constrained by any legal, environmental or industrial obstacles, allowing completion of 
superstructure construction within two years (Senior Officer interview, Niedersachsen; 
HWG, 2018). This reflects the considerable efforts made by AfW, the City of Cuxhaven and 
the NLWKN (Department for Waterway, Coastal and Nature Conservation of the State of 
Lower Saxony) (NLKWN, 2018):  
 
“In Lower Saxony we had no development at the PoC that went to court, every 
project was given the official approval order without any contact with the courts, 




Siemens were also attracted by NPorts’ ability to access grants to provide state-led 
investments for infrastructure expansion on greenfield land, resulting from the PoC’s change 
of governance arrangements in 2005 (Manager interview, NPorts; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; 
2018e). In contrast, the State of Bremen, formed a policy to attract private investment to 
construct its planned ‘Offshore Terminal Bremerhaven’ (OTB), contrasting Niedersachsen’s 
strategy of driving state-led investments (Senior Manager interview, BIS Bremerhaven; 
Bremenports, 2011; Brooks, 2004). This difference in policy inhibited the OTB’s construction 
due to absent private investment. This absence of private investment has been influenced by 
the OTB development being legally challenged by German environmental groups since its 
conception (Project Manager interview, BIS Bremerhaven; Senior Policy Officer interview, 
BMVI).  
 
However, in order for Siemens’ new manufacturing and installation solution at the PoC to be 
operational, on-site suppliers were required within the PoC to support Siemens’ new nacelle 
manufacturing facility, which was previously selected for the Port of Hull in the Humber 
Ports case (Siemens, 2016b; 2017). The eventual transplantation of Siemens’ suppliers into 
the PoC who provided investment to build new superstructure, enabled the PoC’s 
adaptation and diversification into offshore wind and supported the new regional path 
around the offshore wind industry through providing new employment and further 
augmenting the local offshore wind supply network (Notteboom, 2016; Martin & Sunley, 
2006). This was primarily driven by Siemens’ transplantation catalysing new demand for 
suppliers and logistics services to support their port-centred manufacturing and logistics 
operations from the PoC (Siemens, 2016b; 2017):  
 
 “Siemens wanted suppliers to be settled next to them because they needed a short 
route and cost-effective approach for moving the [turbine] parts and components” 
Senior Advisor, AfW Cuxhaven. 
 
This new port demand triggered a reaction from the City of Cuxhaven, the AfW and the 
CPDC (Cuxhaven Port Development Company) to extend and enhance the ‘OMP’, by 
designating a 11ha ‘supplier park’ (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). This supplier park was delineated 
and newly constructed within the larger 100ha industrial and commercial area by the CPDC 
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which cost €1.28M, supported by grant funding of €768,000 from the Niedersachsen 
government (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c).  
 
As CPDC owned the land of the supplier park and operates as a publically-owned private port 
development company (CPDC, 2009). The City of Cuxhaven is the majority shareholder of the 
CPDC and the CPDC is arranged as a GmbH, which is officially a limited liability company 
(GTAi, 2018; CPDC, 2009). This institutional arrangement allowed the CPDC to receive and 
spend large public grants from Niedersachsen to newly construct the supplier park and avoid 
infringing upon EU State Aid rules (European Commission, 2014; Martin, 2000; CPDC, 2009):  
 
“It [CPDC] was set up to receive the money from the EU and the State government, 
we needed a GmbH set up for this” Former Senior Director, former AfW. 
 
Furthermore, another enabling ownership arrangement was the reorganisation of land 
ownership in 2009 between NPorts (as subsidiary of the Niedersachsen government) and the 
CPDC (as subsidiary of the City of Cuxhaven), to allow each non-firm actor to have their “own 
coherent land plot for firm settlements and negotiations” (Senior Advisor interview, AfW 
Cuxhaven; Martin, 2010 Niedersachsen Ports, 2017; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). This 
reorganisation of land ownership and governance meant that land for the Siemens facility, 
Siemens’ optional area and the supplier park was owned by the CPDC forming part of the 
larger 100ha ICA, although outside the PoC’s officially delineated limits (Niedersachsen 
Ports, 2017; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). This enabled Siemens and its suppliers to identify distinct 
and coherent plots of land to organise their transplantation, investment and construction 
activities with the CPDC (Senior Advisor interview, AfW Cuxhaven; Niedersachsen Ports, 
2017; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). 
 
The first of the Siemens suppliers to commit was STUTE Logistics who provide inbound and 
outbound logistics services for Siemens’ components, value-added activities (such as 
lubrication of small parts for components) and storage services (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018i; 
STUTE Logistics, 2017). The transplantation of STUTE Logistics in 2016 was supported by a 
€4.69M investment into fixed assets (Senior Advisor interview, AfW Cuxhaven; AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2018c). Niedersachsen Bank provided STUTE Logistics with €490,920 “individual 
business investment aid” from the ‘Joint Scheme for the Improvement of Regional Economic 
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Structures’ (GRW), corresponding to 10% of STUTE Logistics’ overall investment (Senior 
Advisor interview, AfW Cuxhaven; Eurofound, 2018).  
 
Nordmark, the second supplier to commit in 2016, required a new production facility in close 
proximity to produce large component parts for Siemens and to support Siemens’ new port-
centred manufacturing and logistics operations (Nordmark, 2016; Siemens, 2016b; 
Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 2016). A €3.65M grant from the GRW supported Nordmark’s 
€18.85M investment for constructing a new production facility and offices at the supplier 
park (Senior Advisor, AfW Cuxhaven; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; Nordmark, 2016; Eurofound, 
2018). The transplantation and construction of new superstructure by Nordmark was also 
driven and catalysed by the construction of the 100ha industrial and commercial area and 
heavy-load roads, and the construction and designation of the 11ha supplier park (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017, 2018a; 2018c).  
 
Subsequently, Nordmark decided to award Muehlhan a long-term contract for protective 
coating services after conducting ITT (invitation-to-tender) rounds “with several coating 
companies” (Senior Director, Nordmark; Muehlhan, 2018). Nordmark had established a good 
business relationship with Muehlhan, who had the “best prices and conditions” and were 
considered a “German company who understood German bureaucracy and rules” (Senior 
Director, Nordmark; Muehlhan, 2018). Muehlhan invested €17.2M for constructing a coating 
facility within the supplier park and for transportation equipment (Muehlhan, 2018; AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2018c). Muehlhan’s transplantation and new construction activities was caused 
by Nordmark’s demand which was catalysed by component orders from Siemens, thus 
further enabling the PoC’s adaptation and diversification into offshore wind (Senior Director 
interview, Nordmark). In addition to Siemens’ suppliers transplanting into the PoC, AMBAU 
expanded its operations and presence within the PoC through the acquisition of CSC’s 
former assets following its disinvestment. 
 
AMBAU’s €30M acquisition of superstructure was driven by CSC disinvesting in 2013 
(AMBAU, 2016; reNEWS, 2013; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c). Following CSC’s disinvestment, 
AMBAU rented CSC’s former production hall for storage from the City of Cuxhaven, as the 
leaseholder (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Senior Advisor interview, AfW Cuxhaven). AMBAU’s 
eventual acquisition of CSC’s superstructure from private banks and expansion in 2016 was 
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primarily caused by NPorts and the City of Cuxhaven working together and setting low rental 
costs for the production hall and storage area, stimulating AMBAU’s interest to rent these 
facilities between 2013 and 2016 (Manager interview, NPorts; AMBAU, 2016):  
 
“They [AMBAU] were always thinking ‘OK, CSC has already gone bankrupt, maybe 
eventually we can take this over when the banks lower the price’… so they could take 
over the whole site at a cheap price after renting first” Senior Executive, Cuxport.  
 
Moreover, the internal corporate decision-making at AMBAU which underpinned its 
acquisition activities after a period of renting CSC’s former production hall and storage 
facilities, assisted the PoC to end its period of uncertainty and disinvestment (AMBAU, 
2016). 
 
In addition to the attractive rental agreement, the OT1, the 50ha industrial and commercial 
area and CSC’s former production hall,  storage facilities and 650T quayside gantry crane 
fitted AMBAU’s needs of extra storage areas, extra quayside cranage for heavy-lifting and 
additional berths for jack-up-vessels, in order to consolidate and heighten its manufacturing 
and pre-assembly capacities at the PoC (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; AMBAU, 2016). Furthermore, 
the rental agreement for AMBAU’s former manufacturing plant had expired and this also 
prompted AMBAU to rethink the strategic capacity of their current production facilities 
(AMBAU, 2018; 2016):  
 
“In the end AMBAU decided it was better to be at a purpose-built facility [OT1] rather 
than a former shipyard which was not really perfect” Senior Executive, Cuxport.  
 
In similarity to Siemens’ new manufacturing and logistics operations, AMBAU’s decision for 
consolidating their manufacturing activities and acquiring superstructure in the PoC was also 
driven by AMBAU’s strategy of cost reduction, through removing the transportation of 
components between their plants (AMBAU, 2016). Essentially, the corporate decision-
making and strategies of firms like AMBAU and Siemens enable port adaptation and 
stimulate regional path creation processes (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Lagendijk, 2014). 
Siemens, Siemens’ suppliers and AMBAU reacted to broader changes in policy, market 
demand, technological innovation and supply chain evolution within the offshore wind 
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industry, allowing port authorities to capitalise upon a new market such as offshore wind 
(Wind Europe, 2017a; Martin, 2010).  
 
5.5.2 Further state-led infrastructure investment: 2016 - 2018 
 
This element of the episode is around the new expansion of infrastructure on greenfield 
land, namely the OT2, enabled by state-led investments (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018e; Figure 
2.4). Despite the disruption of construction which followed STRABAG’s disinvestment 
jeopardising the Offshore Master Plan (OMP), the AfW, NPorts and the Niedersachsen 
government decided to complete the OT2, to capitalise upon the long-term growth potential 
of the German offshore wind market (Manager interview, NPorts; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 
2018e). Moreover, the new construction activities were enabled by key decisions to provide 
state-led investments to complete the OT2 without final inward investment decisions from 
firms, reflecting the proactive and entrepreneurial nature of NPorts and its ability to access 
and use grants, private bank loans and public finance (Notteboom, 2016; Monios & 
Wilmsmeier, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018e). 
 
The sub-berth 9.3 was around “50% complete” before STRABAG disinvested (Manager 
interview, NPorts; STRABAG, 2013). Moreover, Siemens required a heavy-load ro/ro ramp 
instead of using heavy-lift cranage (Siemens Gamesa, 2017). Therefore, Siemens visited the 
PoC to assess sub-berth 9.3 and requested NPorts to complete construction (Manager 
interview, NPorts; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018e). Furthermore, NPorts had the capacity to 
demonstrate to Siemens that planning permission for construction was in place since 2012, 
which was originally for STRABAG’s planned large-scale production and installation of 
gravity-based foundations (NLWKN, 2018; 2012; STRABAG, 2015):  
 
“The planning was there and in the short-term Siemens could start construction. This 
was definitely a reason Siemens came, they didn’t want any obstacles, any legal 
obstacles…” Former Senior Director, former AfW.  
 
Consequently, NPorts provided a €9.5M state-led investment, wholly funded by the 
Niedersachsen government, to complete the sub-berth 9.3 with heavy-load ramp (European 
Commission, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; 2018e; Maritime Journal, 2016). This state-led 
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investment was evidently a reactive decision to the infrastructure demands of Siemens 
(Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Siemens Gamesa, 2017). However, the investment policies 
and long-term vision of Niedersachsen and NPorts evident within the ‘OMP’ advocated this 
state-led investment (Maritime Journal, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Niedersachsen, 2016; 
Notteboom, 2016): 
 
“I would say 60-70% of the ramp was ready when Siemens signed the 
contract…Siemens said ‘OK we can believe your promise. We can believe this’. And 
because of this Siemens made the decision to come to Cuxhaven” Manager, NPorts. 
 
However, NPorts in conjunction with the Niedersachsen government, took a more 
entrepreneurial and proactive strategy to complete the OT2 which expanded the ‘OMP’ 
(AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Maritime Journal, 2017; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Notteboom, 
2016). This state-led investment strategy was based upon renewed interest from offshore 
wind developers and manufacturing firms, which was underpinned by future offshore wind 
projects planned for the North Sea, in addition to having existing planning permission for the 
OT2 (Maritime Journal, 2017; Niedersachsen, 2016; NLWKN, 2010; 2016; 2018):  
 
“The port infrastructure and industrial areas are needed for further production and 
maintenance of turbines. Ports in Niedersachsen need more work to build up more 
turbines in the German North Sea…to get more jobs and attract companies” Senior 
Officer, Niedersachsen.  
  
Importantly, new changes in the RESA framework and market support regime implemented 
by the Federal government, notably the adding of 500MW of installed offshore wind 
capacity between 2021 and 2022, 700MW per year between 2023 and 2025, and 840MW 
added per year from 2026 onwards, enabled the renewed interest from offshore wind 
developers and manufacturing firms (BMWi, 2016). 
 
NPorts invested €600,000 to construct new surfaces on the quayside infrastructure at sub-
berth 9.2 (Maritime Journal, 2017; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c). The sub-berths 9.4 and 9.5 were 
created, and €7M was provided by NPorts to newly construct infrastructure at sub-berth 9.4 
to handle jack-up vessels (NLKWN, 2018; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018e). A deeper approach to sub-
berth 9.5 was built to support jack-up vessels (Senior Advisor interview, AfW Cuxhaven; 
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NLWKN, 2018). NPorts invested €3.5M, utilising EU ‘ad hoc aid’, facilitating the construction 
of a heavy-load quay at sub-berth 9.1 (Maritime Journal, 2017; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; 
European Commission, 2017d; European Union, 2017). These state-led investments occurred 
despite revised and stricter EU regulations being placed upon public investments into ports 
and airports since 2017 (Manager interview; NPorts; European Union, 2017; European 
Commission, 2016; 2017d).  
 
On the whole, the PoC’s revival and expansion into offshore wind since 2014 was driven by 
the transplantation of Siemens, Siemens’ suppliers (STUTE Logistics, Nordmark and 
Muehlhan) and AMBAU’s acquisition of CSC’s former assets, and further state-led 
investments for the expansion of infrastructure from the Niedersachsen government and 
NPorts. These distinctive investments were influenced by the continued provision of feed-in-
tariffs from the Federal government, the increased installed capacity targets outlined in the 
RESA 2017 and planned offshore wind projects in the North Sea catalysing demand from 
offshore wind developers, Siemens’ new port-centred demand for manufacturing activities, 
and the previous disinvestment of CSC and STRABAG allowing new port assets to be 
constructed by Siemens, Siemens’ suppliers and NPorts and existing assets to be acquired by 
AMBAU (BMWi, 2016). Furthermore, following the PoC’s change of governance in 2005, 
NPorts had the power, resources and financial capacity to make proactive state-led 
investments to expand port infrastructure on greenfield land, by utilising public finance, 
private bank loans and grants from the EU and Niedersachsen.   
 
More specifically, Siemens’ distinctive transplantation was catalysed by investments for the 
expansion of infrastructure at the OT2 and 100ha ICA, reflecting the long-term vision in the 
Offshore Master Plan (OMP) (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). Siemens transplantation was also 
facilitated by the disinvestment of STRABAG who vacated the OT2 and 100ha industrial and 
commercial area allowing Siemens to harness these infrastructural assets and the Port of 
Bremerhaven’s constrained competitiveness. The transplantation of Siemens’ suppliers and 
the OT2’s further construction, was influenced by the continued provision of feed-in-tariffs 
and increased installed capacity targets set by the Federal government (RESA, 2017), port 
land ownership arrangements, a long-term strategic vision and state-led investments laid 
out in the ‘OMP’ and Siemens’ port-centred demand. CSC’s disinvestment and AMBAU’s 
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previously low rental agreement formed an attractive economic opportunity for AMBAU, 




This chapter discussed the different phases of the PoC’s adaptation and diversification into 
offshore wind through four distinctive episodes. The chapter looked across four key causal 
episodes to better understand how the evolutionary process of port adaptation unfolded at 
the PoC (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010).  
 
Firstly the Federal government created an enabling and constraining institutional 
environment for offshore wind through adapting the RESA since 2000, which was 
underpinned by installed capacity targets and feed-in-tariffs, thus creating an appropriate 
market environment for the Niedersachsen government, NPorts and the City of Cuxhaven to 
make proactive port infrastructure investments to attract firms (BMWi, 2015; Monios & 
Wilmsmeier, 2016).  However, the Federal government’s reduction of installed capacity 
targets for offshore wind in 2013 strongly influenced the decisions made by OMM, STRABAG 
and CSC to disinvest, which underpinned the PoC’s period of uncertainty and disinvestment 
(BMWi, 2015; reNEWS, 2013b; STRABAG, 2013). As such, the Federal government has 
enabled the market environment in which NPorts and the City of Cuxhaven could capitalise 
upon offshore wind through the introduction of clear installed capacity targets and feed-in-
tariffs incentives and constrained it, through the reduction of installed capacity targets in 
2013, marking distinctive changes in RESA policy and shifts in broader political perspectives 
(BMWi, 2015; Martin, 2010). However, the Federal government continued to provide feed-
in-tariffs and increased the installed capacity targets in the RESA 2017, which enabled a 
continued and eventual renewal of interest from offshore wind developers and 
manufacturing firms from 2014 onwards (BMWi, 2016). At the same time, the 
Niedersachsen government has provided an enabling market environment for NPorts and 
the City of Cuxhaven through instances of large state-led investments for the expansion and 
conversion of port infrastructure (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; Martin, 2010). Furthermore, 
Niedersachsen had large financial resources and considerable power to actively change the 
PoC’s governance and ownership (Niedersachsen Ports, 2009; Debrie et al, 2013). Moreover, 
Niedersachsen embraced a joint approach on the local scale with NPorts, the City of 
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Cuxhaven, the Cuxhaven Port Development Company (CPDC) and the AfW to ultimately 
realise the OMP, thus facilitating the PoC’s adaptation and diversification into offshore wind 
(Notteboom, 2016). This coalition of actors responded to the evolution of the German 
offshore wind market by inputting new ideas and strategies for essential port infrastructure 
into the OMP (Niedersachsen, 2003).  
 
Secondly, the Offshore Master Plan (OMP) stands out as an important port strategy and 
vision designed to adapt and diversify the PoC as a base for offshore wind and has been 
extended and deepened over time, aligning to the evolution of the offshore wind industry 
(Niedersachsen, 2003; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). This distinctive port strategy and vision has 
broader implications for economic development paths, as the OMP clear catalysed the PoC’s 
future adaptation and diversification into offshore wind (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Notteboom, 
2016). The OMP reflects the entrepreneurial and proactive nature of NPorts and the 
Niedersachsen government to invest and physically adapt infrastructural assets for potential 
firms within the offshore wind market (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). The design and 
implementation of the OMP has been strongly directed and influenced by a wider coalition 
of actors with a common interest regarding the long-term adaptation and diversification of 
the PoC (Cox and Muir, 1988; MacKinnon et al, 2018; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). The long-term 
vision built into and emerging from the OMP was key in attracting and launching the test 
turbine field, demonstrating the market potential and novelty of offshore wind, underlining 
the future of offshore wind in Germany which was yet to occur (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). Few 
North Sea ports in the mid-2000s had the strategic vision and forward-thinking outlook to 
demonstrate the potential of offshore wind and the opportunity for ports to capitalise upon 
job creation and investment opportunities associated with the embryonic German offshore 
wind industry of the time (Niedersachsen, 2003).  
 
Thirdly, the OMP’s vision and success was fulfilled by the PoC’s change of governance and 
ownership arrangements (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Debrie et al, 2013). The Ports and Shipping 
Administration of the State of Lower Saxony (PSALS) was changed to NPorts to operate as a 
new port authority for Lower Saxony, moving beyond the remit of a bureaucratic 
department of the state government (Niedersachsen Ports, 2009). Decision-making powers, 
resources and responsibilities were devolved to NPorts Cuxhaven, new individuals with 
industry and business expertise in port engineering projects were hired, and there was a 
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new long-term vision around investing and building port infrastructure to support future 
offshore wind activities (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). This new long-term vision was made possible 
by this change of governance circumstances as a new management team at NPorts 
Cuxhaven adopted a new strategic focus, supported by NPorts’ central board and 
Niedersachsen politicians, which heightened the importance of offshore wind within PoC’s 
business portfolio, and prioritised state-led investment for port infrastructure to attract 
offshore wind firms (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c). In terms of governance, NPorts Cuxhaven 
is a port authority entirely owned by the Niedersachsen government, with powers, resources 
and responsibilities devolved to NPorts Cuxhaven for business development, infrastructure 
planning, managing construction activities and developing port real estate (Niedersachsen 
Ports, 2009; 2017; Niedersachsen, 2017). As a result of Niedersachsen’s longevity as the 
owner of NPorts since 2005, NPorts Cuxhaven has received large state-led grants from 
Niedersachsen to expand and convert port infrastructure on greenfield and brownfield land 
through different phased projects, to support future offshore wind activities (AfW Cuxhaven, 
2018; 2018c). NPorts Cuxhaven and Niedersachsen’s ability and financial capacity in taking 
entrepreneurial risks using public finance, private bank loans and grants because they 
deemed port infrastructure investment as essential for attracting new firms and creating 
new employment opportunities in Cuxhaven, meant that this investment burden was not 
placed on private investors (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c; Niedersachsen Ports, 2017). 
Therefore, NPorts Cuxhaven has obtained operational flexibility with devolved power, 
resources and responsibility since the PoC’s change of governance in 2005, whilst being 
supported by the Niedersachsen government as its long-term owner, allowing it to receiving 
large grants for infrastructure investments (Niedersachsen, 2009; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c).  
 
Finally, a series of state-led investments for the expansion and conversion of port 
infrastructure has underpinned the transplantation of firms, namely CSC (BARD), STRABAG, 
Siemens, Nordmark and Muehlhan (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). The series of investments for the 
expansion of infrastructure and episodes of transplantation lead to the realisation of the 
OMP and the PoC’s adaptation and diversification into offshore wind. As such, the PoC’s 
adaptation and diversification into offshore wind was led by port actors (NPorts, 
Niedersachsen and the City of Cuxhaven), as opposed to being led by external offshore wind 
firms (Notteboom, 2016). Moreover, the series of state-led investments and firm 
transplantations were shaped and influenced by the Federal government creating an 
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enabling institutional environment for offshore wind through establishing an appropriate 
installed capacity targets and feed-in-tariffs, which catalysed investment from project 
developers, created a pipeline of orders for manufacturing firms and catalysed investment 


































This empirical chapter explores the adaptation of the ‘Humber Ports’, encompassing the Port 
of Hull (PoH) and the Port of Grimsby (PoG), drawing upon theoretical concepts and notions 
in the analytical framework (see Figure 2.4). The Humber Ports’ adaptation and 
diversification was undertaken by key actors, who were aiming to stimulate a new regional 
path around the offshore wind industry and provide a new purpose for the Humber Ports.  
 
This empirical chapter is structured by the principal causal episodes of the Humber Ports’ 
temporal evolution. The content of these episodes are organised around key modes of 
investment (conversion and expansion) from the analytical framework, which stimulate the 
process of port diversification into the offshore wind industry (see Figure 2.4). The modes of 
investment drive the physical construction of port assets upon brownfield and greenfield 
port land (see Figure 2.4). This chapter also focuses upon how upon how the vision and 
strategies of key firm and non-firm actors were influenced by port governance arrangements 
and the contexts of external market, industry, regulatory and policy environments (see 
Figure 2.4). The analysis highlights how the Humber Ports adapted and diversified through 
two distinctive trajectories of offshore wind manufacturing and O&M (operations and 
maintenance). The first episode is the origins and initial growth of the offshore wind path, 
the second episode is the disruptions and divergence between sub-regional paths and the 
third episode is realisation of the offshore wind path.   
 
The chapter begins with discussing the origins of the Humber Ports’ adaptation and 
diversification into offshore wind. This episode discusses how and why key senior individuals 
within Hull City Council (HCC) and other actors in Hull decided to diversify the PoH into 
offshore wind and how a coalition of firm and non-firm actors attempted to attract Siemens’ 
transplantation into the PoH. The first episode also includes the exploration of how and why 
small-scale O&M activities initially emerged at the PoG through Centrica’s transplantation. 
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These investment activities were shaped by senior individuals at the GFDE (Grimsby Fish 
Dock Enterprises) and the North East Lincolnshire Council (NELC).  
 
The second episode highlights how the PoH and the PoG, within the Humber Ports case, 
experienced two divergent trajectories of adaptation and diversification into offshore wind, 
organised between port two sites. Echoing the disruption of the port adaptation process at 
the PoC explored in Chapter 5, the Humber region and the PoH also experienced a prolonged 
period of serious uncertainty and disruption, driven by ambiguity around the ABP and 
Siemens joint venture. The second episode then explores the underpinnings of Centrica’s 
continued operations at the Fish Dock, and the investments of E.ON, Ørsted (formerly DONG 
Energy), RES and CWind into the Fish Dock to conduct O&M and marine support activities. 
These firm investments reflected the governance and organisation of the UK offshore wind 
industry, as there were a select number of developers who were planning to construct, 
operate and maintain consented UK offshore wind projects from the PoG. This episode 
reflects an important finding uncovered in Chapter 5; O&M activities are less affected by 
growing market uncertainty in comparison to manufacturing activities. 
 
The final episode is the renewed expansion of offshore wind at the Humber Ports from 2013, 
which drove forward the regional path around offshore wind through the creation of new 
jobs and expanding the regional supply chain connected to the Humber Ports, centred upon 
Siemens’ inward investment into a blade manufacturing facility at the Alexandra Dock 
located at the PoH. The final episode then moves onto discuss how and why Ørsted 
continued to invest into the PoG to create a larger O&M ‘hub’ at the Royal Dock, with the UK 
government playing a key role to establish an attractive national market environment for 
offshore wind. 
 
The three episodes entail the emergence, disruption and expansion of manufacturing and 
installation activities at the Port of Hull (PoH), and the emergence, continuation and 
expansion of O&M activities at the Port of Grimsby (PoG). Each episode is made up of 




Figure 6.1: Humber Ports three causal episodes 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
6.2 Path origins and growth: 2006-2011 
 
This first episode will discuss how and why the Humber Ports initially diversified their market 
portfolio and asset base to support the offshore wind industry, which ultimately stimulated 
an early regional path around offshore wind (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; 
Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). The episode is formed of two distinctive elements which evolve in 
parallel.  
 
On the North bank of the Humber, the initial diversification of the Port of Hull (PoH) into 
manufacturing and installation activities emerged from HCC seeking new economic 
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research by IBM Plant Location International (PLI) (Senior Director interview, HCC). The first 
element largely emerges from this context and discusses the intended diversification of the 
PoH into offshore wind, which was triggered by Siemens’ interest to conduct manufacturing 
and support installation activities from the PoH’s Alexandra Dock. On the South bank of the 
Humber, the initial diversification of the Port of Grimsby (PoG) into O&M activities was 
influenced by the strategic interests of individuals at the GFDE (Grimsby Fish Dock 
Enterprises) aiming to alleviate its dependence upon fish handling and storage activities as a 
core business within their portfolio. The second element also emerges out of this context 
and discusses how and why the PoG diversified into the offshore wind sector through 
supporting O&M activities, which was shaped and driven by the transplantation of Centrica 
and required the construction of infrastructure and superstructure at the Fish Dock.  
 
The ROC subsidy regulation provided an attractive market climate for developers to prepare 
and invest into ‘Round 1’ and ‘Round 2’ offshore wind projects, clearly designated by the 
Crown Estate (Ofgem, 2017; The Crown Estate, 2017a; 2017b). The UK government 
announced an installed capacity target of 33GW by 2020 in 2007 which was further 
approved in 2009 following the SEA (Strategic Environmental Assessment) for ‘Round 3’ 
offshore wind projects, which also drove interest and turbine orders from developers in the 
early UK offshore wind market (Senior Manager interview, ORE Catapult; DTI, 2007; DECC, 
2009). Since 2002, the UK policy environment for offshore wind created an enabling climate 
for developers to capitalise upon government subsidies via ROCs (Renewable Obligation 
Certificates), triggering a reaction from ABP at the PoH and the GFDE (Grimsby Fish Dock 
Enterprises) to attempt to capture investment from component manufacturing firms and 
developers to conduct O&M activities (Dawley, 2014; DTI, 2007 DECC, 2009; IRENA, 2012). 
Furthermore, a £60M fund to support turbine manufacturers investing in UK ports was 
announced in the 2010 Budget subject to EU state aid approval, which further stimulated 
inward investment interest from offshore wind developers and manufacturing firms (Former 
Commercial Officer interview, former ABP; Reuters, 2010). However, following the election 






6.2.1 Proposed diversification into manufacturing activity: 2006 onwards 
 
The first element of this episode is around how senior executives at ABP in Hull planned to 
diversify the PoH’s existing asset base and portfolio into offshore wind, to gain increased 
returns for ABP and support the development of future offshore wind projects (Former 
Commercial Officer interview, former ABP; Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
Figure 2.4).  
 
The origins of the Humber Ports’ diversification into offshore wind at the PoH and new 
offshore wind path began with ABP (Associated British Ports) identifying a market 
opportunity to capitalise upon the rapidly growing European container traffic in the mid-
1990s, which ultimately ended with the financial crisis of 2008 causing a slowdown in market 
demand for container handling (Harlaftis & Theotokas, 2010; Kalgora & Christian, 2016). This 
collapse of demand influenced a coalition of firm and non-firm actors to rethink their 
strategies around creating new jobs, integrating supply chains and catalysing industrial 
growth through diversifying the Humber Ports’ portfolio and infrastructural asset base 
(Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Figure 2.4).  
 
The rising demand for container handling and the underutilised Alexandra Dock influenced 
ABP’s new market investigations in the mid-1990s, leading to ABP’s senior commercial 
executives to decide to diversify from general and break-bulk cargo handling into container 
handling operations, by constructing a deepwater terminal named ‘Quay 2000’ (Project 
Manager interview, former ABP; Harlaftis & Theotokas, 2010; University of Hull, 2018; 
Notteboom, 2016):  
 
“There was a derelict wooden pier at Alexandra Dock back in 1996, so we started 
looking at how that could be redeveloped…originally the idea started as ‘Quay 2000’ 
and it was going to be a container terminal” Project Manager, former ABP. 
 
ABP eagerly welcomed investment interest from ‘Samskip’, a global logistics firm and 
terminal operator. This investment interest led to ABP’s joint discussions with Samskip as the 
principal user of the future container terminal, renamed ‘Quay 2005’ because of delays 
(Former Commercial Officer interview, former ABP; Hull City Council, 2000; University of 
173 
 
Hull, 2018). ABP then applied for a parliamentary order to the UK government for a Harbour 
Revision Order (HRO) to develop the Quay 2005 project for Samskip (DfT, 2006; University of 
Hull, 2018). HROs are used to change the use of port assets (infrastructure and 
superstructure) through the UK government authorising applications made by port 
authorities to strategically diversify port assets (DfT, 2016; Notteboom, 2016; Figure 2.4). 
The Secretary of State for Transport granted the HRO in April 2006 for the Quay 2005 
container terminal and the project would go ahead once ABP had confirmed a reliable 
terminal user for Quay 2005 (DfT, 2006; University of Hull, 2018). ABP’s need for securing a 
user before it made investments reflects the profit-driven motives of ABP to support its 
shareholders seeking returns (Former Managing Director interview, former ABP; Verhoeven, 
2010; Suykens &  van de Voorde, 1998).  
 
ABP needed to construct a new quayside infrastructure outside the pre-existing lock gates to 
build the Quay 2005 container terminals, allowing vessels to load containers directly from 
the River Humber (Former Managing Director interview, former ABP). This river terminal 
construction strategy for Quay 2005 was critical in enabling the PoH to diversify into 
offshore wind activities, as a river terminal with quayside access was a crucial infrastructural 
asset for loading and unloading turbine components (DfT, 2006; Mott Macdonald, 2011; 
University of Hull, 2018).  
 
However, the decrease of European containers flows following the 2008 financial crisis drove 
the collapse of demand for container handling at North Sea ports (Harlaftis & Theotokas, 
2010; Kalgora & Christian, 2016). This triggered Samskip to pull out of the renamed ‘Hull 
Riverside Container Terminal’ project in 2008 (formerly ‘Quay 2005 project’), leaving ABP 
with consent through the existing HRO (Harbour Revision Order) and local planning consent 
from Hull City Council (HCC) to adapt and diversify the PoH, but without a customer to use 
the planned container terminal (Project Manager interview, former ABP; DfT, 2006; 
University of Hull, 2018). 
 
The changing conditions of the container market were crucial in shifting ABP’s strategic 
approach for developing the PoH, moving away from the strategy of diversifying into 
container handling activities and towards diversifying their market portfolio and asset base 
to support offshore wind (Former Managing Director, former ABP; Notteboom, 2016; 
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Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). In the late 2000s senior figures within ABP created a strategic 
aim of diversifying and reallocating the use of Alexandra Dock for offshore wind activities, 
using the justification of ABP avoiding missing out on possible revenue generated from a 
new market opportunity such as the UK oil and gas market of the 1980s and 1990s (Former 
Managing Director interview, former ABP; Notteboom, 2016):  
 
“We needed to…internally within ABP…build up the confidence of other senior 
individuals that there was a valid market and that there was an opportunity in 
offshore wind” Former Commercial Officer, former ABP.  
 
This was a challenging activity for senior figures at ABP in Hull, as ABP had previously been 
concerned with limiting their risk-taking on infrastructure investments, which was based 
upon securing users to make steady returns from traditional cargo, automobiles and 
container handling activities (Former Senior Advisor, Green Port Hull; Verhoeven, 2010).  
 
In September 2006 Hull City Council (HCC) commissioned ‘IBM Plant Location International’, 
which operates as a consulting service within the IBM multinational corporation, to find new 
economic opportunities for Hull and identified renewable energy as key economic 
opportunity, alongside ‘Ports and Logistics’, ‘Pharmaceuticals’ and Hull’s ‘City Centre’ (IBM 
PLI, 2006; University of Hull, 2018). The recognition of these economic opportunities later 
drove and influenced individuals at ABP to initially plan to diversify the PoH’s assets to 
support offshore wind as an emerging renewable sector (Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999; Figure 2.4):  
 
“…we [Hull City Council] were looking at potential competencies just about the same 
time as the banking crisis which as a manufacturing area, hit us particularly hard. 
So…we brought IBM in for an objective view…” Senior Director, HCC. 
 
The proactive strategy and actions of HCC to identify local economic opportunities for Hull 
was common amongst most local authorities under the Labour government from 1997 – 
2010 (Pike & Tomaney, 2009; IBM PLI, 2006). The absence of a strategic plan directly for the 
Humber region was also indicative of ABP’s economic position, who traditionally aimed to 
secure long-term contracts with port users to appease its shareholders, as opposed to 
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operating as a key actor for driving economic development in the Humber (Former 
Commercial Officer interview, former ABP; Verhoeven, 2010; Baird & Valentine, 2007).  
 
The ‘Time to Act’ report published by DECC (Department for Energy and Climate Change) 
influenced the decision made by senior figures in ABP to reallocate the use of Alexandra 
Dock and capitalise upon emerging opportunities within the offshore wind industry (Former 
Commercial Officer interview, former ABP; DECC, 2009). This report on UK ports supporting 
the offshore wind industry was shaped by the Crown Estate announcing the development 
zones for Round 3 projects in comparatively close proximity to the River Humber and more 
broadly, the DECC’s ‘Strategic Environmental Assessment’ (SEA) revealing that up to 33GW 
of offshore wind capacity could be installed by 2020 (Former Commercial Officer interview, 
former ABP; DECC, 2009; The Crown Estate, 2010a; 2010b).  
 
Hull City Council (HCC) was a key non-firm actor as it had statutory powers to change the 
ABP’s HRO remit and usage for activities on the Alexandra Dock from container handling 
activities to offshore wind activities (which required an approach to the UK government), 
making the Alexandra Dock an attractive infrastructural asset base for future investors 
(Senior Director interview, HCC; MacKinnon et al, 2018; University of Hull, 2018; Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999). The dynamic working relationship between ABP and Hull City Council from 
2008 onwards was crucial in changing the original HRO and bringing together a coalition of 
private and public actors at different points in time (Dawley et al, 2019; Notteboom, 2016; 
Wood, 1998; Cox, 1999). 
 
“The Siemens project was led by HCC very much with ABP, we were driving it. But the 
LEP’s role was also significant in that Lord Haskins as Chair was very effective at 
lobbying the government” Senior Director, HCC. 
 
Furthermore, the subsequent introduction of the Humber LEP (Local Enterprise Partnership) 
in 2011, who were not granted the same authority, resources and development 
responsibilities as the now abolished Yorkshire Forward, meant that HCC became more 
entrepreneurial and proactive in attracting Siemens to the Alexandra Dock (Dawley et al, 
2019; Pike et al, 2016b). This new role and influence of HCC enabled the PoH site to become 
more competitive in regard to capturing Siemens’ investment, as it coincided with the rival 
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AMEP (Able Marine Energy Park) on the south bank of the River Humber losing the political 
support of Yorkshire Forward following its abolishment (Dawley et al, 2019; Pike et al, 
2016b).  This account contrasts the role of sub-national government agencies in the PoC 
case, which revealed a stronger coalition of actors focused upon the adaptation and 
diversification of one port site to support offshore wind activities (Niedersachsen Ports, 
2014; Cox, 1998; Wood, 1999).  
 
Despite a renewed sense of strategic drive from ABP regarding the adaptation and 
diversification of the Port of Hull (PoH) into offshore wind, the Alexandra Dock’s future 
development was always dependent upon “getting the right deal with a customer for the 
project”, reflecting ABP’s commercially driven motives and investment rationale as a private 
port authority (Commercial Manager interview, ABP; Verhoeven, 2010; Brooks, 2004).  
ABP required an anchor investment to validate its strategy to change the HRO and enable 
the conversion of the Alexandra Dock’s under-utilised port infrastructure (Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). In parallel, HCC identified and began promoting the Alexandra 
Dock at the PoH as a potential site for attracting an offshore wind turbine manufacturer such 
as Siemens (Senior Director interview, HCC; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Wind Europe, 
2017a). This strategic action by HCC was shaped by the loss of the Quay 2005 project 
following the 2008 financial crisis and the clear need to provide new job opportunities and 
investment into Hull (Senior Director interview, HCC). Although HCC was promoting and 
directing the Alexandra Dock as a potential site for offshore wind, there was still an absence 
of a long-term vision and/or port ‘Master Plan’ for the Humber ports (Notteboom, 2016; 
Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011). This was shaped by ABP’s control over development within its 
estate and the limited land availability for expansion around the Humber Ports, as the ports 
are enclosed by roads, industrial sites and residential areas (Executive Director interview, 
Humber LEP).  
 
Siemens’ original port investment interests in the late 2000s, to establish blade and nacelle 
manufacturing and turbine assembly facilities at a UK port, simulated engagement and 
meetings with senior executives at ‘Yorkshire Forward’, who were aiming to change how the 
Humber Ports were operating and developing to become more proactive, entrepreneurial 
and have greater bearing upon regional economic development (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 




“We were trying to get the Humber ports to think about adding value to what went 
through the port to the local economy, rather than just being a holding place for 
cargo and cars” Former Executive Officer, former Yorkshire Forward. 
 
Siemens’ search for a UK port site in 2009 spurred local authorities on the North and South 
banks of the River Humber to engage in close competition to secure Siemens’ investment. 
This competition diverged the regional support for two rival sites comprising the greenfield 
AMEP (Able Marine Energy Park) site on the River Humber’s South bank, owned by Able UK, 
and the Alexandra Dock site on the River Humber’s North bank at the PoH, owned by ABP 
(Senior Director interview, ABLE; BVG Associates, 2017). This divergence of support partly 
constrained the potential for forming a strategic coalition of regional firm and non-firm 
actors concerned with diversifying the Humber Ports’ into offshore wind (Cox, 1998, Wood, 
1999; Notteboom, 2016). 
 
Following Siemens’ search of over 100 UK port sites, the AMEP site, championed by 
Yorkshire Forward and central government, was chosen as Siemens’ preferred site on the 
Humber and UK (Former Executive Officer, former Yorkshire Forward; House of Commons, 
2010). Siemens were attracted to the AMEP site as they could request Able UK to newly 
construct specialised port infrastructure on a greenfield site, as Siemens were unsure a port 
layout was suitable to support their future manufacturing and installation of turbines with 
co-located component suppliers (Senior Director interview, Able UK; MacKinnon et al, 2018).  
 
Siemens’ UK search for a port site and ITT (invitation-to-tender) in 2010 catalysed ABP’s 
interest in diversifying into offshore wind and prompted ABP and HCC to work together to 
attract Siemens, thus attempting to shift Siemens’ interest in the AMEP site championed by 
Yorkshire Forward and central government (Commercial Manager, ABP; House of Commons, 
2010; University of Hull, 2018). Throughout negotiations with Siemens, ABP stated that it 
would only invest to build port infrastructure if Siemens would also be prepared to invest 
and if Siemens’ activity was commercially viable in securing returns for ABP, which was 
indicative of ABP assuring investment value for its shareholders (Verhoeven, 2010; Brooks, 
2004). Furthermore, “Siemens hadn’t gambled on the UK offshore wind market” until ABP 
matched Siemens’ investment interest and planned to develop “port infrastructure based on 
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securing a long-term deal with Siemens”, as ABP very rarely speculates (Former Managing 
Director, former ABP).  
 
Senior UK government Ministers and officers who supported the UK offshore wind market 
through ROC subsidies, put pressure upon senior executives at ABP to validate the UK 
government’s support and sign an MoU with Siemens in 2010, in order to catalyse a new 
path around offshore wind by creating new jobs and supply chain development in the 
Humber region (DECC, 2009; Financial Times, 2011; Martin, 2010):  
 
“If ABP was going to invest and get a bit of this action from the subsidised offshore 
wind market then the UK government wanted to have some kick-back…and that 
particular kick-back was the rejuvenation of the Alexandra Dock” (Former Senior 
Advisor, Green Port Hull).  
 
The MoU was not a legally binding investment commitment or joint venture at this stage and 
each party could legally pull out of this partnership commitment, making the future 
adaptation and diversification of the PoH uncertain (Technical Director interview, WSP; HM 
Government, 2014a; Notteboom, 2016). Siemens’ decision to sign the MoU with ABP and UK 
government in 2011 for its transplantation into the PoH was influenced by a range of 
criteria, factors and conditions (Former Managing Director interview, former ABP). These 
included the distinctive scale of existing Alexandra Dock with longest available quay on the 
Humber, short steaming time from the PoH to respective North Sea offshore wind projects, 
ABP’s willingness to invest and its planned deliverability of port infrastructure, the UK 
government approval of revised HRO and Hull City Council (HCC) ensured that local planning 
permission would be in place, and HCC, East Riding of Yorkshire Council, ABP and University 
of Hull would formulate the £25.7m ‘Green Port Growth Programme’ supporting skills 
development, site assembly, business investment advice and grants, research development 
and innovation (Former Managing Director interview, former ABP; HM Government, 2014a; 
University of Hull, 2018; MacKinnon et al, 2018).  
 
Siemens were discouraged from transplanting into the AMEP because the ‘Development 
Consent Order’ process caused lengthy delays for developing the greenfield AMEP (Former 
Managing Director interview, former ABP). Siemens were further discouraged by an ongoing 
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high-level legal battle between Able UK and ABP regarding the future development of the 
AMEP site, which was triggered by ABP in response to heightening competition from Able UK 
and its AMEP site (BBC News, 2015; MacKinnon et al, 2018; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011):  
 
“We lost out on Siemens simply because at that point we didn’t have planning for the 
AMEP…it has been one of the most complicated and hard-fought battles…we had 
ABP opposing us at every level” Senior Director, Able UK. 
 
Ultimately, Siemens’ intent was to build a facility for manufacturing nacelles at the PoH’s 
Alexandra Dock site and a blade assembly plant at the Paull site, both located on the north 
bank of the Humber and owned by ABP (University of Hull, 2018; Financial Times, 2011; 
MacKinnon et al, 2018). However, a change of national institutional and political contexts 
regarding the UK government’s commitment to renewable energy and offshore wind 
resulted in a period of uncertainty and delay around the Humber Ports’ adaptation and 
diversification, and the regional path around the offshore industry wind (MacKinnon et al, 
2018; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Financial Times, 2014).  
 
6.2.2 Diversification into Operations and Maintenance (O&M): 2007 onwards 
 
The second element of this episode is centred upon how infrastructural and material assets 
of the ‘Fish Dock’ at the Port of Grimsby (PoG) were diversified and converted to support 
O&M activities and created the early regional offshore wind path (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs 
& Notteboom, 2011; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). The declining fish 
handling and storage activities was the primary focus of business and infrastructure usage at 
the PoG’s Fish Dock before the arrival of O&M activities (Senior Advisor, Ørsted; BBC News, 
2007). However, an enabling policy environment for offshore wind influenced developers to 
construct offshore wind projects and convince Centrica to transplant into the PoG to 
conduct O&M activities (DECC, 2009; BBC News, 2007; IRENA, 2012; The Crown Estate 
2017b). 
 
The initial diversification of the PoG’s asset base and market portfolio into offshore wind 
began with ABP transferring decision-making powers and responsibilities to the Grimsby Fish 
Dock Enterprises Ltd (GFDE) as the Fish Dock’s operator, including the power to lease port 
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areas from ABP (Martin Boyers interview, GFDE; Debrie et al, 2013). However, ABP’s original 
aim was to enable the adaptation and diversification of the Fish Dock into a fish market and 
for supporting fish storage and processing activities (Martin Boyers interview, GFDE; Boas, 
2007). The GFDE was formed in 1991 by the “fish merchants association, the Grimsby fishing 
vessel owner association, the marine engineering association, a slipway company, individuals 
in the seafood industry and North East Lincolnshire Council (NELC)”, who jointly decided to 
create a new economic future for the Fish Dock (Senior Officer interview, North East 
Lincolnshire Council). The transfer of decision-making powers around business development, 
planning, strategic use of assets, autonomous investment approval and permitting GFDE to 
have its own tenants, meant that the GFDE was the main actor for engaging with offshore 
wind firms interested in transplanting into the PoG from 2007 onwards (Senior Officer 
interview, NELC; Debrie et al, 2013; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b). The GFDE adopted a 
‘proactive’ investment strategy as a result of its declining activities in the weakening UK 
fishing industry, aiming to generate a new dues and rent via O&M operators by utilising 
existing and constructing new infrastructure at the Fish Dock, which was rented from ABP 
(Senior Director interview, GFDE; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; BBC, 2007; 2013).  
 
To anticipate and capitalise upon the potential of O&M opportunities within the offshore 
wind industry and stimulate a future growth path for the wider Humber region the GFDE, 
NELC (North East Lincolnshire Council) and ‘Offshore Wind Power Support Ltd’ operating as 
an offshore wind support firm, formed the ‘Grimsby Renewables Partnership’ (GRP) in 2008 
as part of the NELC (Senior Officer interview, NELC; NELC, 2018). The GRP included ABP as a 
vital player and was critical for shaping the future market activity of the Humber Ports in 
offshore wind, as ABP was the PoG’s owner and had ultimate control over the PoG’s users, 
asset base, market portfolio, investments and future strategic development (Senior Officer 
interview, NELC; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b). The GRP was formed for creating a new vision 
for the Fish Dock and this vision was strongly influenced by the long-term decline of fishing 
activities (Senior Director interview, GFDE). The GRP’s primary function was centred upon 
supporting inward investments and marketing the PoG as a key infrastructural asset base to 
the emerging offshore wind industry (NELC, 2018; Markard & Petersen, 2009; Maskell & 




The GFDE were initially informed of Centrica’s activity in the North Sea by a small vessel 
owner who was conducting a met mast survey for Centrica and confirmed that Centrica was 
interested in constructing an offshore wind project in close proximity to the River Humber 
and required a port base (Senior Director interview, GFDE). After Centrica were awarded 
market support from the UK government via ROCs, Centrica formally approached senior 
individuals at the GFDE in 2007 to transplant into the PoG to support their ‘Lynn’ and ‘Inner 
Dowsing’ offshore wind projects, which triggered the GFDE to provide investments into 
refurbishing the Marine Control Office and constructing a new pontoon to support Centrica’s 
O&M activities (Senior Director interview, GFDE; BBC News, 2007):  
 
“Centrica’s met mast survey turned out to be good for developing offshore wind 
farms… then everything became in our favour. Centrica wanted a port base. We 
[GFDE] invested on the back of this…I convinced our directors” Senior Director, GFDE. 
 
In addition to Centrica’s transplantation, Siemens identified the PoG as a suitable port base 
for offshore wind and moved a service team into Centrica’s facility in 2008 to support the 
operations of the Lynn and Inner Dowsing projects (Senior Officer, NELC). Furthermore, 
Centrica provided an additional £3.6M investment in 2012 to add new facilities in the Fish 
Dock to provide more specialist O&M services (OffshoreWIND, 2012a; MacKinnon et al, 
2018). The transplantation of Centrica was an early example of the Humber Ports’ 
diversification into O&M activities at the PoG and supported the creation of a new regional 
path around offshore wind, which was reflected through new job creation and smaller firms 
involved in building or commissioning O&M support vessels (Senior Executive interview, 
Team Humber Marine Alliance; Notteboom, 2016). 
 
6.3 Disruptions and divergent sub-regional paths: 2011-2013 
 
The structure and organisation of this episode is two-fold, with both elements occurring in 
parallel chronologically which explain divergent sub-regional paths of growth at the port 
level. The first element concerns the uncertainty and disruption around Siemens’ 
transplantation and ABP’s associated investment into the PoH. The second element is 
around continued O&M activity at the PoG which was catalysed by private investment from 
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offshore wind developers such as Centrica, E.ON and Ørsted, and set within the broader 
context of planned offshore wind projects nearing the construction phase. 
 
The Humber Ports’ initial adaptation and diversification into offshore wind at the PoH (Port 
of Hull) and the PoG (Port of Grimsby) provided renewed political and economic optimism 
around Humber region, created a significant opportunity to increase regional employment 
and grew the regional offshore wind supply chain (Notteboom, 2016; MacKinnon et al, 2018; 
Financial Times, 2011; BBC News, 2007; 2013; Figure 2.4). However, the Humber Ports’ 
adaptation and diversification and the regional offshore wind was subsequently constrained 
by the UK’s changing offshore wind policy environment, thus creating great uncertainty for 
developers who were consequently delaying orders to turbine component manufacturers 
such as Siemens (Financial Times, 2014; Dawley et al, 2015; MacKinnon et al, 2018).  
 
The changing offshore wind policy environment was driven by the Coalition government 
announcing the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) within its White Paper published in July 
2011, which comprised a shift to a CfD (Contracts for Difference) subsidy arrangement based 
upon a competitive bidding process from 2017 onwards, thus moving away from the ROC 
(Renewable Obligation Certificate) direct subsidy system (DECC, 2011; DECC, 2012; Dawley 
et al, 2015). This shifted the institutional landscape and created a constraining institutional 
environment for offshore wind in the UK, which consequently disrupted investment 
decisions from project developers, manufacturers and port authorities (DECC, 2011; Martin, 
2010; Dawley et al, 2015). The introduction of the EMR created uncertainty by creating a 
transition to the new subsidy arrangement (Assistant Director interview, BEIS; Dawley, 2014; 
Dawley et al, 2015). Furthermore, the coalition government also announced a reduced 
installed capacity estimate from the previous 33GW by 2020 to 8-16GW by 2020 within its 
Offshore Wind Industry Strategy (OWIS), an estimate which could change depending upon a 
range of factors including unknown levels of cost reduction (DBIS; 2013; HM Government, 
2013). This further catalysed and deepened market uncertainty, as developers had unclear 
estimates and no clearly defined installed capacity target for UK offshore wind project 
development (DBIS, 2013). 
 
Despite the growing uncertainty around Siemens’ transplantation into the PoH and ABP’s 
associated investment, O&M activities at the PoG continued and underwent a period of 
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growth, as developers such as Ørsted planned future offshore wind projects which could be 
operated and maintained from the PoG (Financial Times, 2014; BBC News; 2013; Ørsted, 
2019). This period of O&M activity and growth was influenced by the Crown Estate’s 
designation of Round 3 projects from 2010 onwards and the continued awarding of ROC 
subsidies to developers, which created an attractive economic opportunity for developing 
offshore wind projects from UK ports (Dawley, 2014; IRENA, 2012; The Crown Estate, 2017b; 
Wind Europe, 2017a). 
 
6.3.1 Disruption of investment into manufacturing activity: 2011-2013 
 
The UK government’s political and institutional change with the election of a Conservative-
led coalition created a different standpoint on UK offshore wind market support and the 
future estimates regarding the installed capacity of offshore wind turbines, which resulted in 
a constraining institutional environment for the UK offshore wind market and consequently 
disrupted the diversification of the Humber Ports into offshore wind (Dawley et al, 2015; 
DECC, 2012; HM Government, 2013; Martin, 2010; 2000). Essentially, the institutional and 
policy changes disrupted the scale and speed of investment from developers and the 
consequent demand for port sites to support the construction of UK offshore wind projects, 
thus constraining the adaptation and diversification of the Humber Ports into offshore wind 
(Dawley et al, 2015; HM Government, 2013; Notteboom, 2016). The introduction of the EMR 
(Energy Market Reform) and Levy Cost Framework (LCF), alongside changes to the installed 
capacity targets in the OWIS, were the primary driver for influencing Siemens’ uncertainty 
and disrupted their planned investment into the PoH (Dawley et al, 2015; DECC, 2011; DECC, 
2012). This subsequently hindered ABP’s planned investment to support Siemens’ 
transplantation and constrained the Humber Ports’ diversification and the region’s offshore 
wind path development (Martin, 2010; Financial Times, 2014):  
 
“The period between the [Siemens and ABP] MoU and their Final Investment 
Decisions was fraught with policy issues and Siemens were on the point of saying ‘do 
you really want this investment?’” Senior Director, HCC. 
 
Consequently, Siemens began searching for alternative continental port sites to manufacture 
and assemble their nacelle and blade components. This strategy was shaped by Siemens’ 
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concerns around the UK government’s long-term ambition regarding the future targets of 
installed turbines and its long-term commitment to supporting the market through the CfD 
subsidy system (Regional Manager interview, A2SEA; MacKinnon et al, 2018; DECC, 2011; 
2012).  
 
However, Siemens’ major investment delay stimulated firm and non-firm actors to tackle a 
range of policy, planning, consenting and industrial challenges (Project Manager interview, 
former ABP). Responding to and solving these challenges was vital to enable the conversion 
of the Port of Hull’s infrastructural and material assets and capture Siemens’ ‘Final 
Investment Decision’ (FID) (Boas, 2007; Figure 2.4). 
 
Siemens’ investment delay was born out of the UK’s offshore wind policy and market 
settings when Siemens carried out their UK port search in 2009/10 and subsequently signed 
the MoU with ABP and the UK government (The Crown Estate, 2017a; 2017b; Martin, 2010): 
 
“When Siemens made their commitment to Hull through the MoU there was only 
‘Round 1’ allocated and an indication that there would be further rounds to follow 
but no guarantee. Siemens wanted the right level of government support in the long-
term” Commercial Manager, ABP.  
 
ABP, as the private owner and operator of the Humber Ports, required a legal financial 
commitment through a FID (Final Investment Decision) and a commercially viable business 
case from Siemens before they would invest to enable the conversion of port infrastructure 
for Siemens (Former Managing Director interview, former ABP; Brooks, 2004; Figure 2.4). 
This investment rationale is indicative of ABP’s profit-orientated approach of investing into 
infrastructure to support typical cargo handling activities for a short to medium term return 
(Verhoeven, 2010; Brooks, 2004). Despite Siemens’ delay and uncertainty, ABP’s 
commitment to Siemens through the MoU brought about certain obligations to invest 
capital for undertaking planning applications, environmental impact assessments and site 
inspections (Project Manager interview, former ABP; HM Government, 2014a; University of 
Hull, 2018). However, Siemens and ABP were both actively seeking clarity on UK offshore 
wind policy post-2020 regarding installed capacity expectations, the future of CfD auctioning 
rounds and Crown Estate licensing rounds, alongside the long-term strategic commitment of 
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the UK government to the offshore wind industry (Senior Director interview, HCC; DECC, 
2012; DBIS, 2013; The Crown Estate, 2017b; Financial Times, 2014):  
 
“There were some policy issues around the industrial future of offshore wind and 
guarantees about the future of offshore wind deployment. We were trying to build 
that national perspective for Siemens and ABP” (Assistant Director, DBEIS). 
 
The investment delay allowed a coalition of local, regional and national actors to work 
together differently at different points in time to unlock Siemens’ transplantation and ABP’s 
investment, whilst lobbying and negotiating with the UK government to clarify the future 
CfD subsidy rounds and meeting with the Crown Estate to better understand the 
implantation of future licensing rounds (Assistant Director, BEIS; Cox, 1998; Wood, 1999; 
Financial Times, 2014).  
 
ABP, Siemens and Hull City Council also formed a ‘Joint Project Team’ (JPT) to deal with 
project-based industrial, planning, consenting and regulatory challenges constraining the 
Siemens and ABP investments and the conversion of Alexandra Dock for offshore wind 
(University of Hull, 2018; Cox, 1998; Wood, 1999; Boas, 2007). The JPT worked with a range 
of statutory (MMO [Marine Management Organisation], Environment Agency, Highways 
England, Historic England, the Crown Estate and Natural England), and non-statutory (RSPC, 
Yorkshire & Lincolnshire Wildlife Trusts, The Ramblers Association, Trans-Pennine Trail, 
Sustrans, the Local Access Forum) agencies (Project Manager interview, former ABP; 
University of Hull, 2018). The ‘Single Conversation Group’ (SCG) was also formed by the 
Humber LEP to bring together statutory agencies, Hull City Council, East Riding of Yorkshire 
Council and the Humber LEP to ensure “planning and regulatory procedures around the 
Siemens investment were done as speedily as possible”, working in parallel with JPT 
(Assistant Director interview, DBEIS). These two groups were attempting to solve a range of 
project development challenges to enable Siemens’ transplantation and ABP’s investment 
and to support construction activities upon brownfield land (Project Manager interview, 
former ABP). The formation of the JPT by a group of actors working through technical and 
planning issues of the Alexandra Dock and the SCG operating as a strategic group of 
interested parties, demonstrates how a collection of multiscalar firm and non-firm actors 
responded to Siemens’ keen interest as a large inward investor (Cox, 1998, Wood, 1999; 
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University of Hull, 2018). However, this coalition of actors was temporary in their actions, 
had overlapping responsibilities for adapting the Alexandra Dock, operated across two 
distinctive groups, worked on different spatial scales and conducted strategic actions at 
different points in time (Dawley et al, 2019; Phelps & Wood, 2006; Cox, 1998, Wood, 1999). 
 
A major industrial challenge was around constructing the quay wall at the Alexandra Dock on 
brownfield land to support the loading of turbine components onto a new specialised vessel 
owned and operated by ‘A2SEA’, who influenced the construction of the quay, because 
“Siemens asked us [A2SEA] what we needed to allow our vessels to do offloading … so ABP’s 
new quay is based upon our requirements” (Regional Manager, A2SEA).  
 
There were also a number of planning, consenting, regulatory and environmental challenges 
constraining the Alexandra Dock’s conversion which required lengthy public consultations 
supported by the JPT and SCG, resulting in a coastal realignment scheme, public right of way 
diversion, safeguarding of listed buildings and relocation of pre-existing site users (Boas, 
2007; University of Hull, 2018). 
 
“The bureaucracy, legislation, planning and consenting controls and public objections 
made it unbelievably hard to deliver this project and very very hard to deliver it in 
any sort of commercially viable timeframe for Siemens” Project Manager, former 
ABP.  
 
One of the most critical challenges was the approval of a HRO (Harbour Revision Order) to 
allow Alexandra Dock at the PoH to support offshore wind activities. This involved adapting 
the existing HRO for container handling activities for the proposed ‘Quay 2005’ terminal 
(DfT, 2006; University of Hull, 2018). Hull City Council (HCC) acted as an important local actor 
within the coalition of actors through brokering high-level negotiations between ABP, 
Siemens and the UK government (Senior Director interview, HCC; Notteboom, 2016; Cox, 
1998; Wood, 1999). This activity enabled the HRO’s approval by the Secretary of State for 
Transport and HCC ‘Outline Planning Permission’ to build a wind turbine manufacturing 
facility at the Alexandra Dock in May 2012 (DfT, 2006; URS, 2012b; Hull City Council, 2012; 




“We worked closely with the statutory agencies because Alexandra Dock was a listed 
structure… we had to ‘herd the cats’ as it were…we had to work with two Secretaries of 
State and senior officers, we got them onside by saying… ‘we have a huge opportunity with 
Siemens and we want to make sure everything goes well’” Senior Director, HCC.  
 
Furthermore, HCC proactively fast-tracked the conversion of the brownfield Alexandra Dock 
through a ‘Local Development Order’, meaning ABP and Siemens had consent to convert the 
Alexandra Dock in September 2013, which aligned to Siemens’ required timeframe for 
constructing their new manufacturing facility (Executive Director interview, Humber LEP; 
URS, 2012a; 2012b; , University of Hull, 2018):  
 
“I think is amending existing consent as opposed to going through a new 
Development Consent Order process like Able had to for their site, actually won us 
Siemens” Former Managing Director, former ABP. 
 
In addition to HCC, there were also efforts from a coalition of regional and national actors 
who utilised political agency and provided Hull with leverage to capture and finalise the 
Siemens’ transplantation and ABP’s investment (Cox, 1998; Wood, 1999; Financial Times, 
2011). High-ranking individuals within the Humber LEP, the Team Humber Marine Alliance 
(THMA) and MPs who had significant standing and relationships with Ministers and senior 
government officials, lobbied the UK government on behalf of the Humber region’s local 
authorities, Siemens and ABP (Executive Director interview, Humber LEP; University of Hull, 
2018):  
 
“We had times when things looked a bit uncertain and you need to call on superiors 
and having those people with political clout was really helpful when there were 
policy problems” Executive Director, Humber LEP. 
 
The primary purpose of these lobbying activities was to gain clarity over the levels of 
financial support within future CfD auctioning rounds, the Crown Estate licensing rounds and 
the long-term commitment of the UK government to supporting offshore wind projects for 
developers, manufacturers and ports (Executive Director interview, Humber LEP; DECC, 




Clarity around the future of national offshore wind policy and the pipeline of projects for 
developers was crucial for Siemens and ABP, as Siemens required enough component orders 
from developers to justify transplanting into the PoH, whilst ABP required Siemens’ 
investment to commercially justify their investment as a private port authority (Former 
Commercial Officer interview, former ABP; Financial Times, 2014; ; Verhoeven, 2010; Brooks, 
2004):  
 
“It’s all about securing industry confidence to kick-start manufacturing because port 
infrastructure and facilities are pretty expensive and specialised for offshore wind … 
and the answer is central government” Former Managing Director, former ABP.  
 
Political lobbying and high-level discussions between the UK government and the coalition of 
regional and national actors led to the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
indicating in March 2013 that a FIDeR (Final Investment Decision enabling for Renewables) 
Scheme was to award eight renewable energy projects with CfD contracts in May 2014 
(DECC, 2013; 2014b). This FIDeR Scheme gave prospective developers some degree of clarity 
and confidence that the UK government was prepared to support offshore wind investment 
through the new EMR policy framework (Former Commercial Officer interview, former ABP; 
DECC, 2012). Nevertheless, it was not until Spring 2014 that offshore wind developers, 
manufacturers and port authorities knew which renewable energy projects were to be 
awarded CfDs and could obtain a visible pipeline of orders from project developers (DECC, 
2013; 2014b). As such, Siemens’ and ABP’s investment delays triggered great uncertainty in 
the Humber region and nationally. However, it allowed a coalition of local, regional and 
national level actors with overlapping responsibilities and conducting different activities at 
different times to work together strategically and attempt to capture Siemens’ interest to 
transplant (Cox, 1998; Wood, 1999). This enabled the Humber Ports’ diversification and the 
stimulation of a new path regional offshore wind path (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; 
Martin & Sunley, 2006).  
 
6.3.2 Continued investment into Operations and Maintenance (O&M): 2011-2013 
 
Despite the Humber Ports’ adaptation and diversification becoming disrupted through the 
uncertainty of Siemens’ and ABP’s investment delays, operations and maintenance (O&M) 
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activities at the ‘Fish Dock’, Port of Grimsby (PoG) continued without interruption as they 
were less affected by market and investment uncertainty in comparison to manufacturing 
activities (Notteboom, 2016; Financial Times, 2014). The continued growth of O&M activities 
at the PoG was driven by developers such as Ørsted planning and investing into future 
offshore wind projects including ‘Lincs’, ‘Westmost Rough’, ‘Race Bank’ and ‘Hornsea Project 
One’, which could be operated and maintained from the PoG in the future (Ørsted Hornsea 
Project One, 2018; Ørsted, 2019). In addition to the arrival and continued operation of 
Centrica and Siemens’ service team in the PoG, additional developers and O&M operators 
transplanted into the PoG to conduct O&M activities, which would drive forward the 
adaptation and diversification of the Humber Ports into offshore wind (Notteboom, 2016; 
BBC News, 2007; 2013; Centrica, 2012b).  
 
E.ON was the next developer after Centrica to capitalise upon the existing port infrastructure 
at the Fish Dock and approached the GFDE (Grimsby Fish Dock Enterprises) to transplant 
O&M operations in 2012 to serve its ‘Humber Gateway’ project (OffshoreWIND, 2012b). 
E.ON’s transplantation led to a creation of 50 jobs and the construction of new office 
facilities upon brownfield land, thus developing the region’s offshore wind path 
(OffshoreWIND, 2012a; Martin, 2010). As part of securing the E.ON investment and future 
activities, E.ON required the GFDE to construct new pontoon infrastructure and lock gates to 
allow larger O&M vessels to access the Fish Dock (Senior Advisor interview, Ørsted). These 
construction activities were enabled by investment from the GFDE and a £500,000 grant 
from the NELC (North East Lincolnshire Council) through its ‘Change Board programme’ and 
was originally enabled by close discussions between the GFDE, NELC, E.ON and ABP (Senior 
Officer interview, NELC; Fishupdate, 2014). Once again firm and non-firm actors worked 
together strategically to enable E.ON’s transplantation and construct an important 
infrastructural asset in the lock gates to attract future O&M activities (OffshoreWIND, 2012a; 
2012b). The GFDE, NELC and ABP worked in close coordination with interested developers 
such as Centrica and E.ON to stimulate the growth of O&M activities at the PoG. They 
formed part of a broader coalition of firm and non-firm actors on national, regional and local 
scales who were concerned with diversifying the Humber Ports and creating a new regional 





Subsequently, Ørsted (previously named DONG Energy) approached the GFDE in 2013 to 
transplant onto brownfield land in the Fish Dock and construct office facilities to support 
O&M activities for its Westermost Rough project, as “the Fish Dock infrastructure largely 
met our needs for our early offshore wind projects” (Senior Advisor interview, Ørsted; 
Ørsted, 2017). To secure Ørsted’s investment, GFDE constructed a new pontoon and berth 
for Ørsted’s O&M vessels (Senior Director interview, GFDE). The GFDE and the Fish Dock, as 
a key infrastructural asset, also attracted RES and CWind who operate as smaller O&M 
service providers and who invested in 2013 (with CWind later expanding in 2018), thus 
adding to the PoG’s O&M activities and supporting the regional offshore wind path 
(OffshoreWIND, 2013a; Humber Business, 2018a).  
 
As such, the diversification and conversion of port infrastructure at the Fish Dock was 
enabled by the GFDE’s proactive investment strategy to provide suitable port infrastructure, 
centred upon meeting the port demands of developers and having “the ability to get 
European and central government funding through the [North East Lincolnshire] council” 
(Senior Director interview, GFDE; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Boas, 2007). This was shaped 
by GFDE’s governance and ownership model as “a type of cooperative business and 
operating like a consortium effectively”  (officially a Private limited Company), who have 
received around £2.2 million in grants from the EU and UK government and have spent 
approximately £3 million on infrastructure supporting O&M activities (Senior Director 
interview, GFDE; GFDE, 1991a; 1991b). Essentially the range and growth of O&M activities at 
the Fish Dock was shaped by investments from the GFDE and firms, which created a 
considerable demonstration effect and led to ABP later realising that O&M was an important 
port market in supporting offshore wind activity. 
 
6.4 Path realisation: 2013 onwards 
 
The final episode marks a distinctive period of change from the previous episode of 
uncertainty and delay constraining the Humber Ports’ adaptation and diversification and 
hindered the development of a regional offshore wind path (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & 
Notteboom, 2011; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). This episode is organised into two elements. 
The first element is around the transplantation of Siemens into the Port of Hull (PoH) to 
conduct manufacturing and installation activities, and the second element is the continued 
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expansion and private investment from Ørsted into the Royal Dock at the Port of Grimsby 
(PoG) to conduct further O&M activities. Although Siemens and Ørsted were involved in 
different offshore wind activities at different ports on the Humber, they both made strategic 
transplantations and ongoing investments to drive forward the construction of 
infrastructural assets and superstructure upon brownfield land (BBC News, 2013; 2014; 
Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). These flagship investments enabled the Humber Ports to 
diversify on a greater scale in terms of port assets and firm activities supporting the offshore 
wind sector, which fully established a new regional path around offshore wind (Humber 
Business, 2018b; 2018c; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Boas, 2007; Figure 2.4).  
 
6.4.1 Flagship investments into manufacturing activity: 2013 onwards 
 
This element of the episode is around Siemens’ and ABP’s FID (Final Investment Decision) to 
legally commit to investing in a joint venture (BBC News, 2014). These investments enabled 
the PoH (Port of Hull) to become a manufacturing and installation base for offshore wind 
through constructing port assets at the Alexandra Dock and the Paull site on the North bank 
of the River Humber (University of Hull, 2018; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). The legal 
commitments of Siemens and ABP to their joint venture enabled the transplantation of 
Siemens into the PoH and ABP’s provision of investment to construct port infrastructure, 
which catalysed a new regional path around the offshore wind industry (BBC News, 2014; 
Martin, 2010; Boas, 2007).  Siemens’ Final Investment Decision (FID) to provide £160M for its 
joint venture with ABP was largely underpinned by the UK government’s decision for the 
first FIDeR round in 2014 which supported five offshore wind projects and provided a new 
market for Siemens  (NAO, 2014; Martin, 2010; DECC, 2014b):  
 
“DECC gave a high amount of the manufacturing capacity for turbines which was 
supported in the first FIDeR process to Siemens…so Siemens had a solid pipeline 
which meant that they were able to invest into their facilities at Hull” Former 
Commercial Officer, former ABP.  
 
This meant Siemens were the main supplier of turbine components for developers 
constructing the East Anglia ONE and Neart na Gaoithe offshore wind projects, who were the 




A key example of important operational work which facilitated the Siemens investment, was 
when HCC and SCG worked closely with Siemens to drive forward the approval of Siemens’ 
new planning application for turbine manufacturing and installation facilities at the 
Alexandra Dock by September 2014 (Hull City Council, 2014; University of Hull, 2018). This 
allowed Siemens and ABP to commence the tightly scheduled construction activities 
corresponding to demands of developers (Executive Director interview, Humber LEP). 
 
ABP’s FID to provide £150M for its joint venture was influenced by ABP gaining renewed 
confidence in Siemens’ investment interest in the PoH (Former Managing Director, former 
ABP; BBC News, 2014). ABP’s decision was directly shaped by Siemens becoming newly 
confident of demand from developers, who had received CfDs within the first FIDeR round 
(NAO, 2014; DBIS, 2014b; BBC News, 2014):  
 
“The developers gained confidence because of the government’s actions and signed 
with Siemens to buy their components…then Siemens thought ‘we better find a 
suitable port’ and they had a deal with ABP waiting” Former Managing Director, 
former ABP.  
 
To enable ABP’s FID, senior executives within ABP presented a business case to shareholders 
as a reaction to Siemens’ renewed interest, as the FID needed to be commercially viable and 
based upon the medium to long-term activity of Siemens at the Port of Hull (PoH) 
(Commercial Manager interview ABP; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Verhoeven, 2010; 
Brooks, 2004). ABP’s FID to invest £150M marked a distinctive turning point in ABP’s 
corporate decision-making approach as a private port authority, as they made a strategic 
investment guaranteed to make long-term and steady returns and was directly shaped by 
Siemens’ project-based activity within the UK offshore wind industry (Former Commercial 
Officer interview, former ABP; BBC News, 2014; Verhoeven, 2010). The FIDs by ABP and 
Siemens enabled the Humber Ports’ adaptation and diversification by prompting Siemens’ 
transplantation and the construction of infrastructure and superstructure at the PoH to 
support offshore wind activities, thus supporting the regional path around the offshore wind 




ABP began constructing infrastructure at the Alexandra Dock in November 2014 to enable 
Siemens’ transplantation of its nacelle manufacturing and assembly operations (BBC News, 
2014). However, in the same month Siemens decided against its strategy of manufacturing 
nacelles at the Alexandra Dock and turbine blades at the Paull site, shifting its 
transplantation and investment strategy to manufacture blades at the Alexandra Dock and 
moving the manufacturing and assembly of nacelles to the Port of Cuxhaven (University of 
Hull, 2018; ; Siemens, 2016b). Siemens decided to shift their production of nacelles to the 
Port of Cuxhaven because they could access and build a co-located supply chain on a large 
quayside area whilst having area for expansion (Commercial Manager interview, ABP; 
Siemens Gamesa, 2017; Humber Business 2018c):  
 
“In order to make a project operate successfully for offshore wind you need to be 
able to be quayside based for almost all of your activity to reduce land and marine 
logistics costs” Project Manager, former ABP. 
 
Siemens’ motive to change its UK investment strategy corresponded to their inability to co-
locate suppliers on the Alexandra Dock or Paull site and their inability to move large turbine 
blades between the Paull site and the Alexandra Dock due to unsuitable road infrastructure 
(Former Commercial Officer, former ABP; University of Hull, 2018; BVG Associates, 2017). 
Both ABP and Siemens were reluctant to invest an extra £20M to plan, consent and 
construct new road and port infrastructure to connect the Alexandra Dock to the Paull site, 
leading to questions over who would pay for the extra costs (University of Hull, 2018; BVG 
Associates, 2017).  
 
Substantial efforts were again spearheaded by Hull City Council (HCC) to adjust planning 
consent for Siemens’ new blade manufacturing and pre-assembly facility at the Alexandra 
Dock, as a result of Siemens’ altering their manufacturing and investment strategy to 
construct their planned nacelle manufacturing facility to the Port of Cuxhaven (Senior 







“From November 2014 to June 2015 there was no planning consent when the 
Siemens factory was under construction. Some local authorities might have said ‘we 
need to stop until we get permission’. That flexible can-do approach was important” 
Senior Director, HCC. 
 
Key individuals and highly skilled project managers at ABP in Hull responded to Siemens’ 
new port demands by designating a new operational layout to increase blade production 
from 450 to 600 per year, whilst managing a strict completion deadline of January 2017 
(Project Manager interview, former ABP; Siemens, 2016a). These efforts on the operational 
scale by HCC and ABP, as part of a broader coalition of firm and non-firm actors, lubricated 
and facilitated the construction of port infrastructure and superstructure at the Alexandra 
Dock for Siemens’ blade manufacturing and pre-assembly facility (Notteboom, 2016; Cox, 
1998; Wood, 1999). 
 
Following the relocation of existing customers and an extensive series of construction 
activities, Siemens’ blade manufacturing and pre-assembly facility in the PoH began 
operations in September 2016 and the production of blades began December 2016, with the 
first installation vessels departing in early January 2017 (Project Manager interview, former 
ABP; Siemens, 2016a; University of Hull, 2018). Siemens’ transplantation into the PoH and 
ABP’s investment underpinned the diversification and conversion of the PoH’s infrastructural 
and material assets on brownfield port land, thus catalysing the Humber Ports’ adaptation 
and diversification into offshore wind and greatly enhanced the regional path around the 
offshore wind industry (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999; Boas, 2007; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). Siemens created a manufacturing plant for 
producing lower value blades with fewer supply chain linkages but with a greater labour 
intensity in the Humber, instead of producing higher value and specialised nacelles with 
high-skilled engineers (Siemens Gamesa, 2017; Dawley et al, 2019). This meant that the 
Humber’s industrial path was less advanced in terms of manufacturing activities in 
comparison to the path revealed in the PoC case, which ultimately downgraded the PoH 
within Siemens’ global production network (Siemens Gamesa, 2017; Coe & Yeung, 2015; 





6.4.2 Ongoing Ørsted investment and expansion: 2013 onwards 
 
The second element of the final episode is around Ørsted’s investments from 2013 onwards 
to expand its operations within the Port of Grimsby (PoG) and construct infrastructure at the 
Royal Dock to support new O&M activities, which enabled the Humber Ports’ diversification 
and further developed the regional path around the offshore wind industry (Ørsted, 2017; 
Martin, 2010). The UK government created an attractive market environment for Ørsted and 
stimulated their investment into originally deciding to develop their ‘Westmost Rough’ 
offshore wind project (Martin, 2010; Ørsted, 2017). This was done through the UK 
government awarding Ørsted financial support through a ROC and the Crown Estate 
awarding Ørsted consent to develop the Westermost Rough site in November 2011 (Senior 
Advisor interview, Ørsted; Martin, 2010; Ofgem, 2016; Ørsted, 2017).  
 
Ørsted’s £11.5M investment to construct infrastructure and superstructure on brownfield 
land at the Royal Dock was influenced by its necessity to support the long-term O&M of its 
Westermost Rough project, which was planned to be fully commissioned and operational by 
2015 (Senior Advisor interview, Ørsted; Ørsted, 2017):  
 
“The key driver for DONG [Ørsted] investing and moving into the Royal Dock was its 
existing infrastructure and they also needed a bigger lock for any bigger vessels in the 
future” Senior Officer, NELC.   
 
Ørsted’s investment was supported by a £1.1M grant from the UK government’s ‘Growing 
the Humber’ Regional Growth Fund (RGF), administered by the Humber Local Enterprise 
Partnership (LEP) and NELC (OffshoreWIND, 2013b; Ørsted, 2017). Although this 
engagement and close coordination between these local, regional and national government 
actors supported Ørsted’s investment through awarding the RGF grant, Ørsted’s decision to 
invest was primarily driven by the pre-existing infrastructural and material assets at the 
Royal Dock (Executive Director interview, Humber LEP; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Ørsted, 
2017). These assets included assessible quayside infrastructure, a larger lock than the Fish 
Dock’s lock to handle SOVs (Service Offshore Vessels) in the future, availability of quayside 
space for expansion and close proximity to the ‘Westermost Rough’ offshore wind project to 
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enable short steaming time (Executive Director interview, Humber LEP; Senior Advisor 
interview, Ørsted; Ørsted, 2017).  
 
Offshore wind developers such as Ørsted have greater power than component 
manufacturers to demand port sites such as the PoG, as developers control how, where and 
when the installation, operation and maintenance of their offshore wind projects from a 
particular port location (Senior Advisor interview, Ørsted). This provided ABP in Grimsby and 
the North East Lincolnshire Council (NELC) with greater leverage than Hull City Council (HCC) 
and East Riding of Yorkshire Council to secure new and renewed inward investment for 
O&M, as project developers favoured the PoG over the PoH for conducting O&M activities 
because of the appropriate infrastructural asset base and had previously demonstrated the 
suitability of the PoG for supporting O&M (Senior Officer, NELC; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). 
The different levels of power and influence of local authorities in the Humber shaped their 
ability to capture inward investment, whilst operating within a broader coalition of actors 
concerned with the development and diversification of the Humber Ports into offshore wind 
(Cox, 1998; Wood, 1999; Notteboom, 2016). 
 
Ørsted’s investment was supported by ABP providing a £5M investment to convert lock 
gates at the Royal Dock, thus enabling Ørsted’s O&M vessels to assess the lock for almost 24 
hours rather than being tidally restricted (ABP, 2014; Boas, 2007):  
 
“ABP are a very commercial and profit orientated organisation…they wouldn’t have 
minded investing in the new lock gates if they knew they were getting future 
business from us [Ørsted] as a result” Senior Advisor, Ørsted.   
 
ABP’s investment into the lock gate infrastructure was also catalysed by ABP observing 
GFDE’s (Grimsby Fish Dock Enterprises) business activity of receiving long-term rent 
contracts and reliable dues from O&M operators in the Fish Dock, which prompted ABP to 
react and capitalise upon Ørsted’s interest to expand (Senior Director interview, GFDE; ABP, 
2014; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). Ørsted’s O&M activities provide a steadily growing and 
reliable source of income for ABP, who identified O&M as a long-term port activity and 
therefore viewed their relatively minor £5M investment as commercially viable and very low 
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risk (Policy Advisor 3 interview, DfT; ABP, 2014; Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & van de Voorde, 
1998).  
 
Ørsted’s longstanding future commitments to the UK offshore wind industry was shaped by 
the DECC’s FIDeR round in 2014, which awarded Ørsted a CfD for its ‘Hornsea Project One’ 
offshore wind farm (DECC, 2014a; Ørsted Hornsea Project One, 2018). In addition, the 
DECC’s FIDeR first CfD allocation round awarded Ørsted a CfD for its ‘Hornsea Project Two’ 
offshore wind farm (BEIS, 2017b). The allocation of CfD subsidies to two of Ørsted’s major 
offshore wind projects catalysed Ørsted’s investments to create a larger O&M ‘Hub’ to 
support its UK offshore wind project from 2016 onwards (Senior Advisor interview, Ørsted; 
DECC, 2013; 2014a; DBEIS, 2017c; Humber Business, 2016):  
 
“I don’t think DONG (now Ørsted) would have come to the Humber without the CfDs. 
It wasn’t commercially viable without them and it still isn’t” Technical Director, WSP.  
 
Ørsted’s O&M Hub required the construction of infrastructure and superstructure at the 
Royal Dock, including the removal of a coal jetty to enable the installation of larger 
pontoons, refurbishment of an existing warehouse and construction of additional office 
buildings and crew facilities (Senior Advisor interview, Ørsted; Humber Business, 2018b). 
These construction activities were vital for Ørsted’s future expansion in the UK offshore wind 
industry and the operation and maintenance of its Race Bank, Hornsea Project One and 
Hornsea Project Two offshore wind farms using larger SOVs (Service Offshore Vessels) 
(Senior Advisor interview, Ørsted).  
 
Ørsted’s grander investment commitment and construction activities was also enabled by 
ABP leasing additional quayside space to Ørsted and ABP’s previous investment to construct 
lock gates for Ørsted (ABP, 2014; Humber Business, 2017b): 
 
“DONG (Ørsted) went to various port authorities and said ‘if you make an investment 
and changed the infrastructure for us we would certainly consider making a firm 
arrangement’…rather than just ABP speculatively making a decision and hoping they 




These decisions and investments reflect ABP’s profit-oriented motive of leasing quayside 
land on a long-term basis to secure returns for its shareholders via O&M activities 
(Verhoeven, 2010; Baird & Valentine, 2007). O&M activities provided a dependable source 
of revenue for ABP, as the lifetime of a current wind turbine is around 25 years (Regional 
Manager interview, A2SEA). Investments made by Ørsted and ABP enabled the Humber 
Ports to adapt and diversify into offshore wind through supporting new O&M activities at 
the Port of Grimsby (PoG), further developing the regional path around offshore wind 
through new job creation and stimulating regional supply chain growth (Notteboom, 2016; 




This empirical chapter discussed the different phases of the Humber Ports’ adaptation and 
diversification into offshore wind through three distinctive episodes. The episodes highlight 
two tracks of the Humber region’s offshore wind path trajectory and reflect two different 
forms of port adaptation and diversification into offshore wind: offshore wind 
manufacturing and installation activities at the Port of Hull (PoH) and offshore wind O&M 
activities at the Port of Grimsby (PoG). This chapter can form some important conclusions 
explaining the Humber Ports’ adaptation and diversification in relation to the thesis’ 
research questions regarding the diversification of port assets, dynamics of port governance 
and ownership, and enabling and/or constraining multiscalar institutional environments. 
 
Firstly, the role of the government has been significant in shaping the national offshore wind 
market environment for ABP, the GFDE and firms to make investments into infrastructural 
and material assets to support manufacturing, installation and O&M activities (GWEC, 2016; 
Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). These investments shaped the shifts between the key episodes 
of the Humber Ports’ adaptation and diversification into offshore wind (Notteboom, 2016). 
By providing a renewable energy market support initially through ROCs and later CfDs, the 
UK government provided a level of investment certainty which catalysed interest from 
offshore wind developers (Centrica, E.ON, Ørsted) to invest into the UK offshore wind 
market and subsequently transplant operations into the PoG to conduct O&M activities 
(DECC, 2014; 2015b). Equally, the UK government drove a period of uncertainty through 
introducing the EMR, which reduced the installation capacity estimates from 33GW by 2020 
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to 8-16GW by 2020 and created a lack of clarity regarding levels of market support via CfDs 
beyond 2020 for offshore wind (DECC, 2011; 2012). The decisions and policies of the 
government created a constraining institutional environment for project developers, 
manufacturers and port authorities who were seeking to invest into offshore wind, which 
disrupted the diversification of the Humber Ports into offshore wind (Martin, 2010; Dawley 
et al, 2015). Fortunately for developers, component manufacturers and the Humber Ports, 
the UK government created a renewed sense of market clarity through the first FIDeR (Final 
Investment Decision Enabling Renewables) round for CfD support in 2014 (DECC, 2014; 
2015b). This influenced and catalysed the ABP and Siemens joint venture investment which 
enabled the conversion of the Alexandra Dock at the PoH and stimulated continued 
investment from Ørsted into the Royal Dock at the PoG (Siemens, 2016a; Dawley et al, 2019; 
Humber Business, 2016). These larger investments greatly enhanced and embedded the 
offshore wind path in the Humber by financing the large scale construction of the Humber 
Ports’ asset base, whilst creating new employment and regional supply chain opportunities. 
 
Secondly, there was a distinctive lack of a strategic port ‘Master Plan’ and long-term vision 
from ABP, regional government agencies and local authorities for the Humber Ports’ long-
term development. This meant that ABP weren’t enabled by a port ‘Master Plan’, allowing it 
to become more ‘reactive’ and responsive to emerging market opportunities and make 
‘opportunistic’ investments, as opposed to operating as a more ‘proactive’ and strategic port 
authority through planning to support offshore wind in the long-term future (Monios & 
Wilmsmeier, 2016). Senior executives and officers at ABP in Hull had sought to strategically 
shift ABP’s investment approach to diversify the PoH’s market portfolio and asset base to 
capture opportunities in offshore wind (University of Hull, 2018). This was originally 
stimulated by HCC’s drive for creating new economic opportunities for Hull and Siemens’ 
search for a UK port base. Furthermore, the decline of fishing activities at the PoG and an 
investment approach made by Centrica, prompted the GFDE (Grimsby Fish Dock Enterprises) 
to diversify the PoG’s market portfolio and asset base into supporting small-scale O&M 
activities (BBC News, 2007; 2013). A coalition of firm and non-firm actors, often with 
overlapping responsibilities, worked together temporarily to successfully capture 
investments from Siemens and Ørsted, whilst addressing various operational, strategic and 




However, the lack of a port ‘Master Plan’ and strategic long-term vision meant the Humber 
Ports took a ‘reactive’ investment approach and responded to opportunities emerging in the 
offshore wind market (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Notteboom, 2016). This allowed the 
Humber Ports to be opportunistic, flexible and swift to respond to emerging investment 
opportunities in the UK offshore wind market, despite having a lack of vision, a 
fragmentation of port sites and little up-front financial commitments to attract investment 
from offshore wind firms (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Dawley et al, 2019). Essentially the 
port adaptation and process in the Humber Ports case was firm-led, in comparison to a more 
port-led adaptation and diversification process in the PoC case, meaning the ‘reactive’ 
approach was most suitable for the Humber Ports to capture inward investment and 
enabling these evolutionary processes (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Notteboom, 2016). 
 
Thirdly, Siemens and Ørsted were the two main offshore wind firms catalysing the Humber 
Ports’ adaptation and diversification and shaping the region’s offshore wind path trajectory 
(Siemens, 2016; Humber Business, 2016). In essence, Siemens and Ørsted invested into the 
Humber Ports because of their geographical position to support Siemens and Ørsted within 
their North Sea offshore wind production networks, whilst being in close proximity to 
planned offshore wind projects in the North Sea with short steaming times for installation 
and service vessels. 
 
The government was the source of investment uncertainty when it introduced the EMR 
(Electricity Market Reform) framework, which underpinned Siemens’ uncertainty and 
catalysed investment delays from Siemens and subsequently ABP (DECC, 2011; 2012; 
Financial Times, 2014). Despite the initial drive from Siemens to transplant into the PoH, 
Siemens’ lack of certainty over supporting offshore wind activities disrupted ABP’s interest 
and commitment to investing into the PoH following the MoU (Financial Times, 2014). 
Moreover, this lack of certainty from ABP was influenced by their investment policy of 
confirming a legal FID (Final Investment Decision) through a joint venture with an investor 
before making a large-scale investment for the conversion of port infrastructure, in order to 
forecast potential returns for its shareholders. However, ABP provided investment for 
converting lock gates at the PoG and catalysed Ørsted’s investment into the Royal Dock 
without a FID from Ørsted, although this was a considerably less sum and was an important 
addition to ABP’s infrastructural asset base anyway (ABP, 2014). Therefore, this investment 
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posed less risk to ABP’s shareholders compared to ABP’s larger investment for its joint 































Chapter 7 Comparative analysis of port diversification and path creation: 




The preceding empirical analysis chapters discussed how the processes of port adaptation, 
diversification and path creation unfolded in each case study. This chapter moves things on 
still further by developing a comparative analysis, cutting across cases and using the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter 2. The chapter’s analytical framework helps draw 
out the important contrasts between national institutional and market environments, port 
visions and strategies, infrastructural and material asset bases, port governance models and 
investment approaches, corporate strategies of offshore wind firms and inward investment, 
and regional path outcomes.  
 
7.2 National institutional environments 
 
The empirical analysis added a deeper understanding of how the multiscalar institutional 
environment influences and shapes the adaptation and diversification process, as argued for 
by Hassink et al (2019), Trippl (2019), Dawley et al (2019), MacKinnon et al (2018), Martin 
(2010) and others in EEG. As part of which, the empirical analysis uncovered that the levels 
of “alignment” of strategic ambitions and visions of key actors (port authorities, sub-national 
government agencies and offshore wind firms) to the national institutional and market 
environments were crucial for enabling the port adaptation process (MacKinnon et al, 2018, 
pp27; Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016; Figure 2.4).  
 
The evolution of the UK and German market subsidy regimes for offshore wind was an 
important factor in enabling and constraining the path creation process within both port 
cases, as the shifting institutional environment and market subsidy regimes influenced how, 
why and when the Port of Cuxhaven (PoC) and the Humber Ports diversified into offshore 
wind (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Wind Europe, 2017a; 2017b). The most important 
changes in the national institutional environments for market creation and industrial 
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Table 7.1: Main institutional environment changes 
Source: Author’s own research 
 
Germany experienced a more progressive and stable institutional and market environment 
for offshore wind in comparison to the UK, which endured more significant political change 
and greater fluctuation in market regimes, despite the UK developing offshore wind projects 
at a much earlier stage in the early 2000s (BMWi, 2015; GWEC, 2016; IRENA, 2012). Due to a 
stronger alignment between offshore wind industrial and market policy in Germany in 
comparison to the UK, Germany’s Federal government could better enable port adaptation 
by creating a stable environment for sub-national government agencies, port authorities and 
firms to provide investment and capitalise upon market opportunities (BMWi, 2015; IRENA, 
2012; MacKinnon et al, 2018). 
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Overall, the contrasting national market and industrial policy environments both enabled 
and constrained the port adaptation process and the path trajectories of the Humber Ports 
and the PoC, by enabling and constraining investment from project developers, 
manufacturers and port authorities (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 2011; Martin, 
2010). The evidence highlighted that changes in the UK and German institutional 
environments and offshore wind markets drove disinvestment and operational uncertainty, 
as they became misaligned to the future industry expectations of project developers and 
manufacturers, which constrained the path creation process in similar ways across the port 
cases (MacKinnon et al, 2018; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Dawley et al, 2015). Similar 
episodes of investment uncertainty were evident in each case for key actors (port 
authorities, sub-national government agencies and firms), as the German and UK 
governments shifted the institutional environment by altering the market subsidy regimes 
and industrial policies for offshore wind (DECC, 2011; 2012; BMWi, 2015; Martin, 2010; 
Figure 2.4).  
 
When the UK market environment changed in the early 2010s there were only small-scale 
O&M activities occurring at the Port of Grimsby (PoG), supporting the long-term operation 
of UK offshore wind projects (BBC News, 2007; 2013; OffshoreWIND, 2012a; 2013a). In 
contrast, there was already largescale manufacturing and O&M support presence in the PoC, 
which created more exposure to market uncertainty, given the sensitivity of manufacturing 
activities to sustained flow of orders, investment and contracts from project developers 
(Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 2007; 2009b; Wind Power Monthly, 2011). Three firms 
consequently disinvested from the PoC as a result of changes in the institutional and market 
environment (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). Therefore, as the PoC had a larger scale of existing 
manufacturing activities than the Humber Ports, a greater number of high value 
manufacturing activities, high skilled engineering jobs, potential future reinvestment 
prospects and supply chain opportunities were lost in the PoC case in comparison to the 
Humber Ports case (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c; Financial Times, 2014). As a result of its 
existing manufacturing function at this point in time, the path creation process in the PoC 
case was more vulnerable to changes in the institutional environment in comparison to the 
Humber Ports case, whilst only planned investments were disrupted within the Humber 




Similar episodes of path revival and realisation emerged from the episodes of uncertainty 
within both port cases, as port authorities, sub-national government agencies, external 
offshore wind firms and national governments realigned to support the port adaptation 
process (MacKinnon et al, 2018; Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010). However, the diversification 
and path creation processes were renewed in a similar way from 2014 onwards through 
large scale investment, as enabling institutional environments consisting of more stable 
market subsidy regimes, ambitious installed capacity targets and planned offshore wind 
projects became strongly related to firm demand and the diversification strategies of port 
authorities and sub-national government agencies (Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016; BMWi, 
2014; DECC, 2014a; 2014b). This shaped the regional path outcomes in comparable ways, as 
both port cases experienced increased levels of overall employment within offshore wind 
activities, new firm transplantations and future investment commitments from existing firms 
(AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; University of Hull, 2018; Siemens, 2016a; 2016b; Siemens Gamesa, 
2017). Therefore, the port adaptation process is highly mediated by how firms, port 
authorities and sub-national government agencies manage existing investment plans in 
response to shifting national institutional and market environments for offshore wind 
(MacKinnon et al, 2018; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010).  
 
By taking a long-term research horizon, the comparative analysis has revealed the evolution 
of multiscalar institutional environments. Hassink et al (2019, pp5) argue that scholars in EEG 
should aim for a better understanding of how key firm and non-firm actors navigate 
fluctuating multiscalar institutional environments “to create favourable conditions for new 
growth paths” (Trippl, 2019; MacKinnon et al, 2018; Dawley et al, 2019). The research 
contributes towards this by demonstrating that multiscalar institutional environments and 
arrangements best enable port diversification and positive path outcomes around offshore 
wind when they are stable and provide long-term confidence for key port actors (Martin, 
2010; Hassink et al, 2019; Wind Europe. 2017a). This enables key port actors (port 
authorities, sub-national agencies and firms) to strategically plan and make proactive 
investments based upon future market opportunities, supported by clearly defined national 
policy frameworks and subsidy regimes (Figure 2.4; Dawley et al, 2019). 
 
In relation to the national institutional environment, the changes in port governance 
arrangements and investment were differentiated by contrasting ‘varieties of capitalism’ in 
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the UK and Germany, as outlined by Hall and Soskice (2001) (Debrie et al, 2013; Notteboom 
et al, 2013). The UK operates as a LME (Liberal Market Economy) as a distinctive form of 
capitalism, with policies often made in a top-down manner from centralised government 
bodies and features investment from privately owned port authorities (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Monios, 2017; Notteboom, 2016). On the other hand, there is a more decentralised form of 
economic governance in Germany with a bottom-up policy making approach and functions 
as a CME (Coordinated Market Economy), meaning it has financial, institutional and policy 
support for publically-owned port authorities and government agencies on regional and local 
scales (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Monios, 2017; Notteboom, 2016). However, this dualistic 
framework of CMEs and LMEs has been critiqued by Ćetković et al (2016, pp4) who draw on 
the work by Vivian Schmidt (2005, 2012), wherein they argue that the institutional 
arrangements of CMEs and LMEs can be further conceptualised as being ‘simple’, when the 
“state structure is centralized and governing is concentrated in a single authority”, or 
‘compound’, when states “feature multiple authorities.” Ćetković et al (2016, pp5) 
conceptualise that Germany is a ‘compound CME’, operating as a state with high 
coordination and relations between “state-industry-labour-science”, supported by multiple 
levels of government (Schmidt, 2005; 2012; Hall & Soskice, 2001). The port adaptation 
process in the PoC case was different to the Humber Ports case as Germany functions as a 
compound CME, therefore it has higher levels of strategic coordination between sub-
national levels of government and publically owned ports such as the PoC, alongside a 
greater decentralisation of power and resources to sub-national government agencies 
(Ćetković et al, 2016; BMVI, 2016; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). By 
drawing upon work by Rodriguez – Pose and Gill (2003, pp335) we can clearly understand 
that the PoC case had a greater “decentralisation of resources, authority and responsibility” 
to make key investment decisions and control the port diversification process, alongside a 
stronger “legitimacy” of sub-national government agencies to provide large grants and 
support port diversification, in comparison to the Humber Ports case (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 
2018c; Martin, 2010).   
 
The governance arrangements of ports strongly influenced the investment strategies 
adopted by port authorities and sub-national government agencies (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 
2016; Verhoeven, 2010). The empirical analysis uncovered the investment strategies of port 
authorities and sub-national government agencies was a key differentiating factor, in which 
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‘proactive’ investments were made in the PoC case, in contrast to ‘reactive’ investments 
made in the Humber Ports case (Monios, 2017; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). These 
investment strategies were influenced by contrasting varieties of capitalism in the UK and 
Germany and their distinctive institutional environments (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Martin, 
2010; Figure 2.4). For example, the reactive investment strategy adopted by ABP in the 
Humber Ports case reflects typical corporate investment in the UK as a simple LME and the 
Anglo-Saxon port governance model, as privately-owned ports characteristically invest to 
make returns for shareholders in a flexible and opportunistic manner (Monios, 2017; 
Verhoeven, 2010; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Ćetković et a, 2016). This investment strategy 
enabled ABP to react efficiently to the interest shown by Siemens and Ørsted in the Humber 
Ports as part of a growing UK offshore wind market, which catalysed the port adaptation 
process (Notteboom, 2016; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). By contrast, the proactive 
investment strategy adopted by Niedersachsen Ports in the PoC case reflects the typical 
investment priorities of publically-owned bodies in Germany as a CME, whereby return on 
investment is not a priority and can make riskier investments to support new industrial 
growth and create new employment opportunities (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Monios & 
Wilmsmeier, 2016; Verhoeven, 2010). However, this proactive investment strategy meant 
the PoC was more exposed to changes in the institutional environment for offshore wind in 
2013, which resulted in a more constrained port adaptation process in this period in 
comparison to the Humber Ports (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Notteboom, 2016; BMWi, 
2015).  
 
As such, Germany’s national variety of capitalism as a compound CME reflects and is 
reflected by the characteristics of the Hanseatic governance model in the PoC case (Ćetković 
et al, 2016; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010). This is evident in the 
decision of sub-national state actors to not prioritise returns on infrastructure investment, 
who worked in close coordination with Niedersachsen Ports to ultimately create new jobs, 
attract inward investment and grow the offshore wind supply chain (AfW Cuxhaven, 
2017).On the other hand, the UK’s national variety of capitalism as a simple LME reflects and 
is reflected by the typical features of an Anglo-Saxon governance model in the Humber Ports 
case (Ćetković et al, 2016; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010). This was 
underlined by ABP’s uncertainty around making large scale infrastructure investments which 
required shareholder approval, highlighting the demand for private port authorities to 
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ensure returns on investment (Monios, 2017; Verhoeven, 2010). Based upon the 
comparative analysis and national institutional contexts, Table 7.2 includes the ideal 
characteristics of Anglo-Saxon and Hanseatic port governance models:  
 
Anglo-Saxon governance model Hanseatic governance model 
Operating within simple LMEs Operating within compound CMEs 
Private port ownership and governance Public port ownership and governance 
Reactive infrastructure investments Proactive infrastructure investments 
Opportunistic and flexible investment 
strategies 
Long-term and strategic port visions 
Prioritising shareholder returns Prioritising local stakeholder benefits and 
job creation 
Conservative investment risk-taking  Progressive investment risk-taking 
Project-based engagement with sub-
national actors 
Continuous partnership building with sub-
national actors 
Table 7.2 Characteristics of Anglo-Saxon and Hanseatic port governance models 
 
National offshore wind markets and certainty around market subsidies mediate the port 
adaptation, diversification and path creation processes, by directly influencing periods of 
inward investment and investment disruption (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). 
Monios and Wilmsmeier (2017) and Notteboom (2016) suggest that strategic plans and 
investment for port diversification are heavily shaped and constrained by fluctuating 
national and international market environments (Jacobs & Lagendijk, 2014; Martin, 2010). 
The comparative analysis directly reflects these arguments, as strategic plans and 
investments in both cases were enabled and constrained by broader institutional 
environments and signals in the UK and German offshore wind markets (Martin, 2010; 
Dawley et al, 2015). 
 
7.3 Port governance models: proactive versus reactive investment strategies 
 
Port ownership and governance structures shape how and why port authorities and/or sub-
national government agencies invest to diversify port infrastructure and market portfolios 
(Notteboom, 2016; Monios, 2017; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Figure 2.4). The PoC’s 
diversification into offshore wind was largely enabled by ‘proactive’ investments into port 
infrastructure, which were strategically coordinated by sub-national public actors, in order 
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to catalyse future inward investments (Martin, 2010; Steen & Hansen, 2018; Monios & 
Wilmsmeier, 2016). Essentially, as the PoC adopts a Hanseatic port governance model of 
public ownership and operation, the port authority and sub-national government agencies 
prioritised creating a new long-term future for the PoC and catalyse new employment and 
supply chain opportunities, by making ‘proactive’ infrastructure investments using public 
resources  (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Niedersachsen, 2003; Monios 
& Wilmsmeier, 2016). This aim reflects how some publically owned port authorities can 
invest into port infrastructure to generate “catalytic effects, such as attracting businesses, 
creating jobs and income within the area of the port”, as argued by Musso et al (2006, 
pp172). In contrast, the Humber Ports adopt an Anglo-Saxon port governance model and are 
privately owned, operated and controlled by ABP (Associated British Ports), which organises 
its economic activities and corporate strategies in response to fluctuating port markets, as it 
operates within the UK’s LME (Liberal Market Economy) (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van 
de Voorde, 1998; ABP, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Hall & Soskice, 2001). This meant that the 
Humber Ports only invested into supporting new offshore activities if they could generate 
short-term returns for shareholders, reflecting the private port ownership arrangement of 
ABP (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Verhoeven, 2010). Key individuals at ABP reacted to 
emerging offshore wind market prospects in an opportunistic manner and waited for legal 
investment commitments from external firms before investing into relevant port 
infrastructure (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Verhoeven, 2010; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b). 
This kind of reactive and opportunistic investment approach by ABP reflects the competitive 
nature and profit-driven characteristics of the UK’s private port sector and LME, which 
strongly influences ABP’s investment approach of monitoring and seeking new opportunities 
in approaches made by external firms in the port marketplace (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Monios, 
2017). The reactive investment approach meant the Humber Ports diversification and 
offshore wind path was constrained due to ABP’s dependency upon opportunities in the 
offshore wind market being available (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010).  
 
In contrast to the UK’s highly centralised system of port policy, the decentralisation of 
decision-making power, financial resources and responsibilities for port policy to the state 
level in Germany’s federal governance system, enabled Niedersachsen Ports to adopt a 
Hanseatic port governance model of public ownership and operation and make proactive 
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investments into infrastructure using public resources (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). The devolution of power and resources has 
enabled sub-national actors to collectively mobilise to subsequently catalyse port 
diversification (Martin, 2010; Pike & Tomaney, 2009; Simmie, 2012). The port governance 
context and multiscalar institutional environment meant the PoC’s adaptation and 
diversification process was continually supported over time through a series of proactive and 
planned infrastructure investments, which ultimately captured more inward investments in 
comparison to the Humber Ports (Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 
2016). The provision of infrastructure before or in parallel with firms actively seeking port 
bases can stimulate multiple inward investments over time, as revealed in the PoC case 
(Wind Europe. 2017a; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). This investment approach is most associated 
with the Hanseatic governance model and public ownership by a sub-national government 
body, whereby ports can better access public financing and support (Suykens & Van de 
Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b).  
 
In contrast, the Humber Ports’ reactive investment strategy to diversify is more risk averse 
because ABP only invests into new market activities if it can predict short-term returns 
(Notteboom, 2016; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Martin, 2010). This finding reflects Talley 
(2007, pp502) who argues that “if the port is privately owned” its economic objective is to 
“maximise profits to a minimum profit constraint”. By contrast, the sub-national, non-firm 
(public) actors in the PoC case viewed investment into port infrastructure as necessary for 
generating new regional economic growth, job creation and supply chain opportunities (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010). This finding is 
supported by the OECD (2009, pp114) who highlighted that publically owned port 
authorities “do not aim for profit maximisation but have other objectives, such as 
contributing to overall economic development”, an argument which is strongly supported by 
Brooks and Cullinane (2007b). As such, the proactive investments by sub-national 
government agencies and the port authority enabled a greater number of firm 
transplantations, higher levels of state-led and inward investment, a larger physical 
expansion of port infrastructure and a higher number of offshore wind jobs in the PoC 
compared to the Humber Ports (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c; 
ABP, 2019a; 2019b). Therefore, as a result of the proactive investments into port 
infrastructure the adaptation and diversification processes were better enabled in the PoC 
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case compared to the Humber Ports case (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Notteboom, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the investment approach adopted by ABP in the Humber Ports case allowed 
the Humber Ports to react quickly in response to interest shown by offshore wind firms and 
project developers, which did enable port adaptation and diversification into offshore wind 
(Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Monios, 2017; Notteboom, 2016).  
 
To enable the more effective path creation process and more developed offshore wind path 
in comparison to the Humber Ports case, the PoC altered its governance structure in 2005 
and brought in experts from engineering and energy backgrounds to focus upon proactively 
investing and constructing new infrastructure to attract firms, which enabled its strategic 
diversification (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Debrie et al, 2013; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
Niedersachsen Ports, 2009). The empirical analysis revealed that new individuals from the 
ports and offshore energy sector were given executive power by Niedersachsen Ports for 
making “long-term decisions” to enable the long-term diversification of the PoC into 
offshore wind, ultimately enabling them to strategically plan, govern quayside land, invest 
and design new port infrastructure projects to capture offshore wind firms (Debrie et al, 
2013, pp61). Without this shift and reform in governance, the PoC may not have diversified 
into offshore wind at this moment in time to establish a new regional offshore wind path 
(Debrie et al, 2013; Niedersachsen Ports, 2009; Martin, 2010).  
 
By contrast, the Humber Ports managed to capture firm investments into manufacturing and 
O&M activities without ABP changing its governance arrangements in the Humber 
(Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Dawley et al, 2019; BBC News, 2013). The Humber Ports’ 
diversification into offshore wind was primarily influenced by key executives at ABP and the 
GFDE (Grimsby Fish Dock Enterprises) as part of a ‘reactive’ investment to support offshore 
wind activities (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; University of Hull, 2018; BBC News, 2007; 
2013). Despite these contrasting ownership and governance settings, the key actors in both 
cases managed to diversify into offshore wind and create new offshore wind paths (Debrie 
et al, 2013; Notteboom, et al, 2013; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). However, the diversification 
and path creation process occurred through contrasting approaches, with a more effective 
proactive and strategic investment approach in the PoC case in comparison to the reactive 
and opportunistic investment approach in the Humber Ports case (Notteboom, 2016; 
Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). The empirical analysis highlighted that for ports to 
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successfully diversify and enable a more developed path beyond the path creation phase, 
port authorities and sub-national government agencies can continuously seek to proactively 
and strategically invest into infrastructure to attract future firm investment, or if possible, 
reform their governance arrangements to do so, as highlighted by ABP (Martin, 2010; 
Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Monios, 2017; Debrie et al, 2013; Figure 2.4). 
 
For the PoC and Humber Ports to diversify and unlock new regional paths around offshore 
wind, several important elements had to combine and successfully align (MacKinnon et al, 
2018; Dawley et al, 2019). The creation of a national offshore wind market catalysed port 
authorities and sub-regional government agencies to identify new economic opportunities 
for their ports (Notteboom, 2016; Debrie et al, 2013; Figure 2.4). Next, the port governance 
actors made investment decisions which reflected Anglo-Saxon (private) or Hanseatic 
(public) governance arrangements, in order to enable inward investment from offshore wind 
firms (Verhoeven, 2010; Musso et al, 2006; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Figure 2.4). The 
port’s infrastructural and material base, alongside the port governance arrangements and 
investment approaches, mediated how the port governance actors diversified their existing 
asset base (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Figure 2.4).  
 
7.4 Port visions and strategies 
 
The chapter will now move onto analyse the port visions and investment strategies, which 
have proven to be important mediators of the scale and scope of port adaptation processes. 
The thesis has revealed that once the national offshore wind market has been created and 
for the port adaptation process to occur, key actors concerned with a port identify new 
economic opportunities and change its investment approach to capitalise upon potential 
opportunities within the offshore wind industry (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Figure 
2.4). This factor identified in the empirical analysis contributes to a better understanding of 
how the creation of joint visions for the future by sub-national actors are crucial for enabling 
the port adaptation process (Trippl, 2019; Hassink et al, 2019). As suggested by Steen and 
Hansen (2018), a dynamic ‘collective agency’ is required between firm and non-firm actors 
to identify a strategic vision and newly identified economic opportunities for path creation, 
which can be manifested through a port ‘Master Plan’ or a new investment approach to 
diversify a port’s market portfolio and asset base (Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Notteboom, 
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2011; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Figure 2.4). Firstly, the thesis highlighted that a ‘collective 
agency’ between the port authority and sub-national government agencies found expression 
through a new strategic port vision in the PoC case, which aimed to catalyse the long-term 
growth in a new market (Steen & Hansen, 2018; Niedersachsen, 2003). This demonstrated 
‘place leadership’ as a distinctive type of collective agency, whereby the Niedersachsen Ports 
and sub-national government agencies worked across multiple “institutional and 
organisational divides, in order to build a collective vision for a new offshore wind path for 
the PoC and broader regional economy” (Grillitsch and Sotarauta, 2018, pp14; MacKinnon et 
al, 2019). Secondly, the research uncovered how a ‘collective agency’ between senior 
executives at ABP established a new opportunistic investment approach in the Humber Ports 
case (Steen & Hansen, 2018; Grillitsch and Sotarauta, 2018). This highlights the role of 
‘institutional entrepreneurship’ as a type of collective agency, as institutional entrepreneurs 
at ABP in the Humber challenged existing investment norms and practices of ABP as an 
organisation, which typically focused upon conservative investments into reliable markets, in 
order to harness and valorise port assets for offshore wind and diversify into a newly 
emerging market (Grillitsch and Sotarauta, 2018; MacKinnon et al, 2019). These key findings 
support Notteboom’s position, as he argues that to enable port diversification a strategic 
vision or new investment approach from a port authority is required, in combination with 
collective action from local actors (Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). In 
addition, the alignment of a new port vision or investment approach to broader institutional 
and market settings is crucial for enabling processes of port diversification and new path 
creation (MacKinnon et al, 2018; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4).  
 
A clear contrast between the port cases is the opportunistic diversification strategy of ABP at 
the Humber Ports, which differs from a more long-term port vision formed by key actors to 
enable the PoC’s diversification (Notteboom, 2016; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016, Monios, 
2017). An ‘Offshore Master Plan’ (OMP) was designed and released in 2003 to propose how 
the PoC could capitalise upon emerging opportunities in the embryonic German offshore 
wind industry (Niedersachsen, 2003; Wüstenhagen & Bilharz, 2006). The OMP demonstrated 
the strategic vision of key local and state level actors concerned with the PoC’s long-term 
adaptation and success, aiming to create a regional path (Niedersachsen, 2003; Martin, 
2010). The decentralisation of decision-making power and resources to the state level for 
ports enabled key sub-national government agencies to create this new long-term vision, 
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reflecting the distinctive CME of Germany with strong state and local actors driving path 
creation and development processes from the bottom-up (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Martin, 
2010; Niedersachsen, 2003).  
 
In contrast to the PoC, firm and non-firm actors concerned with the Humber Ports’ 
diversification, did not create a long-term vision through a port ‘Master Plan’ or strategy to 
build future infrastructure and subsequently capture new market opportunities (Notteboom, 
2016; Martin, 2010; Parola et al, 2018). However, key actors at the Humber Ports 
successfully identified and capitalised upon emerging opportunities in O&M (Operations and 
Maintenance) and manufacturing activities, after they reacted to interest from developers 
and component manufacturers seeking suitable UK port sites (BBC News, 2007; 2014; 
Financial Times, 2011; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Wind Europe. 2017a). The Humber Ports 
adopted a more opportunistic and short-term vision in comparison to the PoC, which 
nonetheless still enabled the Humber Ports to adapt and diversify into offshore wind 
(Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Parola et al, 2018; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010).  
 
Essentially, the contrasting port visions and strategies meant that the diversification of PoC 
was focused upon the long-term adaptation and diversification of the PoC, whereas the new 
investment strategy underpinning the Humber Ports’ diversification was driven by 
capitalising upon new market opportunities to generate profits for ABP (Notteboom, 2016; 
Pike et al, 2010; Martin, 2010). However, Hull City Council, North East Lincolnshire Council 
and the Humber LEP were following a similar strategy to actors in the PoC, aiming to create a 
new offshore wind path for the Humber region (Humber LEP, 2016). Both strategies work for 
enabling port adaptation and diversification into offshore wind. However, in comparison to 
the Humber Ports, the long-term vision of key actors at the PoC to consistently seek to 
attract offshore wind firms and build port infrastructure accordingly, enabled the attraction 
of a greater number of offshore wind firms and higher level of financial investment to create 
a more developed regional path around offshore wind. 
 
Another distinctive contrast is how and why different forms of actor coalitions formed and 
worked to enable different port adaptation processes and path outcomes (Notteboom, 
2016; Phelps & Wood, 2006; Cox, 1998; Martin, 2010). The formation of a coalition of public 
actors on the state and local level within the PoC case was critical in enabling the PoC to 
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capitalise upon opportunities in offshore wind (Phelps & Wood, 2006; MacKinnon et al, 
2018; Cox, 1999; Notteboom, 2016). Key local and state actors demonstrated ‘place 
leadership’ to create a new port vision for the PoC and worked collectively across 
organisational divides to enable inward investments, whilst continually focusing upon 
capturing manufacturing, installation and O&M activities over a long-term period (Grillitsch 
& Sotarauta, 2018; Steen & Hansen, 2018; Cox, 1998; Wood, 1999; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). In 
addition, the institutional arrangement of non-firm (public) actors involved in establishing 
this coalition did not change since its formation, meaning there was a continuous strategic 
focus and collective agency involved in capturing investment into offshore wind activities at 
the PoC and creating a new regional path (Martin, 2000; 2010; Steen & Hansen, 2018). On 
the other hand, the actor coalition in the Humber Ports case consisted of both firm (private) 
and non-firm (public) actors, which continuously changed because actors conducted work in 
a ‘temporary’ manner to capture certain inward investments at different points in time, 
reflecting the opportunistic approach of these key actors (Dawley et al, 2019; Phelps and 
Wood, 2006; University of Hull, 2018). For example, at the PoH (Port of Hull) the Single 
Conversation Group (SCG) and Joint Project Team (JPT) included firm and non-firm actors 
with overlapping responsibilities and remits, who acted at different times in response to 
solve various strategic, technical and planning issues to attract and manage a key inward 
investment (University of Hull, 2018; Figure 2.4). Nevertheless, the contrasting actor 
coalitions managed to identify and capture a range of offshore wind activities to ultimately 
enable processes of port diversification and regional path creation around the offshore wind 
industry (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4).  
 
The empirical analysis revealed different forms and arrangements of actor coalitions within 
the port cases, which worked over contrasting timescales and worked together in 
contrasting ways (Phelps & Wood, 2006; Dawley et al, 2019; Cox, 1998). As a result of these 
contrasting actor coalitions, the port diversification process and the regional offshore wind 
paths were ultimately different in terms of their development and evolution (Notteboom, 
2016; Martin, 2010). The longevity of an essentially unchanged coalition of firm and non-firm 
actors in the PoC case, who had a strategic vision, continual focus and collective agency 
around expanding infrastructure for offshore wind activities, enabled the PoC to capture 
numerous inward investments over time and create a more developed offshore wind path 
than identified in the Humber Ports case (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Dawley et al, 2019; Steen & 
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Hansen, 2018; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). A central reason why the regional path in the PoC is 
more developed in comparison to the Humber’s regional path is because a more strategic 
coalition of actors worked together continuously over a longer timescale, overcame a 
greater period of uncertainty with more firms disinvesting, and subsequently attracted more 
firms and investment within a period of expansion (Notteboom, 2016; Cox, 1999; Wood, 
1998; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017).  
 
7.5 Infrastructural asset base: greenfield versus brownfield 
 
The physical nature and form of a port’s infrastructural and material asset base is shaped by 
previous industrial activities occurring within the port, which consequently shapes the future 
diversification and path creation processes (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010). The conversion and expansion of a port’s infrastructural and material asset 
base occurs on either greenfield or brownfield land, which has been identified by the port 
authority, sub-national government agencies and firms to have the potential to support the 
offshore wind industry (Notteboom, 2016; Maskell  & Malmberg, 1999; Figure 2.4). To 
enable the diversification of assets, port authorities and/or sub-national government 
agencies identify how underutilised port assets can be valorised and reoriented, in order to 
capitalise upon a new market and support an emerging sector within a region (Notteboom, 
2016; Maskell  & Malmberg, 1999; Dawley et al, 2019). The diversification of the 
infrastructural and material asset base is shaped by the alignment between the national 
market environment, the new strategic port vision and demand from offshore wind firms 
(Notteboom, 2016; Maskell  & Malmberg, 1999; MacKinnon et al, 2018; Figure 2.4). Whilst 
Maskell & Malmberg (1999) highlight five different types of assets which can be identified 
and harnessed by actors to enable processes of diversification and path creation, this section 
focuses upon the availability and deliverability of land as the key element in providing 
appropriate infrastructural and material assets at ports (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
MacKinnon et al, 2018; Figure 2.4). Moreover, this section also emphasises the importance 
of proximity of ports to particular offshore wind projects, which is a key natural asset for 
enabling port diversification and new path creation around offshore wind (Maskell & 




The availability and deliverability of greenfield or brownfield land is an important factor 
differentiating the diversification and path creation processes within the port cases 
(Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). Before the PoC’s diversification into offshore wind, it had 
large areas of greenfield land available to be converted for offshore wind purposes (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017; Boas, 2007; Figure 2.4). The PoC’s pre-existing asset base, with extensive 
areas of greenfield land, allowed key non-firm actors to plan and construct high-quality port 
infrastructure for offshore wind firms and trigger processes of port diversification and path 
creation (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). As there was large-scale 
availability of greenfield land, firms could request specialised infrastructure to be 
constructed to serve their needs, which stimulated investment interest from manufacturing 
firms seeking to capitalise upon an emerging national offshore wind market (AfW Cuxhaven, 
2017; BMWi, 2015). This meant that a greater number of firm transplantations were 
facilitated more affectively over time in comparison to the Humber Ports case, as there was 
an existing or planned availability of infrastructure for firms to access and harness for their 
specialised offshore wind activities (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4).  
 
By contrast, the Humber Ports had declining and underutilised infrastructural and material 
assets upon brownfield land with very limited area for expansion before its diversification 
into offshore wind (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Figure 2.4). 
Despite this constraining factor, key firm and non-firm actors have successfully diversified 
and converted the Humber Ports’ infrastructural asset base to support offshore wind 
(Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). However, the diversification and conversion 
processes in the Humber Ports case were constrained by the historical nature and the range 
of technical, planning and environmental challenges associated with adapting an 
infrastructural asset base upon brownfield land (Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999; University of Hull, 2018; Figure 2.4). The complex infrastructure related issues were 
created by the Alexandra Dock at the Port of Hull being an old and declining infrastructural 
asset base on brownfield land, which was shaped by historical industrial activities (Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999; University of Hull, 2018). This meant the Humber Ports’ diversification 
process was disrupted until the technical, planning and environmental problems were 
resolved by key actors, thus constraining the growth of a new regional offshore wind path 




However, in parallel with the conversion of the Alexandra Dock at the PoH, the rival AMEP 
(Able Marine Energy Park) on the south bank of the Humber Estuary had greenfield land with 
potential to support offshore wind activities, which stimulated the interest of Siemens as 
they could request specialised port infrastructure (Financial Times, 2014; Able UK, 2017). 
Unfortunately for Able UK, its greenfield AMEP could not be delivered on time for Siemens 
or other offshore wind firms at the time, such as Ørsted (Able UK, 2017). This was driven by 
an overall lack of demand for the AMEP, which was underpinned by the associated “£450 
million of capital investment and lengthy statutory planning required” to construct the 
AMEP, meaning the site became too risky for Siemens to pursue (Dawley et al, 2019, pp9). 
Furthermore, Able UK required compulsory acquisition from the UK government for land 
owned by ABP, which led to multiple planning objections by ABP and a “High Court review 
process that increased the risks associated with the rival AMEP” (Dawley et al, 2019, pp10). 
Ultimately, the lack of availability and deliverability of the greenfield AMEP and the 
availability of existing brownfield port land and infrastructure at the Alexandra Dock which 
met the deliverability needs of Siemens, became a pivotal factor in stimulating 
diversification and path creation in the Humber Ports case (Notteboom, 2016; Dawley et al, 
2019; Martin, 2010; BBC News, 2014).  
 
The empirical analysis revealed that brownfield port land is a key factor shaping the 
contrasting processes of port diversification and path creation around O&M activities within 
the comparative cases (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). The existing infrastructural asset 
base at the Port of Grimsby (PoG), consisting of the ‘Fish Dock’ and ‘Royal Dock’ with 
brownfield land, was key in attracting investment from developers looking to conduct O&M 
activities at relatively little continuous cost (BBC News, 2007; 2013; ABP, 2019b). In contrast, 
the PoC had very little available existing infrastructure available for O&M activities with 
suitable brownfield port land, as it was already being utilised for other port-related activities 
such as general cargo, automobiles or container handling at the ‘Cuxport’ terminal (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017; Cuxport, 2017a; 2017b). Furthermore, key port actors responsible for the 
future diversification of the PoC, decided against investing into and constructing specialised 
port infrastructure to exclusively support O&M activities because of the PoC’s lack of 
proximity to planned offshore wind projects in the German North Sea (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 
BSH, 2014). Therefore, the geographical projection of future German offshore wind projects 
did not align to the strategic ambitions of key actors concerned with diversifying the PoC’s 
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infrastructural asset base to support O&M activities (MacKinnon et al, 2018; BSH, 2014; 
Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999).  
 
By contrast, the existence of brownfield land at the PoG was the key factor in catalysing the 
port diversification and path creation process, as it strongly aligned to the demand of 
developers seeking to operate and maintain their previously constructed offshore wind 
projects (Notteboom, 2016; Dawley et al, 2019; Wind Europe. 2017a). On a broader scale, 
project developers such as Ørsted recognised the Humber Ports as being in close proximity 
to their current and future UK offshore wind projects, in comparison to ports in Teesside, the 
Port of Tyne or the Port of Blyth (BVG Associates, 2016). This evidence suggests that 
existence of brownfield port land is not sufficient enough to attract O&M activities to enable 
port diversification and new path creation. Brownfield port land, as well as greenfield port 
land, needs to be in close proximity to future offshore wind developments and the prior 
construction of offshore wind projects to stimulate processes of port adaptation. 
 
The brownfield port land at Alexandra Dock had a limited expansion area and was smaller in 
scale compared to the greenfield land at the PoC, which was a key factor in influencing 
Siemens’ decision to shift nacelle manufacturing activities to the PoC (AfW Cuxhaven 2017; 
ABP, 2019a). Moreover, the co-location of suppliers for manufacturing nacelles was not 
possible at the PoH due to the limited physical scale of the Alexandra Dock, whereas the PoC 
could provide large greenfield areas to build specialised port infrastructure for a range of co-
located suppliers whilst supporting O&M and installation activities (AfW Cuxhaven 2017; 
ABP, 2019a). As such, the limited physical scale of the Humber Ports’ infrastructural asset 
base constrained their ability to attract a larger range of firms, co-located suppliers and 
offshore wind activities, thus hindering the further development of the Humber’s regional 
offshore wind path (Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Martin, 2010). 
Therefore, the PoC case highlighted that ports with large areas of greenfield land to 
construct new infrastructure have a greater capacity to attract a largescale manufacturer 
who requires co-located suppliers and quayside access (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Siemens 
Gamesa, 2017). 
 
The empirical analysis suggests that the port adaptation process can be supported by 
infrastructure on greenfield and brownfield port land (Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & 
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Malmberg, 1999; Martin, 2010). However, these processes are best stimulated by the extent 
to which port land and infrastructure can be made available through timely deliverability, 
alongside the degree to which port land and infrastructure can serve the scale and meet the 
proximity of demand of current and future offshore wind projects (Dawley et al, 2019; BVG 
Associates, 2016). This is underpinned by the extent to which the pre-existing land and 
infrastructure can be converted and expanded on time, and when offshore wind activities 
can subsequently occur in line with project development timeframes (Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999; Dawley et al, 2019; University of Hull, 2018; Figure 2.4).  
 
7.6 Offshore wind firms: corporate strategies and investment 
 
Ports are infrastructural platforms for enabling processes of adaptation and diversification 
(Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). However, offshore wind developers and 
manufacturing firms are catalysts and drivers of port adaptation (Notteboom, 2016; Dawley 
et al, 2019). Processes of port adaptation, diversification and the realisation of a port vision, 
are all strongly dependent upon firms providing inward and indigenous investment to 
diversify existing infrastructural assets and conduct offshore wind activities (Notteboom, 
2016; Boas, 2007; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Wind Europe. 2017a; Figure 2.4). However, 
due to the different ownership and governance arrangements of the ports in this thesis, the 
port authorities had contrasting levels of dependency upon securing investment before 
making their own investments to diversify into offshore wind, which consequently mediated 
and differentiated how the diversification and path creation processes occurred 
(Notteboom, 2016; Debrie et al, 2013; Martin, 2010). This key contrast is informed by Debrie 
et al (2013, pp61), who argue that investment from privately owned port authorities 
“happens only when risk is limited in relation to expected profit”, which is in clear contrast 
to publically-owned port authorities who are typically more concerned with the wider 
economic development of the region (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; 
OECD, 2009). 
 
The empirical analysis revealed that manufacturing firms and offshore wind developers have 
distinctive investment characteristics, infrastructure requirements and corporate strategies 
which influenced and differentiated the port diversification and path creation processes 
within the port cases (Wind Europe. 2017a; Dawley et al, 2019; MacKinnon et al, 2018; 
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Afewerki, 2019). Key manufacturing firms in the early German offshore wind industry 
demanded specialised infrastructure for manufacturing activities and onshore assembly of 
components. For example, Cuxhaven Steel Construction (CSC), AMBAU and Strabag were 
early industrial players in the German offshore wind industry and the emerging production 
network, who were prepared to make large inward investments (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 
Cuxhaven Nachrichten, 2007; 2009b; AMBAU, 2016; 2018; Coe & Yeung, 2015). Their 
willingness to invest and their demand for pre-existing port infrastructure was heightened by 
the proactive nature of key actors at the PoC who were at the same time planning to invest 
and construct port infrastructure to capture offshore wind activities (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 
2016; Niedersachsen, 2003). As lead firms within the early offshore wind production 
network in Germany and Europe, CSC, AMBAU and Strabag adopted similar corporate 
strategies of taking large investment risks to produce components, in order to cement 
themselves as the main producers of offshore wind components in the early German 
offshore wind industry (Cuxhaven Nachrichten, 2007; 2009b; AMBAU, 2016; 2018; STRABAG, 
2009). Similarly, the path creation and diversification process in the Humber Ports case was 
driven by key firms and developers becoming active in the emerging offshore wind market, 
aiming to undertake manufacturing, installation and O&M activities (Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010; Dawley et al, 2019; Afewerki, 2019). However, the growing activity of key 
firms and developers triggered port actors (port authorities and sub-national government 
agencies) to react to this market activity and retrospectively invest to secure returns for 
shareholders, meaning the Humber Ports’ diversification into was led by offshore wind firms 
and the PoC’s diversification was led by Niedersachsen Ports (Verhoeven, 2010; Monios, 
2017; Dawley et al, 2019).  
 
This reflects the overarching institutional and market context of the UK as a LME (Liberal 
Market Economy), whereby privately owned port authorities have to prioritise generating 
revenue and returns on infrastructure investment, in order to operate and grow in a 
competitive port marketplace (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Baird & 
Valentine, 2007). For example, as part of Siemens’ corporate strategy to capitalise upon the 
growth of the UK offshore wind market and become a lead firm in the European offshore 
wind production network, they began searching for a UK port to conduct manufacturing 
activities and ABP reacted to this market activity by retrospectively attempting to secure 
their investment (Notteboom, 2016; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Financial Times, 2011; 
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2014; Coe & Yeung, 2015; HM Government, 2014b). The Humber Ports’ firm-led 
diversification was demonstrated by Centrica, E.ON and Ørsted approaching the GFDE 
(Grimsby Fish Dock Enterprises) and ABP at the PoG (Port of Grimsby) to conduct O&M 
activities, which stimulated a reaction from the GFDE and ABP who retrospectively made 
investments into port infrastructure to capture their investment (BBC News, 2007; 2013; 
OffshoreWIND, 2012a; 2012b, 2013b). Ørsted is the main firm in the Humber Ports case in 
regard to becoming a lead O&M provider and project developer within the UK offshore wind 
production network (Ørsted, 2019; Coe & Yeung, 2015).  In terms of Ørsted’s corporate 
strategy, its vision and aim shifted in the early 2010s from being a producer of fossil fuels 
towards becoming a global leader of renewable energy production, and the UK’s growing 
offshore wind market presented a new opportunity to realise that overarching vision 
(Ørsted, 2019; 2020; DONG Energy, 2013). As such, as the Humber Ports were more 
dependent and under greater influence of developer and firm investment decisions in 
comparison to the PoC case, firm-led diversification occurred in the Humber Ports and a 
port-led diversification processes occurred in the PoC case (Martin, 2010; Isaksen, 2015; 
Dawley et al, 2015). 
 
The example of Siemens as a key manufacturing firm within both port cases provides an 
interesting comparison of corporate strategy, investment and new path creation (Dawley et 
al, 2016; Martin, 2010). As part of Siemens’ European corporate strategy to move towards a 
new port-based manufacturing and logistics approach for producing turbines to reduce 
costs, Siemens provided inward investments into the PoC and the Port of Hull (PoH) 
(Siemens Gamesa, 2017; Siemens, 2016a; 2016b). However, as Siemens invested to produce 
more complex, specialised and higher value nacelles at the PoC and lower value turbine 
blades at the PoH, this meant that Siemens required suppliers with high level engineering 
capacity to be co-located to the Siemens factory at the PoC (Siemens Gamesa, 2017; 
Siemens, 2016a; 2016b). Therefore Siemens’ corporate strategy and inward investment into 
the PoC served as more of a catalyst for attracting additional manufacturing firms in 
comparison to Siemens’ inward investment into the PoH, thus better enabling the processes 
of port diversification and path creation (Siemens Gamesa, 2017; Siemens, 2016a; AfW 




The different types of firms and the mode of inward investment they provided to conduct 
specialised offshore wind activities also differentiated the port adaptation process and path 
outcomes (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Wind Europe, 2017a; 2017b). In the PoC case, 
several firms provided investment over time to conduct high-end and specialised 
manufacturing activities, who were prepared to provide largescale investments to expand 
the port asset base (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). In contrast, the manufacturing activity at the 
Humber Ports has been solely centred upon Siemens’ willingness to provide inward 
investment to convert the port asset base and conduct more routine based blade assembly 
activities (Siemens, 2016a; BBC News, 2014; Boas, 2007; Figure 2.4). However, this mode of 
investment was heavily dependent upon Hull City Council convincing ABP to enter into 
competition to capture Siemens’ investment (Dawley et al, 2019). Similarly, inward 
investment provided by offshore wind developers to convert infrastructure and construct 
O&M bases in the Humber Ports also meant they had to negotiate with and convince ABP to 
support their activities (Humber Business, 2016). By contrast the PoC case, a range of high-
end and specialised manufacturers were reacting positively to the pre-existing and long-term 
expansion of infrastructure to support offshore wind activities (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). 
Furthermore, the inward investments made by firms into the PoC to conduct manufacturing 
activities and produce more high value and specialised components such as nacelles, 
foundations and towers, meant it has become a more high-end manufacturing hub in 
comparison to the Humber Ports case (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Wind Europe, 2017a). As a 
result of the distinctive modes of investment, types of offshore wind activities and the level 
of dependency of external manufacturing firms upon the port authority to support their 
inward investment, the adaptation and diversification process in the Humber Ports case was 
driven by external firms, in comparison to a port-led adaptation and diversification process 
in the PoC case (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4).  
 
7.7 Path outcomes  
 
The contrasting configurations of how pre-existing infrastructural and material assets were 
diversified by coalitions of key port actors, which were shaped by distinctive port 
governance contexts and multiscalar institutional environments, differentiated how the port 
adaptation process unfolded within the comparative case studies (MacKinnon et al, 2018; 
Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Figure 2.4). There has been a greater number of 
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manufacturing and O&M firms which invested into the PoC in comparison to the Humber 
Ports. These inward investments occurred when a national market for offshore wind was 
established, which catalysed port authorities and sub-national government agencies to 
convert or expand infrastructural and material asset base, in order to capture inward 
investment and establish a platform for offshore wind firms (MacKinnon et al, 2018; Martin, 
2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; see Figure 2.4). Distinctive path creation processes with 
contrasting qualitative characteristics emerged as outcomes of the unfolding port adaptation 
process (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). 
 
The thesis uncovered the contrasting scale and scope of diversification and path outcomes. 
There were contrasting levels of diversification in regard to the scale and scope of the 
offshore wind activities created within the case studies in comparison to other market 
activities within the ports (Notteboom, 2016).  The PoC was more diversified into offshore 
wind as it has received a very high level of public investment, approximately €280m into port 
infrastructure to support offshore wind in comparison to the Humber Ports which received 
smaller public investments into planning and project related activities, alongside the £25.7m 
Green Port Growth Programme (excluding funding for port infrastructure) (University of Hull, 
2018; AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c). Moreover, ABP has made a £15m investment into container 
handling facilities at the PoH in 2018 and has planned a £26m investment into expanding its 
river terminal to handle a greater number of automobiles (Offshore Energy, 2018; Grimsby 
Telegraph, 2019a). The contrasting levels of public investments and overall commitments to 
construct port infrastructure to support offshore wind activities, alongside the recent 
investments from ABP highlighting how the port owner prioritises investments into other 
port activities to maximise traffic and revenue, emphasises how the scale and scope of the 
Humber Ports’ diversification into offshore wind is at a lower level than what is revealed 
within the PoC case (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c; ABP, 2019a; 2019b). 
 
Furthermore, a greater number of firms (eight in total) in the PoC case provided a larger 
scale of inward investment (£350m approx.) in comparison to the Humber Ports case, which 
had six firms providing inward investment (£200m approx.), including two small-scale O&M 
support firms (AfW Cuxhaven, 2018c; University of Hull, 2018; Grimsby Telegraph, 2019b; 
E.ON, 2019; OffshoreWIND, 2012b). This supported the creation of a higher number of jobs, 
more regional supply chain opportunities and coincided with a larger scale of investment 
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from port actors (port authorities and sub-national government agencies) in Cuxhaven (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017; University of Hull, 2018; ABP 2014; Figure 7.1; Figure 7.2). This led to a 
more developed regional offshore wind path in the PoC case in comparison to the Humber 
Ports case (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). Based upon interview data and news articles, 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 highlight the contrasting path trajectories within each port case based 
upon direct offshore wind employment at manufacturing and O&M firms over time (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017; Cuxhavener Nachrichten, 2007a; 2009b; 2013; OffshoreWIND, 2012a; 
2012b; 2013a; 2013b; Siemens, 2016a; 2016b; Siemens Gamesa, 2017; 2019; AMBAU, 2018; 
University of Hull, 2018). As a result of fluctuating periods of growth and contraction within 
the adaptation and diversification process, the path trajectory in the PoC case was more 
unstable and volatile, with a greater scale of contraction between 2011 – 2014 in 
comparison to the Humber Ports case, despite creating a greater number of jobs (Figure 7.1; 
7.2). By contrast, the port adaptation and diversification processes in the Humber Ports case 
led to a more gradual and slower growth of the offshore wind path in comparison to the PoC 
case, characterised by the ongoing expansion of O&M and a softer episode of disruption 
between 2011 – 2013 (Figure 7.1; Figure 7.2).  
  
 
Figure 7.1: Port of Cuxhaven’s adaptation and path creation 





Figure 7.2: Humber Ports’ adaptation and path creation 
Source: Author’s own research 
 
The Humber Ports case has a greater scale of O&M activities and investment from a broader 
range of industry-leading developers (such as Ørsted) in comparison to the PoC case, 
alongside a higher number of current and future offshore wind projects supported by the 
Humber Ports (Ørsted, 2019; Humber Business, 2016; Afewerki, 2019; BSH, 2014; Crown 
Estate, 2010b). Therefore as O&M activities occur over an approximate 25 year lifecycle of 
offshore wind projects, the regional offshore wind path in the Humber may be more 
sustainable and resilient to external shocks such as political or offshore wind market change 
and development, in comparison to the path in the PoC case (Martin, 2010; Martin, 2012; 
Martin & Sunley, 2015b). In contrast, the PoC is more focused upon supporting more higher 
value manufacturing activities in the offshore wind industry and on a larger scale than the 
Humber Ports, meaning it is highly dependent upon manufacturing firms winning future 
contracts for offshore wind projects in the North Sea (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; University of 
Hull, 2018; Wind Europe. 2017a). Ultimately, this may lead to fluctuating offshore wind port 
activities, reflecting how inward investment from manufacturing firms and regional path 
trajectories are strongly influenced by national institutional and market environments (Wind 
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Europe. 2017a; Martin, 2010; Dawley et al, 2019). The diversification of the Humber Ports 
and the PoC into offshore wind have created distinctive qualitative characteristics of the 
regional path outcomes (MacKinnon et al, 2018; Martin, 2010):  
 






• Conversion of assets  
(brownfield land) 




• Assembly based 
production 
• Long-term O&M 
support 
• Embryonic path 





• Expansion of assets 
(greenfield land) 







• Sporadic O&M 
support 
• Established path 




Table 7.3: Composition of path outcomes 
 
Table 7.3 outlines the key differences in the composition of the path outcomes emerging 
from the port case studies. The diversification of the Humber Ports has created a broad 
offshore wind portfolio in comparison to the PoC, consisting of assembly based 
manufacturing and long-term O&M support, which has stimulated an embryonic offshore 
wind path in the Humber region. The creation and future development of the regional 
offshore wind path in the Humber remains highly dependent upon engagement and 
investment provision by exogenous offshore wind firms, with the port authority unlikely to 
make any future investments to support offshore wind. An established offshore wind path 
has been created by the PoC’s adaptation and diversification, characterised by high value 
and specialised manufacturing offshore wind activities. The PoC has established itself as a 
leading port in offshore wind production networks for supporting advanced engineering and 
production, alongside supporting more sporadic O&M activities. The PoC’s diversification 
was driven by investment from the port authority and sub-national government agencies for 
the expansion of new assets on greenfield land, which catalysed indigenous and exogenous 
investment from offshore wind firms. Overall, Table 7.3 highlights that the PoC has 
stimulated an established and specialised offshore wind path, whilst the Humber Ports has 
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created a broad offshore wind portfolio, with capacity to grow its embryonic offshore wind 
path through renewing its long-term O&M support. 
 
In addition to the path outcomes outlined in Table 7.3, there were contrasting distributional 
aspects of the path creation process and outcomes across the two cases (Martin, 2010). In 
the PoC case, the creation of a new path was for the economic benefit of Cuxhaven itself, 
establishing a new infrastructural base to generate new job opportunities and a strong 
localised supply chain within or adjacent to the port (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c). In a 
similar way, the creation of a new path in the Humber Ports case was to create a new 
economic future for the Humber at a moment of increasing unemployment and uncertainty 
in the late 2000s (IBM PLI, 2006). However, from the perspective of ABP, the formation of a 
new path for the wider region also had to generate a successful revenue stream by 
harnessing and diversifying dormant port infrastructure at the Alexandra Dock (PoH) and 
Royal Dock (PoG) for new purposes, in order to maintain or increase profits for its external 
shareholders (University of Hull, 2018; Ørsted, 2016; Humber Business, 2017b).  
 
The success of path creation has been assessed and measured in this research project by 
comparing levels of investment and commitments from port authority and public bodies to 
construct port infrastructure for offshore wind, the scale and quality of jobs created, the 
levels of inward investments from firms, the quantity of new firms and local supply chains 
within each case, the potential levels of future investment in relation to the offshore wind 
paths, and the overall composition and qualitative nature of the offshore wind path 
outcomes (see Figure 7.1; Figure 7.2; Table 7.3). These key path outcomes reflect the nature 
and success of the offshore wind paths and provides the empirical basis upon which the 
research is arguing that the path within the PoC case is more developed (Martin, 2010). 
However, assessing and measuring the success of path creation in a quantitative and 
qualitative manner is an important area of evolutionary and comparative path creation 
research which requires deeper theoretical and empirical development (Pike et al, 2016a; 








Both port cases successfully demonstrated diversification into offshore wind and are 
currently leading port bases in the UK and German offshore wind industries. However, by 
deploying the analytical framework in a comparative context I have revealed the key factors 
which differentiated how the port adaptation process occurred, and how regional path 
outcomes subsequently emerged and developed out of these processes. A key overarching 
factor was the national institutional environment (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2000; 2010; 
Gertler, 2010; Figure 2.4). The national institutional environments are influenced by the 
variegated modes of capitalism evident in the UK, encouraging private port governance and 
the centralisation of resources and decision-making power, and in Germany, supporting 
public port ownership and governance and the decentralised resources and decision-making 
power, which are critical in shaping port adaptation (Martin, 2010; Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Debrie et al, 2013; Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b).  
 
The national institutional environment for offshore wind, comprising national policy 
frameworks and market subsidies for offshore wind, was a pivotal factor in creating and 
subsequently constraining offshore wind markets in the UK and Germany, which shaped the 
port adaptation process across both cases (GWEC, 2016; IRENA, 2012; Martin, 2010). The 
variance in national institutional environments shaped the planning and consequent 
geography of offshore wind project development and the levels of market subsidies for 
offshore wind, which thus influenced when and where firms, port authorities and sub-
national government agencies provided investment (Martin, 2010; Dawley et al, 2019). 
Comparable changes in the national offshore wind markets at parallel points in time 
required port actors (port authorities, sub-national government agencies and firms) to 
strategically respond and plan their future investments accordingly (GWEC, 2016; IRNEA, 
2012; Notteboom, 2016). As a result of differing port governance arrangements, investment 
approaches and responses to changes in the national market and institutional environments 
from port actors, the port adaptation process was less constrained in the PoC case in 
comparison to the Humber Ports case (Verhoeven, 2010; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). 
Stable national market and institutional environments for offshore wind best support port 
diversification and path creation processes (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). There are 
several key factors differentiating the port adaptation process and path creation outcomes 
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within the comparative port cases, which closely reflect the elements underpinning port 
adaptation outlined in the analytical framework (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; see Figure 
2.4).  
 
Distinctive port governance models and the decision-making activities of key port actors 
(port authorities and sub-national government agencies) differentiated the port adaptation 
processes and path creation outcomes (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; 
Notteboom, 2016). Due to the public governance and ownership of the PoC, these port 
actors were less concerned with making short-term returns on investment into 
infrastructure than private sector orientated port actors within the Humber Ports case 
(Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998). This is reflected in how port actors in 
the PoC case decided to proactively invest into port infrastructure, enabling them to attract 
a series of inward investments and create an established offshore wind path, as part of a 
long-term strategic vision (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Table 7.3). In 
contrast, the port actors in the Humber Ports case were reacting to a growing offshore wind 
market and made investments into port infrastructure following legal investment 
commitments of firms to ensure future returns (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Financial 
Times, 2014). Therefore, the public governance context and proactive investment approach 
was more effective in enabling a port-led diversification process in comparison to private 
governance context in the Humber Ports case, enabling a firm-led diversification process and 
reactive investment approach (Verhoeven, 2010; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016).  
 
Following the creation of a national institutional and market environment for offshore wind, 
the analysis revealed the variance in port visions and investment strategies in shaping the 
adaptation and diversification processes (Notteboom, 2016; Trippl, 2019; Martin, 2010). The 
vision for the PoC was based upon a long-term strategy of building an offshore wind port, 
which enabled the PoC to become a leading port in the European offshore wind industry and 
enable a new regional offshore wind path to emerge as an outcome of this port 
diversification processes, characterised by a series of inward investments (Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010). In contrast, the strategy for port diversification in the Humber Ports case was 
based upon a reactive investment approach, to capture short to medium term returns for 
shareholders, which did enable inward investments despite constraining the decision-
making process of certain firms (Monios, 2017; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). Due to its 
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firm-led diversification process, the Humber Ports have been dependent upon offshore wind 
firms making up-front investment commitments to diversify into offshore wind  (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2018c; University of Hull, 2018). In contrast, creating a long-term strategic port 
vision is more effective in enabling port-led diversification, as it allows port authorities and 
sub-national government agencies to make strategic investment plans for diversification into 
a new market over a long-term period (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). To fully realise a 
new port vision or investment strategy, port authorities and sub-national government 
agencies may provide substantial investments into infrastructure to enable a demonstration 
affect, which can act as a catalyst for capturing inward investment (Notteboom, 2016; 
Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Figure 2.4).  
 
The availability and deliverability of infrastructural and material assets was a key factor 
influencing the port adaptation process (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010). The greenfield land at the PoC had large potential for expansion and was 
incrementally delivered through a series of investments from the port authority and sub-
national government agencies (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Niedersachsen, 2003). This 
subsequently catalysed several inward investments over time from offshore wind firms, 
which enabled the PoC to deliver an attractive asset base, diversify into a leading offshore 
wind port and successfully create a new regional path (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Notteboom, 
2016; Martin, 2010). In contrast, stagnating and underutilised brownfield land within the 
Humber Ports case had particular environmental and consenting issues, which caused some 
barriers to inward investment from key firms (University of Hull, 2018). Nevertheless, the 
brownfield land at the Humber Ports was available and more deliverable for offshore wind 
firms than competing port sites, such as the AMEP on the south bank of the River Humber 
(Dawley et al, 2019). Therefore, the deliverability of the Humber Port’s port infrastructure 
alongside the scale and proximity of demand for the Humber Ports, stimulated the 
adaptation and diversification processes, which enabled the Humber Ports to establish itself 
as a leading offshore wind port base and create a new regional path (Dawley et al, 2019; 
Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Martin, 2010). Whilst having greater potential, ports endowed 
with greenfield land are dependent upon a strong configuration and relationship between 
the national institutional environment, prospective offshore wind firms and the strategic 
port vision, investment decisions and financial resources of key port actors, who have the 
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power and legitimacy to diversify a port’s market portfolio and asset base (Martin, 2010; 






































This thesis has reaffirmed the importance of studying ports as strategic asset bases within 
regions and uncovered the importance of investigating the port authority as an overlooked 
actor in shaping processes of adaptation, diversification and regional path creation. By 
undertaking the international comparative analysis of two case studies, the research has 
been successful in meeting the overall aim of the thesis:  
 
To better understand and assess processes of port adaptation and diversification, based 
upon the role of local institutions harnessing and valorising inherited and geographically 
specific port-related assets. 
 
In response the thesis began by assessing key strands of literature within Evolutionary 
Economic Geography (EEG), the role of institutions in EEG and port governance, ownership 
and diversification. Based upon this analysis, I designed an analytical framework to explore 
how port adaptation and diversification shapes the regional path creation process and to 
compare two empirical cases consisting of the Humber Ports case (Port of Hull and Port of 
Grimsby), and the Port of Cuxhaven case. 
 
This chapter will discuss the main empirical findings to answer the three research questions 
explored within the thesis, explain the key theoretical and conceptual contributions, provide 
recommendations for enabling port diversification and path creation and outline future 
research directions. 
 
8.2 Main empirical findings 
 
This section will unpack and explain the main empirical findings to provide answers for the 





What forms of port diversification have been developed by port authorities and associated 
regional institutions?  
 
The port authorities and associated regional institutions in both cases established two 
contrasting forms of diversification, which differentiated the adaptation process around 
offshore wind (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). First, port-led diversification is when 
investment is provided by the port authority and sub-national government agencies for new 
infrastructural assets to be constructed on greenfield land, in order to serve a new purpose 
and market, such as offshore wind (see Figure 2.4; Notteboom, 2016; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999). Second, firm-led diversification occurs when investment is driven by external 
(offshore wind) firms and developers and support by investment from port authorities, in 
order to realign existing infrastructural and material assets on brownfield land and support a 
new market (see Figure 2.4; Martin, 2010; Boas, 2007; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Port-led 
and firm-led diversification are not binary and are often overlapping in reality, as the 
diversification process can be led by both port actors (port authorities and sub-national 
government agencies) and external firms at different times throughout the adaptation, 
evolution and diversification of a port into new market (Notteboom, 2016; Martin; 2010).  
 
Port-led diversification is more evident in the PoC case, wherein the port authority, state 
government and local authority expanded new port infrastructure which diversified the 
PoC’s asset base and future market portfolio, enabling the PoC to adapt and diversify into 
offshore wind (Notteboom, 2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017).  This form of port-led diversification 
was based upon the long-term aim of the port authority and sub-national government 
agencies, which was to capture a series of turbine component manufacturers, installation 
activities and O&M operators gradually over time (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Niedersachsen, 
2003). The incremental expansion of ports assets at the PoC through a series of 
infrastructure construction projects adds new conceptual and empirical evidence to existing 
understandings of potential diversification mechanisms in EEG, as conceived by Martin and 
Sunley (2006), highlighting how a distinctive form of diversification can occur (Notteboom, 
2016; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Niedersachsen, 2003). The gradual expansion of port assets to 
enable diversification was articulated in the ‘Offshore Master Plan’, which was created and 
continually updated by a strategic coalition of actors working on a sub-national scale 
(Niedersachsen, 2003; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). The PoC diversified into manufacturing, 
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installation and O&M offshore wind activities because key port actors led the diversification 
process and proactively planned and constructed infrastructure projects, in order to meet 
projected demand and capture inward investment (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; 
Notteboom, 2016).  
 
In contrast, a firm-led diversification was dominant in the Humber Ports case, shaped and 
driven by the actions of external offshore wind manufacturing firms and developers, who 
shifted the investment approach of ABP at the Humber Ports. Essentially, the port authority 
and local government agencies in the Humber Ports case reacted and responded to the 
interests of leading firms and converted port assets accordingly to capture their 
investments, which enabled a different port diversification process in comparison to the PoC 
(Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Boas, 2007; Notteboom, 2016).  
 
The conversion of port assets in the Humber Ports case was constrained at certain points in 
time as various factors caused barriers for inward investment, which hindered this form of 
firm-led diversification and differentiated it from the form of port-led diversification found in 
the PoC case (Boas, 2007; Notteboom, 2016; University of Hull, 2018). As ABP and local 
government agencies focused upon converting existing port infrastructure in response to 
interest from external manufacturing firms and developers, the firm-led diversification 
process was limited to capturing a certain scale of inward investment and offshore wind 
activities (Boas, 2007; Notteboom, 2016). That said, the deliverability of port infrastructure 
in the Humber Ports case was pivotal in enabling the firm-led diversification process, as it 
captured investment ahead of rival port sites such as the AMEP (Siemens, 2016a; BBC News, 
2014; Able UK, 2017). Moreover, the conversion of port assets in the Port of Grimsby (PoG) 
to support extensive O&M activities, as a distinctive form of firm-led diversification, may 
lead to longer term investments in supporting the long-term port adaptation process in the 
Humber Ports case (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Humber Business, 2016a). This is 
because current O&M activities at the PoG will occur for the 25 year lifespan of existing 
offshore wind projects and there is an increasing long-term demand from developers for 
operating and maintaining offshore wind projects from the PoG (Renewable UK, 2017a; 





In what ways do port ownership and governance models shape a port’s capacity to adapt? 
 
The ‘Anglo-Saxon’ port governance model is evident in the Humber Ports case, meaning the 
Humber Ports are owned and governed by an independent private port authority named 
ABP (Associated British Ports) (see Table 2.1; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Brooks & 
Cullinane, 2007b; Verhoeven, 2010). In contrast, the ‘Hanseatic’ port governance model is 
evident in the PoC case, meaning the PoC is under public ownership of the state government 
and operated by a private company under public ownership of the state (Niedersachsen) 
government, named Niedersachsen Ports (NPorts) (see Table 2.1; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 
1998; Verhoeven, 2010; Baird, 2004). 
 
One feature of the Hanseatic port governance model is to enable the long-term 
diversification of the port into a new market, whilst supporting the broader economic 
development of the region that the port is situated within (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van 
de Voorde, 1998; Notteboom, 2016). The thesis revealed this key characteristic by analysing 
the role of NPorts, who focused upon the long-term diversification of the PoC by establishing 
a strategic port vision in 2003 and strengthened the PoC’s initial and future capacity to 
diversify into offshore wind, which catalysed a new regional path (Notteboom, 2016; Trippl, 
2019; Hassink et al, 2019). The effect of the Hanseatic governance model upon the PoC’s 
adaptation and diversification is primarily evident in the prolonged efforts of NPorts, the 
Niedersachsen government and the City of Cuxhaven, who invested and constructed 
quayside infrastructure in parallel or in advance of emerging market opportunities (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017; Niedersachsen, 2003). This required largescale investment of public 
resources into a series of port infrastructure projects and thus reflects an important trait of 
the Hanseatic governance model, which is utilising decentralised decision-making powers 
and financial resources to enable port adaptation (Verhoeven, 2010; Notteboom, 2016; 
Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; 2018c). Furthermore, the building of the 
PoC’s capacity to adapt through a long-term diversification process required the broader 
consideration and implementation of the strategic ideas generated by key individuals within 
sub-national government agencies and other associated bodies (Notteboom, 2016; Trippl, 
2019; Pike et al, 2010). The Hanseatic governance model enabled the sharing of strategic 
ideas and long-term investment plans between NPorts, the Niedersachsen government and 
the City of Cuxhaven (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998).  
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A change of port governance structures can subsequently alter the capacity of a port to 
adapt and diversify into new markets (Debrie et al, 2013; Notteboom, 2016; Monios & 
Wilmsmeier, 2016). The evidence of port governance change in the PoC case indicates the 
importance of considering how the governance arrangements of ports strongly influence 
how ports can diversify into new markets (Debrie et al, 2013; Notteboom, 2016). The 
introduction of a dedicated port authority at the PoC, which was actively focused upon 
diversifying its market portfolio over a long-term period, strengthened the PoC’s capacity to 
adapt and diversify into offshore wind (Niedersachsen Ports, 2009; Debrie et al, 2013). 
However, when senior individuals within a port authority alter how they view new and 
emerging market opportunities such as offshore wind, due to internal and/or external 
changes, influences or pressures, this can also transform and heighten a port’s capacity to 
adapt (Pike et al, 2010). For example, key senior executives at the Humber Ports decided to 
shift towards supporting the offshore wind sector from being solely involved in traditional 
port activities and markets such as general cargo handling and automobiles, which enabled 
the Humber Ports capacity to adapt and diversify into offshore wind (Notteboom, 2016). This 
finding supports a key argument from Monios and Wilmsmeier (2016), who suggest that 
port adaptation and evolution can change as a result of new strategies from key 
stakeholders (Notteboom, 2016). 
 
Port governance models influence and shape whether proactive or reactive investments are 
made by port authorities and/or sub-national government agencies into quayside 
infrastructure, which may shape a port’s capacity to diversify its asset base and adapt over 
time (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Notteboom, 2016). The Hanseatic governance model 
enables proactive investments into infrastructure, as demonstrated by the PoC (Verhoeven, 
2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998). NPorts made largescale investments using public 
resources before commitments were made by external investors because short-term returns 
on infrastructure investment are not prioritised in the Hanseatic governance model 
(Verhoeven 2010; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). Essentially, these proactive investments 
heightened the PoC’s capacity to adapt and diversify by attracting a series of inward 
investments from project developers and manufacturing firms, who were actively seeking 





In contrast, reactive investments are encouraged when ports operate within the Anglo-
Saxon port governance model (Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Brooks & 
Cullinane, 2007b). The reactive investments made by ABP in the Humber Ports case were 
opportunistic in nature and only occurred in direct response to interest shown by an 
external investor (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). This constrained the Humber Ports’ capacity 
to adapt and diversify because ABP and associated sub-national government agencies were 
highly dependent upon the interests of external firms to catalyse their own investments into 
infrastructure (Baltazar & Brooks, 2007; Brooks & Pallis, 2008). However, as the Humber 
Ports operates within an ‘Anglo—Saxon’ governance model, they may be more inclined to 
conduct reactive investments, as they need to generate and predict reliable returns for 
shareholders, meaning they find it more difficult to proactively invest into port infrastructure 
before securing a customer as it entails greater financial risk (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; 
Talley, 2007; Verhoeven, 2010). Monios and Wilmsmeier (2016) argue that making more 
proactive investments into port infrastructure can heighten the capacity of ports to adapt, 
evolve and capture new market opportunities (Pike et al, 2010). For the Humber Ports to 
achieve this, key individuals within ABP may need to shift the perspective of its shareholders 
and justify how the port will generate suitable returns on an investment with greater risk, 
whilst considering taking a more long-term investment approach (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 
2016; Talley, 2007; Musso et al, 2006). 
 
How do multiscalar institutional environments enable and/or constrain port adaptation? 
 
Empirical research in EEG regularly focuses upon endogenous factors and occasionally 
overlooks exogenous factors influencing processes of adaptation and diversification, which 
has led to a growing number of calls to better understand how the multiscalar institutional 
environment shapes these processes (Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010; Morgan, 2013; Dawley et 
al, 2015). To address this issue, this thesis has uncovered how multiscalar institutional 
environments enabled and constrained port adaptation in different ways within the case 
studies (Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016). The institutional environments consist of the 
market subsidy regimes for offshore wind, national, regional and local industrial policies and 
strategies, rules and regulations governing ports and the offshore wind industry, and the 
institutional arrangements of the port authority and sub-national government agencies 
(Martin, 2000; 2010; Gertler, 2010; Hassink et al, 2019). The thesis has identified a more 
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strongly enabled port adaptation process occurred in the PoC case in comparison to the 
Humber Ports case, as a result of multiple factors aligning and combining on multiple scales 
in a more consistent manner through a series of key causal episodes (MacKinnon et al, 2018; 
Dawley et al, 2019; Hassink et al, 2019; Martin, 2010). 
 
On the national scale, the UK and German governments developed broader institutional 
environments that at various times have moved between enabling and constraining 
conditions for offshore wind, thus shaping a contrasting port adaptation process within the 
case studies (Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010; GWEC, 2016). The policy-driven and subsidy-
dependent nature of the offshore wind industry meant that the port adaptation processes 
within the port cases were strongly shaped by market subsidy regimes and industrial policies 
for offshore wind on the national level (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Dawley et al, 2015; 
GWEC, 2016). The UK government adopted a market-led approach for establishing offshore 
wind, prioritising the provision of market subsidies to attract investment from project 
developers and subsequent inward investment from turbine manufacturers (DECC, 2011; 
Dawley et al, 2015). This meant the port adaptation process in the Humber Ports case was 
strongly dependent upon financial commitments from large project developers into the UK 
offshore wind market around the Humber region, as demonstrated by as Ørsted, E.ON and 
Centrica.  
 
In contrast, from the early 2000s the German government prioritised implementing 
industrial policies for strengthening manufacturing capacity, in order to capture future 
opportunities in the manufacturing of offshore wind turbines (Lema et al, 2014; IRENA, 
2012; BMWi, 2015). Consequently, the port adaptation process in the PoC case was heavily 
shaped by the investment commitments and disinvestments of a series of component 
manufacturing firms (AfW, 2017; Notteboom, 2016). This highlights the specificity of 
offshore wind as a case of port adaptation and diversification, as port markets such as 
general cargo handling and automobiles are less dependent upon market subsidies and 
industrial policy, and would therefore enable a more stable port adaptation process 
(Notteboom, 2016; BMWi, 2015). 
 
However, the institutional environment on the national scale shifted in 2011 in the UK and 
2013 in Germany and as a result, it severely jeopardised market opportunities for ports to 
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capitalise upon and therefore hindered the port adaptation process in both port cases 
(Martin, 2010; IRENA, 2012; Notteboom, 2016). Therefore, the thesis has uncovered the 
importance of considering the enabling and constraining nature of the multiscalar 
institutional environment, as changes on the national scale around a specific port market 
such as offshore wind, support and hinder the process of port adaptation and diversification 
on the sub-national scale (Martin, 2010; 2000; Notteboom, 2016). 
 
The sub-national scale is also of critical importance in shaping the port adaptation process 
(Martin, 2010; Brooks & Pallis, 2008). The port authority and sub-national government 
agencies in the PoC case provided consistent investment into a series of infrastructure 
projects, which strongly aligned to the emerging national market environment and the 
Federal government’s ongoing commitments to providing market subsidies and installed 
capacity targets (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; MacKinnon et al, 2018; BMWI, 2015). Moreover, the 
port authority in the Humber Ports case and the associated sub-national government 
agencies also worked closely together to ensure their investment approaches and policies 
strongly aligned to the requirements of firms interested in the Humber Ports when 
necessary (Dawley et al, 2019; University of Hull, 2018). However, as the port authority and 
government agencies on the sub-national scale in the PoC case decided to actively pursue a 
long-term and strategic port vision to continually expand port infrastructure despite periods 
of uncertainty and firm disinvestment, meant that it strongly and more consistently aligned 
to the national-level market, institutional and policy environment in comparison to the 
Humber Ports case (Niedersachsen, 2003; Martin, 2010; IRENA, 2012). By drawing upon 
insights from Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2003), it becomes clear that the diversification of the 
PoC and the regional offshore wind path was more strongly enabled by the port authority’s 
ability to access decentralised financial resources in the form of public grants and loans, 
exercise authority and responsibility for port development, and draw upon the strong 
legitimacy given to sub-national government agencies for directing infrastructure investment 
and expansion (AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). This extent of decentralisation and close cooperation 
between sub-national government agencies and port authorities to support new emerging 
sectors and regional development reflects the distinctive variety of capitalism of Germany as 
a ‘compound CME’ (Ćetković et al, 2016; Martin, 2010; Hall & Soskice, 2001). As such, 
Germany’s federal government has encouraged strong strategic coordination between 
government institutions and industrial actors such as ports by devolving extensive decision-
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making and spending powers, legitimate political authority, and substantial financial and 
human resources to sub-national levels of government (Ćetković et al, 2016; Rodríguez-Pose 
& Gill, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; BMVI, 2016).  
 
8.3 Theoretical contributions of the thesis 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, comparative studies of port adaptation and diversification mainly 
focus upon exploring the internal functionality and context of port authorities, only 
occasionally adopt long-term historical perspectives and are largely based upon analysing 
trends in quantitative data when investigating empirical cases, meaning they lack a broader 
qualitative understanding of what causes and shapes port adaptation and require a more 
conceptually developed comparative focus (Notteboom, 2016; Wang & Ducruet, 2013; 
Ducruet & Itoh, 2016; Pike et al, 2016a). However, the fields of port studies and transport 
geography recognise that notions of port adaptation, diversification and port governance are 
increasingly important in relation to future research (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; 
Notteboom, 2016). By drawing upon key concepts in EEG and literature on the role of 
institutions and governance, the conceptual approach taken within the thesis contributes to 
existing comparative port studies, by investigating and comparing the underlying contexts, 
influences, actors and mechanisms driving and influencing port adaptation (Pike et al, 2016a; 
Notteboom, 2016).  
 
The thesis engages with the port and port authority as new analytical sites and actors in the 
processes shaping adaptation, diversification and path creation, a perspective that has been 
previously unexplored in EEG. The research is novel in using the port as a new object to 
study these evolutionary processes, looking beyond industries, sectors and clusters as typical 
research objects (Pike et al, 2016a; Simmie & Martin, 2010; Martin, 2010). International 
comparative analysis of case studies is becoming increasingly important because it can 
provide “deeper insights and challenge the rigor and robustness of conceptual frameworks 
and theoretical explanations” within the evolutionary approach in economic geography and 
path creation studies (Pike et al, 2016a, pp135; Boschma & Frenken, 2009). Furthermore, 
conducting international comparative analysis of case studies to investigate processes of 
adaptation and diversification enables the strengthening of future empirical studies in EEG, 
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allowing them to become “more comparable, transparent, and cumulative” (Boschma & 
Frenken, 2009, pp156; Pike et al, 2016a).  
 
As outlined in the Literature Review, the thesis draws upon work of Martin and Sunley 
(2006), Martin (2010), Pike et al (2010) and MacKinnon et al (2019), by defining port 
adaptation as the long-term process of change in response to external changes in the 
institutional environment, and port diversification as the re-orientation of assets to capture 
new markets and drive port adaptation (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Drawing upon the work 
of Martin and Sunley (2006), my thesis defines port diversification as the re-orientation of 
port assets to serve a new and different purpose within a new port market (Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999). The analytical framework was designed to clarify and better understand 
the process of port adaptation and allow the international comparative analysis of port cases 
(see Figure 2.4; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2016a).  As such, the analytical 
framework facilitates a better understanding of the causality, drivers and influences upon 
port adaptation (Pike et al, 2016a; Notteboom, 2016; Figure 2.4). This allowed us to better 
understand the operation and connections between “underlying actors, mechanisms and 
outcomes” of port adaptation (MacKinnon et al, 2018, pp3; Martin, 2010; Dawley, 2014; 
Notteboom, 2016; Figure 2.4).  
 
The first contribution by the thesis is that the thesis sought to better define, unpack and 
analyse the diversification process to better grasp how it is operationalised, which is often 
an abstract process to consider in EEG research (MacKinnon et al, 2018; Martin, 2010). 
Essentially, the analytical framework (Figure 2.4) and Figure 8.1 address the ‘who’, ‘what’, 
‘where’ and ‘why’ questions when ‘doing’ research into evolutionary processes, which 
existing research on port adaptation and diversification in the areas of port studies and 
transport geography need to better comprehend and conceptualise (Pike et al, 2016a; 
Notteboom, 2016; Jacobs & Lagendijk, 2014). Scholars in EEG have recognised the need for 
exploring specific moments “where conscious and deliberative agency by participant actors 
and institutions can influence and even shape the quantitative extent and qualitative nature 
of the emergent paths and their trajectories” (Pike et al, 2016a, pp138). Therefore, the 
thesis sought to unpack and unravel the port adaptation and diversification processes 
through key causal episodes, identified and created by the grouping of a series of smaller 
events by similar time of occurrence and purpose, which ultimately accentuated the 
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important moments of change in the adaptation of the port cases (Pike et al, 2016a). The 
thesis built upon the analytical framework (see Figure 2.4) and drew upon the “Integrative 
framework” for path creation constructed by MacKinnon et al (2019, pp121) to create Figure 
8.1 which forms part of the first contribution, as it provides a more tangible and empirical 
understanding of how the port diversification process unfolds, adds to existing literature in 
EEG on diversification and branching and enables a more advanced international 
comparative analysis of port diversification (see Martin & Sunley, 2006; Boschma & Frenken, 












Figure 8.1: The process of port diversification in practice 
Source: Author (adapted from MacKinnon et al, 2018). 
 
The elements within Figure 8.1 interact and combine to stimulate port diversification. Port 
actors (port authorities and sub-national government agencies), operating within particular 
institutional environments, identify an emerging economic opportunity emerging within 
their region. The port actors formulate a port vision or new investment strategy to harness 
and valorise their infrastructural, material and industrial asset base, in order to capitalise 
upon the newly emerging industrial sector. Port actors (port authorities and sub-national 
government agencies) provide investment to convert and/or expand the asset base, in order 
to fully realise the port vision or new investment strategy and meet the demand of firms 
operating within the emerging industrial sector, which have specific demands for port assets. 
The investments made by port actors are enabled, constrained and validated by the 



































converted and/or expanded and firms operating in the new industrial sector provide 
investment and are utilising the diversified port assets, the port has then successfully 
diversified to serve a new port market and will subsequently support regional path creation. 
As previously stated, the first contribution is the unpacking and analysing of the adaptation 
and diversification process which contributes to a key research gap in EEG, as scholars have 
called for an improved understanding of the “nature and operation” of these processes 
(MacKinnon et al, 2018, pp3; Dawley, 2014; Martin, 2010). The thesis has responded to this 
research gap in EEG by highlighting that the process of diversification in ports is primarily 
shaped and determined by two modes of investment acting as key causal mechanisms 
(Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Figure 8.1; Figure 2.4).  The research uncovered how port 
diversification is operationalised by investment into ports assets through ‘conversion’ 
(Notteboom, 2016; Boas, 2007; Streek & Thelen, 2005). The thesis recognises and applies 
conversion as a mode of investment undertaken to realign port assets for new uses on 
brownfield land, which acts as a mechanism of port diversification (Martin, 2010; Boas, 
2007; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Figure 8.1; Figure 2.4). This understanding and application 
of conversion as a concept moves beyond the traditional application of conversion in EEG 
and socio-political research, wherein conversion is when existing arrangements, structures, 
rules and procedures are reoriented, realigned and modified to serve new functions and 
purposes (Martin, 2010; Boas, 2007; Streek & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2003). Although not 
derived from the existing EEG literature, the thesis identified ‘expansion’ as a key mode of 
investment through which port (infrastructural, industrial, material) assets are expanded on 
greenfield land to serve a new purpose, thus acting as a mechanism for the diversification of 
ports into the offshore wind market (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Figure 8.1; Figure 2.4). This 
conceptual insight provides a new way of conceptualising and conducting a comparative 
analysis of how the diversification process unfolds through the expansion of port assets 
(Notteboom, 2016; MacKinnon et al, 2018; Dawley, 2014; Pike et al, 2016a; Figure 8.1; 
Figure 2.4).  
 
The thesis made a second key conceptual contribution by exploring external institutional 
environments, to better understand how the port adaptation process is enabled and 
constrained over time (Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010; Trippl, 2019; Hassink et al, 2019). 
Research in EEG has in the past placed strong emphasis upon endogenous factors such as 
(knowledge base, skilled labour market, technology base, physical assets) for generating new 
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paths of growth and influencing the diversification process (Neffke et al, 2011; Boschma & 
Frenken, 2009; Martin, 2010). However, Martin (2010), Morgan (2013) and Dawley et al 
(2015) have highlighted the growing demand in EEG research to better understand how the 
external institutional environment influences and shapes adaptation, diversification and 
path creation processes (Gertler, 2010; Martin, 2000). In response, the thesis makes a key 
contribution to EEG research on institutions by highlighting how external institutional 
environments enabled and constrained the processes of port adaptation and diversification 
in different periods (Martin, 2010; Notteboom, 2016). The external institutional 
environments of the offshore wind industry in the UK and Germany enabled the decision-
making behaviour, investment strategies of port authorities and their distinctive modes of 
investment, which consequently shaped how port adaptation unfolded (Martin, 2010; 
Notteboom, 2016). Essentially, the market opportunities in offshore wind for ports strongly 
depends upon the levels of market subsidies provided by national governments, as 
highlighted by the similar roles played by the UK and German governments (IRENA, 2012; 
Dawley et al, 2015).  
 
Moreover, the thesis contributes to and draws together strands within existing literature on 
institutional approaches and on port governance to conduct the international comparative 
analysis of the port cases (see Martin, 2010; Gertler, 2010; Verhoeven, 2010; Notteboom, 
2016; Pike et al, 2016). Based upon key lines of analysis within ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
research, the thesis demonstrated how different national government arrangements 
reflected distinctive ‘Hanseatic’ and ‘Anglo-Saxon’ port governance and ownership models, 
which consequently shaped contrasting port adaptation processes (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Theodore & Peck, 2007; Martin, 2000). Germany has a decentralised form of government 
through a federal system with power, resources and responsibility for ports designated to 
state or local governments, which enables the sub-national governments and publically 
owned ports to effectively stimulate and support port adaptation (BMVI, 2016; 
Niedersachsen, 2009; Martin, 2010). Germany’s variety of capitalism is indicated by the 
Hanseatic port governance model which shapes many German ports, whereby the port 
authority has power, resources and responsibility to invest public money and therefore 
proactively drive port adaptation (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Theodore & Peck, 2007; Verhoeven, 
2010). By contrast, the UK has a highly centralised government and liberal variety of 
capitalism, meaning power, resources and responsibility for ports lies with private port 
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owners operating within a Anglo-Saxon port governance model, reflected by conservative 
and risk averse investment strategies (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Peck & Theodore, 2007; Monios, 
2017; Verhoeven, 2010). Essentially, port adaptation in the UK is strongly influenced by 
private port authorities being reactive and opportunistic regarding their investment 
strategies, basing decisions on the requirements of national or overseas organisations as 
active shareholders (Notteboom, 2016; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016; Baird & Valentine, 
2007). 
 
The third key contribution is the identification of how two different port governance and 
ownership models actively shape and influence processes of port adaptation, diversification 
and regional path creation (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). 
This contribution aims to complement existing literature on port governance and ownership 
(Verhoeven, 2010; Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Debrie et al, 2013), by providing a 
deeper comprehension of how different port governance models can shape contrasting 
processes of port adaptation through the international comparative analysis of port cases 
(Notteboom, 2016; Pike et al, 2016a). As evident in the PoC case, the ‘Hanseatic’ port 
governance model of public ownership and operation enables ports to make more proactive 
investment decisions and take greater risks on providing investment for port infrastructure, 
as making continuous returns is not a main priority for the state government as port owner 
(Suykens & Van de Voorde, 1998; Verhoeven, 2010; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). This port 
governance arrangement is best suited for stimulating port adaptation, as it enables the port 
authority to construct port infrastructure and form an important regional asset base, thus 
providing an enhanced ability to attract firms and inward investment (Martin, 2010; Maskell 
& Malmberg, 1999; Dawley et al, 2019). Nevertheless, the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ port governance 
model evident in the Humber Ports case supported port adaptation by having the power and 
freedom as a private port owner to respond quickly to interest from external firms and make 
more reactive investment decisions (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Monios, 2017; Martin, 
2010). However, the nature of private port governance and ownership, orientated around 
generating returns on infrastructure investment for external shareholders, means that it is 
difficult for private ports to speculate and proactively construct port infrastructure for port 
diversification and path creation, without having certainty around its future usage to provide 
satisfactory returns (Brooks & Cullinane, 2007b; Notteboom, 2016; Monios, 2017; World 




The thesis makes a final key contribution in terms of recognising the importance of the 
agency of actors for driving port adaptation, which subsequently stimulates new regional 
path creation (Notteboom, 2016; Trippl, 2019; Martin, 2010). The international comparative 
analysis of the port cases uncovered how the agency, motives and actions of the port actors 
(port authorities, sub-national government agencies and firms) were critical in facilitating 
new port visions, instances of investment and the diversification of port assets (Figure 8.1; 
Figure 2.4; Notteboom, 2016; Pike et al, 2016a). Drawing upon the different types of agency 
outlined by Grillitsch and Sotarauta (2018), the research revealed that port authorities and 
sub-national government agencies in the PoC case demonstrated evidence of ‘institutional 
entrepreneurship’ by modifying existing institutional arrangements, rules and norms to 
establish a long-term port vision, which enabled the harnessing and valorising of port assets 
(MacKinnon et al, 2019; Figure 8.1). In the Humber Ports case, key individuals within the port 
authority and sub-national government agencies acted more as ‘innovative entrepreneurs’, 
as they identified and subsequently exploited new economic opportunities in the offshore 
wind market by formulating a new investment strategy to harness and valorise port assets 
(Grillitsch and Sotarauta, 2018; MacKinnon et al, 2019; Figure 8.1). The port authorities and 
sub-national government agencies in the PoC case, which operated as innovative and 
institutional entrepreneurs, demonstrated the necessary ‘place leadership’ by advocating 
their regional offshore wind paths to attract external firms and interests, whilst building a 
coalition of actors to enable a new regional path around offshore wind (Grillitsch and 
Sotarauta, 2018; MacKinnon et al, 2019; Bailey et al, 2010; Figure 8.1).  
 
Port visions are a key example of how actors exercise their agency and plan future 
investment to catalyse the adaptation process, thus providing a better understanding of how 
port adaptation and diversification are operationalised (MacKinnon et al, 2018, pp3; Dawley, 
2014; Trippl, 2019). This contribution complements a growing research agenda in EEG by 
providing an international comparative analysis of how different actors exercise agency to 
drive adaptation and new regional path creation (Grillitsch and Sotarauta, 2018; MacKinnon 
et al, 2019; Steen, 2016; Pike et al, 2016a). There are two clear types of port visions and 
approaches created by port actors (port authorities and sub-national government agencies), 
which highlights the necessary agency required to drive port adaptation and path creation 
(Notteboom, 2016; MacKinnon et al, 2018). On the one hand, there can be more strategic 
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and long-term port visions aiming to construct large-scale port infrastructure in order to 
attract a series of inward investments and firms, as demonstrated in the PoC case (AfW 
Cuxhaven, 2017; Niedersachsen, 2003). On the other hand, there can be more opportunistic 
and shorter-term investment approaches, which aim to capitalise upon specific inward 
investment opportunities at certain moments in time, as highlighted in the Humber Ports 
case. In order for ports to successfully realise their port visions and validate their new 
investment approaches, coalitions of key actors (port authorities, sub-national government 
agencies, quasi government bodies) need to work in close coordination to build place 
leadership capacity, attract investment and manage new firm transplantations (Dawley et al, 
2019; Cox, 1998; University of Hull, 2018). The empirical analysis illustrated that a coalition 
of actors with continuous activity and cooperation managing a series of inward investors are 
best suited to enable the realisation of a strategic and long-term port vision and port 
diversification, as highlighted in the PoC case (AfW Cuxhaven, 2019). The empirical analysis 
also highlighted that opportunistic investment approaches can enable port diversification 
and are realised by temporary coalitions managing specific inward investments at certain 
points in time, as evident in the Humber Ports case (Dawley et al, 2019; MacKinnon et al, 
2018). 
 
8.4 Policy implications for port diversification and regional path creation 
 
Based upon the empirical findings and comparative analysis, the thesis suggests that the 
Port of Cuxhaven (PoC) has been more successful in stimulating new path creation around 
the offshore wind industry. This overall conclusion can be made because the port 
diversification process in the PoC case was more strongly enabled by investment from port 
authorities, sub-national government agencies and firms in the offshore wind industry in 
comparison to the Humber Ports case. This section will now look at key policy implications 
and lessons. 
 
The thesis has uncovered that national policy frameworks and institutional arrangements for 
ports and offshore wind are critical in shaping port diversification and regional path creation 
(Martin, 2010; 2000). The national framework for ports in Germany underlines the potential 
benefits for ports to be owned and governed by states and/or local authorities (BMVI, 2016; 
2017). The institutional arrangements of publically owned ports, governed and managed by 
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sub-national government agencies in Germany, has helped stimulate and drive new 
directions for ports and new regional economic development paths, as evident in the PoC 
case (BMVI, 2016; Niedersachsen Ports, 2009; 2017; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Martin, 2010). 
National ports policy in the UK has enabled a widespread shift of ownership and governance 
of ports to private port authorities operating on a national scale, often with ties to 
international bodies as shareholders (Monios, 2017). This national level policy has meant 
that the creation of new regional paths and the process of port diversification is highly 
dependent upon decisions of private port authorities aiming to drive profitability and returns 
for shareholders (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). For UK privately owned ports to diversify 
into a new market and stimulate new regional path creation, key individuals within port 
authorities can decide to strategically change their investment approach and support the 
growth of a sector emerging with a region, such as offshore wind in the Humber region.  
 
In addition to the importance of national ports policy for shaping port governance and 
regional economic development, the stability of the national level institutional environment 
and market regime for offshore wind was pivotal in enabling port diversification into 
offshore wind and the path creation process (Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010; Monios, 
2017). The institutional environment and market regimes in the UK and Germany underwent 
comparable periods of stability and instability (Martin, 2010; MacKinnon et al, 2018). 
However, the thesis highlighted that on the whole the federal government in Germany 
provided a more stable policy environment and market regime for offshore wind which was 
important in providing certainty for port authorities and firms (Martin, 2010; MacKinnon et 
al, 2018; IRENA, 2012; GWEC, 2016). Therefore, national government institutions should 
strive to provide a stable policy environment and market regime for offshore wind, as it  
stimulates investor confidence and assurance that the national government is in full political 
and financial support of the offshore wind industry (Martin, 2010; MacKinnon et al, 2018).  
 
The research provides some implications for port authorities and sub-national government 
agencies who are seeking to enable port diversification and regional path creation 
(Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). The creation of a strategic and long-term port-vision by 
port authorities as powerful regional economic actors, whilst being opportunistic and 
flexible to react to emerging market opportunities, is critical for enabling port diversification 
and regional path creation (Notteboom, 2016; Trippl, 2019; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). A long-
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term and strategic port vision allows the port authority to newly focus its human and 
financial resources upon diversifying to support a new sector over a long-term period, 
despite future market and investor uncertainty. The port vision can be supported by a sense 
of direct adaptability and urgency from the port authority to proactively plan, invest and 
construct port infrastructure, to enable inward investment from external firms and diversify 
into a new market, such as offshore wind. The formation of port visions can be 
complemented by conducting horizon scanning research for future market opportunities and 
carrying out infrastructure planning and investment, which may foster a new and previously 
unrealised adaptative capacity of port authorities and local institutions and can stimulate 
wider regional economic development (IPPR North, 2016; Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2010). 
The PoC is a leading example of how a port can formulate a strategic and long-term port 
vision, continuously update it over time and ultimately realise the vision over a decade later 
(AfW Cuxhaven, 2017; Niedersachsen, 2003). ABP as the port authority of the Humber Ports, 
other port authorities elsewhere and the project’s collaborative partner the Humber LEP 
(Local Enterprise Partnership), can take key lessons and build on existing strategies from this 
important governance activity, which emphasises the long-term planning of infrastructure to 
enable future port diversification and new path creation. However, the private governance 
model evident in the UK may constrain vision making and proactive investment to a certain 
extent. 
 
The thesis also revealed that it is critical for sub-national governance agencies, alongside the 
port authority, to build a strategic coalition of key actors who are jointly concerned with the 
future diversification of the port and wider regional economic development (Notteboom, 
2016; IPPR North, 2016). This involves local, regional and state actors to work closely and in 
collaboration with port authorities to identify relevant actors who can support the 
diversification of the port into a new market, such as offshore wind. A coalition of actors is 
most affective in enabling port diversification and regional path creation when it is 
continually operating to achieve a common and long-term vision (Notteboom, 2016; Dawley 
et al, 2019; Trippl, 2019). The changing form and arrangement of the actor coalition can 
disrupt the progress of successfully achieving port diversification and realising a long-term 
vision. A successful coalition continuously focuses upon attracting a series of inward 
investments from external or existing firms actively involved and growing in a new sector 
such as offshore wind. The decentralisation of decision-making powers, resources and 
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responsibilities for ports to sub-national government agencies is most effective for enabling 
port diversification and building strategic coalitions of actors (Debrie et al, 2013; Rodríguez-
Pose & Gill 2003). However, not all countries are likely to achieve this form of governance in 
the short to medium term, such as the UK. Therefore, in the context of enabling port 
diversification and regional path creation in the UK context, it is critical for local councils, 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and other relevant bodies on the sub-national scale to 
be open to change, seek future economic development opportunities and continually work 
in greater collaboration with UK port authorities. A closer relationship can support the 
building of a strong territorial coalition of actors and the creation of a long-term vision for 
the region and port(s), centred upon emerging opportunities in a specific sector, such as 
offshore wind. 
 
As suggested by Evenhuis (2016; 2017), changes in multiscalar institutional arrangements 
and the environment strongly mediates the process of regional economic change and path 
creation around new industries (Martin, 2010; 2000). Mirroring the arguments of Evenhuis 
(2016; 2017), this research has identified how on the local and regional scales in the UK 
there is greater institutional change and more evidence of “repeated restructuring and 
refitting of institutional arrangements” known as ‘institutional churn’, in comparison to 
Germany (Pike et al, 2015, pp19). This process of institutional churn is exemplified by the 
shift from Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) to Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
following the election of the UK Coalition Government in 2010 (Pike et al, 2015). Therefore, 
the institutional environment on the sub-national scale in Germany more strongly enables 
processes of port diversification and new path creation, as sub-national government 
agencies have greater longevity and capacity to create and implement long-term port visions 
(Evenhuis, 2016; 2017; Notteboom, 2016; Martin, 2010). On the basis of this finding, the 
research can recommend national government institutions should fully consider the 
consequences of reforming sub-national government, as this may constrain their ability to 
provide financial support for port authorities and stimulate new regional growth paths.  
 
The thesis can provide some practical lessons for port authorities and sub-national 
government in the UK, Germany and beyond, and for the Humber LEP as the project’s 
collaborative partner. As previously discussed, the deliverability and availability of port 
infrastructure for firms in close proximity to offshore wind projects is crucial for supporting 
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port diversification and a regional path around offshore wind. The Offshore Master Plan for 
the PoC set out a long-term port vision and Master Plan, which provided the necessary 
foresight for expanding and delivering port infrastructure to accommodate for a future 
offshore wind market (Niedersachsen, 2003; AfW Cuxhaven, 2017). To support a process 
similar to this, port authorities and sub-national government agencies should try to be open 
to work collectively and make proactive investments to deliver port infrastructure for firms 
interested in conducting port-based offshore wind activities (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016).  
 
8.5 Future research  
 
The findings and conclusion of the thesis has revealed that there are many directions for 
future research to further explore and certain issues which can be deepened. There is a clear 
opportunity for future comparative studies on port diversification into offshore wind using 
different types of offshore wind ports across different national contexts in Europe, North 
America and Asia. For example, a future research project could compare an embryonic 
offshore wind port in the US to a more established port serving North Sea offshore wind 
projects from Denmark or Germany. This future research would ascertain how relevant and 
useful the analytical framework developed in this project is for investigating and comparing 
other ports which have diversified into offshore wind, whilst providing opportunities for 
changing, deepening and/or extending elements of the analytical framework (Figure 2.4).  
 
The thesis has aimed to strengthen the narrow body of work in EEG and path creation 
studies which seeks to compare case studies across different international settings (Pike et 
al, 2016a). The thesis has demonstrated how to go beyond focusing upon single empirical 
cases in studies of path creation and explore two international comparative cases (Pike et al, 
2016a). However, the research faced certain limitations when conducting research on path 
creation in an international context (Pike et al, 2016a). The research was difficult to 
operationalise in terms of identifying and accessing the most relevant interviewees involved 
in influencing the adaptation and diversification process, in order to better understand their 
particular agency and context (Pike et al, 2016a; Dawley, 2014). This limitation was most 
apparent because individuals involved in directly shaping the adaptation and diversification 
of the port cases had either changed organisations or had retired from work, meaning it was 
hard to actually identify and find these key individuals. The main way of overcoming this 
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limitation was ‘snowballing’ with existing interviewees and using online search tools such as 
LinkedIn. On the whole, the research highlighted the requirement for more multi-site 
international comparative analysis in EEG and demonstrated some of the challenges found in 
undertaking ‘deep contextualisation’ of evolutionary and path creation processes across 
different international settings, which raises questions of how researchers in EEG can 
conduct and successfully achieve this mode of evolutionary research across different sites 
(Pike et al, 2016a). 
 
A key limitation in gaining a deep contextualisation of these processes was found in tracing 
the historical “tracks and routes identified, selected, and explored by actors prior to the 
emergence” of the offshore wind path in the Humber and Cuxhaven (Pike et al, 2016a, 
pp132; see Martin, 2010). This difficulty occurred because the research was investigating the 
role of actors in the past, meaning the interviewees required for the research had moved 
organisations or had retired from their profession. Another limitation within this project was 
researching the diversification of the port cases and the path creation process as they 
evolved in real time as the project progressed (Pike et al, 2016a). This required the 
consistent researching, updating and cataloguing of the most relevant individuals and 
organisations the project needed to examine the most important primary and secondary 
data required to inform the subsequent comparative analysis. Moreover, deciding an 
endpoint to the empirical research was an additional difficulty and limitation in the project 
and in researching evolutionary processes over time (Pike et al, 2016). Due to the scope and 
resources of this project, the endpoint of gathering primary data was at the end of the 
overseas research in Germany, with greater time and resources the additional primary data 
may have been collected. Following overseas fieldwork, I gathered secondary data on any 
relevant developments within the port cases which influenced the adaptation and 
diversification process, such as the transplantation of Muehlhan into the PoC in 2018 and 
the expansion of infrastructure at the PoG to support Ørsted’s O&M operations in 
2018(Muehlhan, 2018; Humber Business, 2018b)). 
 
Due to the relative success of both port cases in adapting and diversifying into offshore 
wind, there was a slight limitation in being able to draw strong comparisons and differences, 
especially in regard to the path creation outcomes of the adaptation process (Notteboom, 
2016; Martin, 2010). To address this limitation, future research may consider comparing a 
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port case which has diversified successfully into the offshore wind industry, such as the Port 
of Esbjerg (Denmark), to a port case which have failed to diversify into offshore wind, such 
as the Port of Bremerhaven in Germany. This future research may provide theoretical and 
empirical contributions to research on evolutionary paths, by deepening our understanding 
of how attempted port diversification has influenced the failure of path creation, or the 
emergence of different types of regional paths, such as path extension, path exhaustion or 
path renewal (Isaksen, 2015; Martin, 2010).  
 
Clearly there are opportunities for applying, clarifying and deepening concepts and ideas 
around how the internal dynamics of port governance can enrich our understanding of how 
port adaptation and diversification leads to new regional path creation (Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010). These concepts and ideas include different types of port governance models, 
port vision-making and master planning activities, and proactive versus reactive investment 
decisions and approaches (Verhoeven, 2010; Notteboom, 2016; Brooks & Cullinane, 2017b; 
Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016). This may forge greater linkages between concepts and ideas 
in EEG and ports as key sites of adaptation and change, whilst contributing to existing 
literature on port governance and diversification (Martin, 2010; Pike et al, 2010; Notteboom, 
2016; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2016).  
 
The offshore wind industry is a unique case of port adaptation and diversification, as it is 
materially tied to certain offshore locations and therefore requires certain ports in particular 
localities to support the development of projects. However, there may be other industrial 
sectors ports can support by diversifying their market portfolio and asset base, in order 
support new regional path creation around a specific industrial sector (Notteboom, 2016; 
Martin, 2010). These sectors may include automobiles, subsea oil and gas, or biomass, as 
they are dependent upon ports as being infrastructural platforms and dynamic conduits to 
support the growth of particular sectors in certain localities or regions (IPPR North, 2016; 
Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Exploring a different sector may clarify and deepen the 
analytical framework for investigating port adaptation adopted in this thesis, and possibly 
add valuable theoretical and empirical contributions to key theoretical ideas and concepts in 
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International Firm Ørsted Senior Advisor 13/12/2017 
International Firm A2SEA  Regional Manager 05/12/2017 
International Firm WSP Technical Director 09/01/2018 
National  Firm ABLE UK 
 
Senior Director 11/05/2017 
National Firm ABP  Commercial 
Manager 
07/11/2017 










National  Firm Former ABP  Project Manager  
 
30/11/2017 




Policy Advisor 1, 
DfT 
22/01/2018 
Policy Advisor 2, 
DfT 
22/01/2018 











Deputy Head 28/11/2017 






Assistant Director 20/12/2017 




Senior Manager 24/11/2017 
Sub-national Firm Grimsby Fish 
Dock Enterprises 
Senior Director 01/06/2017 






Sub-national Non-firm Green Port Hull Senior Advisor 20/11/2017 
Sub-national Non-firm Hull City Council  Senior Director 
 
30/11/2017 
Sub-national Non-firm North East 
Lincolnshire 
Council 
Senior Officer 19/10/2017 
Sub-national Non-firm Team Humber 
Marine Alliance  
(THMA) 
Senior Executive 01/02/2018 

























International Firm Rhenus Cuxport 
GmbH 
Senior Executive 04/04/2018 
Senior Director 24/04/2018 
International Firm Nordmark 
(Denmark) 
Senior Director 26/04/2018 
International Firm Offshore Marine 
Management 
GmbH 
Senior Director 13/03/2018 
International Non-firm Offshore Wind 
Industry Council 
(OWIC) 
Senior Executive 07/05/2018 
National Firm 8.2 Consulting AG Senior Consultant 23/04/2018 






National Non-firm Federal Ministry 










National Non-firm Germany Trade 
and Invest (GTAi) 
Senior Director 10/04/2018 
National Non-firm ZDS (Federation 
of German 
Seaports) 
Senior Director 06/04/2018 
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National Non-firm Fraunhofer 





Group Manager 19/04/2018 
National Non-firm Former Offshore 
Wind Industry 
Alliance (OWIA) 
Former Manager 03/04/2018 
Lander (Lower 
Saxony) 
Non-firm Ministry for the 
Economy, Labour 
and Transport of 
Lower Saxony 






















Ports GmbH & Co. 





























Non-firm BIS Bremerhaven Senior Manager 12/04/2018 
Project Manager 12/04/2018 
Sub-state (sub-
Lander) 
Non-firm University of 
Bremen 
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